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Abstract 
Whilst Hegel's influence upon the Frankfurt School's reconstruction of Marx has not gone 
unnoticed, this influence has never really been adequately theorised. In particular, the 
question of how the Frankfurt School understood the relation between Hegel's method and 
Marx's materialism has received very little systematic attention. The present study is a 
response to this situation: it presents the Frankfurt Marxist tradition as a significant 
although by no means uncritical contribution to the theory of historical materialism. 
Moreover, that contribution is shown to derive from some of the central concepts of 
Hegel's philosophy. Thus in opposition to those commentators, Marxists and non-Marxists 
alike, who have tended to view Frankfurt Marxism as an exercise in eclectic revisionism, I 
argue that the work ofHorkheimer and his colleagues constitutes an attempt to restate and 
defend, on the basis of an immanent critique of Hegel's idealism, the fundamental principles 
of Marx's historical materialism. Accordingly, the central chapters of this thesis are 
devoted to a close examination of the way in which members of the Frankfurt School, 
building on the work of Lukacs and Korsch, sought to appropriate Hegel's subject -o~ject 
dialectic on behalf of materialism. In the course of this investigation the following themes 
come to prominence: the relation between Hegel's social philosophy and a critical theory of 
society: Horkheimer's project of multi-disciplinary materialism: the methodological 
significance of the category of totality; materialism as the preponderance of the object; the 
possibility and nature of a Freud-Marx synthesis; the concept of a critical as opposed to a 
traditional scientific theory of society. Taken together these themes constitute the basic 
problematic of the Frankfurt Marxist tradition. The intention of this study is to demonstrate 
the importance of that problematic for the further development of the materialist theory of 
history and society .. 
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Chapter 1. Origins of Critical Theory 
Critical theory, as first elaborated in the work of Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, has a 
two-fold intention: it seeks to offer an account of the condition of late capitalist society, 
whilst simultaneously providing a philosophically self-conscious meditation upon the nature 
of social theory. Considered substantively, Frankfurt Marxism is concerned with the social 
formation of consciousness, and in particular with the new and increasingly diverse forms 
of ideological control that in this century have become integral to the stability of 
administered capitalism. 1 This historically specific investigation is complemented by, and is 
a consequence of, the early critical theorists' understanding of the nature and purpose of a 
social theory. Initially influenced by the philosophical emphasis of Lukacs' History and 
Class Consciousness, as well as Korsch's Marxism and Philosop~y, the first generation of 
critical theorists attempted not only to advance a particular analysis of contemporary 
society but also to distinguish their theory as radically different in kind from alternative 
approaches to the human sciences. Just as Lukacs attempts to define Marxism in terms of 
method rather than the truth of any specific thesis in Marx's political economy, so the 
Frankfurt theorists give a great deal of attention to the question of what it is that separates 
a critical theory of society from the traditional conception of theory characteristic of the 
natural sciences. 2 Thus, from the very first articles in the Zeit.r.;chrijt through to the later 
work of the 1960s we find a significant and enduring concern with the philosophical hasis 
of social theory. The early programmatic writings of Marcuse and Horkheimer, for 
1 For a classic analysis of the mass media as a mechanism of social control see the essay 
by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment As Mass 
Deception' in ]Jialectic of Elilightenment, pp.120-167. 
2 Lukacs' essay "What is Orthodox Marxism?' in Hi.\'fmy and Class ('1()l1sci()IISlle.\" 
provides a useful summary of the argument that Marxism is essentially defined by its 
method. 
2 
by utilising Hegel's concept of a normative, substantive form of Reason (Vermmjt) as the 
organising principle for a theory which can both describe as well as evaluate the society it 
confronts.3 Later, during the period of American exile, Marcuse returned to this same 
question and in a major work, entitled appropriately enough Reason and Revolution, 
argued that the method of Hegel's speculative philosophy is central to the Marxian critique 
of society.4 In fact this orientation towards questions surrounding the meta-theoretical 
status of Marxism persisted through to the very end offirst generation critical theory. Thus 
Adorno's Negative Dialectics, in effect his philosophical magmlm opus, contains an 
extended discussion of the method underlying his earlier socio-cultural studies and its 
relation to the program of critical theory. 5 As Adorno puts it, "this largely abstract text ... 
seeks to explain the author's concrete procedure"~ an obligation that the author proceeds to 
discharge by means of an impressively wide ranging philosophico-political discourse.6 For 
the student of critical theory Negative Dialectics constitutes not only a late closing account 
of the nature and condition of the Frankfurt project, but through its return to the question 
of what it is that distinguishes historical materialism from other kinds of social theory, 
demonstrates the centrality of methodological thinking within this particular Marxist 
tradition. 
3 Cf Max Horkheimer's 'Traditional and Critical Theory' in Critical Theory: Selected 
~ssays, and Herbert Marcuse's 'Philosophy and Critical Theory' in Negations. 
4 See also Marcuse's preface to the later American edition (1960) of Reason and 
Revolution in which he again argues for the importance of Hegel's dialectic in the 
formulation of the critical project. 
S Adorno's lengthy introduction to The Positivist Dispute in Germ~ Socio!o/IY pro~des 
an accessible introduction to some of the more obscure methodological matenal contamed 
in Negative Dialectics. 
6 Adorno, T.W., Negative Dialectics, p.xix. 
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The purpose behind the above admittedly brief history of Frankfurt Marxism is to suggest 
that critical theory, like so many other intellectual movements of the twentieth century, is 
characterised by a significant degree of self-awareness: as it seeks to provide a particular 
knowledge of the world it simultaneously reflects upon the very possibility of that 
knowledge. Now, in choosing to focus upon issues of meta-theory the Frankfurt School, 
like the Hegelian Marxists who preceded them, were responding to a specific weakness in 
Marx's thought, namely the failure to produce a sustained, and explicit discussion of the 
method underlying his analysis of capitalist society. 7 As a result of this lacuna, various 
interpreters of Marx, in particular Engels and his numerous followers, sought to develop an 
account of his thought which emphasised the immediate, unproblematic unity of Marxism 
with other branches of scientific knowledge. Against this positivistic reading the Frankfurt 
theorists returned to Hegel, not with the intention of restoring his system but to recover, by 
means of an immanent critique of his idealist philosophy, the philosophical basis of Marx's 
theory of historical materialism. 
This aspect of their thought is very often overlooked by commentators, many of whom 
focus upon specific aspects of the Frankfurt School's analysis of late capitalism, whilst 
tending to ignore the methodological framework underpinning that analysis. 8 To counter 
7 Typically Marx tends to discuss the question of method in the form of prefa~es 
and introductions to his work upon political economy. Hence most debate concerrung 
his methodology has tended to centre around the preface to A Contribution J'owC!rds 
the Critique of Political Economy, the introduction to the Grundrisse and the vanous 
prefaces and afterwords to Capital. The obvious problem here is that by their very 
nature these texts fail to provide a comprehensive discussion of this question. 
8 Martin Jay, for instance, in The Dialectical Imagination, a~ributes the. f~llowing 
research program to the Institute: the integration of psycho-analYSIs and matenallsm, the 
study of political and social authority, aesthetics and the critique of mass culture, the 
this bias I shall develop an argument to the effect that what is most interesting about 
Frankfurt Marxistl\ indeed what distinguishes it from other social theories including 
orthodox Marxism, is its distinctive approach to the question of method in social scientific 
theory. I shall initially support this claim by means of an historical study of the process of 
theoretical development which brought critical theory into being.9 Of necessity, this will 
involve a close examination of the immediate intellectual context of the Frankfurt School 
, 
in particular the conflict between the orthodox and Hegelian Marxists. Now in developing 
their own response to this dispute the critical theorists came to define themselves not only 
against the intellectual crudity of a great deal of Marxist orthodoxy but also against the 
failure of Korsch and Lukacs, as they perceived it, to satisfactorily express the 
methodological significance of Marx's historical materialism. The reconstruction of this 
whole argument should, therefore, be of interest not only to those who might be 
sympathetic to the Frankfurt critique of contemporary society but also, and more generally, 
to philosophers of social science. As Raymond Geuss observes: 
Marx's theory of society, if properly construed, does clearly give us knowledge of 
society but does not easily fit into any of the accepted categories of 'knowledge' ... 
Rather Marxism is a radically new kind of theory; to give a proper philosophic 
empirical study of the authoritarian personality and the philosophy of history. In many ways 
illuminating, Jay's work unfortunately fails to adequately reflect the substantial 
methodological concerns characteristic of the Frankfurt theorists. In particular it fails to 
trace, at least in any detail, the impact of Hegel's thought upon their project. 
9 The tenn 'critical theory' was first coined by Horkheimer who used it to denote what 
he called Marx's 'dialectical critique of political economy'. See his 'Traditional and Critical 
Theory' in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, p.206. Commenting upon this te~ol?gy, 
Adorno writes: "Horkheimer's phrasing, 'critical theory', seeks not to make [histoncal] 
materialism acceptable but to make men theoretically conscious of what it is that 
distinguishes materialism - distinguishes it from amateurish explications of the world as 
much as from the 'traditional theory' of science." (Negative Dialectics, p. 197.) 
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account of its salient features requires drastic revisions in traditional views about 
the nature of knowledge. 10 
It is to the credit of the Frankfurt School that they were amongst the first to realise just 
how drastic these revisions might have to be and accordingly set out to provide an account 
of Marxism which gives due recognition to this problem. For this reason if no other, their 
work is of considerable philosophical importance, and as I shall argue, deserves greater 
recognition within the Anglo-American philosophical community than it has so far 
achieved. 11 The aim, therefore, of this first chapter is to identity, however provisionally, the 
nature of this revisionary project as well as to indicate some of its philosophical interest. 
Orthodox Marxism and the Franlifurt School 
One possible approach to the Frankfurt Marxist tradition is to contrast it with various 
positivist, empirically oriented approaches to the study of society. 12 To do this, however, is 
to ignore the actual theoretical context from which the Frankfurt theorists emerged, and so 
to lose sight of many of the specific questions which their work seeks to address. This 
10 Geuss, R., The Idea of a Criticallheory, p.l. For a review ofGeuss' book see Kai 
Nielsen, 'The Very Idea ofa Critical Theory', Ratio (New Series), IV 2, December 1991. 
11 The critical reception of Frankfurt Marxism by the Anglo-American philosophical 
academy has tended to be almost unifonnly hostile. Thus Jon Elster, in his An Introduction 
to Marx, p.IS, writes that "the work of the Frankfurt School is marred ... by Hegelian 
obscurantism and thinly disguised elitism." and refers his readers to a "devastating review" 
by Kolakowski. See also Alasdair MacIntyre's Marcuse for a similarly dismissive 
approach. 
12 Geuss' The Idea of a Criticallheory, takes this line and offers a useful discussio~ of 
critical theory in tenns of its general opposition to empiricist social science. See especIally 
Chapter 3. 
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context is defined, as I have already suggested, by the dispute between the orthodox and 
Hegelian Marxists, between those theorists who wished to cast Marx's theory as a new 
positive science, and others, such as Lukacs and Korsch, who sought to emphasise its 
essential relation to Gennan Idealist philosophy.13 Indeed, much of what is specific to 
critical theory and most interesting can best be understood by positioning the work of the 
Frankfurt School with reference to the above debate. This interpretative strategy contrasts 
with the argument of a number of commentators who have tended to regard Marx as 
merely one influence, albeit a very important influence, amongst many in the development 
of the Frankfurt project. 14 Whilst not wishing to deny the obvious fact that the critical 
theorists draw upon a diverse range of theoretical sources (Nietzsche, Freud and Weber are 
often cited in their work) the simple truth of the matter is that Frankfurt Marxism is first 
and foremost a fonn of Marxism. More particularly it is a partially critical, partially 
sympathetic response to the work of the early Hegelian Marxists, and unless this is clearly 
understood, no adequate account of critical theory is possible. Accordingly this first 
chapter will seek to outline some of the differences between the Hegelian Marxists and the 
theoretical tradition of Marxist orthodoxy to which, in the period 1880-1930, the majority 
13 George Lichteim has observed that: "The distinction between the historical 
materialism of Marx and the dialectical materialism of Engels and his successors is crucial 
for Adorno, as it was crucial for the Lukacs of History and Class Consciousness." (From 
Marx to Hegel, p.25.) Unfortunately, Lichtheim's observation, whilst correct, is supported 
by vel)' little detailed discussion. See also Nicolae Tertulian's article 'Lukacs, Adorno and 
German Classical Philosophy', Telos, 62, Fall 1984, for a useful discussion of the influence 
of Hegelian Marxism on the work of Adorno. 
14 See Martin Jay's Adorno in which it is argued that this representative of the Frankfurt 
School should be understood not simply as a Marxist but also as an aesthetic modernist, a 
cultural mandarin, a Jew and a proto-deconstructionst. Apart from the fact that. various 
items in this eclectic list are in obvious conflict with one another, the problem WIth Jay's 
approach is that the specific content of Adorno's Ma:xism is l?st. .Against Jay, .1 wo~d 
argue that Adorno's concern with, for instance, aesthetIC moderrusm 1S not express1ve of an 
independent interest but is shaped and fashioned by his materialist outlook. 
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of Social Democratic and Communist theoreticians subscribed. In the course of this 
discussion, it will become apparent that critical theory stands as much in opposition to 
orthodox Marxism as it does to the mainstream of social science. As Adorno observes \\;th 
respect to those sociologists who advocate a strictly scientific empirical approach to their 
subject matter: "It is in the nature of society itself that the natural scientific model cannot be 
happily and unreservedly transferred to it" .15 Yet the orthodox tradition, by representing 
Marx's historical materialism as a science of history standing alongside the various natural 
sciences, is guilty of precisely this mistake. In short the Frankfurt School's concern with 
rescuing historical materialism from the scientistic interpretation of the theory is an entirely 
logical complement to their well-known rejection of positivistically-oriented programs of 
social research. 
In what follows, I shall argue that the above similarity between Marxist orthodoxy and 
positivism is a consequence of the fact that the orthodox interpretation of Marx: relies 
heavily upon the popularised version of historical materialism found in the late work of 
Engels. On this account, Marx's theoretical principles are accorded the same 
epistemological status as the laws of natural science: Marxism is not different in kind from 
other scientific theories, but on the contrary represents the first real application of scientific 
method to the domain of history and society. In fact, within the orthodox tradition as a 
whole, it was something of a commonplace that Marx did for the study of human history 
what Darwin had achieved in the sphere of natural history, both thinkers being credited 
with having uncovered the fundamental laws of development governing their respective 
objects of study. Undoubtedly, part of the motivation for this position was to secure the 
15 'Sociology and Empirical Research' in The Positivist Dispute ill German 
Sociology, p. 73. 
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prestige of the natural sciences for historical materialism: if Marx's theol)' could be 
plausibly represented as a science with its own specific subject matter, fundamental 
concepts and laws, the theory's epistemological status could be effortlessly guaranteed. 
Indeed, for Engels as for many other Marxists, the following argument appeared 
compelling: science is the most secure fonn of knowledge that we have, that Marxism is a 
science, therefore that Marxism is a secure knowledge. 16 The Frankfurt School, however, 
regarded the scientization of Marx's theory as a serious mistake. Not only did this strategy 
obscure the real nature of materialism, it also led to grave errors of political judgement. 
Thus Marcuse, commenting upon Bernstein's revisionist program writes that: 
reVlslomsm replaced the critical dialectic conception with the conformist 
attitudes ofnaturali~m. Bowing to the authority of the facts, which indeed justified 
the hopes of a legal parliamentaty opposition, revisionism diverted revolutionaty 
action into the channel of a faith in the 'necessary natural evolution' to socialism. 17 
16 This particular formulation of the argument does not appear in Engels but it is 
certainly consistent with everything he has to say on the matter. See, for instance, his 
argument that scientific knowledge divides into three departments: knowledge of 
inorganic nature, of organic nature and of the historical process. In contrast to 
scientific knowledge, Engels counter-poses the supposed eternal laws of morality and 
argues that such laws tum out to be no more than expressions of class interest. (Allti-
Duhring, pp.123-133.) 
17 Reason and Revolution, p.399. Similarly Walter Benjamin in discussing the 
"evolutionaty" reading of Marx popular in Social Democratic and Communist circles 
comments that: "Nothing has corrupted the Gennan working class so much as the notion 
that it was moving with the current. It regarded technological development as the tau of the 
stream with which it thought it was moving." See his "Theses on the Philosophy of 
History" in Illuminations, p.250. According to the "evolutionaty reading", which Benjamin 
is criticising, the development of the forces of production leads necessarily to a c~~ge ~ 
the relations of production. More specifically, this was understood to mean that soclahsm IS 
the inevitable consequence of the process of capitalist development. 
9 
Marcuse's objection was intended to apply not only to the revisionist wing of the Social 
Democratic movement but also to that whole spectrum of Marxist opinion, whether 
reformist or revolutionary, for whom socialism constituted the developmental goal towards 
which society was inevitably moving. In opposition to this historical naturalism, Marcuse 
and his colleagues argued that Marxism is not a positive science of social life but a theory 
of society which in the fashion of Hegel's dialectic seeks to criticise as well negate the 
world as it exists. 18 What this means is that the theory is not restricted to describing what 
merely happens to exist, but seeks instead to negate it: materialism not only reveals the 
disparity between the self-understanding of society and social reality but also points to the 
emancipatory potential for the resolution of this conflict. Thus critical theory is 
distinguished from any form of positivist social theory, whether it be "scientific Marxism" 
or mainstream empirical social science, by its commitment to a wholly different kind of 
thinking. Against a tradition of social theory which seeks to emulate the method of the 
natural sciences, the theory advocates a dialectical form of enquiry. Against the claims of 
the abstract understanding (Verstehen), the mode of cognition Hegel regarded as 
characteristic of the sciences, it proposes a discipline of critical reason (Venmnft). Against 
empiricism, with its fetishism of the fact and law-like conjunction, the critical theorist 
invokes a logic of totality, essence and appearance, real possibility, negation and emphatic 
truth. 19 In summary the Frankfurt theorists understand materialism as an attempt to re-
establish the relevance of Hegel's idealist agenda to the development of social theory. And 
without this philosophical "return", the positivist distinction between fact and value, a 
18 See Marcuse's preface to Reason and Revolution. 
19 These Hegelian terms will be discussed in later chapters of this thesis 
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distinction which these theorists believe has distorted social theory right up to the present 
day, cannot be overcome. 
This is not an arcane theoretical point, of interest merely to philosophers of social science, 
but touches upon profound questions concerning the self-knowledge of humanity. In this 
context the lesson idealism teaches is that understanding a form of life cannot be 
distinguished from a judgement concerning the rationality of that form~ in the language of 
Hegel, a genuine science (Wissenschaft) of society requires that the classificatory schemata 
and lawlike regularities which define Verstehen give way to the regulative, and critical 
demands of Vernunft. But if this is a "return" to Hegel, it must be emphasised that it is 
mediated by Marx's historical materialism. Despite what some critics have claimed, the 
Frankfurt School cannot be understood as latter-day Left Hegelians: the influence of Marx 
is simply too pronounced to make this charge stick. 20 Thus in a clear acknowledgement of 
this influence Adorno writes that: 
It was Marx who drew the line between historical materialism and the popular-
metaphysical kind. He thus involved the former in the problematics of philosophy, 
leaving popular materialism to cut its dogmatic capers this side of philosophy. 
Since then, materialism is no longer a counter-position one may resolve to take~ if 
is the critique of Jdealism in its entirety, and of the reality for which Idealism opts 
by distorting it. 21 [Italics mine] 
20 Alasdair MacIntyre, for instance, makes the claim t.h~t Marcuse is.a Left-Hegelian 
who has failed to learn the lesson of Marx's original cntlque of IdealIsm. (/'vlarclI.\(!. 
pp.22-40.) 
21 Negative Dialectics, p.197. 
11 
This recovery of the Hegelian dimension of Marxism should not, however, be confused 
with the sterile dogmatic constituent of Soviet Marxism known as "dialectical materialism"; 
it is rather, as Adorno explains, the attempt to understand materialism as, in the first place, 
an immanent critique of both Hegel's Idealism and the society of which that philosophy is 
an expression.22 Such a critique involves the apparently difficult intellectual feat of taking 
Hegel seriously whilst rejecting the fundamental idealist premise of his system. Essentially 
critical theory is an attempt to articulate the encounter between idealism and materialism. 
Recognising the influence of the former, the theory centres upon the concepts of freedom 
and rationality; under the influence of the latter it is concerned to demonstrate that these 
concepts cannot be adequately realised within the capitalist order of society. What results 
is, as Horkheimer put it, a theory that is incapable of neutrality for it is "a theory dominated 
at every tum by a concern for reasonable conditions of life. "n Here it should be emphasised 
that these "reasonable conditions of life" are not defined by an appeal to a transcendent set 
of normative criteria, but are the result as Marx puts it of "the self-clarification (critical 
philosophy) of the struggles and wishes of the age.,,24 Put another way, critical theory 
explores the tension between how the world is and how we think the world is, and in so 
doing produces a critique that is necessarily immanent to the society it considers. In short, 
the theory is a form of collective self-knowledge, insofar as it brings to our attention the 
22 The classical site for this doctrine can be found in the section entitled 
""Dialectical and Historical Materialism" in Stalin's History of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union. For an account, as well as a critique of the conception of dialectic 
expounded by Stalin and his apologists see Herbert Marcuse's Soviet Marxism, 
especially Chapter 7. 
23 'Traditional and Critical Theory' in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, p.199. 
24 Marx to Ruge, September, 1843 in Marx: Earzv Writings, p.209. 
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various conflicts and contradictions inherent in the social life process in which we are all 
inescapably participants. 
The consequence of these reflections is that the sort of theory advocated by the Frankfurt 
School is going to be radically distinct from conventional social scientific thought; it is not 
simply that the theory says something different about specific social phenomena from, for 
instance Weberian sociology, but rather that the fonner is developed on the basis of a 
methodology that is radically distinct from the latter. One needs only to recall Weber's 
sharp separation of fact from value to realise that a critical theory, with its inherent 
commitment to the goal of a rational society, is going to proceed towards its object of 
study quite differently from a theory under the spell of scientific objectivity. In this respect 
critical theory also contrasts with the tradition of orthodox Marxism, a tradition which 
regards historical materialism as a theory which does not contain, nor depend upon, any 
form of normatively motivated critique.25 For Marxist orthodoxy, the materialist theory of 
history and society provides the basis for a practice that is at once political and scientific, 
the practice of scientific socialism. As a political agency, scientific socialism orientates itself 
to the historical process in just the same way as technology relates itself to the world of 
nature: both practices are governed by the recognition of a necessity external to the subject. 
However, this attempt to establish a "scientific" politics is misconceived: one cannot 
advocate a transformation of society without at the same time appealing to some kind of 
nonnative standard. Thus, even if scientific socialism could demonstrate the inevitability of 
25 In this context it is worth noting that certain Althusserian critics of the Frankfurt 
School have argued that the attempt to construct Marxism as a continuation of the Gennan 
Idealist tradition is to lose sight of the real scientific character of Marx's theory. Thus 
Goran Therborn argues that the critical theory of the F:~ School "involves a do~b~e 
reduction of science and politics to philosophy." See his article 'The Frankfurt School 10 
New Left Review, 63, Sept-Oct 1970. 
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the transfonnation of the capitalist mode of production into another, it would remain an 
open question as to how that transfonnation should be regarded from the standpoint of 
existing nonns and values. Worse still, it would seem impossible for "scientific" ~1arxists, 
situated as they are within a self-imposed ethical vacuum, to even begin to answer this 
latter question.
26 
Critical theory, by contrast, develops its emancipatory project by means of 
a theoretical practice, namely immanent critique, intentionally constructed so as to 
overcome this disabling positivist duality of science and criticism. If this can be achieved, 
the way is open to construing materialism as a discipline that is at once critical but also free 
from the arbitrariness of a world view. 
Historical and Dialectical Materialism 
To better establish the distinction between orthodox Marxism and the critical theory of the 
Frankfurt School I shall, in this section, offer an account of the fundamental principles upon 
which the fonner doctrine rests. In the course of the discussion it will be established that 
this particular interpretive tradition is distinguished by the fact that it portrays Marx's 
theory of history as one component, albeit a very important component, of a much wider 
unified scientific world view. Furthennore, by seeking to integrate Marxism into the family 
of existing sciences the orthodox tradition is drawn, however unconsciously, towards an 
essentially positivist conception of the task of philosophy. Thus according to positivism 
26 The gap cannot be bridged simply by appealing to the concept of inte.rest, for in 
those circumstances where socialism is not a realistic prospect the compulslOn of self-
interest would count aoainst this particular political project. Hence some like Norman 
Geras have been led t~ argue that any kind of socialist movement has to possess an 
ethic of "mutual concern and care", in other words an ethic of solidarity, so as to 
overcome the disabling logic of egoistic concern. (The ('olltract ql A/ull/al 
Indtfference, pp. 75-76.) 
l~ 
science provide us with knowledge concerning the world whilst the responsibility of 
philosophy is to reflect upon the underlying formal structure of that knowledge. It is my 
contention that Marxist orthodoxy offers a surprisingly similar account of the relation 
between these two theoretical enterprises. However, before proceeding any further with 
this discussion there is a tenninological issue surrounding the notion of orthodoxy which 
needs to be addressed. Conventionally, historians of ideas have tended to use the tenn 
"orthodox Marxism" to designate the political and theoretical movement that found 
organisational expression in the Second International. By contrast, I shall use the tenn in a 
more inclusive sense to denote not only the above theoretical tradition but also the later 
doctrine of Marxism-Leninism associated with the Third International. This may appear as 
a controversial decision, for it seems to ignore the many real differences between the 
theoretical basis of early Social Democracy and that of its Communist rival. Without 
denying that a significant political chasm did indeed separate these groups, the reform 
verus revolution debate being perhaps the most famous aspect of that quarrel, I shall 
however argue that both political groupings were under the sway of a common 
epistemolOgical paradigm privileging scientistic forms of cognition over and against other 
forms of knowledge. This common paradigm originates with the later work of Engels, 
particularly his "philosophical" texts Anti-Duhring, The Dialectics of Nature and Ludwig 
Feurbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. This body of writing was 
immensely influential, both practically and theoretica.11y, within the early western Social 
Democratic movements as well as the later Communist Third International. Without 
exaggeration it may be said that these works effectively defined the research paradigm of 
that entire generation of Marxist theoreticians, most noticeably Kautsky, Labriola, Mehring 
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and Plekhanov, who came to prominence after the demise of Marx and Engels. n All of 
these theorists conceived of their work as an extension or development of Engel's original 
program for a "science" of history. Commenting upon this codification of Marx's thought 
Lichtheim writes: "What cannot be doubted is that it was Engels who was responsible for 
the subsequent interpretation of 'Marxism' as a unified system of thOUght destined to take 
the place of Hegelianism and classical German philosophy in general. ,,28 Thus according to 
Lichtheim, his interpretation influenced the development not only of German Social 
Democracy but also of Soviet Marxism and for this reason he argues that "Leninism has to 
be regarded as a 'revision' of the orthodox Marxism of Engels, Plekhanov and Kautsky.,,29 
This observation although essentially correct needs to be set out in considerably more 
detail. Now in the course of setting out such detail it will become apparent that there is 
indeed a common meta-theoretical core to both Second and Third International Marxism, 
and that in consequence the use of the term "orthodox Marxism" to designate both 
traditions is less idiosyncratic than it might at first appear. 
To support this argument, I shall identifY two central principles of Engels' thought which 
together define the orthodox tradition. The first such principle is that Marx's theory of 
historical materialism represents a radical theoretical break with the tradition of German 
Idealism; in effect the theory constitutes a definitive transition from philosophical 
speculation to a science of society. Thus for Engels, Marxism is a specific scientific 
discipline within the wider family of sciences; this new theoretical discipline, which he calls 
27 Cf Anderson, P., Considerations on Western Marxism, pp. 5-6. 
28 From Marx to Hegel, p.67. 
29lbid. 
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historical materialism, takes history as its domain and proceeds on the basis of concepts 
derived from the study of economic life to establish the fundamental laws of the historical 
process. These laws which make reference to the forces and relations of production 
characteristic of a given society, what Marxists sometimes call the economic or material 
base, are supposed to be able to account for the past as well as future pattern of 
development of that society. And not merely economic development: the above laws are 
also credited with the capacity to explain the existence of the diverse forms of 
consciousness, political and legal as well as philosophical, religious and aesthetic, that 
spring up alongside the material life process. 
This, of course, is the famous base-superstructure theSiS, the idea that the material 
substratum of social life, the mode of production, determines the superstructure of ideas by 
means of which individuals understand and interpret social reality. Presenting this thesis in 
summary form, Engels writes: 
. .. the economic structure of society always furnishes the real basis [of historical 
explanation], starting from which we can alone work out the ultimate explanation 
of the whole superstructure of juridicial and political institutions as well as of the 
religious, philosophical and other ideas ofa given historical period.30 
Although Engels cautions against interpreting materialism as a form of economic 
detenninism, and accords a limited form of autonomy to the superstructural sphere, he has 
no objection to the view that the mode of production is "in the last instance" the 
30 Engels, F., 'Feurbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy' in Marx lind 
f,,'ngels: Selected Works, p.616. 
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determinate causal factor in the explanation of superstructural change. Thus Marx's 
historical materialism is a science precisely because it systematically connects changes in 
one area of social life with changes in another; what we think is determined bv how we 
produce our materia1lives. Hence contra idealism, thought does not produce reality but is 
rather its reflection. In developing this doctrine, the followers of Engels were greatly 
impressed by the summary of the method of historical materialism found in the preface to 
Marx's Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Here Marx describes the 
"guiding principle" of his work in the following terms: 
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite 
relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production 
appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of 
production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic 
structure of society, the real foundation on which arises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The 
mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, 
political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. 31 (Italics 
mine) 
This much quoted passage was taken by many orthodox Marxists as justification for the 
view that Marx's achievement consists in identifying the underlying causal basis of the 
historical process; as Hilferding puts it Marxism aims "at the discovery of causal 
31 A Contrihution to the Critique of Political f~conomy, pp.20-21. 
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connections. ,,32 According to this account, Marx's theory offers an explanatory model that 
distinguishes two distinct aspects of the social life process, base and superstructure, and 
relates them in the fashion of an independent to a dependent variable. The independent 
variable, which Engels calls the economic structure, refers to Marx's concept of a mode of 
prodUction, a social formation consisting of the forces and relations of production. The 
former consist of the means of production (machinery, tools, raw materials) and human 
labour power (the capacity for productive activity) whilst the latter are the social relations 
established in the course of the productive process. For the orthodox Marxist, the thesis 
that the mode of production constitutes the "base" or "real foundation" on which the 
ideological superstructure is built is a thesis describing a structure of causal interaction 
between these two fundamental elements of social life. In turn this structure is the basis of 
the claim that Marxism is a scientific theory, with its own specialised concepts and laws, 
which deserves to be ranked alongside the established natural sciences. 
This initial statement of the orthodox position, however, requires some further refinement; 
in particular, more needs to be said concerning the nature of the causal hypothesis at the 
centre of this interpretation. Thus according to orthodox Marxism the development and 
growth of the productive forces, and technological change in particular, should be regarded 
as the cause of any subsequent changes in the relations of production. However, alongside 
this idea there is another causal hypothesis, namely that the material base of society, which 
Marx calls the mode of production, determines the superstructure of ideas in terms of 
which individuals apprehend their social being. It should be noted, however, that in 
developing this position, most orthodox Marxists took pains to distance themselves from 
32 Finance Capital, (Introduction). 
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the thesis of technological or economic determinism: the idea that the historical process is 
to be explained in terms of a uni-directional causal chain linking technological-material 
developments to changes in forms of social life. Against this thesis, Engels and his 
followers argued, although not always consistently, that the forces and relations of 
production, as well as the base and the superstructure cannot be related simply as cause 
and effect but should be understood as distinguishable aspects of social being which act 
and react upon one another. Plekhanov's writings, for instance, demonstrate that although 
explanatory primacy is accorded to the forces of production, a degree of reciprocal 
interaction is allowed to exist between the forces and relations of production. Thus he 
writes that: 
. .. a certain state of the productive forces is the cause of the given production 
relations .. . the latter (once they have arisen as a consequence of the 
aforementioned cause) begin themselves to influence that cause. Thus there arises 
an interaction between the productive forces and the social economy.33 
In arguing in this fashion Plekhanov is, of course, reiterating an interpretation of the 
materialist thesis advanced by Engels in his later works and correspondence to various 
followers in the European socialist movement. Thus in a letter to Bloch, Engels argues that 
there is a complex process of interaction governing the relation between the economic 
element and the superstructure. As he puts it: 
According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimate determining 
33 'Fundamental Problems of Marxism' in Selected Philosophical Work~: Vol Ill, p 155 
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element in history is the production and re-production of material life. More than 
this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into 
saying that the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms that 
proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. The economic situation 
is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure '" also exercise their 
influence upon the course of historical struggles ... 34 
Engels goes onto argue in this letter that there is an interaction between all of these 
elements but then concludes that in this complex process the "economic movement finally 
asserts itself as necessary". We shall return to this particular caveat a little later~ for the 
moment however I shall assert that the orthodox formulation of historical materialism leads 
directly to a scientistic-mechanistic account of Marx's thought. Thus history, and social life, 
are represented as subject to "laws of motion" which in tum are formulated in terms of 
mechanical concepts such as action-reaction, force, direction and so forth. One has only to 
consider, for instance, Engels argument that specific historical events are the resultant of a 
"parallelogram of forces", each force corresponding to the will of an individual, to 
appreciate the pervasive influence of scientific-mechanistic models within the orthodox 
version of Marx. We may conclude, therefore, that this particular reading, informed as it is 
by an emphatically causal framework, does not merely utilise the natural sciences as a 
source of analogy but has a thorough-going commitment to an essentially mechanical 
mode of explanation. 
34 Engels to Blocl\ Sept 21, 1890 in Marx-Engels: Selected Works, p.682. Similarly in a 
letter to Schmidt, (July 14, 1893), Engels writes that: "'If therefore B~ supposes that we 
deny any and every reaction of the political, etc, reflexes of the econormc movement upon 
the movement itself, he is simply tilting at windmills." (Marx-E.llge/s: Selected Works, 
p.688-89). 
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It is now time to say something concerning the second principle employed by Engels in his 
account of Marx's thought, the conception of materialism as a completely general 
philosophico-scientific perspective, of relevance not only to the study of society but also to 
that of nature. In essence, this world-view or Anschaung is thought of as providing an 
integrative theoretical framework for the results of the various natural and social sciences. 
Now according to Engels, Marxism although materialist in its general outlook, is unlike 
previous forms of materialism because it is grounded in Hegel's dialectic. Thus the result of 
Marx's encounter with Hegel is a philosophy that conceives of the material world in 
dialectical terms, or as Plekhanov later wrote: " The philosophy of Marx. and Engels is not 
just a materialist philosophy. It is dialectical materialism. ,,35 In retrospect we can see that 
this idea was the result of Engels' desire to resolve, from a "scientific" standpoint, the 
question of the relation between Marx's thought and the idealist tradition from which it 
emerged. The particular problem that Engels faced was that in the prevailing intellectual 
climate of the late nineteenth century, Hegel's Idealism, and in particular his belief that 
reality is the expression of an underlying rational order, looked like the final gesture of an 
obsolete tradition of metaphysical thought. For this reason, many ofMarx.'s early followers 
were reluctant to accord Hegel too much influence with respect to either the genesis or 
content of historical materialism: to do so would seem to be inconsistent with the scientific 
nature of Marx's theory. However, Hegel's contribution to the Marxian project could not 
be simply denied: despite the fact that many of Marx's philosophical writings remained 
unpublished in his lifetime, it was evident that his work was characterised by a consistent 
engagement with the principles and categories of Hegelian thought. In the preface to 
35 'Preface to l~udwig Feuerbach' in Selected Philosophical Works: Vollll, p.73. 
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Capital, for instance, Marx takes the opportunity to deplore the widespread antipathy to 
Hegel's philosophy, and defiantly declares himself to be a pupil of, as he puts it, "that 
mighty thinker". 36 This kind of forthright avowal meant that Marx's early followers were 
confronted with the following problem of interpretation, namely how to allow for the 
influence of German Idealism upon Marx without at the same time undennining the 
positive scientific character of historical materialism. 
Engels' approach to the problem attempts to reconcile these two apparently conflicting 
requirements. Marx's theory of history is acknowledged as a science whilst Hegel's 
philosophy, or at least the version of it constructed by Engels, is made to serve as its meta-
scientific underpinning. Thus in Anti-Duhring Engels associates historical materialism with 
a philosophical doctrine (dubbed "dialectical materialism" by Plekhanov) which seeks to 
fuse a positivist conception of knowledge with an ill-digested form of Hegelianism. 37 The 
undoubted appeal of Engels' account lay in the fact that although it recognises Hegel's 
influence it also promises to preserve the positive scientific status of Marxism by presenting 
dialectic as a universal theory of change applicable to both nature and society.38 According 
to Engels, materialist dialectic consists of a number of "laws" derived from Hegel's Logic~ 
these are usually referred to as the Transfonnation of Quantity into Quality, the Negation 
of the Negation and the Unity and Interpenetration of Opposites. Taken together with the 
36 Capital: Voll, Afterword to the Second Edition, p.29. 
37 David McLellan points out that this term was never u~ed by Marx n~)f indeed Engels. 
In fact, it originated with Joseph Dietzgen, a German SOCial-Democrat, ill the 1870s, and 
was later taken up by Plekhanov and Lenin. See McLellan's The Thought of Karl Marx, 
p.lS2. 
38 Engels, F., 'Feurbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy' in Marx-}~11gels: 
Selected Works, p.611. 
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results of the various empirical sciences, the above laws of dialectic are intended to 
constitute a framework in which a view of reality in toto might be constructed. 
Furthermore, and in a strikingly positivistic fashion, Engels claims that the resulting 
dialectical synthesis replaces philosophy altogether. As he observes: 
... modern materialism is essentially dialectic, and no longer needs allY philosophy 
standing above the other sciences. As soon as each special science is bound to 
make clear its position in the great totality of things and of our knowledge of 
things, a special science dealing with that totality is superfluous. That which still 
survives, independently of all earlier philosophy is the science of thought and its 
laws - formal logic and dialectics. Everything else is subsumed in the positive 
science of nature and history. 39 [Italics mine] 
In one respect this passage is misleading with respect to Engel's own position: it suggests 
that dialectics, here described as part of the "science of thought", is an a prioiri discipline 
on a par with formal logic. This however, is not Engels' view of the matter; on the 
contrary, he believes that the various dialectica1laws serve as the most general expression 
of the laws of motion and development of any form of reality. These laws are not available 
a priori but result from scientific practice, a practice which Engels conceives of in fairly 
traditional terms as being governed by a discipline of experimentation, observation and 
hypothesis formation. In fact his only complaint against traditional scientific theory is that it 
has so far failed to recognise the dialectical nature of its own results. On this account, 
dialectics far from being a venture in a priori speculation, is a theory which elucidates the 
39 Anti-J)uhring, p.40. 
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structure of change in the world as revealed to us through the discoveries of the natural and 
social sciences.
4o 
Furthermore, according to Engels scientific practice provides a decisive 
solution to many of the traditional problems of philosophy. Commenting upon scepticism 
he writes 
The most telling refutation of this [Humean scepticism concerning cognition] as of 
all other philosophical crotchets is practice, namely, experiment and industry. If we 
are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making 
it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and making it serve our own 
purposes into the bargain, then there is an end to the Kantian ungraspable "thing-
in-itself'. 41 
Thus for Engels, the development of the various sciences has a two-fold effect upon 
philosophy. In the first place scientific advance decisively resolves certain philosophical 
questions: scepticism is for instance disposed of by reflection upon the results of 
experiment and industry. Secondly, whatever remains can no longer be considered as the 
basis of an independent theoretical activity: philosophy is now redundant. 42 In its place 
40 Op.cit., pp.33-40. 
41 'Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy' in Marx-Engels: 
Selected Works, p.595. 
42 To appreciate just how close Engels comes to positivism one has only to compare his 
argument with that of the logical positivists. Thus Ayer commenting on the relation 
between philosophy and science writes:"For our part we are concerned to emphasize not 
so much the unity of the sciences as the unity of philosophy with science. With regard to 
the relationship of philosophy and the empirical sciences, we have remarked that 
philosophy does not in any way compete with the sciences." See Language, .l.n~th and 
Logic, p.151. Of course, there are differences between ~ngels and the l~ter 'pOSItIVIStS: for 
the Vienna Circle philosophy relates to science through Its analysis of SCIentific statements, 
whilst Engels saw dialectical logic as the link between the two. 
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there is a task of synthesis; the results of the specialised sciences are to be unified by means 
of dialectical categories into a single, coherent world-view. According to Engels, to grasp 
the real significance of these results there is a need for a sense of their "interconnection" 
and this latter day fonn of "natural philosophy", is nothing other than dialectics. In this way 
Marxism is purged of any critical philosophical content; what is left is on the one hand the 
general "scientific world-view" of dialectical materialism and on the other the particular 
science of historical materialism. Furthermore in the study of society, ideas that are not part 
of the materialist world outlook or of Marx's science of history are to be relegated to the 
realm of ideology, and so dismissed. For the orthodox Marxists this was to be the fate not 
only of the legal-political superstructure of bourgeois society but also of philosophy itself 
In the context of the present discussion what needs to be stressed is that this version of 
Marx was an influence not only on the work of Lenin and his followers but also amongst 
most of the major Social Democratic theorists. For example, Mehring, a leading member of 
the Gennan SPD spoke for many when he declared that "Historical materialism 
encompasses the materialism of the natural sciences, but not the other way round. ,,43 This 
declaration neatly illustrates Kolakowski's view that: "The orthodox majority [of the 
Second International] ... maintained that Marxist doctrine itself contained the answers to all 
or most of the problems of philosophy, and that Engels works ., . were the natural 
completion of Marx's economic and social theories. ,,44 For this majority, Engels provided 
the essential philosophical framework into which Marx's strictly scientific work, namely his 
political economy and theory of history, could be placed. 
43 On Historical Materialism, p.IS. 
44 Main Currents o/Marxism: Vo II, p.3. 
26 
Before concluding this section it is worth noting that Soviet Marxism was in large measure 
a natural extension of this approach. Like Second International Marxism it regarded 
materialism as a universally encompassing theoretical view-point, applicable to both matter 
and consciousness, nature as well as society. Thus we find Lenin writing in 1915 that: 
"The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts is the essence 
. .. of dialectics ... The correctness of this aspect of dialectics must be tested by the history 
of science. ,,45 Elaborating on this thought, Lenin lists certain supposed examples of 
"contradiction" which he argues are daily observed by the individual sciences: 
In mathematics: + and -
In mechanics: action and reaction 
In physics: positive and negative electricity 
In chemistry: the combination and dissociation of atoms 
In social science: the class struggle46 
At this point I shall not comment in detail upon this doctrine other than to remark that 
Lenin, following Engels, bases much of his argument upon a set of extremely tenuous 
analogies between natural and social phenomena. These comparisons are intended to 
support the view that nature, like society, is constituted and indeed develops through 
contradiction. However, as I shall argue in the next section of this chapter the mere 
presence of conflict, opposition, difference or binary polarity in the sphere of nature does 
45 'On the Question of Dialectics' in Collected Works: Vol 14, p.360. 
46 Ibid. 
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not in itself constitute a dialectic, at least in the sense that Hegel and Marx use this tenn. 
For both of these thinkers the idea of dialectic necessarily involves the notion of the 
subjects' activity being in some sort of conflict to the world that it has created, and it is this 
requirement, rather than Engels' metaphysical Laws of Dialectic, which guarantees the 
importance of the concept of contradiction in the development of social theory. Failure to 
appreciate this point leads to the mass of confusions characteristic of the doctrine of 
dialectical materialism, a doctrine which as it turns out is neither dialectical nor indeed 
materialist. 
Hegelian Objections to Orthodox Marxism 
In this section I shall discuss some of the objections, first developed in the work of Korsch 
and Lukacs and later taken up by various members of the Frankfurt School, to the 
orthodox position. Broadly speaking it can be said that this Hegelian Marxist criticism of 
the orthodox tradition involves two distinct lines of argumentation: first a rejection of the 
scientistic reconstruction of Marx's theory of history, and second a profound scepticism 
concerning Engels doctrine of dialectical materialism. Thus beginning with the concept of 
historical materialism we note that orthodox Marxism is a theory which understands itself 
as having a scientific rather than a philosophical intent, as abandoning the idealist narrative 
of Spirit in favour of a science of the historical process. On this account the scientific 
quality of Marxism is vouchsafed by the fact that it contains no appeal to nonnative 
principles but simply describes the contradictory logic of the process of capitalist 
accumulation. 47 For instance, according to Engels, Marx's political economy is in the first 
47 See, for instance, Mehring: "In this respect historical materialism denies all moral 
standards - but in this respect alone. It bans them from the study of history because they 
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place a sCientific description of reality: it represents, as he puts it, the discovery of "the 
special law of motion governing the ... capitalist mode of production and the bourgeois 
society that this mode of production has produced. ,,48 Central to this reading is the idea 
that Marx's theory of history is a science in the exact !)ame seme as any of the natural 
sciences. From the viewpoint, however, of Korsch and Lukacs this formulation is 
immensely problematic insofar as it leads to the separation of Marxism from any form of 
political practice. For ifhistorical materialism stands in the same relation to the social world 
as physics does to the material world, then there would be appear to be no intrinsic 
connection between accepting the materialist hypothesis and commitment to a praxis 
directed towards the transformation of society. This in fact was the position taken by the 
Austro-Marxists, most noticeably Rudolf Hilferding, who argued that the "science of 
Marxism" was logically independent of any kind of critique of capitalist society. 
Commenting upon this tendency Lukacs wrote: 
. .. the essence of the method of historical materialism is inseparable from the 
'practical and critical activity' of the proletariat: both are aspects of the same 
process of social evolution. So, too, the knowledge of reality provided by the 
dialectical method is likewise inseparable from the standpoint of the proletariat. 
The question raised by Austrian Marxists of the methodological separation of the 
'pure' science of Marxism from socialism is a pseudo-problem. For, the Marxist 
method, .. , can arise only from the point of view of a class, from the point of view 
make all scientific study of history impossi~le." (On Historical Mat.eri~/iSfT!' p.3.1.) T~s is 
reminiscent of Weber's own sharp separation of fact from value ill his dISCUSSIon of the 
possibility of a science of society. 
-l8 'Speech at the Graveside of Karl Marx' in Marx-£ngels Selected Works, p.429. 
29 
of the struggle of the proletariat. 49 
Thus just as Hegel connects Science to the historically concrete development of Spirit, the 
young Lukacs associates Marxism with the emergence of a new social class, the proletariat, 
and argues that it is a theory which does no more or less than articulate the 'standpoint' of 
that class. What this means is that the materialist hypothesis cannot be detached from the 
specific socio-historical context in which it emerged, for it is a theory which seeks to give 
expression to the interests of the class whose standpoint it determines. In other words the 
emancipatory potential of Marxism depends upon the fact that it is a theory intended to 
enlighten the proletariat about its present condition, a condition which the theory reveals to 
be one of exploitation and oppression. Hence against the 'scientisation' of materialism, 
Lukacs emphasises the unity of cognition with praxis, a unity that follows from the idea 
that we are dealing with a knowledge concerning essential human interests and which in 
consequence must inevitably impact upon our practical orientation to the world. 
This general criticism of the equation of Marxism with the natural sciences was not 
however the only issue that Korsch and Lukacs wanted to raise. Both thinkers went on to 
develop a number of detailed objections to the account of historical materialism offered by 
Marxist orthodoxy. Thus Korsch questioned the way in which Marx's theory of history and 
society had come to be interpreted as a particular kind of causal narrative relating changes 
in one area of the social life process to changes in another. Against this approach, Korsch, 
like Lukacs, emphasised the organic unity of social life, arguing that it constituted a totality 
of consciousness and being, no part of which could be understood without reference to the 
49 'What is Orthodox Marxism?' in History and Class Consciousness, p.21. 
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relation of that part to the system as a whole. This perspective, inspired as it is by Hegel's 
category of totality, stands in sharp opposition to the mechanistic, almost Humean., model 
of social causality characteristic of the orthodox tradition. In fact Korsch believed that 
adherence to this model was responsible for the kind of confusion epitomised in Engels' 
often agonised attempts to evade the charge of economic detenninism. Thus commenting 
upon the Engels-Bloch correspondence he writes: 
He [Engels] unwisely conceded that to a large extent so called 'reactions' 
(Ruckwirlmngen) might take place between the superstucture and the basis '" 
thereby introducing completely unnecessary confusion '" For without an exact 
quantitative determination of 'how much' action and reaction takes place, without 
an exact indication oj the conditions under which one or the other occurs, the 
whole Marxian theory of historical development of society, as interpreted by 
Engels, becomes useless even as a working hypothesis. As stated, it affords not the 
slightest clue as to whether one is to seek for the cause of any change in social life 
in the action (Wirlmng) of the base upon the superstructure or in the reaction of 
the superstructure upon the base. 50 
This is an important criticism, for it identifies the central incoherence of the orthodox 
interpretation of the materialist thesis. In particular, if two-way interaction is admitted, then 
it becomes questionable as to whether there is any clear sense in supposing that the material 
base of society be thought of as ultimately causally determinate? Orthodox Marxists tend 
to respond to this problem by talking about "primary" and "secondary" causes but this, as 
50 'Why I am a Marxist' in Karl Korsch: Three F.ssays on Marxism, p.64. 
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Korsch rightly observes, is simply to evade the problem. For either the base causally 
detennines the superstructure and all subsequent superslnlcturaf influence or it does not. 
The fonner position leads to the view that the mode of production acts as some kind of 
"prime mover", that absurdly from the primal productive act everything else follows, whilst 
the latter results in a "variety of factors" or in a "limited autonomy" approach to the 
historical process. However, as Korsch notes, once alV! degree of autonomous 
superstructural effectivity is granted it becomes unclear what it is precisely that 
distinguishes historical materialism from other fonns of historical explanation. To take just 
one aspect of this problet1\ we might wonder just how much independence an explanation 
can assign to the superstructure whilst still qualifying as materialist. This question, which 
clearly demands some kind of quantitative response reveals the flaw behind Engels' 
conception of limited autonomy~ in the absence of any system of relative weighting the 
question cannot be answered, and consequently the Marxian thesis thus interpreted lacks 
determinate sense. 
Thls, however, is not the only complication that arises from a critical scrutiny of Engels' 
codification ofhlstorical materialism. Just as problematic is the question of the nature of the 
causal nexus, or mediating link, that is supposed to connect the material life process to the 
superstructure of ideas and beliefs. The orthodox view of this matter appeals to the notion 
of strncturally determined interests, that is to interests detennined by the class position of 
the subject. On this account, individuals in society are regarded as occupying determinate 
positions within the economic structure and in virtue of occupying these positions acquire a 
corresponding set of material interests. Furthermore, according to the Marxist tradition, 
wherever one class rules over another, wherever there is a class society, it is the interests of 
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this ruling class which in the long run tend to prevail. This state of affairs is not simply the 
result of crude oppression, the naked exercise of state power, the use of terror and so forth, 
but depends also upon the ability of a ruling class to establish a position of ideological 
dominance over the population at large: in other words the familiar idea that the dominant 
forms of consciousness in a society are forms which serve the interests of the ruling elite. 
To give just one but very typical example of this kind of explanation we find Lenin arguing 
with respect to the notion of parliamentary democracy that "the various political forms of 
the modem European states serve to strengthen the domination of the bourgeoisie over the 
proletariat" and that in consequence these forms cannot be made to serve the interests of 
another class. 51 
Now certainly there are echoes of this kind of approach in Marx's own writings. In the 
Manifesto, for instance, he and Engels argue that "the ruling ideas of each age have ever 
been the ideas of its ruling class,,52 and that "law, morality, religion, are ... so many 
bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk ... just as many bourgeois interests. ,,53 
Nevertheless, despite this rhetoric of scepticism, it would be a mistake to regard Marx's 
theory of ideology as a theory which simply reduces all forms of consciousness to the 
expression of class interest. 54 To do so is to miss out on much of what is most interesting 
about Marx's view of the relation between thought and the social life process. To consider 
51 'Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism' in Marx Engels: Selected Work~, 
p.24. 
52 Communist Manifesto, p.51. 
53 Ibid. p.44. 
54 It is worth noting that this kind of scepticism conce~g the unifying id~logy of a 
society has a long tradition in philosophy: it begins WIth Thrasymachus' chum 10 the 
Relmblic that justice simply means what is in the interests of the stronger. (336B-34 7E). 
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just one example, Marx praises Hegel for discovering that "religion, wealth, etc., are onl~ 
the estranged reality of human objectification, of human essential powers born into work 
and therefore only the way to true human reality. ,,55 (Italics mine) Thus for Marx, the 
religious consciousness is not false tout court, but is rather the distorted expression of an 
underlying reality, namely human labour as a world producing and transfonning activity. 
As we shall see in the next chapter, Korsch took up this point and argued to some effect 
that materialism cannot consistently denounce the various ideological forms of law, 
morality, philosophy and religion as nothing more than systems of false belief 56 In support 
of this position he cites Marx's original discussion of reification and commodity fetishism, 
arguing that this describes a form of consciousness which precisely through its distortion 
serves to express a certain truth about the world. Hence, under the grip of commodity 
fetishism social relations between individuals appear as relations between things but as 
Norman Geras has pointed out this is not an arbitrary illusion, for "where commodity 
production prevails, relations between persons really do take the form of relations between 
things." 57 To put it another way the individual who believes that production relations are 
governed by impersonal quasi-natural forces has not so much made a simple cognitive 
error but rather failed to move from the realm of appearance to that of essence, to go 
beyond how things seem to a knowledge of how things are. In summary ideology 
expresses the truth of appearance whilst simultaneously deceiving its victims about the 
55 Marx: Early Writings, p.38S. 
56 Commenting upon this inherent ambiguity in. ~ateri~sm, Ad~m? writes. th~t 
dialectical thought "takes seriously the principle that It IS not Ideology m Its~~ .whlch IS 
untrue but rather its pretension to correspond to reality." (,Cultural Cnttclsm and 
Society' in Prisms, p.32.) 
57 'Marx and the Critique of Political Economy' in Ideology and Social Science, 
ed.R.Blackburn, p.293. 
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nature of reality. 
This, however, is not the only objection, at least from the standpoint of Hegelian thought, 
to the orthodox account of ideology. There is another line of argument to the effect that 
orthodox Marxism is unable to explain how a specific mode of consciousness arises in the 
first place as well as how once it has come into being that mode of consciousness is related 
to material reality. Thus althou~ an explanation in terms of interest can be made out for 
certain ideological forms, this kind of explanation appears incapable of telling us much that 
is specific to the particular case. For example, once it has been demonstrated that a certain 
political-legal conception, assuming it commands widespread acceptance, is functional for 
the maintenance of the status quo, then the contribution of materialism to the analysis of 
that fonn appears to be over. This suggests that the materialist hypothesis cannot by itself 
explain why the interest of a ruling elite has manifested itself in a particular mode of 
consciousness, constituted by the unity of a specific form and content, rather than another 
mode that would be equally functional in disguising the class nature of society. In fact 
Engels in a letter to Bloch, seems to concede as much, arguing that the form that historical 
struggles take is determined by superstructural factors rather than the economic base. 58 If 
taken seriously, Engels' observation points to a significant theoretical weakness: it implies 
that materialism is unable to explain most of what is specific to individual superstructural 
phenomena. In consequence, the result of a '"materialist" analysis is that the diverse forms 
of consciousness arising in philosophy, religion, aesthetics, politics and law lose their 
particularity and become no more than exemplars of a generic type, namely false 
conSCIOusness. 
S8 Engels to Bloch, September 21, 1890 in Marx-f;ngels: ,Selected Works, p.682. 
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By way of contrast to this separation of form and content, Hegelian Marxism emphasised 
their essential unity. Thus Lukacs in his critique of the Kantian system writes that 
"actuality, content, matter reaches right into the form, the structures of the forms and their 
interrelations and thus into the structure of the system itself"S9 Echoing this thought some 
years later Marcuse celebrates Hegel's achievement in recognising that: "The categories 
and modes of thought derive from the process of reality to which they pertain. Their tonn 
is determined by the structure of this process. ,,60 In other words materialism is committed 
to the task of providing a comprehensive account of the various elements of the 
superstructure; that is, an account which is concerned with both form and content. This 
means that materialists do not reductively represent the individual phenomenon as simply 
the instantiation of a type, to asserting for instance that Kant's Critique oj Pure Reason is 
an example of bourgeois idealism~ instead they seek to discover the universal, that is 
society, by an analysis of what is most particular to the phenomenon.61 Hence it is by 
reference to the inner logic of form and content, the logic which make the particular 
element what it is, that the social pre-conditions of super-structural elements are identified. 
For example, in the case of Kant's Critique Lukacs argues that the idealist thesis advanced 
in that work is grounded in a particular opposition, namely the opposition between the 
object of experience and the ding an sich, and that it is this contrast which represents the 
S9 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat' in History and Class 
Consciousness, p. 118. 
60 Reason and Revolution, p.121. 
61 As Adorno observes: "It is rather demanded that the force of the general concept be 
transformed into the self-development of the concrete object and that it resolve the social 
enigma of this object with the powers of its own individuation." (Philosophy oj Modern 
Music, p.26.) 
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social content of the work. As he puts it: 
What is novel about modem rationalism is its increasingly insistent claim that it has 
discovered the principle which connects up all phenomena which in nature and 
society confront mankind. Compared with this, every previous type of rationalism 
is no more than a partial system. 62 
Now according to Lukacs, the concept of the ding an sich serves as the organising or 
structural principle of Kant's rationalist project; moreover it is a principle which serves to 
express the central dilemma of bourgeois thought, namely the inability to comprehend the 
world that the bourgeois subject has itself created. Whether this particular interpretation of 
Kant's thought can be sustained is not an issue that I propose to discuss here; rather it has 
been mentioned so as to illustrate the quite distinct approach of Lukacs to the analysis of 
forms of consciousness. By insisting that phenomena must be grasped in their totality, as 
the unity of a specific form with a specific content, he seeks to transcend Engels' obviously 
ad hoc distinction between the form and content of superstructural phenomena and thereby 
to lay the basis for a more adequate theory of consciousness and ideology. 
Having said something concerning the Hegelian-Marxist critique of the orthodox account 
of historical materialism it is now time to consider their criticism of the other fundamental 
component of Marxist orthodoxy, namely the doctrine of dialectical materialism. In what 
follows, I shall argue that this disastrous doctrine is due in large measure to the rigid 
distinction which Engels makes between the method and the content of Hegel's 
62 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat' in History and Class 
Consciousness, p. 113. 
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philosophy. Before coming to that argument, however, let us recall that central to 
dialectical materialism is the claim that there are certain general laws of development which 
govern processes of change and development in nature and society. Thus describing one 
such law, the law of the negation of the negation, Engels writes: 
And so what is the negation of the negation? An extremely general - and for this 
reason far reaching and important - law of development of nature, history and 
thought; a law which as we have seen, holds good in the animal and plant 
kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and philosophy ... 63 
This quotation neatly illustrates Engels' belief that reality is essentially dynamic, that 
everything is subject to growtl\ maturation and decay and that furthermore every such 
process of change or alteration is governed by certain general laws of development which 
taken together define the theory of dialectical materialism. Now it should be said 
immediately that these supposed laws have not been favourably received by most 
philosophically sophisticated readers of Marx and Engels. On the contrary they have been 
dismissed as either empty of content and/or based upon profound logical errors. 
Furthermore there is a strong body of scholarly opinion which asserts that in this respect 
Engels' enthusiasm for the natural sciences led him to propose a theory which has almost 
no connection with Marx's own thought. Thus in a discussion of Marx's materialist 
reconstruction of Hegel's doctrine, Avineri writes: 
63 Anti-Duhring, p.19S. 
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... it becomes evident that [Marx's] view of materialism differs sharply from the 
mechanistic materialism propounded by Engel's in his Dialectics oj Nature. By 
applying dialectics to nature Engels divorces it from the mediation of 
consciousness. Strictly speaking such a view cannot be termed dialectical at all. 
Although Hegel included inanimate nature in his dialectical system, for him nature 
is spirit in self-estrangment. Hence he did not eliminate consciousness but 
reasserted it panlogistica1ly. This was not the case with Engels, who saw in 
inanimate nature only opaque matter. 64 
In making this point A vineri is of course reiterating an argument familiar to readers of 
Lukacs' History and Class Consciousness. Commenting upon Engels' belief that what 
distinguishes dialectical from mechanistic thought is an emphasis upon interaction rather 
than a form of uni-directional causality, Lukacs declares that he "does not ". mention the 
most vital interaction, namely the dialectical relation between subject and object in the 
historical process, let alone give it the prominence it deserves". 6S In other words dialectic is 
not a general theory of reality but a means of theorising the concrete process through 
which subject and object define each other. Much the same point is made by Marcuse, who 
argues that what characterises the Marxian "inversion" of Hegelian thought is its 
commitment to the real historical process rather than the development of the Notion. 66 
64 The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, pp.65-66. 
6S 'What is Orthodox Marxism?' in History and Class Consciousness, p.3 
66 Amongst members of the Frankfurt School, Marcuse was not alone in rejecting 
the doctrine of dialectical materialism. Thus Adorno declares that: "Dialectics is the 
consistent sense of non-identity. It does not begin by taking a standpoint 
(standpullkt)." (Negative Dialectics, p.5). Horkheimer makes a similar point when. he 
writes: "The dialectal method is the quintessence of all intellectual tools for making 
fruitful the abstract elements derived from the analytic Understanding for the 
39 
This allowed Marx to discover that society, and more especially bourgeois society. is not 
merely the site of specific socio-political conflicts but is structured by contradiction, and in 
particular by the fact that the development of the social life process of capitalist society is a 
development which "speaks against" that society. By way of example, Marcuse cites the 
following: the inherent tendency towards crisis in capitalist economies, the bizarre logic of 
productivity whereby advances in productive technique lead to increasing "scarcity and 
toil", the development of poverty from wealth, and the dehumanising nature of socio-
historical "progress". Each of these examples are proposed as illustrations of the 
dysfunctional nature of capitalist society, of socio-economic developments which are 
essential for capital accumulation whilst simultaneously de stabilising for that same process. 
Hence for Marcuse, as for Lukacs, the significance of dialectic does not consist in its 
capacity to underwrite a general inevitably metaphysical theory of reality, rather that 
dialectic enables thought to discover that capitalist society is characterised by the above 
de stabilising, and potentially explosive contradictions. Indeed, for this member of the 
Frankfurt SchooL Engels' desire to apply dialectic outside of history derives from Hegel's 
idealist philosophy of nature. To understand Marcuse's argument here we need to recall 
that this particular component of the Hegelian system is directly dependent upon the 
idealist thesis that the totality of being is the expression of the Notion, and therefore that all 
of reality is essentially thought. It is because of this spiritualisation of Being that Hegel finds 
it possible to discover contradiction in the organic as well as the inorganic world, for where 
there is thought there is purpose, and where there is purpose there is the potential for self-
representation of the living object. There are .no univ~r~al rules for t~s purpose." 
(,The Rationalism Debate in Contemporary Philosophy 10 Between Philosophy and 
Social Science, p.235) 
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defeat and inner conflict. Oddly enough, Engels despite his declared materialism continues 
this very same project, although far less coherently. For it is one thing to declare that there 
is a dialectic of nature if all of Being is thought; it is quite another to suppose from a 
materialist perspective that matter and motion are characterised by contradiction. Thus 
according to Marcuse this ill-conceived attempt to universalise dialectic, to extend it 
beyond the socio-historical sphere, results in a theory that is marked by vacuousness as 
well as a mass oflogical errors. As he notes: 
It is no accident that in Engels' 'Dialectics of Nature' the dialectical concepts 
appear as mere analogies, figurative and super -imposed upon the content -
strikingly empty or commonplace compared with the exact concreteness of the 
dialectical concepts in the economic and socio-historical writings [of Marx and 
Engels]. 67 
The following extract taken from Engels' Anti-Duhring provides a good example of what 
Marcuse is talking about. Thus as an illustration of the "dialectical law" of the negation of 
the negation Engels considers the process by which a grain of barley develops into a 
mature plant. He writes: 
Billions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and brewed and then consumed. 
But if such a grain of barley meets with conditions which are nonnal for it, if it falls 
on suitable soil, then under the influence of heat and moisture it undergoes a 
specific change, it genninates; the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in 
its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain. But 
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what is the nonnal life process of this plant? It grows, flowers, is fertilised and 
finally once more produces grains of barley, and as soon as these have ripened the 
stalk dies, is in its tum negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have 
once again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten-, twenty- or 
thirty fold. 68 
What is striking about this passage is the profound lack of connection between the process 
Engels is describing and dialectic: to describe the transition from grain to mature plant as a 
"negation" is simply to attach a pretentious label to a familiar process. In short, the above 
description contributes nothing to our store of knowledge concerning either nature or 
reality in general. Rather as Marcuse says the terminology is something that has been 
"superimposed" upon the content of a specific natural science. Even worse, Engels' 
particular example sits uneasily with Hegel's own account of this dialectical principle, for 
the latter posits the notion of the "negation of the negation" in the context of an account 
detailing the process of development by which simple Dasein comes to realise itself as the 
highest fonn of being, namely self-conscious subjectivity. This process takes the form of a 
series of transitions from self to other, of qualitative differentiations, by means of which an 
entity undergoes a process of growth, maturation and decay. For Hegel, however, decay is 
not the simple negation of the thing but rather the basis for the development of something 
that is qualitatively new. 
Now this pattern of argument, it should be said, certainly does occur in Marx's historical 
67 Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis, p.120. 
68 Allti-Duhrillg, p.188. 
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analysis, one might think of for example of the way in which he discusses the transition 
from one mode of production to another. But these transitions, it must be emphasised, are 
like those described in Hegel's Phenomenology~ they represent the dynamic qualitative 
movement from one world historical complex to another. By contrast, Engels' attempt to 
apply dialectics to nature is distinguished by the cyclical, recurrent character of the 
phenomena he describes: the grain of barley merely produces more grains of barley. In fact 
Engels himself is aware of this fact and comments somewhat lamely that species of grain 
take a long time to evolve; but this qualification is beside the point, for he has already 
committed himself to an entirely spurious dialectical analysis of the production and 
reproduction of identity. 
Doubtless a great deal more could be said by way of a detailed criticism of Engels' various 
examples of a "materialist dialectic of nature" but I believe that enough of an argument has 
been produced to indicate why thinkers schooled in the thought of HegeL as well as Marx, 
rejected the philosophical program outlined in Anti-Duhring and Dialectics oj Nature. 
Before closing this particular discussion, however, I want to say something in more general 
tenns concerning Engels' approach to the theory of dialectic. As we have seen, one reason 
why Engels goes so badly astray in this area is the fact that he unwittingly bases his 
discussion on Hegel's Idealism, and in particular on his idealist construction of nature. 
There is however another reason, namely Engels' separation of method and content. Thus 
he begins by supposing that Marx somehow preserves Hegel's dialectical method whilst 
disposing of the idealist content of the latter's thought. It is an argument, however, that 
should be utterly rejected. To appreciate the bizarre nature of the interpretation, it is 
sufficient to recall that for both Hegel and Marx no easy separation of method and content 
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is possible. According to Hegel the content of philosophy is thought, or more precisely the 
structure of thought in its process of self-realisatio~ but this structure is at the same time 
the very method which thought must use to become aware of itself Similarly for Marx.. 
who argues that the way in which we theoretically appropriate the world (method) is not 
independent of the way the world is: the history of social being (content) is at the same 
time the history of the theoretical fonns through which we become conscious of that 
process.69 As Lukacs observes: 
Hence only by overcoming the - theoretical - duality of philosophy and special 
discipline, of methodology and factual knowledge can the way be found by which 
to annul the duality of thought and existence. Every attempt to overcome the 
duality dialectically in logic, in a system of thought stripped of every concrete 
relation to existence is doomed to failure. (And we may observe that despite many 
opposing tendencies in his work, Hegel's philosophy was of this type.) For every 
pure logic is Platonic: it is thought released from existence and hence ossified. 70 
Lukacs' stricture can be reasonably applied to Engels' "Laws of Dialectic", for they have 
been extracted from Hegel's system as a fonnal logic of development which is then 
superimposed upon the natural world. Unlike the dialectical thought of Marx and Engels' 
socio-historical studies, a dialectic that develops by means of a "concrete relation to 
existence", Engels' attempt to theorise nature amounts to no more than a series of loose 
69 In a footnote (#72) to Marxism and Philosophy, Korsch observes tha~: '.'Th~ inability 
to comprehend this relationship of identio/ between ~onn. and conte~t. dls~~gwshes the 
transcendental from the dialectical standpomt (whether Idealist or matenalist). 
70 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat' in History alld Class 
('onsciousness, p.203. 
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analogies which illuminate neither the subject matter nor the relation of thOUght to its 
content. In summazy Engels' dialectic of nature is, as Lukacs would put it, a Platonic logic 
released from existence. 
Conclusion and Preview 
What has been said thus far concerning the positive content of Frankfurt Marxism has been 
stated in a schematic and summazy fashion. However, as Hegel realised long ago, the real 
meaning of a philosophical thesis cannot be presented simply as a result but must be 
derived from the process of enqUiry which produces it. 71 In the case of the Frankfurt 
School, as I have already indicated, this developmental process has to be seen, at least 
initially, in tenns of the attitude taken by the critical theorists to the dispute between the 
orthodox and Hegelian Marxists. With respect to the genesis of critical theory, this dispute 
is especially important because it centres on the nature of the relation between Hegel's 
philosophy and Marx's theory of society. The early chapters of this study, therefore, are 
intended to establish that many of the questions which define critical theory, as well as the 
answers to some of those questions, derive from the work of the Hegelian Marxists. 
Considered in itself, this is not a particularly original claim~ most commentators recognise 
the importance of Lukacs and Korsch in the formation of critical theory.72 However, as 
71 As Hegel writes: "For the real issue is not exhausted by stating it as an aim, but by 
carrying it out, nor is the result the actual whole, but rather the result together with the 
process through which it came about." Phenomenology of Spirit, §3. 
72 On the relation between Hegelian Marxism and the Frankfurt School see the 
following: Susan Buck-Morrs, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, pp.24-32~ Martin Jay, 
Ihe Dialectical Imagination, pp.41-42; Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality, pp.197-98; 
Phil Slater, Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School, pp. 36-38. 
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Andrew Feenberg has observed "this influence is frequently acknowledged, but it has yet to 
be traced out in any detail. ,,73 Part of the intention behind this thesis therefore is to provide 
some of this detail as well as to demonstrate its relevance to the task of bringing the central 
questions of critical theory into sharper theoretical focus. In so doing my purpose is not 
simply to produce a historical account of critical theory but also to assess the Validity of the 
critical theorist's project. Indeed, as this study proceeds, it should become clear that there is 
no possibility of either describing or evaluating that project without a clear understanding 
of its theoretical genesis. 
By way of conclusion to the present chapter I shall outline the general structure of the 
argument which will be developed in this thesis. The discussion begins in Chapter 2 with a 
critical account of Korsch's seminal essay Marxism and Philosophy. At the time of its 
publication this short essay caused a considerable stir amongst both Western and Russian 
Marxists, for it challenged not only the political passivity of the Western orthodox Marxist 
tradition but also undennined the near universally held scientistic interpretation of Marx's 
thought. My discussion of Korsch will focus on the following two questions. First, I will 
consider the relation between Marxist theory and the transformative political praxis 
associated with revolutionary socialism, and in particular examine whether there is an 
essential connection between the two, or whether as the neo-Kantians argued it is the case 
that Marxism requires some kind of ethical supplement so as to relate Marx's analysis of 
capitalism to the project of constructing a new social order. Second I will ask how we are 
to understand Marx's famous claim that consciousness is determined by social being. As 
we have already seen, the attempt to provide a coherent account of this relation had caused 
7:. f-ukacs, Marx and the Smlrces o/Critical Theory, p.xii. 
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the orthodox Marxist tradition some considerable trouble; to recap, the problem was that 
any attempt to move away from a rigid economic determinism, the material base 
determines the superstructure of ideas, seemed to lead almost immediately to a fatal 
dilution of the principles of historical materialism. Commenting directly on this question 
Korsch argued that consciousness and social being cannot be held rigidly apart, and that 
indeed consciousness has a constitutive function with respect to a range of social 
phenomena. In the process of explicating this particular thesis, I shall indicate a number of 
problems which must first be solved before Korsch's approach can be successfully 
integrated into a materialist theory of society. I shall also point to some of the ways in 
which his discussion of this matter anticipates the later work of Horkheimer and his 
colleagues. 
Having reviewed as well as criticised Korsch' s attempt to recover the philosophical 
foundations of Marxism I shall tum in Chapter 3 to a consideration of Horkheimer' s 
project of multi-disciplinary materialism, and in particular to his belief that in the wake of 
Hegel and Marx philosophy can only progress by means of a decisive tum towards to the 
theory of society. Accordingly the focus of this chapter will be on Horkheimer's attempt to 
shift philosophy away from its concern with the autarchic consciousness and move it 
instead towards the study of how thought is bound up with forms of social life. The chapter 
begins with a discussion of Korsch' s thesis that Marxism represents the supersession of the 
classical philosophical tradition. It is then argued that Horkheimer's demand that 
philosophy must develop by means of a materialist social theory is an instance as well as a 
development of this strategy of supersession. Having established why Horkheimer makes 
this particular move, I proceed in the next chapter to examine more precisely the nature of 
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the theory that he had in mind. More particularly this chapter is concerned to distinguish 
the Institute's project of multi-disciplinary materialism from the mainstream tradition of 
empirical social science. Hence whilst providing an account of this project I will seek to 
refute the charge that Horkheimer, whether consciously or otherwise, is promoting yet 
another positivist version of Marxism.74 In pursuance of this question a considerable 
portion of the chapter will be devoted to reconstructing his critique of the empiricist model 
of social theory. This critique takes as its premise the claim that social theory whilst 
respecting the need for empirical evidence should refuse to submit to what Adorno has 
called "the tyranny of the fact". Thus in place of the abstract and essentially static image of 
reality constructed by empiricism the Frankfurt theorists seek to construct a historical, 
dynamic and therefore potentially critical account of social phenomena. The tension 
between these two approaches to the theory of society constitutes the major topic of 
Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 looks in some detail at what is surely the principle methodological aspect of 
Frankfurt Marxism, namely its commitment to the Hegelian concept of totality. Because 
this concept has become something of a tenn of art in the literature, the initial section of the 
chapter is devoted to a detailed examination of its role in Hegel's idealist philosophy. The 
discussion then moves on to consider whether it is possible for materialism to coherently 
utilise this concept without falling back, as critics often allege that Lukacs did, into a form 
of Left Idealism. Indeed, in the course of the argument I shall demonstrate that 
Horkheimer's attempt to fonnulate a materialist dialectic between subject and object, 
74 Hanke Brunkhorst makes this charge in his article 'Dialectical Positivism of 
Happiness: Max Horkheimer's Materialist Deconstruction of Philosophy' in 011 Max 
Horkheimer: New Perspectives, p.68. 
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where it is not unacceptably vague, comes perilously close to an idealist position. The 
chapter concludes with an examination of Adorno's important but sadly neglected 
meditation on this question, and in particular his claim that a materialist totality is one in 
which the subject -object dialectic is governed by what he calls the "preponderance of the 
object".75 This thesis is important because, as I shall argue, it offers the possibility of 
reconstructing historical materialism not as an instance of causal detenninism but as a thesis 
whose starting point is with the fact that consciousness is essentially embodied 
consciousness, that thinking is the activity of subjects burdened with physical need and 
desire. The chapter concludes by considering whether this alternative interpretation 
provides a more plausible basis than the vulgar Marxist inversion metaphor for 
distinguishing Marx's materialism from the Idealism of his philosophical mentor. 
Chapter 6 takes a substantive tum and examines the Frankfurt School's attempt to 
synthesise Marx's theory of historical materialism with Freud's analytical psychology. Here 
I advance the argument that this particular synthesis is an attempt to offer a concrete 
construction of a materialist subject-object dialectic. More especially I shall maintain that 
the interest in psycho-analytical theory is a reflection of the fact that Marxism lacks a 
satisfactory theory of the subject, and that therefore it is incapable of relating the particular 
to the general, the individual to society. Indeed according to the Frankfurt School this 
failure is highlighted by the fact that orthodox Marxism has never been able to satisfactorily 
75 For example, David Held in his otherwise comprehensive Introduction to Critical 
Theory fails to discuss this particular thesis. Similarly Raymond Geuss in his review of 
Negative Dialectics chooses to pass over this question and like Held focuses upon 
Adorno's critique of identity thinking. (Journal of Philosophy, 1975, pp.167-175). 
Obviously in any study or review of the work of a thinker choices hav~ t? be made, . 
but to omit all reference to Adorno's attempt to reformulate the matenahst hypotheSIS 
is like seeking to discuss Marx's political economy whilst ignoring his concept of 
value. 
49 
explain why it is that large sections of the proletariat have given their adherence to 
ideologies and social systems which operate against their interest as a class. Certainly in the 
twentieth century the most spectacular example of this kind of false consciousness is that 
provided by the emergence of the irrationalist mass movement in Gennany which gave 
birth to National Socialism. Faced with this radical degeneration in the consciousness of the 
class singled out by Marx as the new universal class, Marxist orthodoxy had very little to 
say that was at all convincing. By contrast the Frankfurt School, in focusing upon the 
interplay between societal phenomena and instinctual drive structures, developed a range of 
hypotheses, the most famous being that of the authoritarian personality, which appeared to 
promise at least a degree of insight into this particular phase of late capitalism. Here it 
should be said that the detail of their arguments concerning the specific nature of Fascism 
raises a substantial number of socio-historical issues which clearly go well beyond the 
scope of this particular thesis.76 In order to avoid superficiality I shall therefore ignore these 
and concentrate instead on providing answers to the following more general but 
methodologically focused questions concerning the relation between historical materialism 
and depth psychology. First I discuss whether Marxism does in fact stand in need of a 
theory of the subject so as to complement the system of political economy outlined in 
Capital. Second I consider whether it is reasonable to suppose that classical psycho-
analytical theory could convincingly play this role. These questions, it seems to me, provide 
the essential theoretical preliminary for any adequate assessment of the various analyses of 
particular historical-social fonnations offered by members of the Frankfurt School. 
76 The classic statement of this thesis is to be found in the published results of a 
collaborative study between members of the Institute and the Psychology Department 
at Berkeley University. These results were published in 1950 under the title The 
Authoritarian Personality. 
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In the final chapter I return to a consideration of what it is that distinguishes Frankfurt 
Marxism from mainstream orthodox Marxism as well as traditional scientific theories. The 
conclusion that I shall seek to establish is that unlike their orthodox rivals the Frankfurt 
School understood Marxism as a theory whose primary orientation is towards the critique 
of existing reality. Thus Marxism is not a new positive science of society, akin say to 
Darwin's evolutionary biology, but a dialectic directed towards the negation of a particular 
social form. This form of critique, it will be argued, acquires force because it is grounded in 
the subject-object dialectic which produces society itself In other words the critique is not 
external to the historical process but is shown to be internal or immanent to its object; it is a 
critique that in the classic Hegelian fashion constitutes itself as a movement of 
consciousness coming to an awareness of its own purposes and intentions. This approach 
overcomes the classic positivist duality of fact and value: the critical theory of Frankfurt 
Marxism is simultaneously an analysis as well as an evaluation of bourgeois society. Indeed 
an understanding of the logic of immanence will reveal that these two apparently 
distinguishable moments of thought are necessarily combined in the development of any 
kind of adequate social theory. 
Having outlined the basic structure of the thesis I shall make a number of brief observations 
concerning my general approach to the Frankfurt School. The first such is that contrary to 
the emphasis of the many commentators who dwell upon the differences between the 
various members of the Frankfurt School my principal concern is to identify the substantial 
common core of ideas that characterise the work of these theorists. This core includes 
amongst other things a wide-ranging critique of the mainstream empirical social sciences, 
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the reconstruction of materialism around Hegel's subject-object dialectic and an attempted 
synthesis of Marxism with psycho-analytical theol)'. In making this claim, however. I am 
not for a moment seeking to argue that the work of Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse 
constitutes a single, unified and consistent body of theol)'. Clearly this is vel)' far from the 
case: to cite just one example, Marcuse's revisionazy study of Freudian theol)', Eros and 
Civilisation, found vel)' little favour with either Adorno or Horkheimer, both of whom 
held to a more orthodox conception of the psycho-analytical enterprise. Nevertheless, there 
are good reasons for focusing upon what is more or less common to these theorists. Most 
importantly it will enable us to subject various of the central elements of the Frankfurt 
Marxist tradition to a close critical scrutiny. Indeed it is my contention that despite a 
significant and still growing literature upon the work of these thinkers much of the 
discussion takes place upon a poorly defined theoretical basis. To take just one example the 
concept of totality is frequently referenced in the literature, yet vel)' few commentators 
take the trouble to discuss its origins in the Hegelian system nor to elucidate the problems 
associated with utilising this concept within the materialist tradition. 77 This is 
unsatisfactol)', for as I shall demonstrate the Frankfurt Marxist project is from a 
methodological point of view grounded in this aspect of Hegel' s thought. 
My second observation concerning the structure of this thesis is that it is largely, although 
not exclusively, centred around the work of Max Horkheimer. This choice does not reflect 
a belief that Horkheimer's work is markedly superior to that of his colleagues; on the 
contrazy it is my opinion that amongst the critical theorists Adorno is by far the most 
77 Martin Jay's ground breaking study of the Frankfurt School, The Dialec!ical 
Imagination, is a case in point. I?espite offering a .useful account ~f the gene~ls of 
critical theory Jay has almost nothing to say concerrung the role of this concept tn the 
work of Horkheimer and his colleagues. 
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profound thinker. Nevertheless for the purposes of this thesis Horkheimer's writings have 
been emphasised because of their programmatic quality and because of the fact that he was 
responsible, especially in the period 1931-1940, for first charting the various courses of 
research which were to characterise the intellectual life of the Institute over the next thirty 
years. Having said that I shall by no means ignore the contribution of his fellow theorists, 
in particular Adorno and Marcuse, to the development of critical theory. 
Finally I would like to emphasis yet again that my approach to the Frankfurt School is 
governed by the belief that their work must be firmly situated within the Marxist tradition. 
More specifically, and certainly more controversially I shall argue that the Institute's variety 
of Marxism is, far from being an exercise in revisionism, an attempt to return to some of 
the fundamental elements of Marx's thought. Certainly this thesis would be fiercely 
disputed by many, and for a great variety of reasons. Unfortunately, not all of these 
arguments can be considered in the present work. For instance, to maintain my position 
with respect to Adorno and Horkheimer's idiosyncratic and deeply obscure Dialectic of 
Enlightenment would represent a substantial task of exegesis and interpretation all on its 
own.78 Indeed commentators such as Helmut Dubiel have argued that Horkheimer's 
program of critical theory is succeeded in the period after 1940 by a radically new 
theoretical discourse, the primary concern of which is with the destructive effect of 
instrumental reason on human existence. For DubieL the text which defines this project, 
namely Dialectic of Enlightement, represents a radical departure from the Marxist 
theoretical tradition because, as he observes, the theory it articulates 
78 For some interesting comments on this text see Stefan Breuer's article 'Adorno's 
Anthropology', Telos, 64, Summer 1985, pp. 15-31. 
53 
... no longer takes as its object the fonns - particularly the capitalist forms - of 
social intercourse by which the human species reproduces itself in appropriating 
nature. Instead, their concern is the world-historical drama of the active 
confrontation of the human species with nature. 79 
Dubiel is not alone in this assessment of the work of the Frankfurt School during this 
period.80 For instance, Slater from an orthodox Marxist position argues that Dialectic ~f 
Enlightenment is a stage in the transfonnation of critical theory into a fonn of Left 
Hegelianism. In Slater's view the theory's criticism of Enlightenment has become divorced 
from any form of critical praxis: it is the criticism of one idea by another, and in 
consequence degenerates into Idealism.81 Unfortunately, whilst the arguments of both of 
these writers deserve consideration this thesis will be unable to provide that service. 
However although the present work has no pretension to completeness, I believe that 
enough will have been said to indicate the way in which a discussion of the relation 
between Marxism and the Frankfurt School's critique of Enlightenment may be most 
usefully advanced. This task it seems to me is important because Marx, despite all attempts 
to bury his work, remains a thinker whose work is seminal for an understanding of the 
social and political dramas of the contemporary world. In consequence, and insofar as the 
79 Theory and Politics, pp.92-93. 
80 The key texts of this period are Dialectic of Enlightenment, written j?intly b~ Adorno 
and Horkheimer in 1944, Adorno's Minima Moralia( 1951) and Horkhetmer's }-,chpse oj 
Reason( 1946). 
81 Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt School, pp.87-88. 
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Frankfurt School help us to read and understand Marx in new and often productive wavs, 
their work constitutes an important indispensable element in that tradition of thought 
launched by Hegel's most brilliant pupil. 
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Chapter 2. Marxism and Praxis: Korsch and the Frankfurt School 
In opposition to the orthodox conception of Marxism as a "science of history", 
distinguished from the existing natural sciences by subject matter rather than method, the 
Frankfurt School held to the view that Marx's theory is essentially critical and negative and 
therefore qualitatively different from any form of traditional scientific practice. This 
characterisation of Marxism, I shall argue, depends to a significant degree upon Korsch 
and Lukacs' prior rediscovery of the centrality of Hegel's dialectic to all aspects of Marx's 
thought. 1 On their account, Marx is, first and foremost, a dialectical thinker concerned to 
elaborate the dynamically reciprocal relation between subject and object, as opposed to 
being either a political economist, sociologist or historian working within the conventional 
boundaries of those disciplines. Furthermore, because the Korsch-Lukacs appropriation of 
Marx emphasises the constitutive role of subjectivity in the production of social 
phenomena, it promises a form of materialism free from the passivity and determinism 
characteristic of Marxist orthodoxy. By focusing upon the previously under-theorised 
domains of consciousness and praxis, these two theorists re-opened, or perhaps more 
accurately opened up for the first time the question of the precise relation between idealist 
philosophy and Marx's theory of historical materialism. This same question, I shall argue, is 
central to the work of the Frankfurt School and in consequence the original project of 
critical theory, if it is to be understood at all, must be seen as a continuation, although 
1 Cf Preface to History and Class Consciousness, p.xliv., where Lukacs argues that 
many of Marx's commentators "have failed to notice that a whole series of categories oj 
central importance and in constant use [in Marx's wo~ks] stem directly from H.e~el's 
Logic." Similarly, Korsch remarks that: "The sense of therr [Marx and Enge~s] mate~al~sm 
is distorted in a disastrous and irreparable manner if one forgets that MarxIst matenahsm 
was dialectical from the very beginning". (Marxism and Philosophy, p.68.) 
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certainly not an uncritical continuatioI\ of the earlier Hegelian Marxist tradition. 2 
Accordingly, this chapter will be largely devoted to a discussion of the influence of 
Hegelian-Marxism, and more particularly that of Korsch, on the Frankfurt School's 
attempt to liberate Marx from the clutches of scientistic orthodoxy. I have chosen to 
concentrate upon this theorist, rather than Lukacs, because by and large there has been 
very little substantive discussion of the role played by Korsch's early work in the genesis of 
critical theory. Of course, this is not to say that Lukacs' contribution to this area will be 
altogether ignored. However, as I will demonstrate, Korsch deserves as much credit as his 
better known contemporary for recovering the critical, revolutionary potential of Marx's 
thought. 
I shall begin by considering Korsch' s belief that what is distinctive about Marxism is its 
practical-critical orientatioI\ or as he puts it the unity of theory with praxis. 3 This account 
is followed by a discussion of the Korschian thesis that consciousness, far from being a 
reflex phenomenoI\ a mental image of a pre-existing social world, is in fact partially 
constitutive of that world. In Chapter 3 the argument continues with a consideration of 
Korsch's view that Marxism represents the dialectical supersession of the classical idealist 
tradition rather than its scientific nemesis. All of this material is intended to serve as a 
prelude to an examination ofHorkheimer's attempt to use Hegelian thought, especially as 
2 The positive influence of the Hegelian Marxist program upon members of the Frankfurt 
School, and in particular their reading of Marx, is not difficult to discover. By way of 
example we may consider the following statement from Marcuse: "The historical heritage 
of Hegel's philosophy ... did not pass to the 'Hegelians'(neither o!the ~ght nor of the l~~) -
they were not the ones who kept alive the true content of this philosophy .. The ~tlcal 
tendencies of the Hegelian philosophy, rather, were taken over by, and contmued In, the 
Marxian social theory". (Reason and Revolution, p.2S2.) 
3 The term practical-critical is used by Marx in t.he T1z.ese~ o.n Fellr~a~h to differentiate 
his concept of materialism from a purely contemplatIve SClentt5ttc matenallsm. 
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it is reflected through the work of Korsch and Lukacs, as a means of reconstructing the 
methodological basis of Marx's historical and social theory. Taken together these chapters 
serve a twofold purpose. First, they are intended to identify as well as to subject to critical 
scrutiny, the cluster of ideas common to both the Hegelian-Marxists and the Frankfurt 
theorists. Second they provide a basis for investigating the contrast between the Hegelian-
Marxist conception of a positive dialectical reconciliation of subject and object, and the 
Frankfurt School's considerably more negativistic conception of the nature of a materialist 
dialectic. In short, this chapter and the next are concerned to introduce a set of questions 
that will assist in specifYing the differences as well as well as the similarities between the 
thought of the first generation of critical theorists and that of the Hegelian Marxists. 
Korsch, Lukilcs and the Frankfurt School 
At a certain level of generality it is not difficult to demonstrate the influence of Lukacs on 
most of the leading members of the Frankfurt School. Horkheimer's programmatic articles, 
for instance, contain numerous formulations of the dialectical method which come straight 
out of the pages of History and Class Consciousness. 4 Similarly, there are many passages 
in Marcuse's work bearing witness to the direct influence of the young Lukacs in the 
formation of critical theory. S Even Adorno, who was in many respects, highly critical of 
4 Cf Horkheimer's 'Traditional and Critical Theory' and 'Materialism and Metaphysics' 
both in Critical Theory: Selected Works. See also the earlier 'Materialism and Morality', in 
Between Philosophy and Social Science. 
S Compare, for instance, the following extracts from Lukacs ~d Marcuse. Lukacs writes 
that: "Nature is a societal category. That is to say, whatever IS held to be natural at any 
given stage of social development, ... , its content, its range and its objectivity are all ~ci~y 
conditioned." (History and Class Consciousness, p.234.) Marcuse makes a similar 
observation when he observes that: "The dialectical totality again includes nature, but only 
insofar as the latter enters and conditions the historical process of social reproduction." 
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Lukacs' Hegelian formulation of the materialist thesis, announced his own philosophical 
program by utilising Lukacs' argument that philosophical problems can be resolved by 
reflection upon the historical conditions in which they arise.6 But if: as these examples 
suggest, the influence of Lukacs is reasonably transparent, the question of Korsch's 
contribution to the Frankfurt program is more problematic. Here, the various 
commentaries display a degree of confusion as well as conflict. Thus Susan Buck-Morrs 
claims that whilst Adorno was attracted to Hegelian Marxism, neither Adorno nor 
Benjamin, the latter being singled out by Buck-Morrs as an important influence upon 
Adorno, were particularly impressed by Korsch's work. 7 Similarly Martin Jay in The 
Dialectical Imagination cites Korsch, alongside Lukacs, as an important influence upon 
critical theory; yet in a later work he argues that Korsch was an essentially marginal figure 
in the intellectual life of the Institute. 8 To support this claim Jay cites a passage from 
Negative Dialectics, in which Adorno specifically criticises Korsch's tendency to surrender 
the autonomy of theory to the pragmatic requirements of praxis.9 Against this largely 
(Reason and Revolution, p.314). 
6 Cf Adorno's inaugural lecture 'The Actuality of Philosophy' in Telos, 31, Spring 1977. 
7 The Origin of Negative Dialectics, p.207. Certainly as Buck-Morrs suggests Benjamin 
had rather mixed feelings about Korsch. Thus he writes in a letter (10.11. 1930) to Adorno: 
"I have read Korsch'sMarxism and Philosophy. Rather faltering steps - so it seems to me -
in the right direction". Theodor Adorno - Walter Benjamin: The Complete 
Corre~pondence 1928-1940. 
8 The Dialectical Imagination, pp. 41-44. 
9 Marxism and Totality, p.149. Adorno's referenc~ to K?~sch is ~erhaps more 
ambiguous than Jay realises. Adorno rarely engaged m expliCIt polenuc WIth other 
Marxists, thus his mention of Korsch might suggest that he believed that Korsch's work, 
although mistaken, should be taken seriously. I!l a letter to ~enek (20.10.38), Adorno 
describes Korsch as "this intelligent and eccentnc man ... who IS really S? ~ar left, that he 
practically comes out again on the right." Quoted in Buck-Morr's Ongm of Negaflve 
Dialectics, p.207. 
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negative assessment, Philip Slater argues that Marcuse and Horkheimer, both of whom 
positively cite Korsch's work, were in broad agreement with his critique of Marxist 
orthodoxy.lO This position is supported by Douglas Kellner, a former student of Marcuse, 
who states without reservation that "the Korsch-Lukacs interpretation of Hegelian 
Marxism represented the most advanced and revolutionary current of Marxism which most 
strongly influenced [Marcuse's] own appropriation of Marx. ,,11 In summary, depending 
upon the commentator selected, Korsch is either a marginal figure making "weak steps" 
towards a Marxism free from the chains of orthodoxy or he is a substantial theorist, equal 
only to Lukacs, in respect of his influence amongst members of the Frankfurt School. 
This dispute, I believe, does not arise simply from exegetical errors but reflects a certain 
ambiguity on the part of the Frankfurt School towards the coupling of theory and praxis. 
With Korsch there is no such ambiguity; he consistently argues that Marxism is to be 
distinguished from traditional science in virtue of the fact that it is premised upon the 
immediate unproblematic unity of theory and practice. In other words materialism, unlike 
the natural sciences, makes the claim that the project of comprehending the world is 
essentially bound up with the attempt to transform it. By contrast, it might be said of 
critical theory that this is a form of Marxism without any pretension to a transformative 
capacity. The opening sentence of Adorno's Negative Dialectics puts the matter thus: 
"Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realise it was 
missed." This remark might be taken to imply not only that the social revolution envisaged 
10 Origin and Significance of the Franlifurt School, pp.3S-38, p.Sl. 
11 Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism, p.40. See also T.B.Bottomore's The 
Frankfurt School, p.72, for a positive assessment of the impact of Korsch' s thought upon 
the evolution of critical theory. 
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by Marx has so far not come about, and that philosophy therefore lives on, but also that the 
possibility of such a utopian moment has passed forever. Marcuse appears to make a 
similar point when he observes that: "The critical theory of society possesses no concepts 
which could bridge the gap between the present and its future; holding no promise and 
showing no success, it remains negative." 12 Both of these quotations suggest the woeful 
paradox of Marxist philosophers compelled by historical development to admit that their 
theory can no longer change the world but only interpret it. If this is true then the relation 
between the Frankfurt School and Korsch appears to be entirely negative: the critical 
theorists reject Korsch's praxis oriented version of Marxism precisely because they believe 
that history has effectively foreclosed on any possibility of revolutionary praxis. However, I 
shall argue that this view of the matter is a misleading simplification. Despite the critical 
theorist's pessimistic assessment of the possibility of immediately relating theory to praxis, 
they did not abandon the regulative idea that an adequate theory of society is also, if only 
potentially, a socially transformative force. Nor despite numerous claims to the contrary did 
they ever unequivocally renounce the possibility of humanity emancipating itself from the 
tyranny of administered capitalism. Thus Adorno, widely regarded as the most pessimistic 
member of the Frankfurt School could write as late as 1968 concerning the veil of 
mystification generated by capitalist relations of production: 
However unbreakable the spell, it is only a spell. If sociology, instead of merely 
providing agencies and interested parties with welcome information, is to fulfil 
something of the task for which it was once conceived , then it must make its 
contribution, however modest, using means that do not themselves fall victim to 
12 (Jne Dimensional Man, p.200. 
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the universal fetishism; thus may the spell be broken. 13 
This remark illustrates the persistent internal tension within the Frankfurt Marxist tradition 
between theory and praxis; for the theory simultaneously reveals the difficulties in the way 
of an effective revolutionary struggle whilst never renouncing the importance or possibility 
of that struggle. Put another way it might be said that Frankfurt social theory is intended to 
point to a range of material, social and cultural forces which act to obstruct or hinder the 
coming-into-being of a class conscious proletariat but that in making this argument the 
theory by no means denies that this process is also an important potential of capitalist 
society. Thus although Adorno and his colleagues held to the view that in most of Western 
Europe and America the proletariat had become atomised and to a large measure 
incorporated into the bourgeois social order, they never declared that this condition was 
either permanent or irreversible. On the contrary they continued to advance a critical theory 
of society in the hope that this activity might in some measure contribute to breaking the 
spell of commodity fetishism, to changing the "happy consciousness" of the contemporary 
world. If this is true it follows that the attempt to sharply counterpose the thought of 
Korsch (as well as Lukacs) to that of the critical theorists is a mistake. Indeed, as I shall 
argue, a careful reading of his essay Marxism and Philosophy leads to the view that 
Frankfurt Marxism derives, in some significant degree, from a critical but sympathetic 
response to many of the ideas contained in this work. In summary these ideas, together 
with those of Lukacs, constitute as will be demonstrated the single most important and 
immediate theoretical source for the Frankfurt program. 
13 'Is Marx Obsolete?', Diogenes, 64, Winter 1968. 
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Philosophy, Science and Marxism 
Central to Korsch's essay Marxism and Philosophy is the idea that historical materialism 
far from representing a "scientific" break with German Idealism is in reality the heir of that 
earlier philosophical movement. 14 Using the language of speculative thought, we might say 
that for Korsch the relation between these two theoretical traditions is one of sublation 
(Aujhebung) rather than simple negation: materialism transcends Idealism but at the same 
time preserves at least some of the content of that earlier philosophical project. Engels, of 
course, had already advanced an apparently similar thesis, arguing that Marx: does not 
simply put Hegel aside but starts out from the revolutionary aspect of his thought, namely 
the "dialectical method". For this reason, Engels argues, the German proletarian 
movement, insofar as it is the practical expression of Marx:' s critique of society, is "the 
inheritor of classical German philosophy".ls Unfortunately, as we have seen, Engels' 
discussion of this matter, apart from being somewhat philosophically naive, is flawed not 
only by an untenable distinction between method and content but also by a form of 
positivism that reduces philosophy to science. By comparison, Korsch's work is 
philosophically more literate, displaying a keen appreciation of the difficulties involved in 
seeking to determine the relation between Marxism and idealist philosophy. Thus 
commenting upon the claim that the materialism of Marx: and Engels constitutes the 
14 The essay was originally published by Carl Grunberg in the Archiv fur die Geschichte 
des Socialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung. In the early years of the Institute, the Archiv 
served as its official publication. Despite its appearance in an academic journal Korsch's 
essay rapidly gained political notoriety: his work ~as criticis~ at the 192~ <;o?gress of the 
German Social Democratic Party as well as bemg the subject of a vttnohc attack by 
Zinoviev at the Fifth World Congress of the Communist International held in the same 
year. 
IS Engels, F., 'Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy' in Marx and 
Engels: Selected Works, p.622. 
63 
"abolition of philosophy", Korsch poses the following relevantly concrete questions: 
How should this process [of abolition] be accomplished, or has it already been 
accomplished? By what actions? At what speed? And for whom? Should this 
abolition of philosophy be regarded as accomplished so to speak once and for all by 
a single intellectual deed of Marx and Engels? Should it be regarded as 
accomplished only for Marxists, or for the whole proletariat, or for the whole of 
humanity? Or should we see it (like the abolition of the State) as a very long and 
arduous revolutionary process which unfolds through the most diverse phases? If 
so, what is the relationship of Marxism to philosophy so long as this arduous 
process has not yet attained its final goal, the abolition of philosophy?16 
As this passage suggests, Korsch, unlike Engels, did not regard the abolition (or sublation) 
thesis as an immediate or self-evident truth. On the contrary, he believed that the notion of 
abolition required careful elaboration so as to distinguish it from the idea, positivist in 
origin, that the "science of Marxism" simply replaces philosophy. In trying to clarifY this 
point, Korsch saw himself as providing a much-needed defence of Marxism against those 
thinkers, Marxists as well as non-Marxists, who believed that historical materialism had 
little or no intrinsic philosophical significance. Describing the nineteenth century reception 
of Marx's theory Korsch observes that: 
Bourgeois professors of philosophy reassured each other that Marxism had no 
philosophical content of its own - and thought they were saying something against 
16 Marxism and Philosophy, p.47. 
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it. Orthodox Marxists also reassured each other that their Marxism by its vel} 
nature had nothing do with philosophy - and thOUght they were saying something 
important in favour of it. 17 
Although these "professors of philosophy" are not explicitly identified it is almost certain 
that the intention behind this passage is to refer to the various adherents of the nineteenth 
century philosophical movement known as neo-Kantianism. To appreciate that this is a 
reasonable hermeneutic step, we need only recall that in Korsch's time neo-Kantianism was 
the dominant philosophical force in the German speaking world, and that amongst German 
academic philosophers it held a near-monopoly position.I8 These latter-day followers of 
Kant sought to distinguish themselves from the Hegelian tradition by re-instating 
epistemology, now interpreted as the theory of the natural and historical sciences, as the 
fundamental philosophical discipline. Thus according to Paul Natorp, a prominent member 
of the Marburg School, philosophy is "the theory of the principles of science and therewith 
ofall culture." Furthermore philosophy, on Natorp's account, is to be construed as a quite 
specific epistemological project, namely the critique, in the Kantian sense of that term, of 
our scientific world-picture. This project was conceived of as a largely transcendental 
investigation into the experiential structures that are the necessary underpinning of all 
scientific knowledge. Hence, for Natorp and his disciples, where science says something 
17 Marxism and Philosophy, p.32. 
18 As Korsch notes, this movement even exerted an influence amongst Marxists, some of 
whom argued that as a science Marx's theory had to be complemented by an external 
philosophical system. This lacuna was usu~y co~ceiyed of ~. te~s ?f an ~~t 
epistemology or ethics, the fonner being reqU1f~ to JUstify .mat~nalism s clrum t?at It IS a 
science whilst the latter was required to underpm the practlcal mterest of Marx s theory, 
namely the goal ofa socialist society. (Marxism and Philosophy, footnote #7, p.32-33.) 
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true about the world, philosophy by reflecting upon science says something about the very 
possibility of this knowledge. 19 Consequently whilst neo-Kantians took the view that 
philosophy must inevitably concern itself with science, they nevertheless sought to maintain 
a sharp distinction between these two branches of theoretical labour. In summary: 
philosophy, in contrast to the first order scientific disciplines, was regarded as a second-
order activity dealing with questions which although dependent upon the existence and 
results of the individual sciences are not themselves scientific questions. On the other hand, 
first order disciplines, whether natural or social sciences, were regarded as providing an 
empirically grounded knowledge of the world rather than being concerned with the 
theorisation of the possibility of that knowledge. 
This sharp separation, on the part of the neo-Kantians, of the content of knowledge from 
its form helps to explain why so many Gennan philosophers found it difficult to relate 
Marxism to philosophy. On their view Marxism, because it understands itself to be a 
scientific theory, is prohibited from claiming a distinctive philosophical content~ for insofar 
as it is a genuine science of history and society it is unable to constitute itself as a 
meditation upon the very possibility of that science. The most that could be said is that if 
Marx's theory turned out to be a genuine science its cognitive structure would be a matter 
for legitimate philosophical concern. But this aversion towards the substantive was not the 
only difficulty hindering the German academy from recognising Marx as a serious 
philosophical voice; the other obstacle was that Marx himself conceived of his thought as a 
19 Neo-Kantianism was, in fact, divided into two schools. The Marburg School, lead by 
Cohen and Natorp, argued that the mathematical sciences consi~te .a paradi.gm for all 
systematic knowledge. By contrast the South-West School, ~nnclpally. ~cke~ and 
Windelband, argued that the natural and cultural sciences were not m comp~ltlon With one 
another but were equally valid, although distinctive methods of research. This argument, as 
we shall see, finds a strong echo in the work of the young Lukacs. 
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form of praxis, as an intervention into rather than an interpretation of world history.2o 
However, in moving beyond the comprehension ofhistorica1 forms and becoming an active 
adversary of existing society, Marx's historical materialism seemed to these academic 
thinkers to lose the essential scientific quality of contemplative detachment. Thus Marxism, 
because it claimed to be both a substantive scientific discipline, and a theory of social 
revolution, could be excluded twice over from the domain of philosophy: neither of these 
interests having any legitimate place in a program whose principal concern it was to specify 
the conditions for, and logical foundations of, the various sciences. As Adorno observed: 
The Neo-Kantianism of the Marburg School, which laboured most strenuously to 
gain the content of reality from logical categories, has indeed preserved its self-
contained form as a system, but has thereby renounced every right over reality and 
has withdrawn into a formal region in which every determination of content is 
condemned to virtually the farthest point of an unending process.21 [Italics mine] 
If this description is correct, then it is little wonder that the neo-Kantians looked askance at 
historical materialism, for this is a theory which proclaims that its philosophical importance 
derives precisely from the fact that it begins not with the formal conditions of experience 
but with the content of social reality.22 Furthermore, and as Korsch argues, the purpose of 
20 Hegelian-Marxism uses the term praxis to denote any form .~f self-~~alising activio/ 
on the part of an individual or collective subject. See also CollettI s definitIon of the term In 
the Glossary he provides for Marx: Early Writings, p.431. 
21 'The Actuality of Philosophy' , Telos, 31, Spring 1977, p.121. 
22 Adorno's description of neo-Kantianism accords with Horkheimer's critique of 
this tendency. See the latter's 'History and Psychology' in Between Philosophy and 
Social Science, pp.III-12. 
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Marx's work is not to passively comprehend that reality but to demonstrate that philosophy 
must rediscover itself in the world-historical struggle of a specific social class, namely the 
proletariat, to transform that reality and thus secure its own emancipation. Indeed, for 
Korsch, Marx's analysis of society is nothing other than the theoretical expression of this 
very struggle. Thus, in opposition to the philosophical academy, Korsch identifies 
philosophy with a specific science, Marx's critical science of society: a form of theoretical 
consciousness which does not stand apart from real material conflict between the social 
classes, but exists as an essential moment of that self-same conflict. I shall call this idea the 
Supersession Thesis, for it suggests that Marxism is not so much a direct response to the 
questions which characterise German Idealism but is rather the means of liberating thOUght 
from the belief that these questions might be resolved by means of purely theoretical 
activity. 
However, before proceeding further with the discussion of these ideas, some mention 
should be made of a difficulty that appears to surround Korsch's formulation of the above 
thesis. The difficulty arises from the fact that Korsch consistently describes Marxism as a 
science, whilst simultaneously denouncing the orthodox tradition for its scientistic 
interpretation of the theory. At first sight this looks plainly inconsistent: on the one hand 
Marx's theory is said to be a science but on the other those who describe it as a science are 
criticised. In this case, however, the inconsistency is more apparent than real. Korsch's use 
of the term "science" should not be taken as an indication of a belief in some fundamental 
cognitive structure common to both Marxism and the natural sciences, but rather derives 
from the use of the word "science" (Wissenschaft) in Gennan philosophical circles. In this 
theoretical milieu, Wissenschaft although often used to designate the natural sciences 
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(Naturwissenschaften) can also refer to any body of systematic knowledge. Thus a 
Wissenschaft will consist of a system of propositions which taken together provide a 
truthful account of the world. The requirement for system excludes the enumeration of 
unrelated facts whilst the demand for truth ensures that a Wissenschajt provides genuine 
knowledge. In the first instance, therefore, Korsch's claim that Marxism is a "science of 
history" says no more than that the theory offers a systematic account of the socio-
historical process; there is no requirement that it should be either structurally identical to, 
or have the same logical form as any kind of natural scientific theory. By itself, however, 
this observation will not suffice to distinguish historical materialism from other forms of 
social and historical theory, for instance phenomenology, which similarly reject the notion 
of a single unified model of scientific cognition. We need therefore to inquire more 
precisely into the nature of the systematic that characterises Marx's theory. With respect to 
this question, the following passage provides a useful clue to Korsch's thinking. 
The major weakness of vulgar socialism is that, in Marxist terms, it clings quite 
"unscientifically" to a naive realism - in which both so-called common sense, which 
is the "worst metaphysician" and the normal positivist science of bourgeois society, 
draw a sharp line of division between consciousness and its object. 23 
This suggests that the most important distinction between Marxism and the positive 
sciences consists in its refusal to separate the cognitive subject from the object of cognition. 
From this viewpoint consciousness, including scientific consciousness, is not something 
standing over and against its object, but a moment of a single process in which subject and 
23 Marxism and Philosophy, p.76. 
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object interact so as to co-detenninine each other.24 This principle, which I shall dub the 
Constitutivity Thesis, tells us that society, considered as the object of theory, cannot be 
understood as a reality existing independently of the subject, for this reality is the product 
of the subject's own activity. In summary, what distinguishes Marxism from the positive 
sciences and constitutes its own unique principle of systematicity is the concept of a totality 
of thought and social being. 25 Part of what this principle entails is that Marxism refuses to 
study phenomena in isolation but instead seeks out their principle of constitution by 
reference to their participation in the whole life of society. Thus the complex of social 
relations, practices and institutions which define a historically determinate form of life 
cannot be comprehended externally, in the way in which for instance we might approach a 
mechanical system, but have also to be related to the self-consciousness of the subjects 
engaged in these relations, practices and institutions. This is not to say that the self-
understanding of a society is to be regarded in an uncritical fashion, as an unquestioned and 
unquestionable given; on the contrary, social consciousness must in tum be explained as 
well as criticised, by reference to the external realm of material being. As we shall see, it is 
this critical dialectic of subject and object, the confrontation between thought and historical 
being, that for Korsch constitutes the real meaning of the theoretical program announced 
by Marx. in the Preface to his Critique of Political Economy. 
24 Compare this thesis with Hegel's remark that "everythin~ ~~s on grasping and 
expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject. (Phenomenology of 
/)pirit, § 17.) 
25 In Chapter 5 of this study we shall see how the notion of Science (Wissenschqft), 
considered as a systematic knowledge of reality, can be developed by reference to Hegel's 
concept of totality. 
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Theory and Praxis 
What has been said thus far is no more than a preliminary account of Korsch's attempt to 
re-discover the philosophical foundations of Marx's social theory. To gain further insight, 
and thus to be in a position to make a realistic assessment of his work as well as its relation 
to critical theory, the argument of Marxism and Philosophy needs to be considered in 
greater detail. Accordingly, the rest of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of two 
principles fundamental to Korsch's thOUght. The first such principle I shall consider is 
Korsch's assertion that historical materialism is a theory with an inherent commitment and 
special relation to an emancipatory praxis directed towards the transformation of the 
relations of production. In making this claim Korsch believes that he is doing no more than 
simply reflecting Marx's own view that historical materialism is a theory that is 
simultaneously a form of "practical-critical" activity.26 This strong coupling of theory with 
praxis is often regarded as a significant point of difference between Korsch's "activist" 
brand of Marxism and the supposedly "contemplative" theoretical stance of the Frankfurt 
School. 27 This contrast however is more apparent than real, for as I will shortly 
demonstrate, the critical theorists, despite their sustained defence of the autonomy of 
theory with respect to immediate or pragmatic political requirements, always sought, 
although not in the fashion ofKorsch, to relate theory to the attempt to change the world. 
26 Theses on Feurbach. See also Marx's discussion of Feuerbach's contemplative 
materialism in The German Ideology, pp.44-47. 
27 For example, Susan Buck-Morrs argues t~at: "No matter how hard o~e ?ies to ?efend 
Adorno as the true inheritor of Marx's theoretIcal legacy '" throughout his life he differed 
fundamentally from Marx in that his philosophy never included a theory of ~litica1 action." 
(Origin of Negative Dialectics p.24.) This comment betrays a confusl.on between a 
pragmatic theory of political action such as Lenin's What Is To Be Done? and a theory 
with a general commitment to praxis. Despite what Buck-Morrs suggests these are not 
necessarily identical .. 
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Whether they were wholly successful in this enterprise is a somewhat complex question 
and one which will have to await a later chapter. 
For the moment, however, the discussion must return to Marxism and Philosophy. In this 
essay Korsch argues that the theory of historical materialism is distinguished from the 
positive sciences by what he refers to as the "unity of theory and praxis." However, 
without further refinement, this formula tells us very little.28 After all, most natural scientific 
theories, in one way or another, are capable of application to the world and so might be 
thought of as unifying theory with practice. But this kind of technocratic-instrumental 
unity, the unity characteristic of any form of practical knowledge, is not the object of 
Korsch's concern. A clue to what he does mean can be found in his observation that 
Marx's theory has a dual aspect. According to Korsch, the theory 
.. , includes from the point of view of the object an empirical investigation 
'conducted with the precision of natural science', of all its relations and 
development, and from the point of view of the subject an account of how the 
impotent wishes and demands of individual subjects develop into an historically 
effective class leading to 'revolutionary practice'. 29 
Thus Marxism, unlike the natural sciences, does not comprehend its object by eliminating 
the perspective of the subject. On the contrary the theory, understood as the systematic 
expression of proletarian consciousness, bears an essential relation to the viewpoint of this 
28 For a useful discussion of what the unity of theory and praxiS might actually involve 
see Cohen's Karl Marx's Theory of History, pp.338-341. 
29 'Why I am a Marxist' in Three Essays on Marxism, p.6S. 
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specific historical agent. 30 In this respect at least, Marxism fails to comply with traditional 
norms of scientific impartiality and detachment. Furthermore, the theory operates from the 
point of view of the subject in a two-fold sense: it purports to explain not only how the 
"wishes and demands" of the subject are as a matter of fact frustrated by social relations, 
but also how those relations might be changed so as to eliminate such frustration. Marxism 
therefore is a theory which aims to emancipate as well as enlighten: by imparting 
knowledge to the subject of its present condition it becomes a moment in the process 
through which that condition is transformed by the subject's own activity. 
Unfortunately Korsch's discussion, with its reference to the "wishes and demands of 
individual subjects", is misleading for it suggests that an emancipatory praxis informed by 
Marxist theory is defined by reference to an empirically determined aggregate of individual 
preferences. On this interpretation, the theory is the articulation of a collective or social 
consciousness, whatever that might happen to be. But to understand Korsch in this way 
would be a serious mistake; not least because the doubtful existence of such a coherent 
collectivity would make it impossible to connect theory with a specific form of praxis. 
However, as I have already indicated, Korsch has a historically precise notion of the subject 
or addressee of Marx's theory; it is the proletariat, a class brought into being as a world-
historical force by the emergent bourgeois society of the nineteenth century. This 
observation suggests that one important difference between Marxism and Idealism is that 
the former, unlike the latter, does not seek to address the subject qua abstract rational 
agent but rather speaks to a determinate social class. Indeed, for Korsch, Marxism is 
nothing other than "the theoretical expression of the revolutionary movement of the 
30 For a discussion of the nature of this viewpoint see Lukacs' History and ('lass 
Consciousness, pp.149-172. 
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proletariat".31 This formula usefully highlights the fact that materialism is a theory marked 
from the outset by an orientation towards the activity (praxis) of a historically specific 
collective subject. Furthermore, by coupling Marxism to the socio-political movement 
defined by the struggle for proletarian emancipation, Korsch draws attention to the way in 
which social theories have a potential to interact with and transform the reality they 
describe. Thus the Marxist theory of society seeks to establish that the capitalist mode of 
production is inimical to the real interests of the mass of producers: it reveals that the 
relation of capital to labour is founded upon exploitation and that in consequence class 
relations in bourgeois society have a necessarily antagonistic character. By disclosing this 
conflict of interest, as well as demonstrating that it is an inherent rather than an accidental 
or transitory feature of capitalist production, Marxism constitutes the expression in thought 
of the pre-existing, although theoretically inchoate, struggle between labour and capital. In 
summary, for Korsch, the relation between Marxist theory and society depends crucially 
upon the fact that it is produced from the perspective of the proletariat, indeed that it 
understands itself as a systematic statement of the interest of that class and in consequence 
becomes an essential moment in the process of realising that interest. In giving voice to this 
concern Marxism provides a theoretical basis for identifying the goals of a proletarian 
movement as well as the means by which these goals might be realised. To give just one 
example, the practical consequence of Marx's theory of surplus value is to identify the 
abolition of wage labour as the principal aim of a working class movement rather than any 
improvement, however substantial, in the real level of wages. Here the connection between 
theory, interests and praxis is perfectly evident: according to Marx, the theory of surplus 
value demonstrates that wage labour is an essentially exploitative relation and therefore 
31 Marxism and Philosophy, p.42. 
74 
operates against the interests of the working class. In consequence, any movement which 
purports to realise the interests of that class must, if it is truly conscious of those interests 
, 
seek the abolition of that particular social relation.32 
Two things follow from this discussion. First, Korsch's reference to the "wishes and 
demands" of the subject needs to be interpreted not in an individualistic or empirical-
psychologistic sense, but rather in terms of the real interests of the proletariat considered as 
a whole. Second, that because Marxism is a form of knowledge organised around that 
interest it bears an inherent relation to the struggle on the part of the proletariat to liberate 
itself from the exploitative and therefore socially antagonistic relation of wage labour. 
These ideas are the essential background to Korsch's view that the Marxist theory of 
society is radically different in kind from traditional, "objective" scientific theories. For if 
we accept that Marx's theory does indeed discover and give expression to the interests of 
the proletariat then we have also to accept that the theory has an essential involvement in a 
praxis directed towards the realisation of the interests of that class. This is why Korsch 
always sought to distance himself from the attempt by orthodox Marxists, for example 
Hilferding, to separate Marxist theory from any kind of practical consequence.33 In this 
context Hilferding's formulation of the argument is paradigmatic: he claims that the theory 
of historical materialism is solely concerned with uncovering "causal connections" and 
32 For a discussion of the relation between Marxist theory and the worker's movement 
see Korsch's 'Introduction to the Critique of the Gotha Program' in Marxism and 
Philosophy, especially pp.143-146. 
33 Rudolf Hilferding (1877-1941) was a prominent member of the Second International 
and an interpreter of Marx's political economy. His classic study l!'inanzkapital publi~h~ in 
1910 offers an analysis of the capitalist accumula!ion process m th~ era ~f l~penalism. 
During the Nazi era he was arrested and according to Kolakows~ (Mal!'. (urre'!ts ?! 
Marxism: Vol 2, pp.257-58) either died at Buchenwald or commttted sUIClde whilst m 
prison in Paris. 
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therefore, like the natural sciences, is objective and free of any value judgements.34 In the 
introduction to Finance Capital, Hilferding provides an especially clear statement of this 
position when he observes that 
... insight into the correctness of Marxism, which includes insight into the necessity 
of socialism, is in no way a result of value judgements and has no implications jor 
practical behaviour. It is one thing to acknowledge a necessity and quite another 
to place oneself at the service of this necessity. 35(Italics mine) 
This sharp separation of the science of Marxism from the socialist project is, for Korsch, 
not so much an aberration on the part of Hilferding but an entirely logical consequence of 
the orthodox position which presents historical materialism as "an advance registered by 
socialism in developing from a philosophy to a science. ,,36 The problem with this view, 
however, is not with the idea that Marxism points to the existence of certain laws of 
historical development but rather that these can be understood in abstraction from their 
practical revolutionary consequences?7 Thus although it is correct to assert that the 
historical process has an objective character, that it results from the developing material 
basis of social life, it is also true to say, as Korsch does, that this process is experienced by 
subjects who potentially have the ability to shape its developmental course in accordance 
34 Finance Capital, p. 23. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Marxism and Philosophy, p.S4. 
37 Op.cit., p.S8. 
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with their real interests.38 Consequently Marx's theory, because it claims to specify those 
interests, will contra Hilferding have obvious implications for "practical behaviour". 
Now in arguing that Marxism is a science with a practical concern, Korsch is issuing a 
necessary corrective to the numerous interpreters of Marx who have sought to equate his 
theory with those of the natural sciences. However, although Marxism and Philosophy 
goes some way towards establishing that critical and positive scientific thought should not 
be conflated, Korsch's discussion of this matter leaves a number of important questions 
unanswered. This quickly becomes apparent if we tum to Horkheimer's influential 
discussion of this self-same question. Like Korsch, Horkheimer begins by arguing that a 
critical theory of society is to be distinguished from a traditional scientific theory by virtue 
of the fact that the former is essentially oriented towards expressing the interests of the 
subject to whom it is addressed whilst the latter represents itself as objective or interest 
free. As Horkeimer puts it, a critical theory of society is "a theory dominated at every tum 
by a concern for reasonable conditions of life" .39 In other words the principle concern of 
such a theory is with a society consciously organised in the interests of its members. Now 
in contrast to Korsch, Horkheimer displays greater determination in making the 
methodological consequences of this position as explicit as possible by arguing that the 
difference between a critical and a traditional scientific theory consists in the fact that the 
former has an internal rather than external connection to social praxis. To see what this 
might involve, consider the following observation concerning the natural sciences: 
38 'Introduction to Capital' in Three Essays on Marxism, p.42 . 
. '9 'Traditional and Critical Theory' in C'ritical1heory: Selected Essays, p.199. 
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In traditional theoretical thinking, the genesis of particular objective facts, the 
practical application of the conceptual systems by which it grasps the facts and the 
role of such systems in action, are all taken to be external to theoretical thinking 
itself 40 [Italics mine] 
The distinction Horkheimer is seeking to make here between theories with an external 
relation and those with an internal relation to human action can be brought out more clearly 
by reflecting upon the way in which natural scientific theories find application to the world. 
In this context it is worth considering Geuss' suggestion that this relation is "never more 
than one of conditional rationality": knowledge of a natural scientific theory enables the 
subject to bring about a particular state of affairs but whether this possibility is realised or 
not depends upon the subject having a prior interest in that state. 41 Put another way, 
acceptance of a conventional scientific theory, together with its associated technological 
practices, does not automatically entail a commitment to any specific course of action. 42 By 
contrast Marxism has an immediate and inescapable relation to human praxis: it does not 
provide knowledge about what it would be rational for the subject to do if he or she had 
certain interests but instead infonns the subject as to the nature of those interests. Thus for 
the addressee of Marx's theory this form of knowledge brings with it the practical 
imperative to act so as to realise the interest which the theory discloses. Of course whether 
individuals choose to act on the basis of this knowledge is a contingent matter: the socialist 
40 Op.cit., p.20S. 
41 The Idea of a Critical Theory, pp.57-5S. 
42 As Horkheimer observes, "science accepts as a principle that its every step h~ a 
critical basis, yet the most importan~ st~p of ,all, the setti".g of tasks, lack.s. a, ~h~r~I~ 
grounding and seems to be taken arbItrarily." ( Notes on SCIence and the CnsIs 10 ( nl1cal 
Theory: Selected Essays, p.S.) 
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project, like any other human project, is not immune from the attractions of akrafiia.·B 
Nevertheless it can be said that Marx's theory is essentially related to activity, or as Korsch 
would put it there is a unity of theory and praxis, in a way that is not true of the natural 
sciences. This much, at least, is common ground between Korsch and the critical theorists. 
However, I shall argue that there is a real difference here, in that the latter have a much 
more profound account of the notion of interest than Korsch. As Marcuse notes "the need 
for radical change must be rooted in the subjectivity of individuals themselves, in their 
intelligence and their passions, their drives and their goals. ,,44 Now for the Frankfurt School 
this did not involve a regression to some kind of utilitarian calculus, rather it was the 
recognition that interest had to be related to the whole complex of needs, biological, 
psychological, social and cultural, characteristic of the human situation. This discussion, 
however, will have to await a later chapter of this study.4s 
The Constitutivity of Consciousness 
Korsch's view of the practico-critical nature of Marxism is closely related to the account 
he offers of the relationship between the subject and object of theory, or in classically 
Marxist terminology, the relationship between consciousness and social being. This 
question, as we have already seen, had caused some considerable difficulty for the 
43 Indeed, it might be said that Adorno: s discussio~ o~ the relation ~et~een the . 
culture industry and those who consume Its products IS 10 fact a ~esc~ptlon of a claSSIC 
form of akrasia: the consumer knows the worthlessness of what IS be10g consumed 
whilst simultaneously seeking ever more of the same. 
44 The Aesthetic Dimension, p.3. 
4S See Chapter 6, which contains a general account of the Frankfurt School's 
psychoanalytically oriented approach to the concept of need. 
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orthodox tradition. Thus some Marxists, in order to avoid the charge of economic 
determinism, had been led into making a series of rather unwise concessions to their critics. 
These concessions originate with Engels who argued that the superstructure of ideas and 
beliefs is characterised by a "limited autonomy" with respect to the material base, and 
should be regarded, at least to some extent, as an independent causal agent in the process 
of historical development.46 Unfortunately, this concessio~ as Korsch recognises, leads to 
a serious methodological confusion which ultimately deprives the materialist thesis of any 
real content. The reason for this confusion is plain enough: the idea that a partially 
autonomous superstructure causally interacts with an underlying economic base makes it 
all but impossible to distinguish between historical materialism and the kind of multi-
factorial explanatory model favoured by mainstream Weberian social science. 47 Against this 
objectio~ Engel's assertion that the economic base is determinate in the last instance is 
less than helpful: it merely adds to the confusion by appearing to reinstate what the notion 
of superstructural autonomy denies, namely the primacy of the economic with respect to 
historical explanation. 
For Korsch this whole problem was the result of a mistaken attempt, on the part of Marxist 
orthodoxy, to interpret the theory of base and superstructure in terms of a mechanistic-
causal model of interaction derived from the natural sciences. On this account the 
ideational superstructure is seen as the reflection in thought of an ontologically 
independent material base, as the causally-induced mental reflex, or image, of an external 
46 Engels to Bloch, September 21st, 1890, Marx-Engels: Selected Works, pp.682-683. 
47 Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism provides the classic 
statement of this approach. See also p.75, pp.90-92, an~ ~.183 w~ere Weber attempts 
to represent historical materialism as a crudely economlstlc, one-sided account of the 
emergence of capitalist society. 
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world of social being. This leads to the absurd conclusion that superstructural elements are 
contingent causal effects resulting from the material life process of society; in other words, 
that the way in which we apprehend that process is logically although not causally 
independent of the activity by means of which we produce and reproduce our social 
existence. Against this interpretation, Marxism and Philosophy offers the outline of a 
dialectical account of the relation between thought and being, an account which emphasises 
the internal and mutually reflexive character of the relation existing between these terms. 
In putting forward this idea, Korsch refers to what he calls the "coincidence of 
consciousness and reality", a phrase which is intended to remind us that forms of 
consciousness "exist within this world as a real and objective component of it".48(ltalics 
mine) Thus according to Korsch, Marx's declaration that social being determines 
consciousness ought not to be interpreted as a statement of efficient cause and effect but 
rather as a reminder that the two are "related ... in the way that a specific particularly 
defined part of a whole is related to other parts of this whole".49 What this means is that 
both consciousness and social being should be regarded as interdependent moments of a 
totality that is centred upon the process of social reproduction. In consequence, Korsch's 
materialism is not so much a theory of a particular efficient causality but rather the denial of 
the possibility of either a pre-social consciousness or an unconscious social existence. As he 
observes in Marxism and Philosophy, 
... the coincidence of consciousness and reality characterises every dialectic, 
including Marx's dialectical materialism. Its consequence is that the material 
48 Marxism and Philosophy, pp.78-81. 
49 Op.cit., p.84. 
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relations of production of the capitalist epoch only are what they are in 
combination with the forms in which they are reflected in the pre-scientific and 
bourgeis-scientmc consciousness of the period; and they could not subsist in reality 
without these forms of consciousness. 50 (Italics mine) 
Now although Korsch uses the term "reflection" in this passage it should be clear that his 
account of the materialist thesis does not rely upon any kind of image-object model. 
Instead he argues that if we consider the material basis of social life and the fonns of 
consciousness in which that basis is represented, then the notion that either can exist 
independently of the other cannot be sustained. Consciousness and social reality are not 
discrete, independent phenomena, but exist in a relation of interdependence, or as Hegel 
would say inter-penetration.51 Thus the relations of production, which according to Marx 
are part of the material base of society, cannot be regarded as either temporally, logically or 
causally prior to consciousness, but need to be understood as social forms, involving 
subjects with specific modes of self-understanding. As Korsch points out these relations are 
in fact dependent upon what he calls "pre-scientific" and "bourgeois-scientific" forms of 
consciousness: they are relations whose existence pre-supposes the widespread acceptance 
of certain ways of thinking about social production. In short, if we recognise that social 
being determines consciousness, as Marx claims, then consideration of this realm of being 
50 Marxism and Philosophy, pp. 79-80. 
51 Horkheimer, criticising the "economism" of orthodox Marxism makes muc~ the 
same point. He argues that it is a mistake to believe "that the psyche of human bemgs, 
personality as well as law, art and philosophy are ... mere reflections of the econo~y." 
Like Korsch he explains this economistic reading as the c0!1sequence of ~ "hIghly 
problematic divorce between, Sp~rit and r~ality ,which ~aI~s to synthest~e them 
dialectically." ('The Present SItuatIon of SOCIal Philosophy 10 Between PhIlosophy 
and Social Science, p.12.) 
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forces us to acknowledge that the material basis of social life, production and exchange, is 
itself infused with consciousness. 
This is undoubtedly an important insight but one that needs to be developed with the 
utmost care, if materialism is not to degenerate into the kind of vacuous theorising whereby 
the mere invocation of the notion of totality is regarded as a sufficient answer to every 
possible question concerning the relation between thought and being. Regrettably Korsch' s 
discussion of this matter remains throughout at a high of level of abstraction: no examples, 
for instance, of the way in which specific forms of consciousness are coincident with reality 
are provided. This is particularly unfortunate because Marx's original account of the act of 
exchange, the act which it should be recalled is the basis of all production relations under 
capitalism, serves as a particularly compelling illustration of Korsch's thesis. Thus in 
Capital it is argued that every such act presupposes the mutual recognition of property 
rights on the part of commodity owners engaged in the relation of exchange. In other 
words, the physical transfer of an item from one individual to another only qualifies as an 
act of exchange if as Marx puts it a specific "juridicial relation" between independent wills 
exists, namely that each party to the exchange gives due recognition to the property claim 
of the other. 52 This is not a contingent social-psychological fact but an acknowledgement 
of the necessary constitutive role of consciousness with respect to the practice of 
exchange. 53 The above mutual recognition of right, it should be emphasised, does not entail 
that property rights are a matter of subjective fiat; like any other right the validity of a 
52 Capital: Volume 1, p.178. 
53 All of this is wholly consistent with Hegel's view of property. as outlined. in Pa~ 
One of his Element of the Philosophy of Right, and later mtegrated m~o his 
description of the economy in Civil Society. This fact was drawn to my attentIOn by 
Dudley Knowles. 
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property claim depends upon an appeal to objective criteria of legal ownership. It does, 
however, entail that what Marx calls "legal fonns of consciousness", far from being a 
contingent effect of the material base, are in fact essential to any description of capitalist 
relations of production. 54 The significance of all of this for Korsch's critique of orthodox 
Marxism can be summarised as follows. According to Marx's theory, the relation of 
exchange is a constituent part of the material base of capitalist society, whilst the legal 
concept of property rights is equally clearly a part of what Marx regards as its 
superstructure. However, as we have seen, the exchange relation is not logically 
independent of the concept of property rights; to suppose that there could be exchange 
without the concept of property is to suppose something which is simply not possible. 
Hence Marx's theory of the base-superstructure relation cannot be understood as a theory 
of efficient causation, for according to the conventional Humean account of the causal 
relation, the terms of that relation are logically independent of one another: no description 
of a cause entails its effect and conversely no description of an effect entails its cause. But 
from what has been said above it is not open to us to describe the activity of exchange in a 
way that is independent of the legal notion of property rights. We may therefore conclude, 
as Korsch does, that orthodox Marxism is mistaken in representing the relation of base to 
superstructure in tenns of an image-object model that is in tum dependent upon an 
underlying narrative of efficient causal determination. We may also conclude, this time 
more positively, that a careful reading of Marx's account of the exchange relation suggests 
that the relation between consciousness and social being needs to be conceived 
dialectically, as a relation between two interdependent, mutually reflexive moments of the 
54 For an argument in favour of the possibility of a rechtsfrei description of production 
relations see G.A.Cohen's Karl Marx's Theory of History, pp.217-225. 
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social life process. 
Having said this it must be admitted that Korsch's Hegelian inspired reading of Marx, 
whilst representing an advance upon the various forms of mechanistic orthodoxy current at 
the time, faces a number of serious objections. In the first place, it can be argued that even 
if a case can be made for the Constitutivity Thesis with respect to certain forms of 
consciousness it is by no means obvious that the thesis is capable of application across the 
whole range of superstructural phenomena. In the case, for instance, of philosophy, there is 
a piece of conventional wisdom which informs us that this theoretical tradition is concerned 
with problems that are essentially timeless. As P.F. Strawson puts it, metaphysics deals with 
that "massive central core of human thinking which has no history ... categories and 
concepts, which in their most fundamental character, change not at all. ,,55 In consequence, 
when considering concepts such as substance and causation, the traditional material of 
metaphysical enquiry, there is no point in seeking to discover a social content or element of 
historical determination because the very nature of these concepts place them outside of 
history and society. Similar although certainly less plausible arguments can be made with 
respect to the socially transcendent or autonomous nature of art and religion. 
To some extent Korsch is aware of this problem: he warns his readers against the view that 
all superstructural elements bear as close a relationship as legal and political forms of 
consciousness to the material base of social life. In fact he regards the superstructure as a 
multi-layered complex of ideas and belief systems, each of which is more or less closely 
55 Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, p.IO. For a counter argument to 
the Strawson position see Marcuse's essay 'The Concept of Essence' in Negation\', pp.43-
87. 
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related to the economic life of society. Thus in addition to legal-political fonns, there are 
the "higher fonns of social consciousness", such as religion and philosophy, as well as 
"medium levels" of consciousness associated with fundamental social institutions such as 
the family. 56 Although Korsch admits that it may be difficult to immediately relate these 
higher or medium fonns to production relations, he insists nevertheless that these fonns 
"express bourgeois society as a totality in a particular way" and that "their ensemble fonns 
the spiritual structure of bourgeois society, which corresponds to its economic structure, 
just as its legal and political superstructure corresponds to this same basis. ,,57 
Unfortunately, Marxism and Philosophy does not get much beyond these programmatic 
announcements: no specific examples of higher or medium fonns of consciousness are 
analysed for their social content nor indeed is any more said to support his general claim 
that all of these fonns must be understood as expressions of an underlying social totality. 
In this respect, then, we have to conclude that Korsch's essay is something of a failure. 
However our judgement should not be entirely negative, for his discussion does succeed in 
addressing one potentially significant ambiguity in the Marxist theory of base and 
superstructure. This ambiguity has given rise to a historically influential reading of Marx, a 
reading which regards all fonns of higher consciousness as no more than ideology, and 
more particularly as ideology understood entirely in the sense of false consciousness. 58 
56 Marxism and Philosophy, pp.81-82. 
57 Op.cit., p.84. 
58 In opposition to this position Horkheimer maintains that superstructural p~enomena 
are not simply fonns of false consciousness but ~ve .to be. understoo.d as possesslI~g a truth 
content, admittedly distorted, relating to the SOCIety m whi~h they anse. Co~en~g ':Ipon 
Kant's ethical thought he writes that: "Morality, therefore, IS by no means sm1pl~ diSffilSsed 
by materialism as mere ideology in the sense of false conscIousness. Rather, It must be 
understood as a human phenomenon that cannot possibly be overcome for the duration of 
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Thus Engels argues that religion, for instance, is "nothing but the fantastic reflection in 
men's minds of those external forces which control their daily life. ,,59 This suggests that for 
the materialist, forms of consciousness such as religion or philosophy have no truth content 
whatsoever and should therefore be regarded as simply obstacles on the route to a scientific 
world view. On this account a large portion of what Marx: identifies as the superstructure 
must be written off as so much false consciousness, as a web of false belief whose only 
purpose is to mask the conflict between the social classes. To take just one example of the 
sterility of this kind of approach we may consider the typical vulgar Marxist analysis of 
Hegel. According to this account German Idealism counts as "bourgeois" Idealism, not 
because it originates with the emergence of bourgeois society but because the idealist 
consciousness is, like religion, a "fantastic reflection" of the life process of that society. 
More particularly, by proposing that the truth of being is thought, Idealism denies the need 
for a practical transformation of material life and thus serves to maintain the existing 
bourgeois social order. To summarise: Hegel's philosophy is simply false and in 
consequence can teach us nothing concerning the real conflicts that characterise this form 
of life. 
It is to his credit that Korsch was one of the first to see that this ruthlessly dismissive 
approach to the higher forms of consciousness constitutes a profoundly unsatisfactory 
the bourgeois epoch. Its philosophical expression, however, is .disto~ed in many re~p~s." 
(,Materialism and Morality' in Between Philosophy and SOCial SClenc.e, p.22.) SiI?il~ly 
Adorno, describing his method of criticism, comments that:. "It takes ~nously the pnnclple 
that it is not ideology in itself which is untrue but rather Its pretension to correspond to 
reality. Immanent criticism of intellectual and arti~ic. phenomena see~s t~ gr~sp. through 
the analysis of their form and meaning,. the contr~dlctto~ between therr obJ~lve Idea and 
that pretension. It names what the consistency .o~ mconslste~cy ?~ the ~ork Itself expresses 
of the structure of the existent." ('Cultural CnttClsm and SOCiety m Prisms, p.32) 
59 Anti-Duhring, p.438. 
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reconstruction of the materialist method. Referring to those Marxists who adhered to this 
interpretation he writes: 
Quoting certain statements by Marx and especially Engels they simply explain away 
the intellectual (ideological structures) of society as a mere pseudo-reality which 
only exists in the minds of ideologues - as error, imagination and illUSion, devoid 
of any genuine of object. At any rate, this is supposed to be true for all the so-
called "higher" ideologies.6o (Italics mine) 
He goes on to argue that Marxists who take this position often view the superstructure as 
consisting of two parts. One part, namely legal and political thought, is accorded a certain 
degree of reality, for these forms of consciousness define, describe and legitimate the 
material and political life of society. By contrast the remaining elements of the 
superstructure, the "higher" ideologies of philosophy and religion, are dismissed because 
these forms are thought of as failing to correspond to anything in the world.61 For Korsch, 
as well as the Frankfurt Schoo~ such an approach is clearly unsatisfactory: a genuine 
materialism cannot simply dismiss "higher" forms of consciousness, for all thought, no 
matter how abstract, is an expression of our social being. It is for this reason that Korsch 
quotes with approval Hegel's maxim that every philosophy is "its own epoch 
60 Marxism and Philosophy, p.72. 
61 The work of G.A. Cohen illustrates another possible approach, namely ignoring those 
elements of the superstructure which appear to be inconvenient. Thus he interprets the 
concept of the superstructure as referring principally to the set of legal and political 
institutions characteristic of a society. Now whilst it is true that, for Marx, these institutions 
are indeed part of the superstructure it is quite clear from the 1859 Preface, as well as from 
other writings, that the term "superstructure" is intended to cover a much wider range of 
phenomena. Cohen, however, seems to ignore this aspect of Marx's original program of 
historical materialist research. (Karl Marx's Theory of History, p.216.) 
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comprehended in thought".62 Consequently Korsc~ who took this maxIm extremely 
seriously, argues that the task of materialism is to discover the hidden social content of 
each and every form of thought, no matter how abstract or seemingly remote it might be 
from the material base. Unfortunately, whilst this is potentially a more fiuitful interpretation 
of Marx's original program, Korsch's essay does very little to advance our understanding of 
how that program might be realised in detail.63 Thus even if we resist the tendency to 
dismiss philosophy, religion and art as forms of false consciousness, we are still left with 
the question as to how these apparently autonomous forms can be related to the underlying 
material basis of social life. 64 Until this question is answered, and answered in detail, our 
judgement must be that the Korschian thesis constitutes a statement of intention rather than 
a substantial analysis. 
The second objection to the Constitutivity Thesis can be formulated somewhat 
provocatively as follows: that Korsc~ in seeking to address some of the difficulties 
associated with materialism, appears to resolve those difficulties by abandoning the very 
doctrine he is seeking to defend. This charge has some substance: there is a worrying 
degree of indeterminacy associated with Korsch's concept of a social totality, because the 
reflexive relation between thought and being which constructs the totality seems to lack 
62 Marxism and Philosophy, p.40. 
63 A comprehensive answer to the question of the r~lation between b~se and 
superstructure is beyond the scope of this study. However, m Chapter 5 there IS some 
further discussion of this issue. 
64 Criticising the argument that .",,!l cu1tur~ i~ ideology" Adon:t<? .writes: "This 
explains the inadequacy of most SOCIalISt contnbu~lO!ls to cu~tural cntlClsm: they lac~ 
the experience of that with which they ~eal. In W1s~g t~ W1~e away the ~h?le as If 
with a sponge, they develop an affiruty to barb an sm. ( Cultural Cntlclsm and 
Society' in Prisms, p.32) 
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any underlying principle of organisation. As Raymond Williams puts it: 
... if we come to say that society is composed of a large number of social practices 
which fonn a concrete social whole , and if we give to each practice a certain 
specific recognition, adding only that they interact, relate and combine in very 
complicated ways, we are at one level much more obviously talking about reality, 
but we are at another level withdrawing from the claim that there is any process of 
determination. 65 
William's objection can be taken further. For, if as Korsch suggests, consciousness and 
reality are mutually constitutive, it becomes difficult to see how the doctrine of materialism 
is to be differentiated from that of idealism. Certainly, it is not alien to the spirit of Hegel's 
thought to suppose that the subject-object relation is one of mutual dependence, that the 
subject produces and in tum is produced by the object. 66 But unless Hegel's version of 
constitutivity can be distinguished from that of materialism, Korsch's "defence" of Marxism 
threatens to reduce materialism to the philosophical doctrine it supposedly supercedes. This 
objection applies not only to the work ofKorsch but as we shall see later to that of Lukacs 
as well. It illustrates, in fact, the central difficulty faced by Hegelian-Marxism of 
maintaining a difference from as well as an identity between Hegel's Idealism and Marx's 
materialism.67 We can begin to see more clearly the nature of this problem by considering 
65 Problems in Materialism and Culture, p.36. 
66 Cf Hegel's Science of Logic, §213-215. 
67 The Communist critics of Korsch and Lukacs made this very charge, arguing that 
their emphasis on consciousness, as opposed to laws of historical development, represented 
a return to Hegel's Idealism. 
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the vulgar Marxist claim that Marx inverts Hegel by establishing that being is not the 
product of thought but rather its real detenninant. This overly simplistic fonnula has been 
effectively criticised by Michael Rosen who argues that: 
Such criticism is besides the point .. . the dialectical development of Thought 
furnishes the structure of reality, and, because it encompasses both thOUght and 
reality, there is no way to play one off against another.68 
However, this observation tells as much against Korsch as its does the vulgar Marxist: if 
thought and reality cannot be played off against one another, and Korsch's argument 
suggests that they cannot, it becomes unclear how Hegel's idealism can be distinguished 
from Marx's materialism. But if this distinction cannot be made then the central thesis of 
Hegelian Marxism, namely that materialism is the sublation of Idealism, must also be 
discounted, for sublation, it should be remembered, requires difference as well as identity. 
I shall conclude the present chapter by briefly noting that this particular question is directly 
addressed in Adorno's later work. 69 Unlike Horkheimer's early programmatic writings, 
which in many ways represent a largely uncritical appropriation of the Korsch-Lukacs 
heritage, Adorno realised that the subject -object totality of Hegelian Marxism was 
unsatisfactory from the view point of historical materialism. As he observes: 
68 Hegel's Dialectic and its Criticism, p.156. 
69 In Chapter 5 I shall consider in more detail Adorno's attempt to formulate a 
materialist version of the subject-object dialectic. 
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The less the dialectical method can today presuppose the Hegelian identity of 
subject and object, the more it is obliged to be mindful of the duality of its 
moments. It must relate the knowledge of society as a totality and of the mind's 
involvement in it to the claim inherent in the specific content of the object that it be 
apprehended as such. 70 
Furthermore, although Adorno recognises the truth of the Constitutivity Thesis he also 
seeks to transcend by it arguing that whilst mind produces society, a genuinely materialist 
dialectic is required to accord what he calls "preponderance" to the external reality of 
society and nature.71 This suggests not only that there is an essential moment of non-
identity in the relation between subject and object but also that the object has a measure of 
ontological priority over the subject. Korsch, however, in his desire to distance Marx's 
theory from any form of mechanistic thought, loses sight of this essential aspect of 
materialism. But if Adorno's criticism reveals that Korsch's version of materialism must 
ultimately be rejected, his recognition of the importance of the Korschian problematic is 
nevertheless a measure of the degree to which the central concerns of critical theory are 
informed by the work of this too often marginalised thinker. 
70 'Cultural Criticism and Society' in Prisms, p.33. 
71 Negative Dialectics, p.192. 
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Chapter 3. Social Theory and the Supersession of Philosophy 
We begin this chapter by recalling the claim made in Chapter 1 that the Frankfurt School 
conceived of their version of materialism as a response to German Idealism, as an attempt 
to come to terms, albeit from a very different set of premises, with some of the central 
problems of that earlier tradition of philosophical thought. Indeed, for the critical theorists 
Marx's historical materialism is to be understood as a critical investigation of the 
historically developed relation between consciousness and the world rather than as a new 
positive science of history. Furthermore although the Frankfurt School regarded Marxism 
as being rooted in the questions of German Idealism, this did not involve any belief in the 
possibility of the continuation or revival of that tradition; on the contrary, they conceived of 
materialism as the means by which classical philosophy might be definitively transcended. 
As Marcuse observes in a review of Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts: 
We are dealing with a philosophical critique of political economy, for the basic 
categories of Marx's theory here arise out of his emphatic confrontation with the 
philosophy of Hegel (e.g. labour, objectification, alienation, supersession, 
property). This does not mean that Hegel's 'method' is transformed and taken 
over, put into a new context and brought to life. Rather, Marx goes back to the 
problems at the root of Hegel's philosophy (which originally determined his 
method), independently appropriates their real content and thinks it through to a 
further stage. 1 
1 'The Foundations of Historical Materialism' in Studies in Critical Philosophy, pA. 
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Hence according to Marcuse the Marxian dialectic is not derived by abstracting Hegel's 
'method' from the content of his thought, as Engels supposed, but is grounded in the 
fundamental problematic of idealist philosophy, of how and to what extent the subject is 
responsible for the constitution of the object of consciousness. HegeL whose philosophy is 
for much of the time an attempt to overcome the problems inherent in Kant's version of 
Idealism, offered a particularly startling answer to this question: the rational subject 
through the activity of thought produces as its other nature and society, and in so doing 
returns to itself by coming to a conscious recognition of the unity underlying the original 
diremption between subject and object. Now for Marcuse, as for other members of the 
Frankfurt School, this answer was unsatisfactory. Despite their admiration for the brilliance 
of Hegel's thought they rejected the idealist conclusion that the world in general, and 
society in particular, can be recognised as the manifestation of Reason. Contrary to Hegel 
the critical theorists maintained that society, and more especially bourgeois society, was 
profoundly irrational and in consequence could not be regarded as an adequate expression 
of a rational subjectivity. 
But if this central aspect of the Hegelian system was rejected by the Frankfurt School, they 
nevertheless believed that his thought had a continuing relevance. As I shall argue some of 
the central content Hegel's philosophy is preserved by means of their reconstruction of 
Marx's materialism, a reconstruction which posits dialectic as the expression of 
contradictions inherent to the social life process. From this it follows that if philosophical 
problems are a representation, albeit an indirect representation, of a pre-existing material 
conflict in the world, then these problems can only be solved by extra-theoretical means. In 
other words a critical theory of society leads to the demand for a transformative praxiS 
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directed towards the social relations governing the productive life of society. Summarising 
this argument Marcuse advances the following thesis: 
A rough fonnula which could be used as a starting point would be that the 
revolutioruuy critique of political economy itself has a philosophical foundation, 
just as conversely the philosophy underlying it already contains revolutionaty 
praxis. The theory is in itself a practical one; praxis does not only come at the end 
but is already present in the beginning of the theory. To engage in praxis is not to 
tread on alien ground, external to theory.2 
Clearly this passage rruses a number of questions concerning the relation between 
philosophy and praxis, not the least of which is the question of the precise nature of the 
praxis that is already "contained" in the philosophical foundations of Marx's thought. 3 
However, leaving these questions aside for the moment one thing is clear. For Marcuse as 
for other members of the Frankfurt School, Marx's political economy is more than an 
economic theory: it represents the practical-critical unity of philosophy and the world. 
Properly understood therefore, Capital is a response to the problems of idealist philosophy, 
even though through its commitment to praxis it transcends that particular philosophical 
2 Op.cit., pp.4-5. 
3 It should be noted that there is a similar conception of praxis in the work of 
Adorno. Thus in a reference to Marx's famous last thesis concerning Feuerbach he 
writes that: "When Marx reproached the philosophers, saying that they had only 
variously interpreted the world, and contraposed to them that the point was to change 
it, then the sentence receives its legitimacy not only out of praxis, but also out of 
philosophical theory. Only in the annihilation of the question is the authe~ticity of the 
philosophical interpretation first successfully proven, and mere thought by Itself cannot 
accomplish this: therefore the annihilation of the question compels praxis." [Italics 
mine] 'The Actuality of Philosophy', Telos, 31, Spring 1977, p.129. 
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tradition. Thus unlike the idealist philosopher, the materialist does not regard the world as a 
completed rational order of being, as a reality to be contemplated and perhaps even 
celebrated. Rather, the latter probes and tests the claim, made by society, that the present 
order of things constitutes an adequate medium for the realisation of the subject. By 
interrogating that claim, historical materialism seeks to demonstrate that the project of 
human self-actua1isation demands a very different kind of social objectivity from that which 
Hegel had described. In short, the materialist encounter with philosophy raises the demand 
that the world must be changed. 4 
This way of reading Marx, it should be said, is not original to the Frankfurt School but 
derives in the first instance from the work of Korsch and Lukacs. Thus Korsch in Marxism 
and Philosophy had earlier written that "in the very act of surpassing the limits of a 
bourgeois [philosophical] position - an act indispensable to grasp the essentially new 
philosophical content of Marxism - Marxism itself is at once superseded and annihilated 
as a philosophical object.,,5 In a subsequent formulation of this same thought he tells us 
that materialism is "the supersession (Aujheben), not only of bourgeois idealist philosophy, 
but simultaneously of all philosophy as such. ,,6 These statements suggest that whilst 
Korsch believed that Marxism possessed its own philosophical content he nevertheless 
regarded it as the terminus of independent philosophical enquiry. Similarly Lukacs, whilst 
celebrating the achievement of Hegel and his predecessors, points to the inherent limitation 
4 In this chapter I shall be mainly co~ceme~ wit.h the relat~on between philosop~y 
and social theory. The final chapter of this theSIS WlI~ ~xplore 10 m~re d~t~ll how l~ IS 
that a theory of society is necessarily connected to cntlque and soclo-pohtIcal praxis. 
5 Marxism and Philosophy, p.43. 
6 Op.cit., p.4S. 
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of philosophical reflection, observing that 
. " classical philosophy is able to think the deepest and most fundamental problems 
of the development of bourgeois society through to the very end - on the plane of 
philosophy. It is able - in thought - to complete the evolution of class. And - in 
thought- it is able to take all the paradoxes of its position to the point where the 
necessity of going beyond this historical stage in mankind's development can at 
least be seen as a problem. 7 
The implication here is that classical philosophy, despite its intellectual richness, must 
ultimately be counted a failure insofar as it seeks a purely theoretical resolution of the 
socio-historical problems posed by the class nature of society. According to Lukacs, the 
problems which philosophy seeks to address are not autonomous theoretical questions but 
are in fact rooted in the material basis of the social life process and as such can only be 
resolved by means of praxis. As we have seen, he argues that the question posed by the 
Kantian ding an sich is an expression in the medium of theory of a specific problem arising 
from the process of social production, namely the problem of commodity fetishism. 8 Thus 
under the commodity form the appearance of social relations as relations between things 
gives rise to a form of philosophical consciousness, classically exemplified in Kant's theory 
of a world of noumenal entities. This representation of the world serves albeit 
unintentionally as a theoretical articulation of the original distortion of consciousness 
7 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat' in History and Class 
Consciousness, p 121. 
S Cf Horkheimer's discussion of Kant's Categorical Imperative in his article 
'Materialism and Morality' in Between Philosophy and Social Science. 
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induced by the commodity form.9 Now according to Lukacs, Marxism, because it is a 
"practical-critical" theory directed towards the transfonnation of society, stands in a quite 
distinct relation to the problems of knowledge, rationality and ethics which concerned Kant 
and Hegel. Although materialism intends to provide answers to the questions of that 
tradition, it also understands itself as the end of classical philosophy; it is in effect a 
philosophical thesis promising to liberate thought from the limitations of the purely 
philosophical consciousness. For the early Hegelian Marxists, as well as the Frankfurt 
School, historical materialism is therefore a theory which seeks to transform philosophical 
problems into questions whose solution is dependent upon the investigation and 
transformation of historically determinate forms of life. 10 Using Hegelian terminology we 
can summarise the above argument by saying that the relation between Marxism and 
philosophy is one of difference as well as identity: materialism, which preserves the central 
questions of the philosophical tradition in the critical theory of society, simultaneously 
negates that tradition by replacing contemplation with praxis. 
9 An interesting example of the relation between philosophical problems and the 
society in which they arise can be found in the work of Abraham Edel. Thus 
concerning Aristotle's concept of potentiality he observes "that Aristotle requires the 
full materials [the bronze of the statue] to be envisaged so that only a single unified 
activity will be involved in the actualisation of the potentiality. This seems to reflect 
the craft process inherent in pre-industrial modes of production. Modern machine 
production, where raw materials pour into one end of the machine and a ~e~ot~ 
finished product comes out the other, would extend the range of potentlahty. 
(Aristotle and his Philosophy, p.86.) 
10 In some ways this is reminiscent of the later Wittgenstein's belief that philosophical 
problems can be resolved by reflecting upon what he calls "the natural history of human 
beings". However, for Wittgenstein, this history is ~ediately available to us: it consists 
of ··observations which no one has doubted but which have escaped remark only because 
they are always before our eyes." (PhilosophicCfI I'!l'estigations, ~.415) Thus philosophy is 
disposed of by means of a pre-theoretical meditation upon certain fundamental aspects of 
the human social condition. 
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In order to test the truth of the above thesis, so as to determine whether and in what sense 
Marx's theory can be legitimately regarded as the supersession of the idealist tradition, the 
proper starting point must surely be with Hegel's original account of this concept. For 
unless we are clear about the meaning of supersession, it seems unlikely that much 
progress can be made with respect to either of the above questions. Accordingly the 
following section of this chapter will be largely devoted to a discussion of the role that this 
concept plays in Hegel's philosophical system. ll We shall then return to Korsch's essay, 
and examine his attempt to use this Hegelian notion to articulate the relation between 
materialism and its idealist predecessor. In the course of the discussion it will become 
apparent that Korsch, whose work so insistently posed the question of that relation, fails 
to produce anything like a satisfactory answer. Despite this failure, Korsch's essay is in the 
context of the present enquiry worth some attention, for it contains a number of ideas 
which although never fully worked out serve to bring the supersession thesis into sharper 
focus. The chapter closes by considering some of Horkheimer's early methodological 
writings, and in particular his argument that the right kind of social theory will seNe as the 
vehicle for the solution of the problems of Idealism. These writings, whilst certainly 
influenced by Korsch' s argument, go far beyond his reconstruction of Marxism, a 
reconstruction which with hindsight appears as unduly conservative as well as incomplete. 
Furthermore, and contrary to what a number of commentators have maintained, much of 
11 It should be said that Hegel uses the concept of sublation in a number of different 
ways. In some contexts it functions as an ~ntirely formal p~ncip~~, that th~ ne~~tion of 
the negation is a positive, and accordmg to Adorno IS utIlIsed to Illegttlmately 
establish what might be called the subjective unity ~f subject an.d obj~t. A~?~o 
rejects this strategy arguing that: "To equate the neg~tI~n o~ negatIOn WIth pOSItIVIty 
is the quintessence of identification; it is the form~ ~nncI~le In ~ur~st form. Wh~t. thus 
wins out in the inmost core of dialectics is the anti-dialectIcal pnnclple: that tradItIOnal 
logic which, more arithmetico, takes minu.s time.s ~nus for. a plus." (Negativ~ 
Dialectics, p.158.) However, in contrast to this qua~I-Io~cal ~erslon of the conc~pt, It 
is possible to find in Hegel's work a more substantIve, histoncally concrete notIon of 
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what the young Horkheimer has to say concerning both the nature and purpose of social 
theory, far from being discarded in the process of evolution undergone by Frankfurt 
Marxism, turns out to be a fairly accurate description of the Institute's subsequent course 
of theoretical development. This need not imply that Horkheimer's work is beyond 
criticism or that it is of greater importance to the Frankfurt School than the contributions of 
either Adorno or Marcuse; what it does suggest however is that Horkheimer was the first 
to successfully define the broad programmatic framework of first generation critical theory, 
and in virtue of this fact his early writings should be regarded as being of particular 
importance for an understanding of much of the subsequent Frankfurt Marxist project. 
Sublation and Determinate Negation 
The narrative of Hegel's Phenomenology is driven by the idea that history consists of a 
series of transitions from one form of consciousness to another. This process of transition 
is described by Hegel as a process of sublation: one form is said to be sublated by another 
form which in tum is sublated by another and so on until we arrive at the terminus of 
Absolute Knowledge. In what follows I what to consider the question of what exactly is 
involved in this account of the way in which one particular understanding of the world 
gives way to another. We shall begin this investigation with a frequently cited passage fonn 
the Science oj Logic where Hegel offers a general definition of the concept of sublation: 
'To sublate' has a twofold meaning in the language: on the one hand it means to 
preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to 
. " Something is sublated only insofar as it has entered into a unity with its opposite; 
sublation. It is this notion which I shall expound and defend in the following pages. 
lOO 
in this more particular signification as something reflected, it may fittingly be called 
a moment. 12 
Applying this definition to the history of ideas we come to the thought that the 
supersession or sublation (Aufhebung) of one theoretical tradition by another means that 
the sublating tradition preserves the very thought which it seeks to overcome. Thus by 
transcending as well as incorporating what is past, the contemporary consciousness 
establishes a unity with its apparent opposite, namely the form that is to be replaced. 
These first thoughts, however, should be sufficient to indicate that Hegel's concept of 
sublation is not an easy one to grasp. Certainly part of the difficulty here is that in 
translating from German to English we come up against the problem that there is no single 
English word which could serve as an accurate translation of aufheben. This is because, as 
Colletti explains, in German the word aujheben has two meanings, "one negative (annul, 
abolish) and the other positive (supersede, transcend).,,13 But even if this linguistic 
constraint could be overcome the problem of providing a determinate sense for the concept 
of sublation remains. Thus simply conjoining the notions of abolition and transcendence 
runs the risk of reducing Hegel's historical narrative to the banal assertion that each 
emergent form of consciousness incorporates something of the past. This is hardly a radical 
thought, much less a revolutionary one, but so far it seems to be all that can be safely said. 
12 Science qf Logic, p.l 07. 
13 Marx: Early Writings, p.432. 
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To make progress on this question it is necessary to go beyond the definition given above 
and recall that for Hegel the concept of sublation is equivalent to that of a double or 
determinate negation. 14 This takes us immediately to the very basis of Hegel's philosophy. 
Thus in an early description of his method Hegel writes that: 
. .. in speculative [begreifenden] thinking, ... the negative belongs to the content 
itself, and is the positive, both as immanent movement and determination of the 
content, and as the whole of this process. Looked at as a result, what emerges from 
this process is the determinate negative which is consequently a positive content as 
well. 15 (Italics mine) 
A more explicit formulation of the idea of the "determinate negative" is to be found in the 
Science of Logic where Hegel in a comment upon the Phenomenology observes that: 
Here [in the Phenomenology] we are dealing with forms of consciousness each of 
which in realising itself. .. has for its result its own negation - and so passes into a 
higher form. All that is necessary to achieve scientfic progress ... is the recognition 
of the logical principle that the negative is just as much positive, or that what is 
self-contradictory does not resolve itself into a nullity, ... but essentially only into 
the negation of its particular content, that such a negation is ... the negation of a 
specific subject matter which resolves itself, and consequently is a specific negation, 
and therefore the result essentially contains that from which it results ... Because 
14 Cf Mure, G.R., The Philosophy of Hegel, p.35. 
15 Phenomenology of Spirit, §59. 
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the result, the negation, is a specific negation it has a content. It is a fresh notion 
but richer and higher than its predecessor, for it is richer by the negation or 
opposite of the latter, therefore contains it, ... and is the unity of itself and its 
opposite. 16 [Italics mine] 
In both passages Hegel describes a process of thought developing by means of critical 
reflexivity; in other words a dialectic through which a shape of consciousness emerges, 
negates itself and is then replaced by a new shape derived from the negation of the original. 
This movement is the essential activity of Spirit which qua rational being is continuously 
compelled to adopt a critical stance towards its own self-articulation. For Hegel, negation 
is never an arbitrary development, but a consequence of Reason recognising the 
inadequacy of its own self-production and moving to correct its failure. Accordingly, the 
condition for all scientific progress is to understand that although the negation of a shape of 
consciousness is a refutation of that shape, it is not simply a refutation but a form which 
contains that from which it results, and therefore preserves what it negates. This, however, 
raises the question of what exactly is meant by the claim that the refutation of a form 
contains that which it refutes. Certainly Hegel is not using containment in the formal 
semantic sense, in the way, for instance, that a logician will say that the statement p is 
contained as the argument of the truth function "'(P). Instead Hegel's use of the term refers 
to the idea that the negation of an entity must be understood as a result or outcome of a 
process which presupposes the existence of what it negates. Thus, unlike the assertion of 
_(P), which does not require a previous assertion of p, a determinate negation is essentially 
constituted by its originating from a specific given positive. For Hegel then., determinate 
16 Science of Logic, p.54. 
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negation is closely akin to a stage in a developmental process: the negative is seen as the 
consequence of the earlier positive form. Thus the negative is the result of a process of 
immanent development, of the self-activity of a positive form coming up against its own 
inherent limitation, and in the process of overcoming that limitation, abolishing as well as 
preserving itself 17 
This still abstract idea of developmental containment is not yet sufficient to fully specify the 
principle of determinate negation; what is required is to discover the real content of the 
process. Here Hegel's Phenomenology is decisive for an understanding of this particular 
aspect of his thought. For the subject matter of this text is rarely an isolated proposition (or 
concept) but a shape of consciousness embodied within a historically specific form of life. 18 
Thus the recognition of negation by Spirit is tantamount to the acknowledgement that 
thought and being, intention and realisation, are in conflict: the world that thought has 
produced does not correspond to the world which it intended to produce. Summarising 
this particular dialectical moment Charles Taylor observes that for Hegel" ... certain 
historical forms of life are prey to inner contradiction, either because they are doomed 
to frustrate the very purpose for which they exist (e.g. the master-slave relation), or 
because they are bound to generate an inner conflict between different conditions 
which are equally essential to the fulfillment of the purpose ... " 19 This failure is, 
17 I shall return to this argument in Chapter 5. 
18 Dudley Knowles has persuaded me that certain forms of consciousness discussed 
in the Phenomenology, such as Sense-Certainty and Perception, are general 
epistemological-metaphysical stances which recur in ~u~er~us guises in the history of 
philosophy. For this reason they should perhaps be dIstmguIshed from the other more 
obviously historically determinate forms which figure in Hegel's account of the 
development of Spirit. 
19 Hegel, p.131. 
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however, not without a certain positive significance. Spirit does not simply recognise that a 
particular shape of consciousness (and the corresponding fonn of life) is doomed but 
understands the failure as a result of its own immanent development. In other words Spirit 
in a detenninate fonn has set forth into the world, and through labour has transfonned both 
itself and its object; yet in this process of self-realisation it also discovers that what has been 
produced conflicts with its original purpose. Hence by changing reality according to its 
own design, a shape of consciousness finds that it has negated itself, that its original 
understanding of the world no longer accords with the world that it has produced. But this 
negation, Hegel argues, has nevertheless a determinate content because it is the expression 
of a consciousness which although failing, and failing inevitably, has so altered the world 
that whatever succeeds it must incorporate not only what was known to Spirit but also 
recognise the necessity of the transfonnation that constitutes the moment of negation. 
Moreover, because consciousness retains knowledge of both the negation and what has 
been negated, it has the material at hand to develop a new positive or "higher" fonn of 
consciousness. This means that although negation is a distinct moment within the 
dialectical process, it is not a stable moment but must always pass over into a new 
resolving fonn. Thus in establishing a new understanding of the world, Spirit launches once 
again into a fresh cycle of development and frustration. This process will continue, at least 
according to Hegel, until Spirit has obtained a final and completely adequate understanding 
of itself, until thought has obtained and thus realised the principle of Absolute Knowledge. 
Applying this argument to the history of philosophy, we come to a view of that history 
quite distinct from the view of those philosophers who regard it as a narrative of errors 
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awaiting correction by the wisdom of the present. Against this position Hegel maintains 
that a philosophy has to be evaluated by reference to its historical context, to the form of 
life to which it seeks to give expression. In consequence, philosophical systems cannot be 
regarded as either simply true or false; instead they should be thought of as more or less 
adequate with respect to the particular set of contextually defined problems they seek to 
address. Furthermore, as the real context of philosophy changes, so do the problems; the 
new philosophies which arise in response to this change partially embody what has gone 
before but also, because the problems themselves have changed, go beyond what has thus 
far been achieved.20 This conception of philosophical development is very far removed 
from the ahistorical notion of argument and refutation current amongst many analytical 
philosophers. Thus according to Hegel, philosophical arguments do not exist in the abstract 
as a set of propositions, but are embedded within historically specific complexes of social 
life and can therefore only be fully understood and indeed assessed by reference to the 
problems characteristic of those complexes.21 This thought finds expression in Adorno's 
observation that "the historical problems of philosophy ... are inextricably bound to 
historical problems and the history of those problems, and are not to be resolved 
independent of them. ,,22 
20 Cf Robert Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel, pp.243-249. 
21 A clear example of this can be found in Hegel's discussion of Stoicism, 
Scepticism and the Unhappy Consciousness. (Phenomenology of Spirit, § 197-231.) 
22 'The Actuality of Philosophy' in Telos, 31, 1977 Spring, p.121. Horkheimer 
makes much the same point in a discussion of the relation between philosophy and 
history. He writes: "If it is true that we must know what freedom is in order to know 
which parties in history have fought for it, it is no less true that we must know the 
character of these parties in order to determine what freedom is. The answer lies in the 
concrete outlines of the epochs of history. The definition of freedom is the theory of 
history, and vice versa." (Eclipse of Reason, p.168) 
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The concept of sublation, therefore, points to the fact that developments in philosophical 
thought, as in other areas of theoretical labour, bear the marks of the very tradition they 
seek to overthrow. This is not due to a lack of human theoretical originality, but results 
from the fact that a philosophy is always the expression, albeit a highly abstract expression, 
of problems that arise from a specific form of life. In tum this form of life is itself a product 
of a certain shape of consciousness; thus the philosopher, in addressing questions that arise 
from that form necessarily confronts but must also in part absorb what has resulted from 
Spirit's earlier activit)?3 In other words philosophy, no matter how original, cannot step 
outside of its material context and in consequence is necessarily conditioned by the 
principle of thought which gives rise to and maintains that context. 
Korsch and the Supersession of Idealism 
Having said something concerning Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy I shall 
seek to apply what has been said to Korsch's claim that Marxism represents the sublation of 
Idealism. In doing this one is forced to immediately confront the following two questions. 
First, what according to Korsch are the constituent principles of the German Idealist 
tradition, the tradition which Marxism is supposed to both preserve as well as transcend? 
Second, and perhaps even more crucially, how precisely does materialism succeed in 
sublating this earlier philosophical movement? Korsch's answer to the first question is to 
23 Commenting upon this dialectic of tradition and innovation, Adorno writes that 
"tradition is immanent in knowledge itself, that it serves to mediate between known objects 
. .. Knowledge as such, even in a form detatched from substance takes part in tradition as 
remembrance; there is no question which we might simply ask, without knowing of past 
things that are preserved in the question and spur it.." (Negative Dialectics, p.54) 
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argue that Hegel's Idealism is a philosophy whose task it "is to reconcile Reason as a self-
conscious Spirit with Reason as an actual Reality, by means of concepts and 
comprehension. ,,24 This summary statement can be usefully related to another observation 
which occurs towards the end of Marxi~m and Philosophy: 
For Hegel, the practical task of the Concept in its 'thinking activity' (in other words, 
philosophy) does not lie in the domain of ordinary 'practical human and sensuous 
activity' (Marx). It is rather to 'grasp what is, for that which is, is Reason,?5 
Both of these quotations, we note, portray Hegel as an essentially conservative social 
philosopher whose primary concern is simply to observe and comprehend what already 
exists.26 Indeed Korsch goes further and argues that ultimately the reason that philosophy 
is important for Hegel is "because it reconciles man to reality.,,27 On this account then, the 
hallmark of German Idealism is a complicity with the world as it is; an attitude which 
appears to finds expression in Hegel's dictum that what is reasonable is actual and what is 
actual is reasonable.28 This charge of complicity is further particularised by Korsch who 
argues that the reality Hegel celebrated was none other than the newly emergent bourgeois 
24 Marxism and Philosophy, p.67 
25 Op.cit., p.82. 
26 Korsch constructs this picture of Hegel almost exclusively on the basis of certain well 
known passages in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right. However, this vision of 
philosophy as a reconciling mode of post festum comprehension can be found elsewhere in 
Hegel. In the Encyclopedia Logic, for instance, he writes: "... it may be held the highest 
and final aim of philosophic science to bring about ... a reconciliation of the self-conscious 
reason with the reason which is in the world - in other words, with actuality." p.8. 
27 Cf Marxism and Philosophy, pp.38-43. 
28 See footnote #45, Marxism and Philosophy. 
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society of the early nineteenth century?9 In fact, he goes on to say that Hegel simply 
expressed in theory what the European bourgeoisie were effecting in practice. It for this 
reason that Korsch maintains that the essential contrast between Idealism and materialism is 
that the fonner is committed to the interpretation of the world as it exists whilst the latter 
. , 
because it disputes the rationality of the present order of things, is the theoretical 
expression of a praxis directed towards the transformation of that world.30 
What are we to make of the above reconstruction of Hegel's thought? In the first place it 
must be said that Korsch's essay suffers from the usual limitations of the philosophical 
manifesto, insofar as general principles are advanced with little or no discussion of what 
they mean or how they might be justified. For instance, and most importantly, on the basis 
of his essay it is impossible, as I have already briefly argued in Chapter 2, to establish a 
satisfactory conception of the distinction between Hegel's idealism and Marx's materialism. 
This argument can now be made out in more detail. Thus if we consider Korsch's claim 
29 This somewhat oversimplifies Hegel's attitude to bourgeois society. For whilst 
Hegel certainly does celebrate bourgeois property rights he is also aware of the fact 
that by itself civil society cannot constitute an adequate realm of freedom. This tension 
comes out clearly in the following passage: "Mind that is objective is a person, and as 
such has a reality of its freedom in property ... But the full realisation of that freedom 
which in property is still incomplete, still [ only] fonnal ... is achieved only in the State, 
in which mind develops its freedom into a world posited by mind itself, into the ethical 
world." (Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, Zusatz to §385) To this qualification Korsch 
would undoubtedly reply that in bourgeois society the State simply reflects the 
interests of the economically dominant class in civil society. 
30 Yet despite this difference, Korsch argues that there is a significant continuity between 
Idealism and materialism: Marx's theory discovers that there is a class compelled by its 
actual life situation to realise the Idealist program of a society constituted on the basis of 
nonns of freedom and rationality. In making this point Korsch is, of course, echoing Marx's 
famous remark that: "Philosophy cannot realise itself without the transcendence 
[Aujhebung] of the proletariat, and the proletariat cannot transcend itself without the 
realisation of philosophy." See 'A Contribution Towards the Critique of Hegel's Philsophy 
of Right: Introduction', in Marx: Early Writings, p.257. 
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that idealism is distinguished by its contemplative stance towards reality whereas the 
materialism emphasises the role of praxis in changing it. Whilst this formula is undoubtedly 
suggestive, without further explication it is not sufficient to adequately illuminate the 
distinction between these two positions. F or example, Hegel's notion of thought 
comprehending the world refers primarily to the philosophical consciousness recognising 
the world as the product of thought, of thought coming to see the world as the result of its 
own activity. This means that the rationality of the world that philosophy discovers is not a 
simple brute fact nor the result of the activity of a transcendent deity, but rather a 
consequence of the essentially active, extemalising nature of thought. In short, if Hegel 
discovers that the world is rational this can only be because humanity as a vehicle of Geist 
has made it so. 31 But if this is true then the distinction between Idealism and materialism in 
terms of contemplation versus activity begins to seem a lot less clear cut: the Hegelian 
subject is not the autarchic subject of a Cartesian consciousness philosophy but is rather a 
historical, world-transforming agent. To this objection Korsch might perhaps reply that it is 
precisely the emphasis Idealism places upon thought that is the point of difference between 
Hegel and Marx: Idealism envisages a single form of activity, namely the activity of Mind, 
whereas materialism represents thought as a moment in the richer totality of a historicised 
conception of human praxis. But this response overlooks Hegel's conception of Mind as 
something whose realisation depends upon its presence in the realm of nature and society. 
For Hegel, the labour of the Concept is not the activity of the isolated scholar, but the 
activating principle of every existent social and natural form.32 It would seem therefore that 
31 Korsch, in fact recognizes as much, for as he puts it: "The greatest thinker produced 
by bourgeois society in its revolutionary period regarded a 'revolution in the fonn of 
thought' as an objective component of the total social process of a real revolution." 
(Marxism and Philosophy, p.39.) 
32 As Adorno puts it: "... thought is always accompanied by the moment of violent 
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on the basis of what Korsch has to say about Hegel, no easy distinction can be drawn 
between idealism as philosophical contemplation and materialism as world transfonning 
praxis. 
Indeed, the weakness in Korsch's account of Hegel becomes even more evident if we 
consider what he has to say concerning the guiding principle of Idealism, namely that the 
purpose of philosophy is to produce for consciousness a recognition of the rationality of 
the world. Although Korsch is aware of this aspect of Hegel's thought, he offers no 
substantial analysis of the concept of Reason (Vernunft) nor indeed of the closely related 
concepts of Freedom and Necessity. Indeed, it can be said that despite Korsch's stated 
intention of discovering the real relation between Marxism and Idealist philosophy, his 
essay is remarkably light on references to the specific substance of Hegel's thought.33 Now 
this failure to adequately determine the theoretical content of the idealist tradition seriously 
undermines Korsch's argument, because it leaves the supersession thesis without any 
determinate meaning. In this respect, as we shall see, the Frankfurt School's attempt to 
address this same question is markedly superior. In contrast to Korsch's somewhat 
superficial characterisation of Idealism, the work of the early critical theorists is informed 
by the clear understanding that if it is to be argued that materialism in some sense preserves 
Hegel's thought, then something must be said about the relation of the latter to Idealism's 
fundamental conceptual trilogy of Reason, Freedom and Necessity. Until this obligation has 
exertion - a reflection of the dire necessities of life - that characterises labour; the strains 
and toils of the concept are not metaphorical." ('Aspects of Hegel's Thought' in Hegel: 
Three Studies, p.21.) 
33 In Marxism and Philosophy, the majority of the textual references to Hegel consist of 
passages from the Philosophy of Right; there are no substantial references to either the 
Logic or the Phenomenology. 
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been discharged, the notion that Marx's materialism represents the triumphant sublation of 
idealist philosophy is no more than a provocative conjecture. 
Bearing this in mind, let us see if something of worth can nonetheless be extracted from 
Korsch's response to the second question associated with the thesis of supersession, the 
question of how precisely Marx's thOUght constitutes the determinate negation of the 
idealist tradition. Now in addressing this question Korsch is again seeking to oppose the 
scientistic Marxism of the Second International, and in particular the sharp distinction it 
made between the philosophical work of the young Marx and his later "scientific" theory of 
history and society.34 On this account Capital, as a work of political economy, represents 
the transition from the philosophical critique of society to a purely scientific account of the 
workings of a capitalist economy. In consequence, those who accepted this interpretation 
were inclined to view the relation between Marxism and philosophy as being wholly 
negative; inasmuch as the later Marx abandons philosophy in favour of a science of 
political economy. Indeed, for the Second International theorists, Marxism does not so 
much sublate the philosophical tradition as simply negate it. 
Clearly this kind of transition, a transition which seems to produce difference without 
identity, is not the kind that would be acceptable to any thinker schooled in Hegel's 
dialectic. Thus for Korsch, as for the later Frankfurt School, this account of the relation 
between Idealism and Marx's Capital needs to be rejected. This follows from the fact that 
the relation between these two moments of thought is one of determinate rather than 
outright negation: in Hegel's formula the latter is the "the negation or opposite" of the 
34 See Colletti's introduction to Marx: Early Writings for a discussion of the 
reception of Marx's writings amongst theorists of the Second International. 
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former but "therefore contains it, but also something more, and is the unity of itself and its 
opposite." What this means with respect to Marx is that it must be possible to construe his 
critique of political economy as in some way embodying or containing its supposed 
opposite, namely Hegel's idealist social theory. Arguably, this idea lies behind Korsch's 
observation that Marx and Engels in their later work "far from neglecting the subject 
[philosophy], . .. actually developed their critique of it in a more profound and radical 
direction." 35 Korsch justifies this remark by appealing to the fact that Marx and Engels' 
post -1848 work "includes not only a critique of the material relations of production of the 
capitalist epoch but also of its specific forms of social consciousness. ,,36 Now as we have 
seen Korsch, following Hegel, regards philosophy as a form of social consciousness and 
therefore as part of the subject matter of Marx's political economy. In other words, Marx's 
later work is "a critique of the whole of bourgeois society and so of all of its forms of 
consciousness. ,,37 Thus the holistic intent of Marx's thought entails that his political 
economy is not confined to the realm of the economic but is rather a critique of the totality 
of consciousness and social being, which by definition includes the philosophical 
conscIOusness. 
Obviously, this approach raises a number of questions, not the least of which is that at first 
glance Marx's Capital contains hardly any discussion of consciousness, much less any form 
of philosophical consciousness. On the contrary it appears to be an elaborate and lengthy 
treatise on what might be called the logic of the value-form. In consequence many readers 
35 Marxism and Philosophy, p.7S. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
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of Marx have responded to this text by understanding Capital as primarily a work of 
political economy, as a radical continuation, albeit highly critical, of the tradition 
inaugurated by Smith, Mill and Ricardo.38 Korsch, however, rejects this view, arguing that 
the world cannot be understood by its partition into a series of independent theoretical 
domains, the economic, social, political and so forth.39 Hence, although Capital is a 
critique of political economy it is not merely a criticism of a particular set of economic 
theories but is rather a critique of the whole of bourgeois society, of its thought as well as 
its material base. This argument can be related to Korsch's view of the relation between 
consciousness and social being, and in particular to the relation between classical political 
economy and the exchange society of which it is the expression. As Korsch puts it: 
"Bourgeois economics belongs with the material relations of productions to bourgeois 
society as a totality.,,40By this he means to say that the economic theory characteristic of 
the newly emergent bourgeois society of the nineteenth century represents the self 
understanding of that society: like Marx's own theory it serves as the systematic, scientific 
expression of the consciousness of a particular social class. The problem with this is that 
once again Korsch's discussion remains at an unacceptable level of abstraction. Even if we 
accept his assurance that forms of consciousness, such as philosophy, express the "spiritual 
structure of bourgeois society", it is by no means obvious how these forms are to be related 
to the subject matter of Capital. Hence the suspicion must arise that in this case abstraction 
is serving no other purpose than to obscure the real difficulty of applying the general 
principle to the specific case. In the absence of any attempt to relate the central concepts of 
38 See, for instance, Joan Robinson's Rconomic Philosophy, p.29-47. 
39 This anticipates Horkheimer's conception of materialism as a multi-disciplinary 
activity. See Chapter 4 for a discussion of the topic. 
40 Marxism and Philosophy, p.84. 
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Capital - the commodity form, use and exchange value, labour and capital - to a critique of 
the philosophical tradition we must judge that Korsch's supersession thesis remains 
unsubstantiated as well indeterminate from the point of view of meaning. Nevertheless his 
notion that the key to understanding the relation between the thought of Hegel and that of 
Marx consists in the application of the dialectical category of sublation to that relation is an 
insight worth preserving. Indeed, in the second half of this chapter I shall argue that the 
formation of critical theory should be understood as an attempt to resolve some of these 
problems, and thus to make good on Korsch's promise to recover the philosophical 
significance of Marx' s thought. 
From Korsch to Critical Theory 
In a lecture given at Frankfurt University in 1931, Horkheimer sought to address the 
question of how philosophy, and more particularly post-Hegelian social philosophy, should 
relate itself to the scientific study of society.41 As we shall see, the general outline of his 
answer owes a great deal to Korsch's argument that Marx's theory of history and society 
represents the supersession of Hegel's idealist philosophy. Indeed, it will be argued that 
Horkheimer provides a more articulated exposition of the supersession thesis than that 
which can be found in the pages of Marxism and Philosophy. Thus Horkheimer, like 
Korsch, maintains that after Marx the traditional philosophical enterprise, as exemplified 
and indeed culminating in the work of Hege~ is no longer tenable: philosophy must give 
41 The text of this lecture is reprinted as the 'The Present Situation of Social Philosophy 
and the Tasks of Institute for Social Research' in Between Philosophy and Social Science. 
It was presented on the occasion of Horkh~imer' s appo~~ent as the dir~or ?f the 
Institute for Social Research, and represents his personal VISion of the future direction of 
the Institute. 
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way to the construction of a scientifically adequate theory of the social life process. This 
proposal, however, despite what some critics have said should not be understood as a tum 
towards conventional scientism, to the belief that positive science can simply replace 
philosophy. For the kind of theory he has in mind, through its commitment to the interests 
of the subject, departs radically from the methodological norms characteristic of the natural 
sciences; this in virtue of the fact that a concern with human interest leads inevitably 
towards the notion of a socio-political praxis directed towards the realisation of that 
interest. This transition from philosophical contemplation to the practical struggle for 
human emancipation is mediated by a social theory which transcends the traditional 
dichotomy between fact and value, descriptive and normative judgements; and insofar as 
the theory succeeds in this aim it constitutes itself as a "practical-critical" body of 
knowledge. Unlike Korsch, however, Horkheimer is not content with an abstract 
description of this process but instead seeks to outline a concrete program of research by 
means of which such a body of knowledge might be brought into being. For Horkheimer, 
materialism needs to move beyond the merely programmatic recognition of a possibility, 
the possibility of transforming philosophy by means of social theory, and demonstrate in a 
concrete fashion how Marx's categories enable the central questions of Idealism to be 
reconstructed as questions about the nature of society. 
Before, however, getting into the detail of Horkheimer's discussion, one other general 
observation concerning his account of the supersession thesis should be made. In contrast 
to Engels' view that materialism preserves the method but not the content of Idealism, 
Horkheimer argues that the former doctrine is immanent to the idealist tradition itself42 In 
42 There is a vague recognition of this in Korsch who observes that: "Hegel said that 
the theoretical consciousness of an individual could not 'leap over' his own epoch. 
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other words, the transition from a philosophy of consciousness to a theory of social being, 
a transition characteristic of materialist thinking, is not external to Hegel's thOUght but in 
fact follows from the very logic of objective Idealism. Here the concepts of containment 
and determinate negation come into play: Marx's critique of Hegel is not a simple negation 
but represents the following through of his philosophy to the point where its intention 
conflicts with the world it seeks to legitimate. Thus Marx takes seriously Hegel's notion 
that society is the expressive medium of human SUbjectivity, that the social being of the 
subject is not a contingent property but rather the necessary means by which the subject 
realises itself Marx differs from his idealist mentor, however, by rejecting the thesis that 
bourgeois society, even one with a State apparatus dedicated to the realisation of a ethical 
social life, could ever constitute an adequate basis for this project of human self-realisation. 
Nevertheless, for Marx as for Horkheimer, the idealist celebration of society represents an 
important theoretical achievement, insofar as it gives expression, albeit at the highest level 
of abstraction, to the very claim that society makes on its own behalf that society exists for 
the benefit of its members. In other words Marx is responding as much to the failure of the 
world as to the errors of the Hegelian system. As Adorno was later to remark : "If one 
does not want to miss Hegel with one's very first words, one must confront, however 
inadequately, the claim his philosophy makes to truth, rather than merely discussing his 
philosophy from above, and thereby from below. ,,43 
To understand the claim to truth made by Hegel's philosophy, it is necessary to recall that 
the central philosophical problem of the German Idealist tradition was the question of the 
Nevertheless he inserted the world into philosophy far more than he did philosophy 
into the world." (Marxism and Philosophy, p. 81.) 
43 'Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy' in Hegel: Three Studies, p.2. 
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relation between consciousness and the external world, between the subject of experience 
and its object. Now HegeL under the influence of Kant's first critique but in sharp 
disagreement with the program of transcendental Idealism, set himself the task of 
overcoming the apparently unbridgeable gulf separating the realm of phenomena from the 
noumenal realm of the Kantian ding-an-sich. As Hegel explains the goal of speculative 
thought "is not abstract but a living concrete unity in virtue of the fact that the opposition 
... between a self-detennined entity, a subject and a second such entity, an object is known 
to be overcome.,,44 This should not be interpreted as the simple reduction of either the 
subject or the object to its other, but rather as the study of the fonns of thought (or 
cultures) - philosophical, religious, scientific, aesthetic, political, ethical - by means of 
which the subject becomes aware that what is external to consciousness, namely nature and 
society, is nothing other than the manifestation of thought.45 Now whilst the Frankfurt 
School were unable to accept this ultimate identification of subject and object they 
recognised the importance of Hegel's argument that social being is not the consequence of 
an autonomous, fully-developed self-consciousness but rather its essential condition. 46 
Acknowledging this insight, Horkheimer writes: 
44 Science oj Logic, p.60. 
45 Marcuse correctly emphasises the existential aspect of these forms: "A social or 
political institution, a work of art, a religion and a philosophical system operate as part and 
parcel of man's own being, products of a rational subject that continues to live in them." 
(Reason and Revolution, p.56) 
46 Describing the influence of Hegel upon the FranJcfurt Sc~ool, Horkheime,~ 
declares that "he is the philosopher to whom we are most 10debted 10 many respects. 
(,The Social Function of Philosophy' in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, p.270.) On 
another occasion he describes his position as "materialism schooled in Hegel's logic". ('The 
Rationalism Debate in Contemporary Philosophy' in Between Philosophy and Social 
Science, p.234.) See also Marcuse's 'Philosophy and Critical Theory' in Nega~ons, and 
Adorno's 'Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy' in Hegel: Three Studies for a diSCUSSIon of the 
influence of Hegel upon critical theory 
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The medium of philosophy remains that of self-consciousness. But Hegel liberated 
this self-consciousness from the fetters of introspection and shifted the question of 
our essence - the question of the autonomous culture-creating subject - to the work 
of history, in which the subject gives itself objective form. 47 (Italics mine) 
As this passage describes it, Hegel's achievement is to shift philosophical concern away 
from the introspective investigation of consciousness, taking it instead towards the study of 
historically determinate forms of life. Marcuse summarises this succinctly by observing that: 
"Hegel links the epistemological process of self-consciousness (from sense certainty to 
reason) with the historical process of mankind from bondage to freedom. ,,48 (Italics mine) 
Unfortunately from the point of view of the Frankfurt School, Hegel's Idealism also 
involved the belief that this process of self-realisation is essentially "intellectual in nature" 
and has as its necessary result "the self-comprehending and thus infinite Idea. ,,49 This of 
course entails that the historical life of the world is not in the final analysis the life of 
empirical (and suffering) individuals but rather of an idealist meta-subject, Hegel's Logical 
Idea, realising itself by means of embodiment in the finite human subject. History is in 
consequence spiritualised and thereby acquires a purposive character: it becomes a process 
determined by a final cause, the realisation of Absolute Knowledge. 
47 Cf 'The Present Situation of Social Philosophy' in Between Philosophy and Social 
SCience, p.2. For the relation between the individual and the social totality see also 
Horkheimer's 1957 essay 'The Concept of Man' in The Critique of Instnnnental Reason, 
pp.9-10. 
48 Marcuse, H., Reason and Revolution, p.95. 
49 Horkheimer, H., 'The Rationalism Dispute in Contemporary Materialism' in Between 
Philosophy and Social Science, p.244. 
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Clearly as materialists, Horkheimer and his colleagues could not accept this reconstruction 
of the historical process; in particular they rejected the idea that the truth of the world is 
ultimately the activity of an abstract subjectivity realising itself in and through the life 
activity of real historical subjects. Nevertheless, despite Hegel's idealistic teleology, the 
Frankfurt School held to the belief that his thought could be utilised by materialism in 
virtue of the fact that it refuses to address the question of consciousness in a purely a priori 
fashion, and seeks instead to explore the social content of subjectivity as it unfolds in world 
history. 50 Therefore, Horkheimer argued, progress in both philosophy and social theory 
depends upon there being "a continuous dialectical penetration and development of 
philosophical theory and specialised scientific practice". 51 Developing this idea, he explains 
that the investigation of the relation between "the economic life of society, the psychical 
development of individuals, and the changes in the realm of culture" effectively constitutes 
"a reformulation ... of the old question concerning the connection of particular existence 
and universal Reason, of reality and Idea, of life and Spirit. ,,52 In other words, the tum 
towards social theory is not the simple negation of philosophy, but rather the means of 
realising at least some of the original goals of the earlier idealist project. 53 Fundamentally, 
50 Compare this with Marx's program for the transcendence of ~hilosophy: "~ere 
speculation ends - in real life - real, positive science, the repr~sentatlon of th~ practIcal 
activity and the practical process of development of I!len, begms. Phrase~m~g ~bout 
consciousness ceases, and real knowledge has to take Its place. When reality IS depIcted, 
philosophy as an independent activity loses its medium of existence." (The German 
Ideology, p.43.) 
51 'The Present Situation of Social Philosophy', in Between Philosophy and Social 
Science, p.9. 
52 Op.cit., pp.1l-12. 
53 It is arguable whether the Frankfurt project is an adequate response to Id~alism 
in its entirety. For instance, it might be said that Horkheimer's proposal has nothmg to 
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Horkheimer's philosophically oriented program of interdisciplinary social research is a 
variant of the Korschian sublation thesis: where German Idealism recasts the fundamental 
philosophical problems as problems of social philosophy, Horkheimer takes one step 
further, and recasts social philosophy as social science. Commenting upon this move, 
Habermas says that the primary intention is to "continue philosophy by other means, 
namely, the social sciences" and that in consequence this version of materialism carries with 
it "a connotation critical of philosophy" . 54 In effect, there is the promise of a form of "post-
metaphysical thinking", a supersession by means of Marx's materialism, of the philosophical 
tradition that culminated in Hegel's idealist system. 55 This comment by Habermas raises 
two obviously important questions. First what are the grounds for Horkheimer's belief that 
philosophy, if it is to continue, can only do so by means of a post-metaphysical scientific 
theory of society? Second what is the precise nature of this kind of theory? More 
particularly what is the relation between Horkheimer's critical theory of society and the 
traditional empirical sciences? Are these two enterprises completely different in kind, or 
does critical theory recognise, at least to some extent, the validity of the cognitive norms 
characteristic of the traditional sciences? In this chapter I shall concentrate on providing an 
answer to the first of these questions; the latter question will in one way or another form 
the subject matter of the subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
say concerning the epistemological and metaphysical elements in the work o! Kant ~nd 
Hegel. Against this one might pursue the Lukacs' argument ~hat many philosop~cal 
problems, for example the problem of the ~ing-l!n-sich, are dlspl,ace~ representations 
of problems arising in the world of. SOCial bemg. S.ee Lukacs IflstOry and Class 
Consciousness, pp.ll0-149. One mtght also conSider Adorno s argu~ent that 
philosophical theories such as determinism or free will are distorted expressIOns of the 
individual's situation in a repressive society. (Negative Dialectics, pp.264-265) 
54 'Remarks on the Development ofHorkheimer's Work', in On Max Horkheimer: New 
Perspectives, p.50. 
5S Ibid. 
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To discover what lay behind Horkheimer's decision to continue philosophy via a theory of 
society we need to consider why he believed that consciousness must be regarded as an 
inherently social phenomenon; in effect why he rejected Kant's model of the autarchic ego 
in favour of Hegel's socially situated account of subjectivity and consciousness. 56 Indeed, 
because this question constitutes the fundamental problematic of Idealism, it is reasonable 
to suppose that to clarifY this latter thesis is to clarify the idea that philosophy can be 
sublated by means of a certain kind of social theory. The close connection between these 
two ideas can be illustrated by examining Horkheimer's approach to the thought of Kant as 
compared to that of Hegel. Thus concerning the former, we find the original author of the 
idealist project being charged with the belief that the source of the constitutive principles of 
the socio-cultural sphere reside in the "closed unity of the rational subject". Ethics, for 
instance, is the expression of an autonomous will recognising no authority other than that 
of reason. 57 Against this, Horkheimer argues that Hegel's achievement was to recognise 
that the subject is necessarily located in "overarching structures of being ... which could 
only be discovered in the social totality. ,,58 (Italics mine) In articles published later in the 
Zeitschrijt, he returns to this theme, observing for example that "neither pure thought, nor 
abstraction in the sense of the philosophy of consciousness ... is capable of creating a 
56 Adorno is making much the same point when he criticises Husserl for 
unconsciously reverting to "the old idealist principle that the subjective data of our 
consciousness are the ultimate source of all knowledge, and that therefore any 
fundamental philosophical analysis must be an analysis of consciousness." See 'Husserl 
and the Problem of Idealism' in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol XXXVII, No.1, 
January, 1940, p.18. 
57 'The Present Situation of Social Philosophy', in Between Philosophy and Social 
Science, p.2. 
58 Ibid. 
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connection between the individual and the pennanent structure of being. ,,59 (Italics mine) 
For Horkheimer, the relation between thought and its object can only be discovered in "the 
historical situation [of the individual] and the theoretical tasks created by it".60 
Furthennore, as a materialist, he believed that the historically specific situation of the 
individual was to be understood, first and foremost, in terms of the individual's relation to 
the productive life of society. As Horkheimer puts it: "Consciousness requires clarity 
concerning the historical context in which it evolves and the praxis within which it emerges, 
takes effect, and is changed.,,61 This, of course, need not entail that consciousness is simply 
the causally determined product of its historical situation: for Horkheimer, as for other 
members of the Frankfurt School, the concept of praxis guarantees that consciousness has 
the potential to become the producer of its own material context. What the above 
statement does entail, however, is that philosophy, in order to make progress, must 
abandon the Kantian inspired concern with a socially-isolated consciousness, that is with 
the fonn and content of individual experience, in favour of an investigation into the relation 
between subjectivity and our material social being. 
To understand this argument something more needs to be said concerning the way in which 
Horkheimer and his Institute colleagues interpreted Hegel's thought. Their reading is 
founded upon the assumption that there is an inherent tension within Hegel's system of 
59 'The Rationalism Debate in Contemporary Philosophy' in Between Philosophy and 
Social Science, p.223. 
60 Ibid. 
61 'Remarks on Philosophical Anthropology' in Between Philosophy and So.cial 
Science, p.159. See also 'History and Psychology' (pp.ll~-120), whe~e l!orkhelmer 
explains that the praxis upon which consciousness d7pends IS the matenal hfe process 
by means of which society produces and reproduces Itself 
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Idealism between on the one hand the productive, world-constituting nature of thought and 
on the other the dependence of Spirit upon material embodiment. This tension, as we shall 
see, will prove fatal to the project of Absolute Knowledge, founded as it is upon an 
extravagant imperialism of the mind. Returning, however, to the topic presently under 
discussion, we note that the Frankfurt reading of Hegel credits him with the view that the 
subject is not an ahistorical given but is formed in and through its historically concrete 
relationship with other subjects and objects. Commenting upon this proto-materialist 
element in Hegel's thought, Horkheimer writes: 
According to [Marx], historically acting human beings are never comprehensible 
simply on the basis of their internal selves, whether of their nature, or of some 
ground of Being to be discovered in themselves. Rather, human beings are bound 
up in historical formations with dynamics of their own. In methodological terms, 
Marx here follows Hegel. 62 (Italics mine) 
However, whilst Hegel understands the historical process in terms of the "logic of Absolute 
Spirit", Marx, according to Horkheimer, derives his account from "consideration of human 
beings living under definite conditions and sustaining themselves with the aid of specific 
tools. ,,63 Unfortunately at this point Horkheimer breaks off the argument, leaving the 
question of consciousness and its material context still very much in the air. This may be 
because he failed to understand the complexity of the very thesis he is defending, and 
simply assumed that the relation between thought and social being, once it has been 
62 'History and Psychology' in Between Philosophy and Social Science, p116. 
63 Ibid. 
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pointed out, is either wholly transparent or requires little in the way of elucidation. It is 
perhaps more likely, however, that it was because Horkheimer believed that Hegel and 
Marx had already definitively established the socio-historical nature of consciousness, and 
that the theoretical priority was therefore to build upon this thesis. This would mean 
developing in detail the various consequences of this idea for both philosophy as well as 
social theory. 
But whatever the reason, the fact must be faced that in this respect at least Horkheimer 
fails to adequately secure the foundations of his program for the social sciences. 
Fortunately we can remedy the omission by turning to Marcuse's contemporaneous 
discussion of the Marxian concept of labour and its relation to society. Whilst this 
discussion is by no means definitive it provides enough material to begin to sketch out the 
kind of argument required by Horkheimer's program of pursuing philosophy by means of a 
theory of society. Thus Marcuse, commenting upon the early Marx's theory of labour, 
argues that his account clearly bears the imprint of Hegel's "ontological concept oflabour" 
as expounded in the Phenomenology .64 According to Marcuse this concept is centred 
around the idea that: 
... labour is 'man's act of self-creation', i.e. the activity through and in which man 
really first becomes what he is by his nature as man. He does this in such a way that 
this becoming and being are therefor himself, so that he can know and 'regard' 
himself as what he is (man's 'becoming-for-himself). Labour is a knowing and 
conscious activity: in his labour man relates to himself and to the object of his 
64 'The Foundations of Historical Materialism' in Studies in Critical Philosophy, 
p.13. 
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labour ... Man can only realise his essence if he realises it as something objective, 
by using his 'essential powers' to produce an 'external', 'material', objective world. 
It is in his work in this world (in the broadest sense) that he is real and effective. 65 
In effect Hegel's view of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology is that of a subject 
positing itself, bringing itself into being, through its status as a world transfonning agent: 
only through activity can the subject define who or what it is, and without this objective 
moment the subject lacks determinacy. 66 Thus Hegel in his discussion of physiognomy and 
phrenology declares that "the individual human is what the deed is", and that "it is the deed 
alone that must be affirmed as his gemtine being". 67 By acting upon the world, by 
transforming it through labour, the subject achieves an external expression of itself; this is 
what Hegel means when he talks of "the mediation of its [i.e. Substance as Subject] self-
othering with itself ,,68 Just as thought requires the medium of language to secure 
determinate expression, so the subject requires an objective realm in order to realise itself 
Materialism learns this lesson, discards the philosopher's abstract conception of subjectivity 
and concerns itself, as Hegel does, with the concrete historical process, the dialectic of 
Desire and Labour, through which the subject brings itself into being. Summarising this 
principle of externalisation Marcuse writes: 
65 Op.cit., pp.13-14. This passage should be compared with Hegel's discussion of 
property in Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §§ 41-71. 
66 Reason and Revolution, pp. 114-120. See also Richard Norman's Hegel's 
Phenomenology: A Philosophical Introduction, p.6S. 
67 Phenomenology ~f Spirit, § 322. 
68 Op.cit., §18. 
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The opposition between subject and object that detennined the fonns of mind 
hitherto described [in the Phenomenology] has now disappeared. The object, 
shaped and cultivated by human labour, is in reality the objectification of a self-
conscious subject.69 
If this principle is granted, the transition from labour to society is but a short step. For, 
according to Hegel, labour is not the activity of an isolated individual seeking to satisfy 
instinctual needs but is an essentially social phenomenon.7o Although animals engage in a 
range of activities that produce and reproduce their species, this activity is instinctive rather 
than intentional: their needs are satisfied through a repetitive and naturally-determined 
cycle of consumption. Human labour, by contrast, escapes this cycle by virtue of its 
creative character: human beings through intentional activity do not simply respond to 
natural impulses but fashion nature according to their own design.71 They do this, 
according to Hegel, in two ways: first, the category of need undergoes social development 
and second, the labour by which specific needs are satisfied becomes embedded in a social 
division of labour. The social nature of production thus entails that human activity, unlike 
natural behaviourial patterns, is subject to historical development, and for the materialist 
this narrative is the real history of the subject. However, the creativity characteristic of 
social production demands a reflective capacity, requiring that the subject is capable of 
69 Reason and Revolution, p.ll7. 
70 Phenomenology of Spirit, §351. See also Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 
especially the discusson of the "System of Needs" in §189-208. 
71 For a discussion of the Hegelian concept of labour see Shlomo Avineri's Hegel's 
Theory of the Modem State, pp. 87-98. 
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consciously imposing their will upon the world. But this is only possible within a social 
context; for, at the very least it supposes a symbolic order by means of which an intention 
might be formulated and thereby secure recognition both from the self and others. 
Furthermore, in order to progress beyond the most primitive levels of productive activity, 
individuals must learn to produce in a co-operative fashion: labour must become socialised 
labour. Now as Marx argues, conscious co-operation requires language, for "language is 
practical, real consciousness": it is the means by which the self relates to itself and to other 
selves.72 This prompts Marcuse to observe that: 
The sphere of objects in which labour is performed is precisely the sphere of 
common life activity: in and through the objects of labour, men are shown one 
another in their reality. The original forms of communication, the essential 
relationship of men to one another, were expressed in the common use, possession, 
desire, need and enjoyment, etc. of the objective world. All labour is labour with 
and for and against others, so that in it men first mutually reveal themselves for 
what they really are.73 
In short, if self-consciousness does indeed develop in and through the process of labour, it 
can only do so insofar as that activity becomes social activity, thereby entailing that the 
individual's sense of self cannot be derived internally but depends upon the social life of the 
species. This insight, which we owe to Hegel, is at the centre of the Frankfurt School's 
72 The German Ideology, p.49. 
73 'The Foundations of Historical Materialism' in Studies in Critical Philosophy, 
p.24. 
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materialist restatement of the program of the Phenomenology.74 Furthermore it is the basis 
of their belief that the traditional philosophical enquiry into a free and rational form of life 
can no longer be undertaken as an a priori exercise but must be pursued by means of a 
scientific study of existing social conditions. 
However, whilst acknowledging the fact that Hegel ' s influence runs deep amongst the 
Frankfurt Marxists, it is at the same time essential to emphasise that critical theory 
transcends Idealism in a number of respects. Thus at the most general level it refuses to 
posit an identity, however mediated, between subject and object; instead, as Horkheimer 
comments: "Materialism ... maintains the irreducible tension between concept and object 
and thus has a critical weapon of defence against belief in the infinity of mind.,,75 This 
remark is directed against the absolutism of the Hegelian subject, against the idea that the 
world is the result of the subject's activity and therefore ultimately identical with thought. 
For despite everything that Hegel says concerning the necessity of the subject to establish 
itselfby means of its other, the object, his idealist dialectic leads inevitably to the view that 
the initial duality of subject and object can be overcome within a higher unity of thought 
and being, and that within this unity difference gives way to identity. Describing this project 
Hegel writes: 
. . . it is premised that the Idea turns out to be thought which is completely identical 
74 Commenting upon the contradictory nature of Hegel's thought Adorno writes: 
"The Hegel of the Phenomenology, in whom the consciousness of spirit as living 
activity and its identity with the real social subject was less atrophied than in the later 
Hegel, recognised the spontaneous spirit as labour, if not in theory at least in his 
language." ( ' Aspects of Hegel ' s Philosophy' in Hegel: Three Studies, p.21.) 
75 'Materialism and Metaphysics' in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, p.28. 
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with itself, and not identical simply in the abstract, but also in its action of setting 
itself over against itself, so as to gain a being of its o~ and yet of being in full 
possession of itself while it is in its other. 76 
The identity that Hegel postulates is, of course, not the bare logical idea of identity (A=A), 
the a priori judgement that a thing is identical with itself, but an a posteriori judgement 
made possible by reflection upon the history of the world. In other words, identity is a 
result rather than a given metaphysical truth: the subject, through world-historic activity, 
produces an adequate external expression of itself and thereby becomes identical with what 
it is. As a materialist, however, Horkheimer rejected this idealist conc1usion~ nevertheless 
he argued that the means for overcoming this particular imperialism of Spirit can be found 
in Hegel's own system. Thus commenting upon the Hegelian dialectic Horkheimer 
observes that: 
Hegel is an idealist in that he presents his system as absolute, yet he created the 
conceptual tool for overcoming such a distorted idea. The correct application of 
the method does not mean simply that the Hegelian system or any of the views 
prevailing today are to be handled precisely as Hegel handled his predecessors. 
Rather, they all lose their character of being steps towards the absolute, which 
earlier doctrines still have in Hegel because of his belief that the dialectic was 
reaching its goal in him. 77 
76 Hegel's Logic, § 18. 
77 'Materialism and Metaphysics' in Critical Theory, p.32. 
130 
In opposition to the Hegelian absolutism of Mind, materialism teaches that all knowledge, 
including itself, is contextually limited, that what we know about nature as well as society is 
conditioned by history. Thus natural science does not confront a ready-made, fixed external 
order of being but a realm of experience mediated through the activity of the subject. This 
realm is as much a function of what we do as it is a function of the way the world is, for it 
is determined by a diverse multiplicity of factors, ranging from techniques and instruments 
of observation through to mathematical methods and theoretic concepts. 78 Indeed it can be 
said that in the absence of specific scientific theories certain experiences would not even be 
possible, for the descriptions provided by the theory are internal to the experiences 
themselves. As Kant suggested long ago, experience cannot be understood merely as the 
passive sensory registration of the world upon the subject but must instead be thought of as 
the result of the understanding bringing concepts to bear upon the manifold of sensation. 
The materialist agrees with this, adding only that activity must be understood in a concrete 
historical sense rather than the transcendental sense of that term provided in Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason. What this suggests is that, contra Hegel, there is no final 
irrevocable truth concerning the world, for all of our knowledge is subject to the limitation 
of its socio-historic context. As Horkheimer puts it: 
When F euerbach, Marx and Engels freed the dialectic from its idealist form, 
materialism achieved an awareness of the ever -changing but irreducible tension 
between its own teaching and reality, and acquired in the process its own 
78 As one philosopher of science has observed: "... the most successful and most 
accurate physical theory of all time, quantum mechanics, has no 'realistic interpretation' 
that is acceptable to physicists. It is understood as a description of the world as 
experienced by observers; it does not even pretend to the kind of Absoluteness the 
metaphysician aims at ... " See Hilary Putanam's article 'Why there isn't a ready made 
world' inSynthese, 51,1982, p.164. 
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conception of knowledge ... materialism, unlike Idealism always understands 
thinking to be the thinking of particular men within a particular period of time. It 
challenges every claim to the autonomy of thought. 79 
Thought, therefore, cannot escape the historical context of its production and in 
consequence of the ever changing nature of that context no absolutist conception of 
knowledge can be sustained. This principle insofar as it applies to the natural as well as the 
human sciences is entirely general. Horkheimer, however, has another more specific 
argument against Hegelian identity thinking and the associated project of Absolute 
Knowledge. In the case of society, Hegel supposes that there is an identity between subject 
and object because he regards social reality as an expressive order, or medium of 
subjectivity. so Horkheimer, in contrast, maintains that there is no such identity: a society 
whose productive life is founded upon the commodity form cannot be understood in terms 
of subjective agency, but must, as Marx argues, be regarded as a realm of objectivity 
standing over and against its creators. As Horkheimer argues: "Because the human 
productive process lacks any true organisation or control ... the whole of social life, which 
in the end depends upon economic factors, is withdrawn from human will. It confronts 
individuals as an alien power offate, as nature."SI Hence under the commodity form social 
labour is not directed consciously by society but rather by the operation of the law of value. 
79 'Materialism and Metaphysics' in Critical Theory, p.32 
80 Although I would defend .this formu~ati(:m i~ sh~uld be appreci~ted that in Hegel 
the distinction between subjectIve and objectIve IS dIfficult to make m absolute t~nns. 
To appreciate the probl~J?1 one n~ed only c<?n.sider that th~ P~ilosophy of Right ~s the 
study of Objective Splnt, that IS? subJectl~ty ~ad~ objectIve by means of mter-
subjective norms actualised in a senes of SOCial mstltutlons. 
SI 'Critical and Traditional Theory' in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, p.?? 
132 
This means that the productive life of humanity, appearances notwithstanding, stands 
outside of human decision, and in consequence of this autonomy Hegel's notion of society 
as a medium of subjectivity remains unrealised.82 In other words, the total productive life of 
the subject is not an action on the part of the subject but an external objectivity standing 
over and against the self This apparently abstract thOUght finds confirmation, on a daily 
basis, in the way in which capitalist society is continuously confronted by what might be 
called a logic of unintended consequence. For example, no single individual, or indeed 
group of individuals, ever actually wills a crisis of over -production~ nevertheless such a 
crisis can be nothing other than the consequence of the aggregate of decisions on the part 
of individual producers and consumers. Thus the result of social activity is very often a 
result which is as unintended as it is undesired. We act, we produce our lives and yet 
paradoxically fail to produce ourselves: the totality of human labour results in an inhuman 
totality governed by laws that are apparently natural as well as eternal. Indeed far from 
recognising ourselves through our labour, we experience the world we produce as an alien 
and alienating objectivity. Thus for Horkheimer, Idealism is as contradictory as the society 
of which it is the theoretical expression: its conception of the world as the product of 
subjectivity is both true and false. True, insofar as it focuses upon the social and active 
nature of subjectivity~ false in that it postulates a non-existent identity between subject and 
object. This tension is in fact the result of the dual nature of Hegel's project: it can be seen 
either as a classical metaphysical system or as a socio-philosophical thesis. Arguably it is 
82 Scott Meikle is perhaps thinking of something similar when he observes that: 
"Marx's Capital ... is in fact our gre~test work of self-underst~ding. The co?dition for 
the generalisation of that understandmg to the whole of humamty, ~owev~r, IS the ~nal 
and complete demise of the value form. Only when human labour IS SOCially supphed, 
not as concealed beneath a form, but directly as social labour, as free conscious co-
operative endeavour, will men and women really understand themselves and their 
lives." (Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx, p.l 00). 
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the latter which is central to the thought of the Frankfurt School whilst the fonner, as I 
have argued in my discussion of Engels' scientistic materialism, paradoxically plays an 
important role in the meta-theory of orthodox Marxism. 
In this chapter, I have sought to relate Horkheimer's general account of social theory to the 
Korsch-Lukacs thesis that Marxism represents the supersession of the idealist philosophical 
tradition, that Marx's critical theory of society undermines as well as preserves the content 
of Hegel's thought. It does this, I have argued, in virtue of the fact that materialism 
represents the immanent development of Idealism's own central problematic: the dialectic 
of subject and object. Consequently, and as Horkheimer argues, there is a need to move 
from philosophy to social theory, to move from a concern with the structure of the 
individual consciousness to an enquiry into the social context of human activity. In making 
this transition, the Frankfurt School unlike Korsch, were aware of the need to relate this 
movement to the central categories of Marx's political economy. For these thinkers the 
Marxian notion of labour, and in particular the idea of social labour, provides the bridge 
between classical philosophy and Marxism: by seeking to understand subjectivity in tenns 
of its real activity in the world, materialism preserves through the medium of social theory 
the active world-constituting subject of Kant and Hegel. 83 Furthermore, as we shall see in 
subsequent chapters, the Frankfurt critique of the world thus produced will return us to yet 
83 As we shall see in the next chapter, the notion of labour, and in particular bodily 
labour, will tum out to be central to Adorno's materialist critique of the Hegelian 
subject-object totality. Thus in a caustic comment upon the pretensions of idealism he 
writes: "Ever since mental and physical labour were separated in the sign of the 
dominant mind, the sign of justified privilege, the separated mind has been obliged, 
with the exaggeration due to bad conscience, to vindicate the very claim to dominate 
which it derives from the thesis that it is primary and original - and to make every 
effort to forget the source of its claim, lest the claim lapse." (Negative Dialectics, 
p.177) 
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another central theme of Idealism, namely the relation between Reason and human action. 
This in tum will take the discussion to the very heart of the Frankfurt enterprise, to the idea 
that an adequate theory of society is an exercise in self-understanding rather than the 
description of objective processes. In fact I shall argue that by returning to the category of 
Reason in the sense of constructing a theory of human interest, the critical theorists 
transcend the distinction between is and ought, between fact and value and in so doing 
make perhaps their most significant contribution to philosophy as well as social theory. 
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Chapter 4. Multi-Disciplinary Materialism: Empiricism or Dialectics? 
The argument of the previous chapter has been largely directed towards explaining 
why in general Horkheimer believed that the logic of Hegel's Idealism leads 
philosophy towards a theory of society. By contrast, this chapter as well as the next 
will be devoted to a discussion of the precise nature of such a theory. In dealing with 
this latter question, we will need to confront some of the ambiguity that arguably 
surrounds Horkheimer's original formulation of the Institute's project. On the one hand 
his argument can be taken as a proposal to simply eliminate social philosophy in 
favour of empirical scientific enquiry. In this case the sublation thesis appears to be 
entirely superfluous: philosophy, far from being preserved, is abolished altogether. 
Using the language of Hegel we might say that there is difference but no identity, that 
this "scientific turn" constitutes the simple rather than the determinate negation of the 
classical philosophical tradition. Thus, in an apparently scientistic formulation of his 
program, we find Horkheimer arguing that philosophical questions "must themselves 
become integrated into the empirical research process; their answers lie in the 
advance of objective knowledge, which itself affects the form of the questions." 1 
(Italics mine) Given the Frankfurt School's consistent hostility towards positivism, the 
call for philosophy to re-orient itself towards empirical enquiry looks paradoxically 
like the positivist demand that philosophy should be replaced by an appropriate union 
1 'The Present Situation of Social Philosophy' in Between Philosophy and Social 
Science, pp.9-10. 
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of scientific and meta-scientific theory. 2 This impression is further reinforced when 
Horkheimer states that the questions posed by the classical tradition must be 
"integrated" into a process of empirical enquiry and pursued "on the basis of the most 
precise scientific methods ... " as well as being further revised and refined "in the 
course of ... substantive work". 3 Here there seems to be more than a hint of a positivist 
end-of-philosophy thesis. Indeed the suggestion appears to be that the task of the 
social philosopher is in some unspecified fashion to translate the traditional 
philosophical questions concerning Reason, Freedom and Spirit into questions 
susceptible to the methods of empirical social science. Thus a scientifically 
transformed philosophy will no longer enquire in a purely a priori fashion into the 
nature of self-consciousness but will instead seek to address this issue by examining 
the historically evolving relation between the individual, society and nature. 
Commenting upon this proposal Hauke Brunkhorst writes that: 
... Horkheimer has given up the search for a philosophical way out of the crisis 
of philosophy [in post-Hegelian thought]. Instead his materialism seeks out 
aporias and does not wish to break out of them at all. Yet Horkheimer does 
not stop short at deconstructivism. His way out is the needle's eye of social 
research, through which all philosophy ... must henceforth pass. It is the idea of 
2 Compare Horkheimer's proposal with the foHowing re'!lark by Wittgen~tein: "The 
correct method in philosophy would really be the follOWIng: to say nothing except 
what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science - i.e. something that has nothing 
to do with philosophy - and then,. whenever some~ne else ~anted to ~ay somethi~g 
metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had faded to gtve a meamng to certam 
signs in his proposition." ( Tractatus : 6.53) 
3 'The Present Situation of Social Philosophy' in Between Philosophy and Social Science, 
p.IO. 
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a social scientific transformation of philosophy. 4 
According to Brunkhorst, then, Horkheimer believed that the cnSlS In classical 
philosophy produced by the demise of the Hegelian system could not be resolved from 
within philosophy itself but by making a turn towards the scientific study of social life. 
As a consequence of this he argues that Horkheimer is an "extreme positivist,,5, and his 
anti-philosophy "the overtly aporetic figure of thought of a dialectical positivism. ,,6 
Now if Brunkhorst is correct it would appear that Frankfurt Marxism is founded upon 
a misguided attempt to combine incompatible modes of thought, to unify speculative 
philosophy with positivist theory, dialectic with empirical enquiry Yet as Brunkhorst 
himself recognises, there are numerous passages in Horkheimer's early writings which 
cast doubt upon the view that the latter had any kind of sympathy with the empiricist-
positivist program. Thus alongside the opposition to traditional metaphysics there is 
also a desire, in the face of what Horkheimer describes as the "chaotic specialisation" 
of the individual sciences, to preserve an interest in what is "general" or "essential", to 
say something about the "degree of reality or .. , the value of' the phenomena science 
observes. 7 This caBs to mind a passage from Hegel's Encyclopaedia Logic where he 
argues that philosophy, whilst dependent upon material provided by the various 
scientific disciplines, has a responsibility to transcend the sphere of experiential 
4 Brunkhorst, H., 'Dialectical Positivism of Happiness: Max Horkheimer's Materialist 
Deconstruction of Philosophy' in On Max Horkheimer: New Perspectives, p.68. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Op.cit. p.72. 
7 'The Present Situation of Social Philosophy' in Between Philosophy and Social 
Science, p.9. 
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immediacy. As Hegel puts it: 
The reception into philosophy of these scientific materials, now that thought 
has removed their immediacy and made them cease to be mere data, forms at 
the same time a development of thought out of itself Philosophy then owes its 
development to the empirical sciences. 8 (Italics mine) 
Applying this same logic to social philosophy, Horkheimer came to the view that the 
task of the philosopher is to assist in the construction of a theoretical synthesis of the 
various social scientific disciplines, which would transcend the limitations of a 
narrowly empirical approach to theory. In effect, there is to be a transition from the 
level of concrete research into specific social phenomena to that of a speculative, 
critical theory of society. Martin Jay has described this process as a dialectic of 
Forschung and Darstellungweise: the former activity consisting of detailed empirical 
study, whilst the latter term refers to the totalising synthesis in which individual 
phenomena as well as general laws of social life come to acquire significance with 
respect to the project of human emancipation and self-realisation.9 Clearly, this is some 
way from the abolition thesis: philosophy instead of being replaced by the various 
empirical disciplines is now obliged to critically interpret their results, to relate these to 
the social life process as a whole, and thereby to the struggle between the classes 
which in large measure defines that process. 10 
8 Hegel's Logic, §12. 
9 Marxism and Totality, pp. 200-201. 
10 'The Rationalism Debate in Contemporary Philosophy' in Between Philosophy and 
Social Science, pp. 238-240. 
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This alternative conception of Horkheimer's proposal, a conception that stands in 
sharp contrast to the end-of-philosophy thesis described by Brunkhorst, constitutes the 
subject matter of this present chapter. During the course of the discussion, I will 
demonstrate that the early Horkheimer's vision of an interdisciplinary theory of 
society, far from being a positivistic version of Marxism, is in fact a restatement of the 
essential philosophical dimension of materialism. 
In developing this argument, it will be necessary to challenge the VIew that 
Horkheimer's work in the period 1931-36 can be sharply distinguished from the 
position first defined in his landmark essay 'Traditional and Critical Theory' published 
in the Zeitschrijt in 1937. 11 Whilst not wishing to deny that this later essay provides an 
especially clear formulation of the distinction between the natural sciences and a 
theory of society, I shall maintain that much of the theoretical basis for this distinction 
is already present in Horkheimer's pre-1937 writings. Despite a measure of rhetorical 
excess, provoked one suspects by the failure of so many German social theorists, 
including Marxists, to undertake any empirical research into concrete social 
fonnations, Horkheimer was never a positivist. On the contrary, he was from the 
outset a thinker working within the Hegelian tradition, and as a consequence his early 
commitment to systematic social research should not be regarded as an unfortunate 
II Simon Jarvis, for instance, argues that: "Later in the decade Horkheimer's 
'Traditional and Critical Theory' placed much greater emphasis on the criticism of 
positivism not merely as limited but as false through and through. This shift in 
emphasis testifies not only to H~rkheimer' s own ,auton?mous ~evelopm~?t but also to 
the strong influence of Adorno s (and Marcuse s) philosophical work. (Adorno: A 
Crilicallntroduction, p.88.) 
140 
concession to positivism but rather as an attempt to locate philosophy in the life 
process of society. 
This thesis will be developed in three stages. First, I shall seek to clarify the relation 
between empirical social science and the project of a multi-disciplinary materialism, 
and more particularly I shall argue that there is a need to distinguish Horkheimer's 
advocacy of various modes of empirical enquiry from the epistemological doctrine of 
empiricism as it has been applied to social theory. With this distinction secured, the 
notion of multi-disciplinary materialism will be related to Hegel's belief that systematic 
Science is only possible as knowledge of the Whole. This task will involve the critical 
evaluation of the fundamental Hegelian concept of totality, as well as an investigation 
into the way in which this concept informs the Frankfurt School's conception of social 
theory, and in particular their reconstruction of Marx's historical materialism. These 
two stages of the argument will constitute the main subject matter of the present 
chapter as well as the next. In Chapter 6 the discussion will then move on to a 
consideration of some of the specific components of Horkheimer's proposed 
theoretical synthesis. In particular I shall be concerned to assess the validity, or 
otherwise, of the Frankfurt School's attempt to synthesise Marx's theory of history 
and society with Freud's depth psychology. 
The Critique ~f Empiricism 
Horkheimer's conception of multi-disciplinary materialism is founded upon the idea of 
a double theoretical synthesiS involving not only the unification of the individual social 
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scientific disciplines into a comprehensive theory of society but also the transcendence 
of the division between philosophy and social theory.12 This double synthesis is 
intended to overcome the limitations that Horkheimer believed are characteristic of a 
purely empirical approach to the human sciences, an approach which although it 
appears to start with what is most concrete, namely individual phenomena, is 
nevertheless premised upon a form of abstraction. More particularly, empiricism seeks 
to comprehend the various specific elements of the social totality by isolating them 
from the whole in which they are situated. Thus empirical social science, marked as it 
is by an intensive division of intellectual labour, begins its work by selecting for study 
some particular aspect of society, for instance social class, urbanisation, political 
behaviour, family structure, the socialisation process and so forth. The empiricist will 
then seek to comprehend the chosen phenomenon in terms of a complex of observable, 
and if possible quantifiable features; for instance, an empirical concept of social class 
will make reference to readily verifiable indices of class such as income or membership 
of occupational groups. Having thereby narrowed the focus of enquiry to an 
apparently manageable problem, the empirically oriented social scientist will set about 
the task of gathering some initial evidence so as to suggest a range of hypotheses 
concerning the selected object of study. These hypotheses, in virtue of their predictive 
observational content, can then be subjected to a range of further empirical tests, and 
either confirmed or disconfirmed, a process which Martin Jay aptly describes as the 
"hypothesis-verification-conclusion model of social research. ,,13 
12 As Horkheimer puts it : "Materialism requires the unification of philosophy and 
science." See his 'Materialism and Metaphysics' in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, 
pp.34-35. 
13 The Dialectical Imagination, p.240. 
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The supposed merit of this approach is that theory emerges from and is supported by 
observation; that whatever generalisations are proposed derive from the "facts of the 
matter" rather than the kind of imaginative speculation which empiricists associate 
with "pre-scientific" social theory. This kind of argument, it should be said, has 
secured widespread if unthinking acceptance amongst social scientists, and has 
resulted in the production of a mass of empirical data describing a variety of social 
institutions, relations and practices. Furthermore, on the basis of this evidence 
researchers have devised numerous, and complex classificatory systems as well as an 
equally large mass of generalisations and statistical regularities. Now although these 
generalisations and regularities fall far short of the theoretical achievements of the 
natural sciences - they do not, for instance, form part of a unified systematic socio-
historical theory - they nevertheless constitute some kind of achievement. Indeed some 
social scientists who work in this tradition advance an argument to the effect that this 
form of low-level, detailed empirical research is an essential preliminary for general 
theory. Thus, just as Brahe's astronomical observations and Kepler's theory of 
planetary motion prepared the way for Newton's physics, a similarly well established 
corpus of empirical research, so it is argued, will come to serve as the basis for a truly 
general theory of social action. 14 In this fashion, empiricism hopes to construct a 
theory of the social whole on the basis of a knowledge of discrete, particular 
phenomena, together with a knowledge of the laws governing their behaviour. 
14 This approach has been argued for, by amongst others, Robert ~ert~n ~ho, in 
his influential Social Theory and Social Structure, calls upon SOCIal SCIentists to 
abandon grand theory and concentrate instead upon developing well supported 
theories of the "middle range". Popper's Poverty of Historicism contains a very similar 
argument. For a discussion of the empirical social scientific tradition see Richard 
Bernstein's The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, Chapter 2. 
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Furthennore, because the cognitive encounter with the particular is conceived of solely 
in terms of an observational encounter, the laws which the empiricist constructs are 
statements which associate one observational variable with another. In consequence, 
empiricism proclaims that it is concerned with a scientific as opposed to an ideological 
theory of society; for what it is developing is a theory that stands or falls strictly 
according to the observational evidence available to the investigator. 15 
Horkheimer's response to this methodological stance is complex. He was, for 
instance, by no means hostile to the use and development of specialised quantitative 
techniques in social theory, observing for instance that "American social research has 
made great preliminary contributions to the design of survey questionnaires, which we 
hope to adopt and develop further for our own purposes.,,16 Furthermore, he was 
ready to concede that the empirical social scientific tradition had produced a sizeable 
bank of data that would be invaluable for the construction of the kind of synthetic 
theory of society that he had in mind. As Horkheimer observed: "In its 
acknowledgement of the decisive significance of theory, materialism is to be 
distinguished from present-day positivism, though not from concrete research, which 
often comes to the same findings as materialism itself,,17(Italics mine) Of course, to 
insist that social theory has a necessary empirical moment is in itself neither 
15 See Marcuse's One Dimensional Man (pp. 105-120) for a critique of this 
particular claim. 
16 'The Present Situation of Social Philosophy' in Between Philosophy and Social 
Science, p.13. Questionnaire and interview material was in fact used in a number of 
Institute projects, appearing for instance in Stiidien iiber Autorilc?it und Familie (1936) 
and The Authoritarian Personality (1951). 
17 'Materialism and Morality' in Between Philosophy and Social Science, p.47. 
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particularly original nor profound; nevertheless Horkheimer's remark is worth our 
attention for at least two reasons. In the first place it helps to dispel the frequently 
propagated myth that the work of the Frankfurt School is an unsupported mass of 
historical and social speculation divorced from any kind of evidential constraint or 
discipline.
18 
Proponents of this view tend to ignore the fact that the theoretical life of 
the Institute was a genuinely collaborative affair, and that apparently ungrounded 
theoretical propositions emanating from Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse often tum 
out to be related to a corpus of detailed research undertaken by other members of the 
Institute. For example, Marcuse' s analysis of fascism as the inherent consequence of 
the liberal phase of bourgeois society is based on the thesis that fascism is the logical 
political expression of the monopoly capitalism into which that society had evolved. 
This thesis finds support in the work of Franz Neumann, a member of the Institute 
who produced an extensive, highly detailed study of the relation between the state and 
the economy in Nazi Germany. 19 By contrast, Adorno and Horkheimer, following the 
Institute's principal economist Frederich Pollock, maintained that fascism was based 
upon a radical transformation of production relations which had taken Germany into a 
form of "post-capitalist" society.20 Doubtless a great deal more could be said 
concerning this particular dispute, as well as the more general question of how much 
empirical support can be found for the other components of the high-level theory of 
late capitalism advanced by the Frankfurt School, but clearly such a discussion is 
18 Kolakowski makes this criticism in Main Currents of Marxism: Vol III, pp.356-
357. For a similar line of argument see Alasdair MacIntyre's Marcuse, p. 18. 
19 Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism. 
20 See, for instance, Pollock's article' State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and 
Limitations' in The Essential Franlifurt School Reader, pp.71-94. 
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beyond the scope of this thesis. 21 Enough has been said, however, to cast doubt on the 
notion that Frankfurt Marxism developed in complete isolation from any program of 
concrete research. 
The second reason for remarking upon Borkheimer's belief in the importance of 
empirical work is that this commitment differentiates critical theory from all those 
forms of Marxism which eschew genuine research and rely instead upon selective 
quotation from the work of Marx and Engels to settle whatever question might happen 
to arise. Against this textual dogmatism, Borkheimer urges a return to Marx's own 
tradition of concrete research. Thus commenting upon the sort of under-evidenced 
assertion characteristic of dogmatic Marxism he writes: 
It remains unknown precisely how economic changes that affect the psychic 
constitution prevailing among members of different social groups in a given 
period transform their overall life expressions [Lebensaiisserungen]. Thus the 
claim that the latter depends upon the former contains dogmatic elements that 
seriously undermine its hypothetical value for explaining the present. 22 (Italics 
mine) 
In contrast then to those vulgar Marxists, for whom the question of class 
consciousness can be settled in an almost a priori fashion, simply by appealing to the 
21 David Held's Introduction to Critical Theory ( pp.52-65) contains a useful 
discussion of the dispute within the Frankfurt School concerning the nature of the 
newly emerged fascist states. 
22 'History and Psychology' in Between Philosophy and Social Science, p120. 
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inherently antagonistic relation between capital and labour, Horkheimer advocates a 
program of detailed research into the series of "psychical mediations" relating the 
individual consciousness, and particularly biological and psychic drives, to the cultural, 
social and economic context in which it arises?3 Such a program, he believed, would 
reveal that the relation between consciousness and the material base of social life 
involves a degree of psychological complexity and social mediation quite unknown to 
cruder forms of materialism which seek to immediately correlate consciousness and 
class by appeal to the notion of material interest. As we shall see later, the desire to 
integrate depth-psychology with materialist social theory is central to Horkheimer's 
notion of a materialism founded upon the synthesis of the various individual social 
sciences.24 We shall also discover that it is an instance of a more general concern on 
the part of the Frankfurt School to pursue the Hegelian program of relating the 
individual to society, experience to social structure, the particular to the general. 
Returning, however, to the matter at hand, we note that Borkheimer, despite 
recognising the importance of empirical evidence, was implacably opposed to the 
empiricist's general conception of how a social scientific theory should be constructed. 
Here it should be noted that his position was to a large extent influenced by the young 
23 Adorno in his correspondence to Benjamin (10.11.38) makes a very similar point 
in the context of cultural theory. Be writes: " ... I regard it as methodologically 
unfortunate to give conspicuous individual features from the realm of the 
superstructure a 'materialistic' turn by relating them immediately and perhaps even 
causally to corresponding features of the infrastructure. Materialist determination of 
cultural traits is only possible if it is mediated through the total social process." 
(Reprinted in Aesthetics and. Politic~, ~d. R.Taylor, p.129) Interest~g1y,. Ado~o 
prefaces this comment by tellmg Benjamtn that he has had an exhaustIve dISCUSSIon 
with Horkheimer on this very topic. 
24 See Chapter 6 for a discussion of this question. 
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Lukacs' earlier critique of positivist science. Indeed it can be safely said that much of 
the argument that is developed in History and Class Consciousness re-appears in 
Horkheimer's thinking about the nature of social theory. For this reason I shall first 
briefly summarise what Lukacs has to say concerning the question of social scientific 
method before considering the way in which his thought was appropriated by members 
of the Frankfurt School. We begin by considering one particularly important 
observation Lukacs makes concerning the positivist conception of observational data: 
... when 'science' maintains that the manner in which data immediately present 
themselves is an adequate foundation of scientific conceptualisation and that 
the actual form of these data is the appropriate starting point for the formation 
of scientific concepts, it thereby takes its stand simply and dogmatically on the 
basis of capitalist society. It uncritically accepts the nature of the object as it is 
given and the Jaws of that society as the unalterable foundation of science.25 
Against this kind of "science" Lukacs argues that to understand a series of individual 
observations "it is necessary to perceive their historical conditioning ... and to 
abandon the point of view that would see them as immediately given. ,,26 This remark 
draws attention to the fact that the myriad regularities pertaining to the social life 
process are by and large neither universal nor "natural" features of human society but 
rather the result of the activity of its members. Thus the various "social facts" which 
appear to the empiricist as simply "given" are in reality produced through historical 
25 'What is Orthodox Marxism?' in History and Class Consciousness, p.7. 
26 Ibid. 
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subjects, in particular social classes, acting upon and transforming the natural and 
social circumstances in which they find themselves. Indeed, it can be said that for 
Lukacs this is the central truth of Capital, and that unlike the classical political 
economy of which it is a critique, Marx's political economy seeks not only to specify 
the set of laws governing a society dominated by commodity production but 
simultaneously discovers their historical character. In other words, Marx's account of 
capitalism as a system of commodity production demonstrates that this form of 
production is not an invariant of social life but merely one possible form, amongst 
others, for extracting surplus labour from the mass of producers. Furthermore, 
capitalism is itself the result of a conflict between the classes, a conflict which led to 
producers being separated from the means of production and thereby transformed into 
a population of potential proletarians. In opposition therefore to the political 
economists, Marx argued that there are definite conditions governing the emergence, 
maturation, and one must add, the decline of the commodity form, conditions that in 
the final analysis are the result of the struggle between the social classes.27 
Summarising all of this we might say that for Lukacs the significance of Marx's 
thOUght consists in the fact that his critique of the economic categories illuminates the 
radical historicity of social phenomena, thereby countering the powerful tendency of 
capitalist society towards the reification of its own life process. 
27 Marx's position should also be contrasted wit~ th~t of Hege) , fo~ wh~m the form 
of production described by th~ classical. econOlntsts IS t~e f!nal histoncal form. of 
production. Marx, of course, did not belIeve that the capitalIst mode of productIOn 
represented such a final form. For a useful discus.sio~,ofHege~'s views on the relation 
between society and the economy see Shlomo A vmen s Hegel s Theory of the Modern 
State, Chapter 7. 
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Horkheimer's critique of the empiricist tradition draws heavily on this argument. Thus 
like Lukacs, he believed that the methodological dictates of empiricism, particularly 
the demands for repeatable observations and quantifiable data, lead its practitioners to 
view society as a stable system of phenomenal regularities, and in consequence to 
overlook the essentially historical nature of the object of their study. Of course, this is 
not to suggest that empiricists are unaware of the fact that social forms have specific 
historical origins. Rather, the criticism is directed against those theories which 
postulate the immutability of whatever social form happens to be currently established. 
Commenting upon this theoretical tendency Horkheimer writes: 
Analysis proceeds from the particular to the general. It suffices to the extent 
that thought has only to isolate from actual events that which repeats itself 
Science thus fulfils its true task for those activities that depend upon the 
relative immutability of natural and social relations. In the liberal period, 
miracles were expected from the mere development of specialised research, 
because the foundations of society were considered static. The mechanistic 
approach fails, however, in the effort to understand history. Here, the issue is 
to understand the dominant tendencies of incomplete, unique processes.28 
(Italics mine) 
By concentrating upon isolated but repeatable types of event, the analytical approach 
runs the risk of naturalising what is in reality the result of a specific socio-historic 
process. Furthermore, rather than situating such regularities as can be discovered 
28 'The Rationalism Debate in Contemporary Philosophy' in Between Philosophy and 
Social Science, pp. 236-237. 
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within the wider dynamic structure of social life, empiricism restricts its vision to 
recurring and hence relatively unchanging phenomena. In consequence, this kind of 
social theory loses sight of the fact that individual phenomena are essentially 
conditioned by their relation to the developing whole of which they are a part. More 
particularly, empiricism forgets that the regularities characteristic of a given society at 
any given moment are fragile historical products, that they have come into being under 
very specific circumstances and in other possible future circumstances will break down 
or disappear altogether. As Horkheimer puts it: "It would ... be wrong to think that 
events in a future society could be deduced according to the same principles and with 
the same necessity as the lines of development of the present one. ,,29 This reflection 
recognises the possibility that what is true of society as it is presently constituted may 
in fact not hold of a future society; it is in consequence the essential premise for any 
kind of radicalism. By contrast empiricism, because it focuses upon what is recurrent 
in the present, tends whether unwittingly or not, towards an essentially conservative 
world view. Moreover, because this doctrine emphasises the constancy of law-like 
conjunction, because it equates science with what is universally true, it loses sight of 
the historically-transitory nature of the regularities it discovers. Thus the laws which 
govern society as presently constituted are regarded by empiricists as the laws which 
must govern any possible form of society, past, present or future. 30 This is supposed to 
follow from the fact that scientific laws by their very nature describe the unchanging 
structure of the world and in this sense are universal. 
29 'On the Problem of Truth' in Between Philosophy and Social Science, p. 205. 
30 See the Introduction (pp.83-111) to Marx's Grondrisse for a discussion of this 
question in relation to political economy. 
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But here, as is so often the case in social theory, we discover that a seemingly abstract 
philosophical proposition is in fact serving a particular ideological function. As Lukacs 
puts it, positivist social theory, however scrupulously it records the facts, suffers from 
an inability to grasp "the problem of the present as a historical problem.,,31 The 
empiricist perspective of observation and law-like conjunction forgets that theory 
cannot stop short at what merely happens to be the case but must seek to express the 
essential character of the reality that it studies. In the case of social theory this means 
not only describing that which exists but also engaging with the inherent tendency of 
the social life process towards development and transformation. We may therefore 
conclude, as Horkheimer does, that theory cannot seek to comprehend that which is 
immediately present without at the same time explaining how the present has come 
into being by reference to its past as well, as identifying the potential for its future 
demise. 
This takes us to the heart of the Frankfurt School's critique of positivism: in place of 
the empiricist paradigm of knowledge their work advances a conception of theory 
based upon the tension between what is actual and what is potential. This entails that 
we cannot understand society simply by observing what is the case, for that which 
exists is in part determined by the fact that it represents the repression of an entirely 
different social order. In other words, a critical social theory cannot simply accept the 
laws which happen to govern reality, for it is aware that the operation and maintenance 
of these laws serves to deny different possibilities of social life. Accordingly, it will 
31 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat' in History and Class 
Consciousness, p.IS7. 
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indicate the contradictions inherent to the operation of those laws, arguing in effect 
that society as it is presently constituted prepares the basis for its own demise, that 
what is actual contains within itself the potential for the being of its other.32 In this 
fashion Horkheimer hoped to define a radical theory of society, which whilst opposed 
to empiricist social science was neither utopian nor ignorant of the importance of 
concrete research. 
Against Horkheimer, however, the empiricist may well reply that the kind of 
historicism which characterises Marx's thought, and then later figures so prominently 
in the work of both Lukacs and Horkheimer, greatly over-emphasises the difficulty of 
producing general laws of social life. Indeed, it might even be argued that in this 
respect there is no great difference between the natural and social sciences: both are 
confronted with the problem of identifying fundamental laws which hold across 
disparate regions of time and space. Popper, for instance, has claimed that 
. .. there seems no reason why we should be unable to frame sociological 
theories which are important for all social periods. The spectacular difference 
between these periods are no indication that such laws cannot be found, any 
more than the spectacular differences between Greenland and Crete can prove 
that there are no physical laws which hold for both regions. On the contrary, 
these differences seem to be, in some cases at least, of a comparatively 
superficial character (such as differences in habits, in greeting, ritual etc), and 
32 Cf Horkheimer, .M., 'Notes on Science and the Crisis' In Critical Theory: 
Selected ~ssays, p.5 
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more or less the same seems to hold good of those regularities which are said 
to be characteristic of a certain historical period or of a certain society (and 
which are now called principia media by some sociologists). 33 
Thus the simple fact of radical difference between "social periods" is, according to 
Popper, not a sufficient reason for supposing that it is impossible to formulate general 
laws which hold throughout history. Indeed Popper goes on to argue that the much-
vaunted differences between societies at different stages of development are very often 
of a "comparatively superficial character" and should therefore provide no impediment 
to the development of a genuinely universal social science. What are we to make of 
this argument? The first thing to note is that Popper's polemic is in large measure 
directed against a non-existent opponent. No intellectually serious Marxist, for 
instance, has ever sought to deny that different societies with different modes of 
production will have features in common and that some of these features can perhaps 
be elevated to the status of general laws. As Marx himself observes: "There are 
characteristics which all stages of production have in common, and which are 
established as general ones by the mind~ but the so-called general pre-conditions of all 
production are nothing more than these abstract moments with which no real historical 
stage of production can be grasped. ,,34 Indeed in a letter to Kugelmann (July 11, 1868) 
Marx distinguishes some universal laws of production, for example the necessity of 
distributing social labour in definite proportions to the various branches of production, 
from the concrete historical form in which those laws are realised. The historical 
33 The Poverty of Historicism, p.l 01. 
34 Grnndrisse, p.88. 
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materialist, therefore, does not deny the possibility of universal laws but argues that by 
themselves such laws are incapable of explaining "real historical stages of production". 
This is quite a different proposition from the historicist doctrine that Popper has 
outlined, for it asserts that historical understanding results from a confrontation 
between general laws of production and the particular social forms in which those laws 
are realised. In short a given society is the outcome of a complex dialectic involving 
what is general and what is particular, it is a concrete universal formed in and through 
the interaction between these two poles. 
The other aspect of Popper's argument that requires some comment is his claim that 
many differences between social periods are "comparatively superficial", and as such 
provide no obstacle to the existence of trans-historical laws. However, from the trivial 
nature of the examples that Popper cites, rituals of greeting and suchlike, it is difficult 
to understand what these examples are supposed to establish. Clearly between any two 
societies there will be a vast range of differences, some of which will be largely 
superficial whilst others point to significant variations in the way in which these 
societies function. More particularly, historical materialism maintains that differences 
in the mode of production will give rise to profoundly divergent patterns of socio-
economic behaviour, and that this provide the basis for a belief in historically specific 
laws. Now if Popper wishes to deny this then he has to make the argument that social 
production has no real history, that the differences between, say, slavery in the Ancient 
World and wage labour in late capitalism are superficial, and that in consequence these 
forms of production share a common essence. Needless to say no such argument can 
be found in his Poverty qf Historicism 
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But if Popper's critique of historical materialism is unconvincing, there is another line 
of defence available to the empiricist. This argument begins by suggesting that both 
Lukacs and Horkheimer are misrepresenting the situation, and that the empirical 
tradition in social theory is simply committed to discovering whatever observable 
regularities happen to exist. In doing this the empiricist may indeed grant that there are 
very few, if any, true universal statements governing social life, but that this fact 
should not preclude research into the numerous regularities which clearly exist in 
particular societies at particular times. 35 Of course, in one sense this is undeniable: an 
societies are characterised by recurring patterns of individual and group behaviour. 
But a theory that confines itself to simply describing such patterns would be a very 
limited enterprise. For whilst it may well succeed in producing a large number of true 
statements, it would be very far from providing us with a clear picture of whatever 
society it is purporting to describe. In particular such an approach fails to situate 
particular patterns of behaviour in any kind of coherent structure; consequently these 
patterns cannot be related to one another nor understood as historical, and therefore 
potentially alterable, forms of social life. Against this objection, empiricists might reply 
that the methodological approach which they advocate is wholly analogous to the 
practice of natural scientists. Thus in natural science there is a recognition that laws 
are not always strictly universal but rather hold only under certain determinate 
conditions. The problem with this response is that the analogy it depends upon is far 
from exact. For the natural scientist, specifying the limits of the applicability of a 
35 This idea finds expression, for instance, in Mannheim's notion ofprillcipia media: 
sociological laws that are not universal but characteristic of historically specific 
societies. 
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physical law is a fairly straightforward matter; for the social scientist, however, the 
notion of limiting conditions is necessarily more problematic. Thus physics or 
chemistry can usually achieve what is required by resorting to some kind of 
quantitative description of the conditions under which the law holds. The social 
scientist, on the other hand, confronts a considerably more difficult question. In fact, 
to make the analogy hold in this area the empiricist has to be able to specify what it is 
that limits the application of the putative law, and this could only be done by 
determining what it is about a "particular society at a particular time" that underpins 
the operation of the law in question. But now the empiricist is involved in an 
investigation of both the nature and history of that society; in other words they are 
involved in determining what is essential to that particular social life process. 
Unfortunately this latter question is precisely the kind of question that empiricism is 
concerned, some would even say designed, to avoid. 
Before, however, returning to a consideration of the kind of social theory that 
Horkheimer advocated I want to consider, albeit briefly, an important response on the 
part of positivist social science to this very question. What empiricism seems to require 
is some means of classifying a society without thereby providing an account of the 
constitutive social relations which define it. This can be done by means a number of 
ahistorical abstractions which are proposed as a substitute for concrete research into 
the origins and nature of the society in question. For example, the notion of industrial 
society is sometimes posited as a means of characterising a specific kind of society, 
one for instance marked out by a significant degree of machine based production. 
However, as Giddens correctly observes, proponents of this theory tend to "presume, 
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or propose, that there is an essential unity to the industrial order wherever it emerges" 
and that in consequence this unity provides the basis for a meaningful social 
typology.36 Against this kind of presumption, historical materialism argues that the 
notion of industrial society is an illegitimate abstraction because it serves to mask 
what in reality are profound structural differences between societies. This masking 
effect prompted Adorno in Negative Dialectics to describe the concept of industrial 
society as "a cover concept", a concept which functions to conceal rather than reveal 
the truth about the world. He writes: 
The classic case of such a cover concept, of the technique of logical 
subsumption for ideological purposes, is the current concept of industrial 
society. It ignores the social conditions of production by resorting to the 
technological productive forces - as if the state of these forces alone were the 
direct determinant of the social structure. This theoretical switch can of course 
be excused by the undeniable convergences of East and West in the sign of 
bureaucratic rule.37 
Adorno's point here is that this concept is the result of an empiricist-technocratic 
approach to social theory: rather than investigate the "social conditions of 
production" , the empiricist locates the essence of society by means of the 
measurement and description of its technological-productive basis. Whilst this accords 
with the general empiricist approach, forces of production being easily observable, it 
36 Sociology: A Brief hut Critical Introduction, p.27. 
37 Negative Dialectics, p.152. 
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makes for a very poor theory of society. In effect the concept of industrial SOCiety 
dispenses with the history of its object, and results in the subsuming of a variety of 
divergent phenomena which concrete historical research would teach us to keep apart. 
From what has been said thus far we may conclude, as Horkheimer does, that a theory 
seeking to comprehend that which is immediately present can only do so by a process 
of mediation; in other words the theory must not only explain how the present has 
come into being by reference to its past but also identify the potential for its future 
demise. Indeed for Adorno and Horkheimer, dialectical thinking distinguishes itself by 
the fact that it is a form of thought "in which everything is always that which it is, only 
because it becomes that which it is not. ,,38 This remark is central to the Frankfurt 
critique of positivism: in place of the empiricist paradigm of knowledge it advances a 
conception of social theory based upon the tension between what is actual and what is 
potential. This entails that we cannot understand society simply by observing what is 
the case for that which exists is in part determined by the fact that it represents the 
repression of an entirely different social order. In other words a critical social theory 
cannot simply accept the laws which happen to govern reality but should also point to 
the way in which the operation of these laws serves to deny different possibilities of 
social life. It should also point clearly the contradictory nature of the reality it 
describes, to the fact that capitalism is structured through a series of contradictions 
which ensure that the more it develops, the more it prepares the conditions for its own 
demise. According to Horkheimer, such a theory would obviously be very different 
from mainstream social science, for it would continuously raise the possibility of our 
38 Dialectic of Enlightenment, p 15. 
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practically transforming the object of cognition, of movmg from theory to 
revolutionary praxis. 
History and Social Theory 
Horkheimer's critique of empiricism, it should be noted, is a multi-faceted affair: 
alongside the classical Marxist suspicion of the ahistorical, there is also the influence of 
the distinctively Germanic tradition of distinguishing GeistesWissenschajt from 
NaturWissenschajt, of separating the human from the natural sciences. This tradition 
impacts upon Horkheimer in both its Hegelian and non-Hegelian forms. In the first 
instance it leads him to maintain that historical processes are to be distinguished from 
those occurring in nature by the fact that they are, as he puts it, incomplete and 
unique. What this suggests is that unlike the natural sciences, which deal with 
determinate types of objects and events related through a stable structure of causal 
regularity, social theory is confronted by the radical indeterminacy and singularity of 
its subject matter. At first sight, however, it seems difficult to understand why 
Horkheimer as a historical materialist would want to advance such a position. It is, for 
instance, not at all obvious why he maintains that a specific sequence of historical 
events, say the French Revolution, is incomplete. Surely, it is possible to comprehend 
this particular moment of European history as something that is self-contained, as a 
process with a determinate beginning and end? Indeed, Horkheimer's emphasis upon 
the indeterminacy of the historical seems to run counter not just to empiricism but to 
the hope of any kind of systematic theory of history and society, including Marx's 
theory of historical materialism. 
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In this section I shall argue that the answer to at least some of these difficulties 
depends upon our coming to understand that for Horkheimer the notion of the 
incompleteness of the historical event is closely bound up with the idea that a theory of 
society is a theory of a concrete living whole, and that in consequence an adequate 
concept of a socio-historical particular must make reference to the life of this whole. 
As Horkheimer puts it "the function and thus also the content of the concepts applied 
are affected by every step in the representation of a living process" and in consequence 
"concepts derived from abstraction change their meaning as soon as they come into 
relation with each other in the representation of a concrete whole. ,,39 Now for 
Horkheimer, history is just such a living process and therefore is not to be construed 
as a sequence of discrete occurrences whose nature can be determined without 
reference to what has gone either before or indeed afterwards. On the contrary, the 
historical process is seen as a continuous developmental movement involving the 
formation, transformation and ultimate demise of particular modes of social being. As 
the historian E.P.Thompson has commented: 
In investigating history we are not flicking through a series of stills, each of 
which shows us a moment of social time transfixed into a single eternal pose: 
for each one of these "stills" is not only a moment of being but also a moment 
of becoming ... Any historical moment is both a result of a prior process and 
an index towards the direction of its future flOW.40 (Italics mine) 
39 'The Rationalism Debate in Contemporary Philosophy' in Between Philosophy 
and Social Science, p.235. 
40 The Poverty of Theory, p.47. 
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Contra atomism, history is not a sequence of self-contained events but an ever-
developing whole, the parts of which are constituted by their relation to what has gone 
before as well as to what has come after. Applying this thought to the example of the 
revolutionary process in France, we will say that the nature of that process is 
conditioned both by the feudal aristocratic order which preceded it and by the 
European bourgeois society to which it gave birth. To understand that process, 
therefore, is to understand not only its origin but also its destination, to see it as a 
moment of becoming rather than an event that is fixed and determinate in virtue of its 
ontological independence. Here there is more than a hint of Hegel's belief that the 
historical process is, at least for most of its duration, opaque to the understanding, that 
until the process has "attained its completed state" we are unable to truly grasp the 
nature of what it is that has come into being.41 (Indeed for Hegel real understanding 
comes only with the end of history, with the attainment of Absolute Knowledge on the 
part of a meta-subject that has become adequately conscious of itself in the realm of 
objectivity.) Of course, this does not mean that for Hegel individual historical 
phenomena are irrelevant to comprehending the historical process. On the contrary, it 
needs to be emphasised that his thought seeks to engage with the universal by 
interrogating the particular. What is entailed, however, is that a history which confines 
itself to the study of particularities falls far short of its intended object, and represents 
the kind of analytical mutilation of reality that Hegel so mercilessly criticised 
throughout his philosophical career. 
41 Elements of the Philosophy of Right, p.23. 
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What Horkheimer took from this can be summarised as follows. Historical materialism 
posits its subject matter as a living unity, as a social life process whose constituent 
moments can only be understood by reference to the movement of that process. Thus 
by way of contrast to the laboratory procedures of natural science which depend upon 
the assumption that the world consists of a multiplicity of discrete objects and 
processes, materialism begins with the concept of a historical totality. This means that 
the identity of a process is not immediately given to the observer but depends upon its 
position within the continuously developing totality of history, and it is in this sense 
that Horkheimer maintains that knowledge of the historical domain is necessarily 
characterised by incompleteness. In other words, if history is to be regarded as a text, 
it is not a stable text but one that is continuously re-writing itself 
Despite this obvious debt to Hegel, it is important to acknowledge real differences 
between Horkheimer and his idealist predecessor. In the case of the former, as I have 
already indicated, there is a belief that an adequate historical understanding comes 
only with the end of history, with the conditions for Absolute knowledge. This form of 
cognition is the very paradigm of completeness, and as Horkheimer observes: 
Until its completion the entire conceptual material is in movement in the minds 
of those who reconstruct it, because the meaning of the individual categories is 
only fulfilled in the whole. As moments of the mental unity, which for Hegel is 
not merely a pure reflection but is itself the Absolute, they are supposed to 
have immutable validity, however ... The complete theory itself is, in Hegel, no 
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longer drawn into history~ it yields an all comprehending thought, the product 
of which is no longer abstract and transient. The dialectic is closed. 42 
Against this kind of dialectic, Horkheimer proposes a form of thought which refuses 
any ambition towards completeness. Describing this as "unconcluded" dialectic 
(unabgeschlossene Dialektik). he writes: 
The materialist cannot have faith in such certainty. There is no conclusive 
image of reality, either in essence or appearance. Even the proposition of a 
suprahistorical subject which alone could grasp reality is a delusion. 
Furthermore, the overcoming of the one-sidedness of abstract concepts 
through the art of dialectical construction does not lead to absolute truth as 
Hegel claims. That process always takes place in the thought of definite, 
historical human beings.43 
According to Horkheimer, then, we must understand that any understanding of history 
is itself always and everywhere historically conditioned. Put another way, there is no 
extra-historical standpoint from which history may be observed; we theorise the 
historical process from within that process and in consequence are seeking to reflect 
upon that which resists completeness. Once again we are returned to the category of 
becoming as opposed to that of being, to a theory that seeks to grasp the inherently 
42 'The Rationalism Debate in Contemporary Philosophy' in Between Philosophy 
and Social Science, p.239. 
43 Op.cit., p.239. 
164 
creative process of the movement within and transformation of our own social life . .w 
But whatever differences separated Horkheimer from Hegel, as well from the Hegelian 
Marxist tradition of Lukacs and Korsch, he was nonetheless in broad agreement with 
the idealist belief that the starting point for a social theory must be with the 
developmental logic of the concrete historical whole. To this extent Horkheimer's 
critique of empiricism can be said to derive from the tradition of German Idealism. 
However, in some of his early writings there is evidence to suggest that Horkheimer's 
approach to history is also influenced by the tradition in German historiography which 
emphasises the unique, singular nature of historical phenomena. Weber, for instance in 
his discussion of the concept of the "spirit of capitalism" argues that: "Such an 
historical concept ... since it refers in its content to a phenomenon significant for its 
unique individuality, cannot be defined according to the formula genus proximum, 
differentia specijica, but it must be gradually put together out of the individual parts 
which are taken from historical reality to make it Up.,,45 For Weber, the historian's task 
is "not to grasp historical reality in abstract general formulae but in concrete genetic 
sets of relations which are inevitably of a specifically unique and individual 
character.,,46 This remark suggests that it is a mistake to suppose that history, like the 
natural sciences, involves general statements relating the occurrence of one type of 
44 As Lukacs observes: "Thus only when the theoretical primacy of the 'facts' has 
been broken, only when every phenomenon is recognised to be a process, will it ~e 
understood that what we are wont to call 'facts' consists of processes. Only then wIll 
it be understood that the facts are nothing but the parts, the aspects of the total 
process that have been broken off, artificially isolated and ossifi~d." ('Reification and 
the Consciousness of the Proletariat' in History and Class ConSCiousness, p.184) 
45 The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o/Capitalism, p.47. 
46 Op.cit., p.48. 
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event to the occurrence of another. Instead, Weber emphasises the singularity 
characteristic of the historian's problem domain, a singularity which requires what 
might be called a compositional approach to concept formation: the step-by-step 
formulation of the set of relations that most adequately represent the particular 
historical complex under investigation. By definition, the kind of theoretical constructs 
which result from this process will not admit of general application but instead, as 
Weber hoped, will through their very specificity succeed in illuminating concrete 
historical situations. As Adorno was to put it many years later when he sought to 
compare as well as contrast the methods of the natural and social sciences: 
In sociology one cannot progress to the same degree from partial assertions 
about societal states of affairs to their general, even if, restricted validity, as 
one was accustomed to infer the characteristics of lead in general from the 
observations of one piece of lead. The generality of social-scientific laws is not 
at all that of the conceptual sphere into which the individual parts can be 
wholly incorporated, but rather always and essentially relates to the 
relationship of the general to the particular in its historical concretion. 47 
(Italics mine) 
It is my contention that Horkheimer's reconstruction of Marxism, as well as his 
critique of empiricism, owes something of a debt to Weber's reflections upon the 
nature of historical understanding. Thus according to Horkheimer the goal of empirical 
47 'Sociology and Empirical Research' In The Positivist Dispute In German 
SOCiology, p.77. 
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social theory is to produce general statements concerning society, in effect statements 
that are akin to the laws of natural science. These statements are hypothetical in form, 
and assert that if such and such conditions hold, then such and such an event will 
occur. However for Horkheimer, Marx's theoretical project, although it contains these 
kind of statements, does not emphasise generality but rather focuses upon the 
"uniqueness" of the historical process. As he observes: 
To the extent that the critical theory of society deduces present conditions 
from the concept of simple exchange, it includes this kind of necessity, 
although it is relatively unimportant that the hypothetical form of statement be 
used. That is, the stress is not on the idea that wherever a society based upon 
simple exchange prevails, capitalism must develop - although this is true. The 
stress is on the fact that the existent capitalist society ... derives from the basic 
relation of exchange ... the critical theory of society is, in its totality, the 
unfolding of a single existential judgement. 48 (Italics mine) 
Thus the hypothetical form of statement is relatively unimportant because the process 
that Marx is theorising, the emergence of the capitalist system of production, is a 
unique world historical process incapable of repetition. In other words, the various 
moments of capitalist development cannot be abstracted from that process and studied 
in the fashion in which a natural scientist might study a physical, chemical or biological 
process, for each such moment is essentially defined by its position within the 
historical totality. To give a concrete example, Marx's notion of primitive 
48 'Traditional and Critical Theory' in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, p.227. 
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accumulation is not a general concept capable of application outside of the specific 
moment in which bourgeois society develops from the decay of the feudal production 
relations. Rather, primitive accumulation is a once and for all occurrence: it is the 
birth of an entirely new mode of production. This is not to say that subsequently blocs 
of capital may not be formed by a process similar to that which Marx describes in 
Capital. However, these latter day acts of accumulation take place in the context of a 
pre-existing world order, a context which profoundly affects their character. 
Horkheimer's remark that critical theory represents the unfolding of a singular 
existential judgement should therefore be interpreted as drawing attention to the fact 
that the theory is primarily concerned not with objects or processes of a particular type 
but rather with the developmental logic of a historical totality. Like Hegel's 
Phenomenology, Marx's Capital should be read as the life-history of a particular 
entity, as an account of a social formation that comes into being, matures and 
eventually declines. It cannot usefully be read as a series of universal propositions 
asserting that if such and such conditions occur then such and such events must 
necessarily follow for the very good reason that the initial conditions Marx describes 
are necessarily a unique historical conjuncture. This point has been well made by Scott 
Meikle, who in pointing to the essential difference between the reproduction of a 
natural and social form argues that: 
With natural species the process is one of the reproduction over time of the 
species; the preservation of an identical generic nature by its transmission 
through successively numerically distinct individuals, each of which equally 
168 
embodies that single nature. The historical process however does not preserve 
a nature through successive generations ~ it develops a nature through 
successive forms. 49 
Unlike natural scientists, social theorists are not confronted with a set of individuals 
belonging to a particular species or genus but with a single, unified process of 
development which effectively defines the nature of the object of their study. Against 
this, it might be argued that underlying the historical process there is in fact a nature 
that is preserved through "successive generations", namely human nature, and that in 
principle at least it should be possible to develop a theory which shows how social life 
in all of its historical variations can be traced back to this universal. In essence this is a 
form of methodological individualism, for it maintains that the various concrete social 
formations that have appeared in the course of the historical process are capable of 
being explained in terms of the nature of individual human beings. Against this, 
Horkheimer holds firmly to the principle of the inherent singularity of the historical 
process. As he observes: 
. .. contemporary materialism does not build up supratemporal concepts and 
abstract from the differences introduced by time. Even the possibility of 
establishing certain general human traits by considering man in his past history 
does not lead to a hypostatisation of these traits as suprahistorical factors. 
Society, on which man's existence partially depends, is a totality which cannot 
be compared to anything else and is continuously restructuring itself. Thus, 
49 f:"sentialism ;11 the Thought of Karl Marx, p.36. This observation highlights the 
error in Engels' attempt to assimilate historical materialism with the natural sciences. 
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while the similarity of human traits through the various periods of history 
allows us to form concepts which are important for understanding 
contemporary social movements, it by no means allows us to interpret these 
traits as the ground of history in its totality. (Italics mine) 
Thus according to Horkheimer, even if a set of "general human traits" could be 
detected these could not serve as a general explanation of the historical process. The 
reason for this, is that the explanandum, in this case the social totality, is a complex of 
phenomena that is both sui generis and subject to continuous transformation. What 
Marx describes in Capital is not an instance of a type, but a moment in the 
development of human society, a moment that is specific and never to be repeated. In 
consequence there is a radical discrepancy between what is purported to be the ground 
of history, specifically a universal hypostatised human nature, and the dynamic reality 
of determinate historical being. The former remains entirely general, whilst an 
adequate specification of the latter tends towards particularity and concreteness; it is 
this discrepancy which suggests that without further mediation the two levels of theory 
cannot be brought into contact with one another. This critique of methodological 
individualism points yet again to the fact that Horkheimer's theory of history and 
society is essentially a totalising theory, a fonn of knowledge focused upon the 
dynamic logic of the whole and its parts. In the next chapter, I shall argue that this 
approach not only differentiates critical theory from the natural sciences but also helps 
to positively determine the essential character of the Frankfurt project. 
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Chapter 5. Totality, Materialism and Dialectic 
Horkheimer's rejection of the empiricist model of theory derives, as we have seen in 
the previous chapter, from a commitment to an essentially historicist methodology, the 
central premise of which is that social phenomena can only ever be adequately 
understood by reference to the socio-historical process through which they have come 
into being. This position contrasts sharply with the empiricist belief that phenomena 
can be grasped in their immediacy, that reality consists of observable discrete elements 
whose identity is independent of the historico-structural relations which they bear to 
one another. To appreciate more exactly what is involved in this methodological 
difference, we may consider a comment made by Horkheimer concerning the 
fragmented, partial form of knowledge that he believed is characteristic of the 
empirical social scientific tradition. Thus he writes: 
The product of the analysis, the abstract concepts and rules, are not of course 
identical with knowledge of events in reality. The individual disciplines yield 
only the elements of the theoretical construction of the historical process, and 
these do not remain what they were in the individual disciplines but acquire 
new meanings. All true thought is thus to be understood as a continuous 
. .' 1 
critique of abstract determmatlons ... 
Here the difference Horkheimer is seeking to establish is the difference between the 
I 'The Rationalism Debate in Contemporary Philosophy' in Between Philosophy 
alld Social Science, p.236. 
172 
"abstract determinations" of analysis (or empiricism), and what he calls "the 
theoretical construction of the historical process". Within the context of this latter 
activity Horkheimer argues that the elements identified by analysis, the elements which 
make up the subject matter of the various social scientific disciplines, come to "acquire 
new meanings". Consequently in re-constructing the historical process, the theorist 
who is seeking the deepest possible understanding of that process is compelled to 
transcend conventional disciplinary boundaries so as to relate its various individual 
moments to the totality of socio-historical being which not merely encompasses but 
also constitutes them. This formulation of multi-disciplinary materialism suggests that 
far from being a kind of positivistic Marxism, the theoretical synthesis first advocated 
by Horkheimer and later taken up by other members of the Frankfurt School is 
founded upon Hegel's conception of knowledge as know/edge of a concrete 
developing whole. 
As a straightforward exegetical thesis this statement is not difficult to defend: there 
are, after all, numerous positive references to Hegel's doctrine of holism not only in 
the work ofHorkheimer but also in that of Adorno and Marcuse? By contrast, what is 
more difficult to determine - as well as being a more interesting question - is the 
precise role that the idea plays in the production of a critical social theory. In other 
words, how does the logic of totality, a logic which forms the organisational principle 
2 Thus Horkheimer in an important fonnulation of critical theory argues that its 
subject is "a definite individual in his real relatio~ to other individuals and gr?Ups,. in 
his conflict with a particular ~lass, and, ,~all~, 10 t~e result~t w~~ of relatton~~ps 
with the social totality and Wlth nature. (ItalICS mme) See Tradltl~nal and Cnttcal 
Theory' in Critical Theory: Selected E~saJ!s, p.~ 11. See al.so ~do~o s ,remarks up~n 
the importance of the category of totalIty 10 SOCial theory 10 hi~ article On the LOgiC 
of the Social Sciences' in The Positivist Dispute in German SOCIOlogy. 
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of the Hegelian philosophical system, cohere with Marx's historical materialist account 
of society? To answer this question we will need to refer, as Horkheimer does, to the 
fundamental principle of Hegel's idealist philosophy, namely that a truly adequate 
knowledge of reality involves more than the analytic cognition of independent, discrete 
elements, and is obliged rather to discover the principle of structure which governs the 
development of the world as a systematic whole. In what follows I shall explore in 
some detail various assumptions underlying this general methodological stance, and 
more particularly I shall be concerned to illuminate the relation between Hegel's 
concept of totality and the Frankfurt School's vision of a form of materialism 
constructed around an integrated multi-disciplinary approach to social theory. Of 
necessity this will involve reconstructing some of the original argument underpinning 
Hegel's totalising vision, a vision that is all too often celebrated by Marxists but rarely 
subjected to careful scrutiny. Indeed, it is my belief that until the methodological 
principles underpinning Hegel's account of the Logical Idea have been brought out 
into the opel4 any notion of a materialist methodology derived from that account must 
remain suspect. More particularly, if we are to take seriously the claim that Hegel's 
method underpins the work of Marx, the problem of constructing a genuinely 
materialist dialectic on the basis of the Hegelian subject -object totality must be 
adequately addressed. For as I shall argue in the final section of this chapter, without 
further refinement the Hegelian Marxism of Lukacs and Horkheimer has a strong 
tendency to obviate the distinction between Hegel's idealist totality and Marx's 
materialist reconstruction of that system. 
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Social Theory and the Concept of Totality 
In a footnote to his discussion of Marx's method and its relation to the Hegelian 
concept of totality, Lukacs in History and Class Consciousness refers the interested 
reader to a section in the Science of Logic concerning the relationship of Whole and 
Part. 3 This reference, it should be said, is somewhat misleading, for if we pursue it 
then we find that the Whole-Part relation is not at all synonymous with Hegel's notion 
of totality but that on the contrary is regarded by Hegel as "immediate", as a category 
in the realm of Appearance rather than Essence, and therefore as something which 
Science is obliged to transcend. 4 As Hegel observes: "The immediate relation is that of 
the Whole and the Parts. The content is the whole, and consists of the parts (the 
form), its counterpart. The parts are diverse from one another. It is they that possess 
independent being. ,,5 In the Zusiitzse to this passage, he goes on to explain that the 
relation of Whole and Part is an example of an external or mechanical relation in 
which terms retain their identity independently of the holding of the relation. Thus, if a 
part is removed from a whole the identity of that part is unaffected, as is the identity of 
those parts remaining in the original whole. In the above passage therefore, when 
Hegel speaks of a Whole, he is referring to what on another occasion he calls a "dead, 
mechanical aggregate", a contingent grouping of objects each of which is capable of 
existing independently of the aggregate to which they happen to belong.6 As Hegel 
3 See footnote #14 to 'What is Orthodox Marxism?' in History and Class 
Consciousness. 
4 Despite this footnote Lukacs himself does not confuse the concept of totality with 
Hegel's category of Whole and Part. 
5 Hegel~ft J.logic, § 135 
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puts it, the unity of an aggregated Whole is "external to the matter" of its constituent 
parts, in other words the relations which define the Whole are extrinsic to the being of 
the individual elements of which it is composed. 7 
Now for Hegel, as for Horkheimer, this way of thinking about the world, of seeing it 
as a mechanical aggregate, is deeply rooted in the theoretical tradition of 
Enlightenment. It is the basis of the materialism of thinkers such as Hobbes 
, 
d' Alembert, Diderot and Holbach, and constitutes a mode of thought which has been 
characteristic of bourgeois theoretical culture up to and including the present day. 
According to this doctrine the world is, at its most fundamental level, a system of 
material particles whose pattern of interaction determines what will and will not occur 
at successive levels of macro-reality. As Horkheimer observes: "The direction of 
physicalist materialism in the seventeenth century ... allowed the definitive equating of 
reaHty and body.,,8 On the basis of this equation, atomistic science predicted that all 
phenomena, social as well as natural, would one day reduce to material motion, and in 
consequence all science to the theory of that motion. Describing the pervasive 
influence of this kind of atomism on classical bourgeois culture, Charles Taylor has 
commented that it is a theoretical perspective that "develops through such diverse 
6 Science of Logic, p.SI8. 
7 Horkheimer is clearly al1uding to this idea when he writes: "The materia~ism 
schooled in Hegel's logic has always been awa~e t.hat t~e abstract. ~lements denved 
from analysis cannot be simply added up to comclde WIth the ongmal phenomena. 
Abstraction and analysis are transformative activities. Their effect must be sublated 
again in the act of knowing ... " I shall argue that this act of sublation is achieved by 
Horkheimer's notion of an inter-disciplinary materialism. (,The Rationalism Debate in 
Contemporary Philosophy' in Between Philosophy and Science, p.234) 
8 'Materialism and Metaphysics' in Critical Theory: Selected Writings, p.2S. 
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thinkers as Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, Locke; and authenticated by the science of 
Galileo and Newton, it entrenches itself in the eighteenth century not only as a theory 
of knowledge, but also as a theory of man and society". 9 One must add that a very 
similar perspective can be discerned in the work of Engels, Plekhanov, Kautsky and 
indeed most other orthodox Marxists. For despite the fact that Engels and his 
followers frequently denied that their materialism could be equated with what they 
called "mechanical materialism", it is certainly true that these thinkers believed that 
descriptions of consciousness could be reduced to descriptions of matter or material 
process. 10 In making this claim, orthodox Marxism, like Enlightenment materialism, 
prepares the ground for a reductivist account of the behaviour of both the individual 
subject as well as individuals grouped together in social formations. 
In what follows, I shall argue that Hegel's concept of totality is best understood as an 
argument against this atomistic strand of Enlightenment thought. Thus one way of 
characterising his dispute with Enlightenment is to focus on what might be called the 
doctrine of external relations, a doctrine which it will be argued provides most of the 
metaphysical underpinning for atomistic thinking. Sharply opposed to dialectical 
thought, it proposes that there is a fundamental distinction to be made between the 
properties of an object and the relations it enters into. More particularly it claims that 
it is the properties that an object has in itself that are decisive in establishing its 
9 Hegel, p.4. 
10 As Engels puts it in [.ludwig Feuerhach and the End of Classical German 
Philosophy: "our consciousness and thinking, ho,":ever supra~ensuous they may se~m, 
are the product of a material, bodily organ, the br~n .. Matter IS not a product. o~ nu~,d, 
but mind merely the highest product of matter. This IS, of course, pure matenallsm. ( 
Selected Works: Marx and Engels, p.596) 
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identity, in determining what kind of thing it is. By contrast, the relations which a thing 
participates in are regarded as extrinsic to the question of its identity. Thus Locke, 
commenting upon the idea of a relation, writes that: "it be not contained in the real 
existence of things, but something extraneous and superinduced. ,,11 In other words, 
whatever various relations a thing may enter into, these may all cease to hold without 
affecting the identity of the thing itself In the context of the above argument, the 
physical sciences are often cited as an example of a knowledge that holds firmly to the 
distinction between properties and relations. For instance, in the case of a system of 
spatial relations we may suppose that all of these might change, without at the same 
time supposing that the identity of the elements thus related undergoes any kind of 
modification at all. As one philosopher of science has remarked, for the atomist: "the 
constituents of every spatio-temporal object lie within its boundaries and its properties 
follow from them.,,12 Now the logic of this position points to a connection that exists 
between the doctrine of external relations and one particularly influential form of 
atomistic thinking, namely reductive materialism. This form of materialism, still 
influential in the natural sciences, argues that fundamentally reality consists of 
individual material objects standing in specific spatio-temporal relations to each other 
and that every other feature of the world must at least in principle be reducible to these 
objects and their changing patterns of configuration. From this it follows that all 
science reduces to the micro-physical, and insofar as a theory appears to resist or be 
incapable of such reduction it must be judged as a poor approximation to genuine 
II An Essay Concerning Human lfnderstanding, Book II, Chapter 25, §8. 
12 Mellor, D., 'The Reduction of Society', Philosophy, 57, 1982, p.56. 
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science. 13 
Now from Hegel's point of view what is wrong with the above program is not so 
much that it is false but that it is significantly incomplete, that it concentrates 
exclusively upon the activity of analysis and thereby ignores the fact that in order to 
comprehend a concrete living whole there is a need for a complementary process of 
synthesis. He illustrates this idea by means of a number of organicist arguments 
deriving from the biological sciences. Thus in the discussion of philosophical method 
with which the Phenomenology opens, Hegel uses the example of a living body to 
illustrate the idea of a whole whose parts are resistant to atomistic analysis. As he puts 
it: 
... in the ordinary view of anatomy, for instance (say, the knowledge of the 
parts of the body regarded as inanimate), we are quite sure that we do not as 
yet possess the subject matter itself, the content of this science, but must exert 
ourselves to know the particulars. 14 
In the Encyclopaedia Logic Hegel returns to this same argument, observing that: "The 
single members of the body are what they are only in relation to their unity. A hand 
e.g. when hewn off from the body is, as Aristotle has observed, a hand in name only, 
13 The equivalent of this program in the social sciences is. th~ . doctrine .. of 
methodological individualism which holds that there are no supra-mdlvldual entitles 
or structures prior to the individual in the explanation of social phenomena. 
14 Phenomenology, § 1. 
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not in fact.,,15 This thought reiterates a familiar Aristotelean thesis, namely that when a 
part is removed from a body it undergoes a significant qualitative change: the 
anatomical specimen, although materially identical to the living part, is no longer what 
it was but has become dead matter. Thus in contrast to the components of an 
aggregate, the parts of a body are by nature neither detachable nor interchangeable: 
outside of the unity of the body, the individual part, despite preserving temporarily its 
internal structure and material constitution, loses its functional capacity. More 
precisely, perhaps, we should say that without presupposing a significant degree of 
complex technological intervention, the idea that the constituent parts of an organic 
whole could ever be self-subsistent, identical within and outwith the whole, runs 
counter to everything we know about the world we live in. This does not entail that 
the analytical knowledge provided by the anatomist is to be discounted, but it does 
mean that the study of parts in isolation from the living body will never by itself be 
sufficient to grasp "organic life in its truth.,,16 For Hegel, therefore, if we wish to 
determine the nature of an organic constituent, it is essential that we see it in the 
context of an organised, living whole. As Scott Meikle puts it: "We need to observe 
the functioning of the whole in order to learn what the part is jor, i.e. what it is. ,,17 
Thus the identity of the individual part, what kind of thing it is, is determined by 
establishing the specific role that the part plays in the maintenance of the life and well-
being of the organic unity in question; conversely, to determine the whole is to 
15 Hegel's Logic, Zusatzse to §216. 
16 Hegel's Logic, Zusatzse to §135. 
17 Meikle, S., Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx, p.158. 
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determine the way in which its structure serves to maintain the life of its parts. 18 Now 
according to Hegel, this functional teleological viewpoint is the key to genuine 
knowledge, not only in the biological sciences but also in philosophy, because it leads 
the investigator to see reality as the expression, or activity, of a living entity. 
Furthermore because Hegel grounds his philosophical Science in the dialectic 
governing the evolution of human society, the organicist argument adumbrated above 
can be brought to bear on the understanding of social as well natural life processes. 
This feature of Hegel's thought, as the Hegelian Marxists including the Frankfurt 
School were to argue, was later taken up by Marx and serves to distinguish historical 
materialism from the mechanistic theories of history and society characteristic of the 
orthodox Marxist tradition. 
Hegel's critique of the analytical mind, however, cannot be fully understood without 
considering another organicist-inspired example of the necessity for a holistic form of 
knowledge. This time the focus of concern is with the various developmental stages or 
forms constituting the life process of a biological entity. In this context he observes 
that: 
These forms are not just distinguished from one another, they also supplant 
one another as incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes 
them moments of an organiC unity in which they not only do not conflict, but 
in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone 
18 Compare this argument with Adorno's remark that: :'to know what. ~ ~ork~r is o~e 
must know what capitalist society is." See his IntroductIOn to The POSitiViSt Dispute lfl 
German SOCiology, p.44. 
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constitutes the life of the whole. 19 (Italics mine) 
For Hegel then, the constituent moments of a process of organic development, whilst 
distinguishable from one another, are at the same time essentially conditioned by what 
he calls "the life of the whole", in other words by their relation to the development of 
that life. Unlike a purely contingent sequence of events, the stages of a life process 
have to be understood by reference to the whole process of which they are a part. This 
involves not only knowledge of a characteristic developmental sequence, the coming 
into being, maturing and passing away of the entity in question, but also an 
understanding of the way in which the stages of that sequence are conditioned one by 
another. 20 For instance, the fact that the birth of an individual is succeeded by its 
maturation is neither accidental nor contingent: the latter stage is to be regarded as the 
potentiality of everything that is born. As Hegel puts it, the fruit is the "truth" of the 
bud from which it came, which is to say that the potential for this particular 
development is part of what it is to be a bud. On Hegel's account, therefore, the 
process of life is not a Humean event sequence, but is marked instead by a necessary 
order, an order grounded in the internal relations existing between its various 
developmental stages. To suppose otherwise, to imagine that fully-formed entities 
might somehow spontaneously come into being is, as Kant might have said, to step 
outside of the realm of possible experience. As an individual subject, my identity is in 
part dependent upon the specific physiological process of development which has 
formed me as a biological entity: it is a history which I cannot coherently put aside. To 
19 Phenomenology of Spirit, §2. 
20 This idea, as we have seen in Chapter 4, plays a large role in Horkheimer's 
account of socio-historical explanation. 
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the objection that it is nevertheless logically possible that an individual might one day 
discover that they had always existed as a mature adult, that their birth and childhood 
had never occurred, Hegel would reply that this simply demonstrates the inadequacy 
of logic when it comes to setting boundaries to the notion of possibility. 21 Unlike the 
mathematical logician, the speCUlative thinker does not believe that non-contradiction 
in a purely formal sense is a sufficient basis for a judgement of possibility. In the same 
way, according to Hegel, the fact that human society evolved in the way that it did is 
an essential feature of its identity. To illustrate this claim we need only consider his 
discussion of the Master-Slave dialectic, which reveals that servitude is the necessary 
pre-condition for freedom, that the labour extracted from the slave is the basis of 
human autonomy. Indeed a great deal of the Phenomenology can be understood in 
precisely these terms, as a narrative revealing the unfolding in historical time of the 
concrete conditions required for human freedom.22 Summarising, it might be said that 
for Hegel, judgements of identity, whether of the individual or the species, are bound 
up respectively with the process of their ontogenesis or phylogenesis, that the history 
of a thing is not contingently related to its identity but is the essence of its constitution. 
Having outlined Hegel's account of the concept of totality, I shall conclude this 
section by making a number of observations concerning the way in which this notion 
might come to serve as a methodological principle for the construction of a materialist 
social theory. First it needs to be emphasised that Hegel's organicism plays an 
21 On this question, Marcuse's discussion of the concept of Real Possibility is worth 
consulting. See Reason and Revolution, pp.lS0-S4. 
22 Cf Alexandre Kojeve's Introduction a la Lecture de Hegel. 
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important role in Marx's own thinking concerning the nature of capitalist society. For 
example, in the Grundrisse Marx argues in strikingly Hegelian fashion that the 
bourgeois system of production constitutes an organic systeIl\ the various parts of 
which "presuppose" each other. As he puts it: 
While in the completed bourgeois system every economic relation presupposes 
every other in its bourgeois economic form, and everything posited is thus also 
a presupposition, this is the case with every organic system. This organic 
system itself, as a totality, has its presuppositions and its development to its 
totality consists precisely in subordinating all elements of society to itself, or in 
creating out of it the organs which it still lacks. This is historically how it 
becomes a totality.23 (Italics mine) 
In this passage Marx is equating the notion of totality with that of an organic system, 
an entity with a determinate l!fe process~ furthermore, he advances the claim that 
society, and more specifically bourgeois society, should be understood as just such a 
system or entity. As we have seen, this aspect of Marx's thought was first recognised 
by Lukacs, who argued that the category of totality is methodologically central to 
Marxism. Unfortunately, Lukacs' attempt to develop this insight is far from 
satisfactory: indeed some critics have maintained that it is doubtful whether the totality 
that he constructs in terms of a subject-object dialectic is altogether consistent with the 
general principles of historical materialism. Nevertheless, as the Frankfurt School 
realised, Lukacs' distinctively Hegelian reconstruction of Marx's method remains an 
23 Grundrisse, p.278. 
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essential starting point for any investigation of the nature of the theory adumbrated in 
Capital. Whether they were any more successful than Lukacs in formulating a 
coherent materialist concept of totality is, however, a question which will have to 
await the final section of the present chapter. 
My second observation concerning the methodological significance of Hegel's thought 
relates to the fact that although both of the examples discussed above derive from the 
realm of organic nature, there is nevertheless a significant difference between them. In 
the first example, the focus is on the mature form of an entity, a context in which the 
interest of Science is structural rather than developmental. Here we abstract from the 
life process in order to better focus upon the internal organisation of the entity in 
question. In the second case, the concept of totality is intended to capture the idea of 
a developmental process governed by a telos, a sequence of changes tending towards 
some final end. To distinguish between these two cases I shall make of use of a 
terminological convention derived from Martin Jay, who refers to the first case as a 
"latitudinal" totality and the second as a "longitudinal" totality?4 Having made this 
distinction, Jay argues that for Hegel the two kinds of totality do not exist in isolation 
but bear an essential relation to each other. Thus if we consider a moment in the 
ongoing, all-embracing, longitudinal totality of the Idea, we do not find a 
homogeneous entity but rather a series of hierarchically related sub-totalities each of 
which can be thought of as a latitudinal whole. Hegel's concept of totality therefore 
has a double aspect: it is structural as well as genetic, involving stasis as well as 
movement. This tension is richly illustrated in his philosophical anthropology, the 
24 Jay, M., Marxism and Totality, p.26, p.59. 
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major theme of which is the progression of the Idea through a succession of forms of 
life which in the process of their realisation create the very conditions that will 
eventually destroy them. For Hegel, the demise of a form is always an immanent 
consequence of its characteristic mode of functioning: the form by articulating its 
essential structure prepares its own destruction. Thus if we consider the 
Phenomenology, for instance, the history of Spirit (Geist) is a history whose focus 
continuously alternates between on the one hand the ever-developing life of the meta-
totality, the Idea, and on the other the various determinate structures of thought and 
action, most importantly the Family, Civil Society and State, which typify the specific 
social formations involved in the development of objective Spirit. 25 This aspect of 
Hegel's thought, namely that the dynamic of the meta-totality of the Idea is founded 
upon the immanent structural conflicts that define its various constituent sub-totalities, 
was to prove of immense importance in the development of materialism. For 
materialism, as Horkheimer and his colleagues were to argue, is not a contemplative 
but a critical theory of society: it is concerned to demonstrate that the matrix of social 
relations which constitute society do not form a harmonious whole but are essentially 
antagonistic. This intention finds powerful support in the dialectical movement 
described above. 
My final general observation concerning the role that the concept of totality might play 
in a materialist social theory relates to the way in which this notion governs the 
fundamental cognitive progression of Hegel's system, namely the transition from 
25 Marcuse uses the example of the family to illustrate the thesi~ that "every 
particular moment contains, as its very content, the whole, and must be mterpreted as 
the whole." See Reason and Revolution, pp.159-60. 
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knowledge of the object to that of the subject. 26 Hegel begins this section by 
remarking that atomistic thinking remains fixated on one particular aspect or level of 
objectivity, that of Mechanism in which there is a "complete mutual indifference" of 
objects to one another, each being ontologically self-subsistent as well as independent 
of the containing whole. 27 Now for Hegel, an adequate conception of objectivity must 
go beyond that of Mechanism to higher levels of ontological organisation, namely 
Chemism and Teleology. Thus at the level ofChemism, the relations that a thing bears 
to others are regarded as essential to its identity, and in consequence the "mutual 
indifference" characteristic of the elements of a purely mechanical system is 
transcended. As Hegel puts it: "in the case of the chemical object the determinateness, 
and consequently the relation to other and the kind and manner of this relation, belong 
to its nature. ,,28 At this level, therefore, the being of the individual is not 
comprehensible in itself, in isolation from that to which it is related, for here being is 
inextricably entwined with the being of another. However, even this enriched relational 
form of knowledge is insufficient for a philosophical Science, because it tells us 
nothing concerning the purpose of the object in question. Accordingly, Hegel 
introduces a third level of description, namely Teleology, where the notion of 
objectivity is explicitly associated with that of an end: at this level to say what a thing 
is, is to say what it is for. 29 It should be noted that this conception of the object goes 
26 This transition culminates in knowledge of the subject-object totality: a unity of 
thought and being which was to fascinate not only Marx but also his latter-day Left-
Hegelian interpreters. 
27 Science of Logic, p.714. 
28 Op.cit., p.727. 
29 Op.cit., pp.705-755. 
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beyond the Aristotelean concept of an internal telos characteristic of a particular 
species, for it culminates in a vision of reality as a single, living, purposeful totality 
unfolding through the historical process. It is in short the basis of that most 
fundamental transition in Hegel's idealist dialectic, the transition which reveals that the 
truth of the object is the life of the subject. 30 Commenting upon this move, 
Horkheimer observes that for Hegel: "philosophy has the same absolute content as 
religion, the complete unity of subject and object, a final and eternally valid 
knowledge.,,31 It was this particular content, however, that the Frankfurt School as 
materialists were unable to accept. Their view of the matter is perhaps best 
summarised by Adorno's well-known aphorism: "The Whole is the False", a deliberate 
inversion of the Hegelian formula that the True is the Whole. By this remark Adorno 
does not of course mean to deny the importance of totality for social theory~ rather, he 
is concerned to challenge Hegel's tendency to construct history as a kind oftheodicy, 
a narrative of progress describing the self-activity of the Notion as it realises itself ever 
more adequately in nature and society. This tendency derives in tum from what might 
be called an "expressivist" conception of history, a conception which regards the 
historical process as a movement towards a determinate end or goal. All of this 
becomes clear as soon as we take the trouble to contextualise Hegel's formula 
concerning the True and the Whole. In the Phenomenology the context of this identity 
is a discussion of the general content of a philosophical Science. Whilst attempting to 
describe this content Hegel remarks that "everything turns on grasping and expressing 
the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject." It is shortly after this remark 
30 For a more detailed account of this particular dialectic see Charles Taylor's Hegel, 
pp.318-328. 
31 'On the Problem of Truth' in Between Philosophy and Social Science, p.18S. 
188 
that the identity of the True and the Whole is declared: 
The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence 
consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said 
that it is essentially a result, that only in the end is it what it truly is~ and that 
precisely in this consists its nature, viz to be actual, subject, the spontaneous 
becoming of itself 32 
For Hegel, then, the True is the historical development of the whole which takes place 
in accordance with the essential nature of the Logical Idea. History therefore is akin to 
a process of organic development, of a nature unfolding itself through a process of 
growth and maturation. 33 By contrast Adorno's aphorism is a warning against 
intentionalising the historical process, of crediting it with any kind of purpose or final 
end. More particularly, it is a warning against Hegel's belief that a narrative of 
normative progress, progress towards the True, can be discovered by means of an 
exercise in world-historical speculation. Thus according to Hegel, philosophical 
Science reveals that history is a process of development, the development of the 
organic whole which is objective Mind (society) towards freedom and rationality. 
Counter to this, the Frankfurt School regard history as a narrative of domination, the 
32 Phenomenology, §20. 
33 As Dudley Knowles has pointed out in a personal communication this view of 
Hegel as an exponent of a grand teleological narrative, needs to be balanced by 
reminding ourselves that his conception of Objective Mind places a grea! deal of 
emphasis upon the notion of human freedom. Thus as makers of our own hist?ry we 
are not compelled to realise what is rational In consequence, the evolutIOn of 
Objective Mind is very far from being an orderly logical process of developme.nt, but is 
marked from the outset by a series of false-starts and often murderous regressions. 
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domination of the subject first by nature and then by society; there is no end, purpose 
or goal to this process other than perhaps the literal destruction of human beings. Thus 
Horkheimer, criticising Hegel's organicist social theory, writes that: 
Reason cannot become transparent to itself as long as men act as members of 
an organism which lacks reason. Organism as a naturally developing and 
declining unity cannot be a sort of a model for society, but only a fonn of 
deadened existence from which society must emancipate itself 34 
This suggests a complex, dialectical attitude towards organicist theories of both 
history and society. On the one hand, Horkheimer is in agreement with the view that 
society can be construed as being analogous to some kind of organic structure, as a 
system whose parts are mutually inter-dependent and functionally co-ordinated. On the 
other hand, he is concerned to question the rationality of this state of affairs; for 
insofar as society can be understood in the fashion of a natural process it is to be 
criticised as an imperfect realisation of the social ideal. For Horkheimer, as for other 
members of the Frankfurt School, a true society can only be the result of collective 
purposeful action, of consciously agreed means and ends; capitalist society fails this 
test because the laws which govern its development are opaque to consciousness. In 
the words of the young Marx, the world that we produce through our activity stands 
over and against us as an alien other; it is not the result of reason, but rather of blind 
material forces acting upon and compelling the individual subject into unfree activity. 
Hegel, of course, would radically dispute this thesis, but in remarking this difference 
34 'Traditional and Critical Theory' in Critical Theory: Selected F:ssays, p 208. 
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we are simply noting a real point of distinction between Marx's materialism and 
German Idealism. 
By way of conclusion to this section I want to return once again to the work of the 
young Lukacs and compare, albeit somewhat briefly, the role which the category of 
totality plays in his thought with the way in which that concept figures in the Frankfurt 
Marxist tradition. Let us begin by considering what is undoubtedly the central claim of 
History and Class Consciousness: that the employment of the category of totality 
constitutes the real point of difference between Marx's thought and any fonn of 
positivistic social theory, be it orthodox Marxism or empirical sociology. Thus at the 
most general level Lukacs argues that what is distinctive about Marxism is not any 
specific substantive thesis concerning history and society, but rather that its method 
consists of integrating "the isolated facts of social life" into the historical process as a 
whole, of comprehending individual phenomena not in themselves but by reference to 
their position within the dynamic totality of social existence.35 Now from what has 
been said previously concerning the Frankfurt School's commitment to a materialist 
program of multi-disciplinary research, it should be clear that Horkheimer and his 
colleagues would have been in broad agreement with this position. They would also 
have agreed with Lukacs' argument that the whole that is the principal concern of 
Marx's theory is not a mechanical system governed by deterministic universal laws, but 
rather a complex structured unity, the organising principle of which is the dialectic 
between su~ject and object, praxis and the world that is given to it. Indeed for the 
35 See, for example, 'What IS Orthodox Marxism?' In History and Class 
Consciousness, p.8., p.IS. 
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Frankfurt School the merit of this Hegelian approach is its potential for liberating 
materialism from the causal determinism which so many orthodox Marxists had read 
into Marx's metaphor of base and superstructure. Where they parted company with 
Lukacs, however, was with his belief that the dialectic of the historical process tends 
towards some necessary end or goal, namely the unity of the subject and object as 
realised through self-knowledge of the subject. This element in Lukacs' thought, it 
should be said, derives fairly directly from the Hegelian conception of the historical 
process as the activity of a supra-individual subject realising its essential nature.36 
Pursuing this thought through the medium of Marxism, Lukacs argues that history is 
the process by which a socially specific class, the proletariat, constitutes itself as both 
subject and object. Indeed for Lukacs what is unique about this class is precisely its 
structurally determined potential "to see the social totality as a concrete historical 
totality; to see the reified forms as processes between men; to see the immanent 
meaning of history that only appears negatively in the contradictions of abstract forms, 
to raise its positive side to consciousness and put it into practice." 37 (Italics mine) As 
we have seen, despite the Frankfurt theorist's considerable debt to Hegel, this strong 
teleological thesis plays no part in their appropriation of his thought; indeed it has been 
argued that their account of dialectic is defined precisely by its opposition to this 
central principle of Hegelian thinking. For the Frankfurt School, history lacks the kind 
of immanent meaning that Lukacs seeks to attach to it, because it lacks the meta-
subject of the proletariat. Of course, this is not to say that Horkheimer and his 
36 In the closing pages of the Phenomenology, ~egel ~ummarise~ his t~ought. by 
remarking with respect to Spirit that t~~ "the <;lther sl~e of l~S B~conung, History, IS a 
conscious, self-mediating process - SpInt emptIed out mto TIme. (§808) 
37 History and Class Consciousness, p.197. 
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colleagues ignore the role of this social class in their analysis of society; that would be 
an altogether nonsensical position. It is to say, however, that for the Frankfurt School 
, 
the proletariat cannot come to occupy the place of Hegel's Geist as Lukacs seemed to 
think it could. Against his belief that in virtue of the structural position of this class in 
bourgeois society the proletariat must, of necessity, come to a consciousness of that 
totality, the Frankfurt School argued that no such necessity existed. On the contrary, 
such a consciousness would represent a wholly contingent historical achievement, one 
moreover that is constantly threatened by forces of reaction and even barbarism. 
Indeed it might even be said of some of the later work of the Frankfurt School that if 
any logic governs the formation of consciousness in capitalist society it is a wholly 
negative logic, a logic of what Adorno calls identity thinking, where those under the 
grip of this mode of thought lose any capacity to discover the difference between what 
society proclaims itself to be and what it is in reality.38 In the final chapter of this 
thesis, I shall return to this question, and discuss whether, as Susan Buck-Morrs 
claims, Frankfurt Marxism really is "Marx minus the proletariat".39 For the moment, 
however, my purpose is simply to draw attention yet again to the Frankfurt School's 
refusal to identify totality with the notion of a historical te/os. Against the Idealism of 
Hegel - and, it must be said, Lukacs - they held to the view that the historical process, 
at least to date, represents the domination of the subject by the object, and that 
furthermore the prospect of emancipation from this process cannot be theorised as a 
necessity internal to the life of society. In summary, the vision of totality offered by the 
38 Fredric Jameson offers a perceptive discussion of the relation between Adorno's 
critique of identity thinking and Marx's account of commodity production. See Late 
Marxism, especially pp.15-2,4. 
39 The Origin of Negative Dialectics. See Chapter 3 of this work for a discussion of 
the relation between Adorno's Marxism and that of the young Lukacs. 
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Frankfurt School is one that is thoroughly purged of the imperialism of the subject: as 
a materialist analysis it returns us to the priority of the object, and thereby to the 
failure of the subject to constitute itself. 
Subject-Object Dialectics 
The second half of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of the question of whether 
the subject-object dialectic posited by Hegel can be successfully appropriated by 
materialism. Of course, such an appropriation will demand some measure of 
theoretical labour, for a viable materialism must have the capacity to distinguish itself 
from its Idealist origins. This in tum suggests that in comparing and distinguishing 
these traditions we should be aware of their difference as well as their identity, that we 
should be alive to the fact that at some point in the argument materialism must break 
with Idealism. In what follows, I shall explore this question by focusing upon the 
relation between Hegel and the Frankfurt School. In particular, I shall be concerned to 
determine how successful Horkheimer and his colleagues were in offering a genuinely 
materialist reconstruction of the Idealist subject-object dialectic. Part of this task will 
involve demonstrating that the Frankfurt School's conception of the social totality is 
not only consistent with Marx's original thesis, but is indeed superior to the orthodox 
interpretation of that thesis as the specification of a causal relation between 
consciousness and the material world. 
A useful starting point for this discussion is provided by a lecture given by Horkheimer 
to the Kant Society in Frankfurt in 1931, and later published in the ZeitschriJt under 
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the title 'History and Psychology'. During the course of this lecture, Horkheimer 
engages in a polemic against the Heideggerian notion that history is to be understood 
as the "inner historicity of Dasein". Concerning this idea he comments: 
Just as engagement with external history illuminates the individual being (das 
jeweilige Dasein), the analysis of individual existence (das jeweilige 
Existenzen) conditions the understanding of history. Dasein is indissolubly 
implicated in external history, and accordingly its analysis cannot lead to the 
discovery of any ground that moves in itself, independent of all external 
determination. Real history, then, with its multifaceted, supraindividual 
structures is not merely a derivative, subsidary, objectivated realm, as 
existential philosophy would insist. 40 
This passage usefully brings together a number of elements in Horkheimer's general 
account of the nature of social and historical theory. Most significantly, with respect 
to the question at hand, it illustrates his belief that a theory of society must maintain a 
tension between the subject, seen as an active, consciously reflective bearer of 
experience, and the supraindividual structures and relations which appear to 
individuals as an external objective realm of being determining the content of that 
experience. In fact for Horkheimer this opposition serves as the basis of his materialist 
conception of society as totality, because it suggests that an adequate social theory 
begins with the recognition of the mutually constitutive relation between the subject 
and object of social experience. In other words, to view society as a totality is to 
40 'History and Psychology' in Between Philosophy and Social Science, pII3. 
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comprehend it as the result of a dialectical relation, the terms of which are constituted 
according to Hegel by a process of reciprocal interaction. This, however, raises the 
question of the sense in which materialism can consistently maintain that the subject 
constitutes the object of experience; for without further clarification the thesis comes 
uncomfortably close to that version of Idealism, criticised by the young Marx, which 
proposes to explain social structures by reference to the consciousness of individuals. 
In response to this kind of concern, Horkheimer argues that there is an important 
distinction to be made between the subject, conceived of as an individual and the 
subject interpreted as society. Thus he writes that: 
The whole perceptible world as present to a member of bourgeois society and 
as interpreted within a traditional world-view ... is seen by the perceiver as a 
sum-total of facts; it is there and must be accepted. But there is at this point an 
essential difference between the individual and society. The world which is 
given to the individual .,. is in its present and continuing form, a product of the 
activity of society as a whole. 41 
According to this passage, then, the world as it is perceived by the individual is 
something that is produced by "society as a whole". However, this formulation of the 
constitutivity thesis points to a potential ambiguity in Horkheimer's concept of society. 
On the one hand, society exists as object, a "second nature" that is simply given, that 
confronts the individual as an alien other standing over and above them. On the other, 
it seems to take on some of the characteristics of the subject: society can be 
41 'Traditional and Critical Theol)" in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, pp.199-200. 
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understood as an active, productive force that is in large measure responsible for the 
world that we live in. This ambiguity, however, is not necessarily a defect in 
Horkheimer's argument but may instead point to the contradictory nature of the object 
that he is theorising. Thus commenting upon the failure of bourgeois society to 
constitute itself as a genuine subject he writes: 
The individual sees himself as passive and dependent, but society, though 
made up of individuals, is an active subject, even if a non-conscious one, and to 
that extent a subject only in an improper sense. This difference in the existence 
of man and society is an expression of the cleavage which has up to now 
affected the historical forms oflife. 42 (Italics mine) 
The cleavage to which Horkheimer refers is the gulf that exists between the activity of 
society as subject and our perception of that activity. Thus society, through the 
activity of its individual members, produces and reproduces itself on a daily basis, yet 
this activity is not the result of a unified intentional design on the part of any human 
agency, either individual or collective, but is rather the outcome of the aggregation of 
numerous independent decisions taken by individual agents attempting to pursue and 
maximise their own self interest. In consequence the world of social phenomena 
appears to the individual as a largely alien, inhuman world, one which is dominated by 
relations between things rather than relations between independent subjects. This leads 
Horkheimer to claim that the sense in which society can be thought of as subject is 
ultimately an improper sense, because the activity of this subject is not governed by 
420p.cit., pp.199-200. 
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any form of consciousness or intentionality. Nevertheless, it is in just this improper 
sense that Horkheimer sees the world as the expression of human activity rather than 
as a "totality of facts" that is simply given to us. Indeed this is the paradox behind the 
original Marxian thesis of reification: the social activity of human subjects takes on and 
in a certain sense actually becomes a realm of inhuman objectivity, whilst 
simultaneously preserving itself as a form, albeit a degraded form, of praxis. 
This thesis clearly raises a number of questions. In the first place there is the problem 
of de-limiting the notion of the object as an object of praxis. Thus there is a serious 
question as to whether the world that is given to the individual but produced by the 
action of society can be equated with the world of nature, a realm of objectivity which 
appears as completely external and independent of both the individual and social 
subject. I shall say something concerning this question towards the end of this chapter. 
For the moment, however, I want to concentrate upon Horkheimer's claim that in 
contrast to the natural sciences the object of social theory is not independent of the 
subject but is the result of human activity ,and more particularly is the result of socia] 
labour. Thus according to Horkheimer, to conceive of society as either determined or 
constituted by a set of pre-given nomic regularities is to succumb to a reified form of 
thin1dng: it is to mistakenly equate specific socio-historic forms with natural forms, 
and thereby falsely objectify what is in reality the product of the subject. In making this 
argument, Horkheimer is representing critical theory as a theory with a de-reifying 
potential, a theory that seeks to recover the mark of subjectivity in a world that the 
empirical social scientist theorises as an objective realm standing over and above the 
subject. 
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Now there is a sense in which this line of argument sits comfortably with Marx's 
original thought, insofar as it appears to represent a fairly natural extension of the 
theory of commodity fetishism to the entire realm of social existence. However, there 
is also a sense in which Horkheimer's dialectic of subject and object departs radically 
from the fundamental tenets of historical materialism, at least as they are usually 
understood. We may put the matter like this: for most thinkers, Marxists as well as 
non-Marxists, historical materialism has been thOUght to involve some notion of what 
the later Lukacs refers to as ontolOgical priority. Explaining this concept Lukacs 
writes that: 
If we ascribe one category ontological priority over the others, we simply mean 
that one of them can exist without the other, without the opposite being the 
case. This holds for the central thesis of all materialism, that being has 
ontological priority over consciousness.43 
Here the being that has priority over consciousness is of course the social being of 
humanity, an entity that for the historical materialist can arise only in and through the 
process of material production. Now according to Lukacs the priority of this realm 
depends upon the fact that the functions of production and reproduction are the 
essential basis for every fonn of human activity, that, to quote Engels, there is "the 
simple fact ... that mankind must first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing before 
it can pursue politics, science, art, religion etc." This remark suggests that the "simple 
43 The Ontology of Social Being, p.3 I. 
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fact" that we are dealing with is the Brechtian priority of Essen over Moral: the fact 
that we must eat before we can teach morality. Of course, whether historical 
materialism does indeed reduce to this fact is an arguable matter and one that shall be 
addressed shortly. For the moment I am interested only in establishing whether this 
conception of materialism might be thought to challenge Horkheimer's formulation of 
the subject -object dialectic by virtue of the fact that his formulation appears not to be 
couched in terms of the priority of either the subject or the object. Indeed if the subject 
and object are mutually constitutive of each other as Horkheimer suggests they are, 
and if therefore neither term can be thought without the other, then the opposition 
between Idealism and materialism becomes tenuous to the point of non-existence. This 
was certainly the position at which Lukacs eventually arrived with respect to his own 
earlier work: famously, he judged History and Class Consciousness to be an "attempt 
to out-Hegel Hegel" because of its assumption that an "identical subject-object" can 
be created by an act of self-knowledge alone. 44 Similarly, in the case of the Frankfurt 
School, it might be argued that in seeking to escape the constrictions of vulgar Marxist 
materialism, and in particular the belief that the nature of material production 
determines consciousness, Horkheimer and his fellow critical theorists end up 
abandoning historical materialism in favour of a form of Left Idealism. 
Critics who take this line tend to assume that it is a relatively simple matter to 
distinguish materialism from Idealism: they appeal to Marx's slogan that "social being 
determines consciousness" and contrast this with the idealist postulate of a world 
produced by thought. This distinction, however, is not as clear as it might at first 
44 See the 1967 Preface to History and Class Consciousness 
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seem; for in Marx's sense of the term, every kind of social being, including the process 
of material production, is necessarily permeated by forms of consciousness. Thus the 
determination of consciousness of which Marx speaks involves the determination of 
certain forms of consciousness by the whole complex of practices, relations and 
crucially modes of consciousness which constitute the process of material production. 
As an instance of this determination, we might consider the relation between scientific 
theory and industrial production. Indeed this relation according to Horkheimer is so 
close that science itself must be counted amongst the means of production.45 But if 
Horkheimer was clear about the way in which various forms of consciousness were 
part of what Marxists called the material base, he did not appear to be aware of the 
fact that a materialist dialectic requires, as Lukacs rightly emphasises, some notion of 
ontological priority. All too often Horkheimer is content to simply assert the mutual 
relatedness of these terms; thus in describing what is distinctive about dialectic he 
writes: 
A dialectical process is negatively characterised by the fact that it is not to be 
conceived as the result of individual unchanging factors. To put it positively, 
its elements continuously change in relation to each other within the process, 
so that they are not even to be distinguished from each other. Thus the 
development of human character, for example, is conditioned both by the 
economic situation and by the individual powers of the person in question.
46 
45 See his 'Notes on Science and the Crisis' in Critical Theory: Selected £ssays, 
p.3. 
46 'Materialism and Metaphysics' in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, p.28. 
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The problem with this kind of formulation is that, in seeking to avoid the crudity of 
economic determinism, Horkheimer proposes a conception of dialectic that opens the 
door for a renascent form of Idealism. This becomes clear if we consider another 
passage in which Horkheimer defines the subject-object dialectic as a process in which 
mutually dependent elements act and react one upon the other . 
... the subject-object relation is not accurately described by the picture of two 
fixed realities which are conceptually transparent and move towards each 
other. Rather, in what we call objective, subjective factors are at work; and in 
what we call subjective, objective factors are at work. 47 
This somewhat vague formulation of the relation between subject and object fails 
utterly to establish a viable distinction between Hegel's Idealism and Horkheimer's 
materialism. Indeed the vagueness of this thesis seems to invite, as many Left 
Hegelians discovered, a return to the very doctrine which materialism considers itself 
to have superseded. The reason for this slippage is not difficult to discover: the 
formula of the mutual relatedness of subject and object immediately invites the thought 
that this dialectic is nevertheless marked by a certain asymmetry between its two 
constituent elements. This results from the fact that the object, whether conceived of 
as society or nature, cannot be thought of as acting consciously in any sense at all. In 
the case of the subject on the other hand, there is a necessary potential for 
consciousness and hence creative praxis. Thus although it is true that neither 
47 Op.cit., p.29 
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individuals nor collections of individuals are always adequately conscious of the nature 
of their action - at least in the sense of its real causes and consequences - nevertheless 
they must be credited with the potential to acquire this kind of understanding. 
However, in acknowledging this asymmetry there is a danger of privileging the activity 
of the subject over that of the object, of seeing it as the dominant or determinate 
moment in the dialectic. Certainly this was the charge made against the young Lukacs 
by his orthodox Marxist opponents, and indeed looking at Lukacs' History and Class 
Consciousness one may come to feel that there is some justification for this particular 
criticism. Thus commenting upon the transformation of the consciousness of the 
working class he writes: 
... when the worker knows himself as a commodity his knowledge is practical. 
That is to say, this knowledge brings about an objective structural change in 
the object of knowledge. In this consciousness and through it the special 
objective character of labour as a commodity ... now awakens and becomes 
. I I' 48 socia rea Ity. 
In this passage - and there many others like it in the same essay - there is the clear 
suggestion that a change in consciousness is equivalent to a change in the world, for 
the world is identified with the activity of the subject, and insofar as the consciousness 
of the subject changes, so does the world. Thus praxis comes to be equated with 
theoretical knowledge, with knowledge of the social whole which the subject 
transforms by becoming aware of the dialectic underpinning that whole. 
48 History and Class Consciousness, p.169. 
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Now the question of whether or not the above is an accurate representation of Lukacs' 
own position is, in the context of the present discussion, not an issue that is important 
to discuss. What is important, however, is the fact that this kind of Left Hegelianism, 
with its emphasis upon the activity of the subject, has an inherent tendency to look like 
Idealism. 49 If this is true, it behoves materialists who wish to appropriate Hegel's 
subject-object dialectic to take care to formulate that dialectic in such a fashion as to 
clearly distinguish it from its idealist predecessor. Although this might seem to be a 
fairly obvious requirement, there is very little in Horkheimer's work which directly 
addresses this particular question. In the early Zeitschrijt articles there is some limited 
discussion of the distinction between Marx's concept of materialism and scientistic 
notions of the relation between mind and matter, but nothing which could be said to 
constitute a systematic statement of the distinction between Idealism and 
materialism. 50 If we wish, therefore, to continue to explore this issue from within the 
Frankfurt Marxist tradition, it will be necessary to tum to the work of Theodor 
Adorno, a theorist distinguished by a lifelong concern with the question of what it is 
that separates Marx's materialism from the philosophical tradition of Idealism. 
Adorno's interest in this problem finds particularly eloquent expression in his late 
49 For example according to Lucien Goldmann the Lukacian doctrine amounts to 
the following: "There is no given world, t~e. obje~t is cons~ruc~ed, and i~s .inseparability 
with the subject even goes as far as their Identity - partIal, In my OpiruOn, but total 
according to Lukacs - in the social sciences. The Lukacsian concept of 
Gegenstandsstruktur has been translated into French as. 'ob)e.ctive' ~ ob)e~ivity - but 
this concept is in opposition to ~y idea of abs?lute obJectiVIty. O~JectlVIty does n~t 
exist. There is only the structuratlon of the object by the subject. See Goldmann s 
Lukacs and Heidegger, p.30. 
50 See in particular Horkheimer's article 'Materialism and Metaphysics' in lritical 
Theory: Selected Essays, pp. 10-46. 
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work Negative Dialectics, which although written some thirty years after the first 
formulation of critical theory constitutes, as I shall demonstrate, a continuation of the 
debate initiated by the young Lukacs', and subsequently taken up by Horkheimer and 
Marcuse as they sought to formulate the nature of critical theory in the pages of the 
early Zeitschrift. 
Adorno on the Preponderance of the Object 
At the outset of any discussion of Adorno's work, and in particular his attempt to 
construct a materialist as opposed to an idealist dialectic, the following pair of 
observations are worth making. First there is the apparent paradox that Adorno's 
materialism is based as much upon Hegel's Idealism as upon Marx's critique of that 
doctrine. The paradox however is more apparent than real: for Adorno, Hegel's 
thought continuously comes close to the theory of historical materialism. Thus 
concerning the influence of Hegel on the philosophy of consciousness, he writes: 
These days it is hardly possible for a theoretical idea of any scope to do justice 
to the experience of consciousness, and in fact not only the experience of 
consciousness but the embodied experience of human beings, without having 
incorporated something of Hegel's philosophy.51 (Italics mine) 
As we shall see, Hegel's notion of embodied experience will play a large role in 
Adorno's attempt to recover the real meaning of Marx's materialist critique of 
51 Adorno, T.W., Hegel: Three Studies, p.2. 
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Idealism. 
My second observation is that Adorno, like the later Lukacs, is seeking to assign 
some kind of priority to the notion of the object. As he puts it: "It is by passing to the 
object's preponderance that dialectics is rendered materialistic. ,,52 The problem, of 
course, IS to specify the nature of that preponderance. For Adorno, who was 
SUSpICIOUS of any kind of prima philosophia, the materialist thesis cannot be 
constructed on the basis of a metaphysics of identity, and in particular it is not to be 
derived as Engels believed, from the scientistic assumption that mind is matter or 
material process. 53 This is not to say that Adorno favoured a dualist approach to this 
question, but rather that he rejected the kind of philosophy founded upon ontological 
first principles of identity and difference. More specifically, his thought takes the 
dialectical form of denying both the identity as well as the non-identity of subject and 
object. As Adorno put it, concerning the relation between these two terms: "They are 
neither an ultimate duality nor a screen hiding ultimate unity. They constitute one 
another as much as by virtue of such constitution they depart from each other. ,,54 
Now at first sight it might seem somewhat strange for a materialist to seek to deny the 
"ultimate unity" of subject and object; for if materialism is going to successfully 
appropriate Hegel's dialectic, then its task is surely to demonstrate that the subject can 
be reduced to the activity of the object, that to "invert" the logic of Hegel's Idealism 
52 Negative Dialectics, p.192. 
53 For a discussion of the influence of Engels' scientism on the Marxian tradition see 
S.Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, pp.65-77. 
54 Negative Dialectics, p.174. 
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the truth of the subject is the life of the object. This at least has been the position of 
those commentators who have taken Marx's statement that his dialectic is the "direct 
opposite" of the Hegelian dialectic as a proposal to reductively explain consciousness 
in terms of social and/or natural processes and conditions. Indeed the Frankfurt 
School, and in particular Adorno, are often held up as theorists who seek to eliminate 
the subject from social theory, because of their argument that the self-determining 
individual of classical bourgeois theory has been undermined by the development of 
industrialised mass culture as well as techniques of socio-psychological manipulation. 
In other words, the subject has been absorbed by the realm of social objectivity, and 
thereby reduced to the status of a bearer of the trans-subjective structures and 
relations which define late capitalist society. 
However, despite this analysis of the contemporary conSCIOusness, Adorno refused to 
equate materialism with the reduction of the subject to any form of objectivity, be it the 
realm of nature or society. To understand why he was reluctant to do this, it will be helpful 
to think of the ways in which social theorists have in the past attempted to eliminate the 
subject in favour of the object. The first such way is to reduce the subject to some kind of 
mechanistic phenomenon; for instance the early materialists of the Enlightenment, under the 
influence of Newtonian thought, construed the human subject as in essence a bio-
mechanism. 55 Adorno charges that this form of reductionism is an instance of "the reified 
consciousness that mistakes itself for nature", a consciousness that overlooks the essential 
relation between the individual and society in favour of a theory grounded purely in 
55 Hobbes, for instance, offers this kind of bio-mechanist vision of human beings. 
See especially Chapters 1-6 of Leviathan. 
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biology. 56 Now in saying this, Adorno is not denying that individuals possess a bio-physical 
constitution, but rather rejecting the idea that this constitution entails that social phenomena 
can be naturalised through their reduction to a set of processes within the natural order. For 
Adorno, understanding the action of subjects in society necessarily involves reference to the 
consciousness of those subjects, and in particular to the various socially-produced fonns of 
self-understanding, forms which Marx refers to as ideologies and which are essential to the 
identification of the action in question. Thus an act of exchange counts as an act of 
exchange not in virtue of any physiological state of the participants to this economic relation 
but through the conformity of that act to the nonns governing exchange. 57 In other words, 
social being necessarily involves and is constituted by socio-historically situated fonns of 
consciousness; consequently the being of the subject in society is distinct from the being of 
an entity in the realm of nature. Commenting upon the importance of consciousness for 
materialism, Adorno observes: "Dialectics lies in things, but it could not exist without the 
consciousness that reflects it - no more than it can evaporate into that consciousness. If 
matter were total, undifferentiated and flatly singular, there would be no dialectics in it. ,,58 
Contrary, therefore, to the scientistic reductionism of vulgar Marxism, a reductionism that 
equates consciousness with "matter in motion", critical theory advances a conception of 
materialism which holds to the irreducibility of the subject, which insists upon the necessity 
56 'Subject and Object' in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, p.SOS. 
57 Commenting upon the role of what he calls "identity thinking" in the exchange 
process Adorno writes: "The exchange principle, the red':lction of human lab~ur to the 
abstract universal concept of average working hours, IS fundamentally akin to the 
principle of identity. Exchange is the soci~ ~odel of the principle, and wit~out .the 
principle there would be no exchange; It IS through ex~han~e t~at n~n-Ide~tIcal 
individuals and performances become commensurable and Identical. (italiCS mme), 
Negative Dialectics, p.146. 
58 Op.cit., p.20S. 
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of understanding social reality through a consideration of consciousness, without at the same 
time equating that reality with consciousness. 
However, in emphasising the social nature of the subject Adorno was careful to avoid 
another form of reductionis~ namely the reduction of the individual to an instance of 
supra-individual structures of social being. At first sight this might seem a strange 
position for a historical materialist to take: certainly within the Marxist tradition there 
has been a persistent tendency to discount the individual and focus instead upon 
explanations centred around the macro-processes of social production and 
reproduction. Although in the next chapter we shall consider in much greater detail 
why Adorno as well as other members of the Frankfurt School wanted to resist this 
tendency, a few brief remarks on the topic will not be out of place at this point in the 
discussion. To begin with, therefore, we observe that in contrast to the tradition of 
German Idealism which seeks to demote the empirical subject in favour of some kind 
of transcendental meta-subject, be it Kant's transcendental unity of apperception or 
Hegel's Geist, Adorno and his colleagues held fast to the importance of the 
contingent, suffering, and necessarily finite individual. Furthermore, this attachment to 
the individual is maintained not only in the context of philosophical criticism but also 
with respect to social theory. As Adorno observes: "The separation of sociology and 
psychology is both correct and false. ,,59 Correct, because it helps theory to resist the 
pull of social reductionism, to hold to an irreducible psychological moment in the 
explanation of human behaviour~ false, because this separation encourages academic 
59 'Sociology and Psychology', New Left Review, 46 (Nov-Dec 1967), p.78. 
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specialists to "relinquish the attempt to know the totality".60 It is in this context that 
Martin Jay has argued that the desire to preserve the individual as an object of 
theoretical concern is motivated by a hedonistic current in Critical Theory, by an 
insistence upon the importance of "genuine corporeal gratification" for materialist 
ethical thought. 61 Although Jay qualifies the notion of corporeal gratification by 
insisting that it be genuine gratification the remark is to some extent misleading, in that 
it suggests a kind of Left Utilitarianism. To guard against this confusion it must be 
emphasised, as Jay does not, that for the Frankfurt School the notion of 
"gratification" is not a primitive unanalysable concept but is grounded in the concept 
of human need. However, having said this it is also true to say that for Adorno and his 
colleagues, unlike so many traditional Marxists, a genuine materialism necessarily 
returns thought to the sensuousness of human existence, to the fact that the subject is 
an object amongst other objects, a body which acts and is acted upon by the world in 
which it is situated. In doing this Frankfurt Marxism reminds the theoretician of the 
sensual nature of the confrontation between the individual and the external world of 
nature and society, and thereby preserves that experience as an essential moment for 
theory.62 
60 Op.cit., p.78. 
61 Adorno, p.88 
62 However, this emphasis upon the fulfilment of human need s~ould not. be 
confused with the productivist project characteristic of orthodox MarxIsm. Speaking 
of the moment of truth in the utopian tradition Adorno writes: "Enjoyment itself 
would be affected, just as its present framework is inseparable fro~ operating, 
planning, having one's way, subjugating. Rien !aire com,,!e une bete, IYlOg on ~~ter 
and looking peacefully at the sky, 'being, nothing else, Wl~hout .any further defimtlon 
and fulfilment', might take the place of process, act a~d sat~sfa.ctlOn,. a..nd so truly keep 
the promise of dialectical logic that it would culminate 10 Its ongm. None of the 
abstract concepts comes closer to fulfilled utopia than that of eternal peace." A1inima 
Moralia, p.lS7. 
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But if the subject is not to be reduced to any form of objectivity, whether as bio-
physical mechanism or bearer of supra-individual social structures, neither is it to be 
thought of as apart from the object. Indeed for Adorno, the key to understanding 
historical materialism, to seeing it as distinct from the various metaphysical forms of 
materialism, is to consider the way in which for Marx "the object enters into the 
subject". By reflecting upon this particular mediation we will discover that in a 
materialist dialectic of subject and object, the latter is the dominant element. Thus as 
Adorno observes: 
Subjectivity changes its quality in a context in which it is unable to evolve on 
its own. Due to the inequality inherent in the concept of mediation, the subject 
enters into the object altogether differently from the way in which the object 
enters into the subject. An object can be conceived only by a subject but 
always remain something other than the subject, whereas a subject by its very 
nature is from the outset an object as well. Not even as an idea can we 
conceive a subject that is not a object; but we can conceive an object that is not 
a subject. To be an object also is part of the meaning of subjectivity; but it is 
not equally part of the meaning of objectivity to be a subject. 63 
According to Adorno, then, there is an important asymmetry between the concept of 
the subject and that of the object, an asymmetry which depends upon the fact that the 
very notion of subjectivity logically presupposes a realm of objectivity. Thus we can 
63 Negative Dialectics, p.183 
211 
conceive of a world without subjects, but we cannot conceive of a subject without an 
object, for subjectivity requires embodiment. That is to say if the subject is not an 
object amongst other objects, if it does not act and is not acted upon by those objects, 
then there would be no such thing as subjectivity. This dependence is not a contingent 
fact but arises from the very concept of sUbjectivity. In other words the Husserlian 
project of discovering the subject through the process of "bracketing off' the object is 
completely misconceived: to exclude the world of the object is to deny the subject. As 
Adorno puts it: 
The pronoun 'my' points to a subject as an object among objects, and again 
without this 'my' there would be no 'I think'. The being of a subject is taken 
from objectivity - a fact that lends a touch of objectivity to the subject itself 
64 
Here Adorno is arguing that the object is a logical condition of the subject, that the 
Kantian "I think" depends upon the existence of the human body "as an object 
amongst other objects". To this is it might be objected that Adorno is equivocating 
between two quite distinct notions of objectivity. The first involves the idea of the 
subject's active embodiment: the thinker is a doer, or, as Hegel puts it thought and will 
are not independent categories. The second notion, illustrated in the quotation above, 
concerns the objectivity involved in an act of self-reference. This latter kind is 
supposed to be a consequence of a theory of truth and linguistic reference rather than 
the pattern of dialectical argument associated with Hegel's philosophy of action. This 
64 Negative Dialectics, pp. 183-84. 
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objection, however, cannot be sustained. Adorno's reflections upon the use of deictic 
pronouns refer directly to the dialectic of self and other: to speak of myself supposes 
something that is not-myself, a distinction that can only be made, according to him, in 
the context of selves that are embodied and exist within a common material reality. To 
put it another way the consciousness that I possess as a subject is predicated upon my 
awareness of my body in its sensory as well as practical relation to a world of objects 
that surrounds it. In making this claim, Adorno is drawing upon the legacy of German 
Idealism, and in particular the Kantian thesis that "the consciousness of my existence is 
at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside 
me.,,65 In short consciousness is not some kind of immediate, inner datum as it is for 
Cartesians and radical empiricists, but is necessarily mediated through the physical life 
process. 
Thus, if we consider the realm of sensation we discover that far from providing the 
basis for Idealism's constitutive subject, sensation points to something which cannot 
be reduced to consciousness. This is because sensation is inherently bound up with 
physicality, that it has, as Adorno puts it, an essential "somatic moment." Hence, our 
visual experience of colour is dependent upon experience of coloured objects, our 
tactile experience upon experience of the surface of objects, and so on. This is not a 
simple counter-assertion but derives from the phenomenology of sensation itself : to 
perceive a colour is to perceive something that has that colour and moreover stands in 
a determinate spatial relation to one's own body. As Hegel observes in his discussion 
of the Thing and its Properties (das Ding und seine Eigenschaften), the ability to 
65 Critique of Pure Reason, B276. 
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recognise properties depends upon the ability to ascribe them to objects, and that in 
consequence the notion of experience depends upon the notion of experience of 
objectivity.66 In short, jf we reflect upon the structure of perception then we come to 
the conclusion that our perceptual experience is necessarily structured as an embodied 
experience of things and that contra Cartesianism, it cannot be radically disconnected 
from the somatic. 
As presented so far, Adorno's reflections on the relation between subject and object, 
whilst clearly anchored in the Idealism of Kant and Hegel, might seem considerably 
removed from Marx's historical materialism. But here we need to make a distinction 
between what Marx himself actually said and the account of his doctrine presented by 
Marxist orthodoxy, an account which nearly always takes as its starting point the 
preface to the Critique of Political Economy. On the basis of that text, materialism is 
constructed primarily as a causal hypothesis relating changes in the material base of 
social life to changes in the superstructure of ideas. However, I shall argue that by 
focusing upon the corporeal nature of the subject, by - so to speak - prioritising the 
body, Adorno returns us to the actual principle of Marx's materialism. In essence, my 
argument is that the notion of an embodied consciousness is necessarily bound up with 
the concepts of need and labour. What this means is that the subject, considered as an 
embodied consciousness, cannot relate to the world in a purely detached or 
contemplative fashion, but is forced by nature to sustain the body, to satisfy a range of 
biologically determined needs. In consequence, the human subject exists under a 
compulsion to act, and specifically to labour, whether directly or through the labour of 
66 Having established this thesis Hegel, of course, immediately seeks to re-establish 
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others. It is this compulsion which, according to materialism, forms the basis not only 
of consciousness but sociality, for it leads inexorably towards the development of 
social labour: a system of production in which individual producers do not work 
directly for themselves but in order to satisfy a portion of the total social demand. 
However, before saying something about the way in which labour contributes to the 
formation of consciousness, let us see just how closely Adorno's materialism parallels 
that of Marx. We may consider, for instance, the following passage from the 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts: 
Hunger is a natural need; it therefore requires a nature and an object outside 
itself in order to satisfy and still itself. Hunger is the acknowledged need of my 
body for an object which exists outside itself and which is indispensable to its 
integration and to the expression of its essential nature. 67 
The purpose of this observation, as Marx himself makes clear, is to draw attention to 
the objectivity of biological need, to point to the fact that the human subject does not 
relate to the world as a disembodied consciousness but as a being marked out, by 
interalia, hunger and thirst. Indeed there is an essential dependency of the subject 
upon the body: we are constituted as part of nature and in consequence, and on a daily 
basis, must struggle to maintain that constitution. Against the pretensions of the 
subject itself - and here it should be said that idealism develops those pretensions to 
their maximum - Marx reminds us that the human subject is a "natural, embodied, 
the primacy of Spirit by demonstrating that it is the truth of the object. 
67 Marx: Early Writings, p.390. 
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sentient, objective being" and in virtue of this fact "a suffering, conditioned and limited 
being.,,68 We might add that this latter description comes out of the former because the 
objects of human need are independent of us, because we require them whilst they 
remain indifferent to our condition. Yet according to Marx, this confrontation between 
the corporeal self and its other is not simply a negative affair~ the awareness of need 
that is unfulfilled is the starting point for the activity through which the subject comes 
to define itself This activity is of course labour, the process through which the 
individual, as well as society as a whole, seeks to overcome the condition of need, and 
in so doing comes to realise what for Marx is the species being of humanity. 
Now for Adorno this argument, whilst central to historical materialism, does not 
originate with Marx, but rather with Hegel's speculative history of the master-slave 
relation.69 Thus in the following passage taken from a section in Negative Dialectics 
entitled 'The Concept of Mind' , Adorno writes: 
We know that Hegel, in his chapter on master and slave, develops the genesis 
of self-consciousness from the labour relation, and that he does this by 
adjusting the I to its self-determined purpose as well as to heterogeneous 
matter. The origin of the "}" in "Not I" remains scarcely veiled. 70 
68 Op.cit. p.389 
69 In conversation Dudley Knowles has pointed out that this idea is also present in 
Hegel's discussion of "the right of the objectivity of the action". See Elements of the 
Philosophy of Right, §120. 
70 Marx: Early Writings, p.389 
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Here Adorno credits Hegel with the discovery that self-consciousness is an emergent 
feature of the labour process, that in the confrontation between the slave and the 
world the former comes to recognise itself through a process of externalisation. That is 
to say, the slave in seeking to transform the world transforms himself, for he learns 
what he is and what he is capable of in the very moment that he serves the purpose of 
another. But once again in recognising this element of Hegel's thought Adorno is 
simply reiterating what Marx himself had to say concerning the significance of 
Hegelian thought. Thus Marx observes: 
The importance of Hegel's Phenomenology and its final result - the dialectic of 
negativity as the moving and producing principle - lies in the fact that Hegel 
conceives the self-creation of man as a process, objectification as loss of 
object, as alienation and as supersession of this alienation; that he therefore 
grasps the nature of labour and conceives objective man ... as the result of his 
own labour.71 
But, however, positively one might care to view the labour process - and there can be 
no doubt that both Hegel and Marx regarded the historical expansion of labour as the 
basis of human freedom - it is essential to recognise that this process cannot be self-
determined, but is driven by the internal need of the subject confronted by scarcity as 
well as the operation of natural law.72 For this reason Marx always took care to 
separate the realm of freedom from that of necessity and to locate the former in that 
71 Op.cit., p.389 
72 Hegel, of course, would deny this, arguing that through the ~yst~rn of social 
labour humanity realises its immanent goal of freedom and self-determmatlOn. 
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portion of human time which has escaped the burden of labour. 
To conclude this chapter, I want to draw the vanous strands of the preceding 
discussion together so as to suggest what Adorno means by his notion of the 
preponderance of the object. The first sense which we can attach to his thesis is the 
idea that there is a realm of objectivity, the world of nature, that exists independently 
of the subject. More exactly we shall say that this realm, unlike society, is 
ontologically independent of any kind of human activity: it is neither the product of 
mental nor manual labour. In taking this position, Adorno is distancing materialism 
from the idealist conception of nature as being in some sense the creation of thought. 
Thus for Kant, time and space are not mind-independent realities, but forms of 
intuition presupposed by the very concept of experience; whilst in the case of Hegel, 
the whole of Nature is the Idea passed over into its Otherness, and as such is part of 
the movement by which thought comes to a knowledge of itself. Against this tendency, 
Adorno holds to the irreducible otherness of nature, to the fact that our experience is 
to a very large measure an experience of something radically distinct from mind. Of 
course, this is not to say that we cannot "humanise" nature, that through the labour of 
generations we have no effect upon the natural world that surrounds us; on the 
contrary Adorno and his colleagues were all too aware of the capacity of a socialised 
humanity to control and even dominate nature. What this thesis does remind us of, 
however, is the brute fact that in its relation to nature the subject is confronted by 
something that cannot be reduced to itself, inasmuch as it is confronted by its essential 
other, an other which eludes Hegel's return to Mind. In consequence a materialist 
totality, however mediated the relation between subject and object might be, maintains 
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an essential moment of difference; even if Mind is construed in terms of social labour , 
as world transforming praxis, Nature cannot be reduced to the outcome of that labour. 
The immediate consequence of this thesis is the realisation that conscIOusness IS 
distinct from the object of consciousness, that in becoming aware of something we are 
aware of something other than ourselves, of something that resists and is independent 
of our will. This primal confrontation is the basis of materialism: the subject is no 
longer conceived of as a passive, contemplative entity but as a being located in a world 
whose indifference to itself it must seek to overcome. Thus for Adorno, as well as for 
Marx, a genuinely historical materialism is a materialism that locates thought, any kind 
of thought, within its essential somatic or corporeal context. In the first instance that 
context is the confrontation between the body and the world, the world of nature as 
well as society. As Terry Eagleton enquires: 
What if an idea of reason could be generated up from the body itself, rather 
than the body incorporated into a reason which is always already in place? 
What if it were possible, in a breathtaking wager, to retrace one's steps and 
reconstruct everything - ethics, history, politics, rationality - from a bodily 
foundation? 73 
Of course, as the author himself admits, this enterprise is itself fraught with hazard, 
inasmuch as it threatens at every moment to collapse into a mechanical materialism or 
"false transcendentalism of the body every bit as disabling as the ideologies it seeks to 
73 The Ideology of the Aesthetic, p 197. 
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oppose".74 Nevertheless, for Eagleton the possibility exists that there may "'be some 
way of working laboriously upwards from the opposing thumb or oral drive to 
mystical ecstasy and the military-industrial complex.,,75 It is this project, he argues, 
which underlies the work not only of Marx but also of Nietzsche and Freud : in the 
case of Marx the body is identified with labour; for Nietzsche with power, whilst for 
Freud, it is the vehicle of desire. 76 To this list I would add Adorno: a theorist whose 
materialism can best be understood as a synthesis of these distinct but by no means 
exclusive visions. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 For an interesting discussion of the way in which these conceptions of the body 
might be unified see Russell Keat's 'The Human Body in Social Theory', Radical 
Philosophy, 42, Spring 1986. 
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Chapter 6. Towards a Materialist Theory of the Subject 
As we have seen in Chapter 4, Horkheimer's attempt to develop materialism through a 
strategy of interdisciplinary research is a response to the strengths as well as the 
weaknesses of the traditional empirical model of social scientific enquiry. Unlike many 
other Marxists for whom the process of evidence gathering has all too often been a 
matter of secondary importance, Horkheimer consistently maintained that materialism 
must learn to utilise the evidential base and sophisticated quantitative techniques 
characteristic of mainstream social science. 1 Yet in advocating the need for a program 
of rigorous and detailed empirical research in the development of social theory, he 
conceded nothing to the general epistemological model favoured by empiricism. In 
fact, Horkheimer's conception of a multi-disciplinary materialism, whilst certainly 
involving some of the methods characteristic of the empirical social sciences, draws 
upon certain traditions of thought - noticeably the work of Freud and Weber - which 
to say the least pose a variety of challenges to the empiricist position? This i1lustrates 
the general point that a concern with questions of evidence and observation does not 
automatically entail a commitment to the principles of empiricism. For that philosophy 
I It is worth reca1ling that Marx made copious use of various institutional sources of 
data. The fact that he regarded this kind of detailed empirical study as integral to his 
method of work whereas Horkheimer's approach appears as something of a 
controversial novelty for a Marxist theoretician is largely a testimony to the 
intellectual degeneration of the Marxist tradition in the first half of the twentieth 
century. 
2 As many commentators have noted, the key Freudian notion of the unconscio~s 
sits uneasily with the empiricist's view of scientific knowle~ge. Popper, for exampl.e, 1.n 
COI?iectures and Refutations, argu~s t~at psychoanal~lcal theory, because It IS 
immune from observational refutatlOn IS a pseudO-SCIence (pp.33-59). See also 
Adorno's Negative Dialectics for a discussion of the anti-empiricist quality of Weber's 
key methodological concept of an ideal type (pp.162-166). 
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goes far beyond the common-place thought that theories must be supported by a body 
of evidence: it involves a specific and very restrictive interpretation of the concept of 
evidence, an interpretation which, as I have already argued, was rejected by all of the 
leading members of the Frankfurt School. 
However, the question of the relation between critical theory and empiricism is not the 
concern of the present chapter. Instead I propose to focus upon the attempt by 
Horkheimer and his colleagues to unify Marxist social theory with Freudian depth-
psychology; for it is this particular theoretical fusion which effectively defines the 
Frankfurt School's conception of materialism as a multidisciplinary activity. As 
Douglas Kellner puts it: "The synthesis of Marxism and psychology instantiates the 
Institute's transcendence of disciplinary boundaries and specialisations and its belief 
that fruitful theoretical innovation can best be obtained by supra-disciplinary work. ,,3 
Whilst this is true enough, it should also be said that the Frankfurt School's strategy of 
theoretical synthesis has been fiercely contested by a variety of critics. On the one 
hand there are those Marxists who regard the Marx-Engels corpus as a sufficient basis, 
and indeed the only possible basis, for the development of social theory. And for such 
ultra-orthodox thinkers any attempt to relate Marxism to insights stemming from other 
theoretical traditions is regarded as an unnecessary dilution of a body of scientific 
principles that are entirely adequate with respect to their problem domain. On the 
other hand, there is a more heterogeneous body of critics who take the line that 
whatever the merits or otherwise of historical materialism, this doctrine cannot be 
synthesised with psychoanalytical theory because to do so is to seek to unify 
3 Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity, p.36. 
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traditions which are in reality incompatible. 4 In what follows, the arguments of both 
groups of critics will be subjected to a close, and it should be said, largely critical 
analysis. I shall begin by arguing that the attempt to cast Marx's original theory as a 
completely comprehensive solution to the problem of understanding socio-historical 
complexes is profoundly mistaken. Marxism, whatever some of its adherents may 
believe, is neither a closed nor a complete theoretical system. Following on from this 
critique of ultra-orthodoxy, the discussion will turn to the question of whether, and in 
what sense, materialism requires a theory of subjectivity. Here it will be argued that 
Marxists must learn to incorporate into their theory of society some of the concepts 
and principles of other theoretical disciplines, and in particular those of depth 
psychology, if they are ever to be in a position to explain the persistence of structures 
of oppression and exploitation. The chapter will conclude with a general defence of 
the Frankfurt School's belief in the relevancy of psychoanalytical theory to the 
Marxian project. 
Marxism and the Social Scient{fic Tradition 
It should be noted that the readiness of Horkheimer and his colleagues to give serious 
consideration to the work of thinkers normally regarded as standing outside of the 
Marxist tradition serves to distinguish critical theory from the various schools of 
"know-nothing" vulgar Marxism which seek to construct historical materialism as a 
universal science of society. Characteristically, adherents of this dogmatic approach 
display an exclusive, at times obsessive, concern with the task of identifying and 
4 Cf Timpanaro, S., 'Marxis~ and Ide.alis~' in New I,eft .Revie~, 85, May-June 
1974, pp.21-22. Also Kolakowski, L., Main C lIrrents of MarXism: ~ 01 Ill, p.407. 
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endlessly interpreting a canon of "classical Marxist" texts. Coupled with this 
doctrinaire stance is a belief that Marxism has very little or indeed nothing to learn 
from the various theoretical traditions developed independently of, or in opposition to, 
the work of Marx and Engels. Hence at one fell swoop it becomes possible to dismiss 
the entire tradition of non-Marxist social scientific thought. Those who adopt this 
attitude do so because they regard the founders of historical materialism as having 
produced a body of work that in itself is sufficient to develop a wholly adequate 
theory of history and society. In consequence, reference to any material that stands 
outside of the "classical" tradition is at best a distraction, and at worst the source of 
serious errors. Even a thinker as intelligent as Korsch is guilty of being ready, on the 
basis of often patently flimsy arguments, to summarily dismiss whole schools of 
thought. For example in a discussion of the relation of Marx's theory to contemporary 
sociology he writes: 
What is the relation between Marxism and modern sociological teaching? If we 
think of the sociology originated by Comte, and first named by him, as a 
special section in the system of constituted sciences, we shall find no link 
between it and Marxism. Marx and Engels paid no attention to either the name 
or content of this ostensibly new branch of knowledge. 5 
Here the implication is that just as Marx and Engels effectively discounted the thought 
of Comte, contemporary materialists should in their turn completely ignore the 
sociological tradition to which his work gave rise. This dismissive approach is simply 
5 Karl Korsch: Three fJ:~says 011 Marxism, p.ll. 
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one instance of a widespread tendency amongst Marxists to assert, usually without 
much argument, that the various mainstream social sciences constitute a class-based 
vision of society, in other words a "bourgeois social science". Indeed for the ultra-
orthodox this bloc of theory manages, in some unexplained fashion, to integrate the 
various, diverse traditions in psychology, sociology, political science, economics, 
history and cultural theory into a whole that is ideological in nature and which results 
in a series of misleading and often plainly false views concerning the nature of social 
reality. 6 
This, of course, is an extremely dubious argument, which falls apart almost as soon as 
it is examined. For instance, if we consider Korsch's somewhat tendentious piece of 
polemic against sociology we note that it presupposes that there is a single unified 
theoretical movement, originating with Comte, and forming the basis of "modem 
sociological teaching". In fact at the time that Korsch was writing, sociological theory 
was already marked by a fundamental methodological dispute between on the one 
hand, Durkheim's scientistic conception of the sociological method and on the other, 
Weber's argument that social theory necessarily involves the interpretation of human 
action. 7 This observation suggests two thoughts: first that the attempt to portray 
sociology as a unified world view is misconceived, and second that a Marxism which 
ignores the very real tensions and differences within this theoretical tradition is a 
6 Korsch's argument was echoed some thirty year~ later i~ certain New ~eft 
critiques of the social sciences. See, for ex~mple" Martl~ Sha:v s New Le~ RevI~w 
article 'The Coming Crisis in Radical SocIology repnnted In Ideology In Social 
Science, ed. R.Blackbum, pp.32-34. 
7 For a discussion, from the point of view critical theory, of the differences 
between Durkheim and Weber see Simon Jarvis' Adorno, pp.44-48. 
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Marxism which lacks intellectual seriousness. 
There is, however, another and certainly more serious problem associated with the 
kind of theoretical isolationism exemplified in Korsch's statement, namely the 
assumption that Marx's theory, as originally formulated, constitutes a satisfactory 
theory of the social life process in its totality. This claim is easily as problematic as the 
argument we have just considered, for it supposes that Marx's original project of 
developing a comprehensive materialist social theory was to some substantial degree 
brought to completion. The truth of the matter, however, is that most of Marx's later 
writing are principally concerned with political economy, and have very little to say 
that bears directly on the general principles of historical materialism or upon the 
application of those principles to specific forms of consciousness. Furthermore, if we 
consider the various political, legal and social structures which correspond to these 
forms, such as the state or the family, it cannot be said that Marx offers us a 
substantial account of any of these obviously important phenomena. To suppose 
therefore, as Korsch and others do, that all superstructural elements can be explained 
exclusively in terms of the original concepts and principles of historical materialism is 
little more than an act of faith. 
The above theoretical deficiency is perhaps most apparent, and certainly most 
politically significant, when we consider Marx's discussion of the relation between 
political-legal forms of consciousness and modes of production. 8 Here what is so 
8 Similar problems emerge if we consider any o~ the other forms of consciousne~s 
which Marx mentions in his 1859 Preface. To take Just one example, that of aesthetIc 
consciousness, it is clear that neither Marx nor Engels had a fully-worked out 
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obviously missing is anything remotely resembling an extended, systematic account of 
either the concept or reality of the bourgeois state.9 In consequence of this omission, 
Marxists interested in the political life of society have found themselves in the 
unfortunate position of attempting to develop a general theory of that process on the 
basis of various scattered and, it must be said, not always consistent fragments, in 
which Marx and Engels sought to address this particular question.1O The result of this 
work has very rarely been impressive. As Ralph Milliband puts it: "Marxists have made 
little attempt to confront the question of the state in the light of the concrete socio-
economic and political and cultural reality of actual capitalist societies." II Instead, 
discussion has too often focused upon simply iterating certain of Marx's general 
statements concerning the nature of the political process in capitalist society, and on 
this basis making a series of poorly-evidenced assertions concerning whatever specific 
political formation happens to be under investigation. 
materialist analysis of either the production or consumption of works of art, nor had 
they anything to compare with the aesthetic theory of German Idealism. As Terry 
Eagleton rightly points out: "Their [Marx and Engels] comments on art and literature 
are scattered and fragmentary, glancing allusions rather than developed positions. This 
is one reason why Marxist criticism involves more than merely re-stating cases set out 
by the founders of Marxism." See his Marxism and Literary Criticism, p.2. 
9 It should be noted that Marx originally intended to write a six-volume study of 
bourgeois society, the fourth volume of which was to deal with the question of the 
state. In a letter to Engels (April 2, 1858) Marx outlines his plan for A Contribution to 
the Critique of Political Economy in the following terms: "The whole business is to be 
divided into six books: 1) Capital 2) Landed Property 3) Wage Labour 4) State 5) 
International Trade 6) world Market". 
10 For a discussion of the failure of the classical Marxist tradition to develop a 
comprehensive theory of political processes and institutions in capit~ist societ,Y see ~he 
introduction to Ralph Milliband's Marxism and Politics. See al~o Gidden's dISCUSSIon 
in A Contemporary Critique of Historical Material~sm. EspecIally Chapter,9, where 
he reviews various Marxist accounts of the state and Its relation to class COnflICt. 
II The State in Capitalist Society, p.8. 
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This criticism, however, based as it is upon the failings of individuals rather than any 
inherent limitations of a Marxist political theory, can perhaps be dismissed with the 
promise that in future materialism will respect the historical specificity of its object. 
Yet, this reassurance fails to dispose of the more fundamental objection to a Marxian 
theory of politics, namely that the theory constitutes no more than a partial account of 
political life. This follows from the fact that both Marx and Engels focus almost 
exclusively upon the question of state power, in order to demonstrate that in capitalist 
society the state despite its claim to universality does not exercise power on behalf of 
society as a whole but rather for the benefit of a specific social class. 12 Whilst this 
thesis is obviously important for a theory of political life, it is very far from being a 
comprehensive theory of political life. To appreciate this point we need only to reflect 
upon the way in which classical Marxism deals hardly at all with the obviously 
important question of the way in which power is transformed into authority; in other 
words the process of legitimation by means of which the state secures a normative 
hegemony over society as a whole. As Horkheimer observes: 
The majority of men have always worked under the leadership and command 
of a minority, and this dependence has always found expression in a more 
wretched kind of material existence for them. We have already pointed out that 
simple coercion alone does not maintain such a state of affairs and that men 
have learned to approve of it ... The class system within which the individual's 
12 This line of argument derives from Marx a~d ~n~~ls' statemen~ in the 
Communist Manifesto that the modern state ex.e~~~lve IS but a commtttee for 
managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeOIsIe . 
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outward life run its course is reflected not only in his mind, his ideas, his basic 
concepts and judgements, but also in his inmost life, in his preferences and 
desires. Authority is therefore a central category for history. 13 
Horkheimer's emphasis upon the question of how authority is legitimised, of how 
individuals come to internalise the norms of their society, serves as a useful corrective 
to the Marxist political tradition. For even where this question has been addressed, the 
discussion has tended to concentrate upon the question of the power that the 
bourgeoisie undoubtedly exercise over the institutions involved in the process of 
securing consent to a political regime. What this ignores, however, is any 
consideration of why these institutions, and the ideas which emanate from them, are 
accorded legitimacy in the first place, of why it is that the "ideas of the ruling class" 
should also tum out to be the "ruling ideas of the age". In short, classical Marxism 
lacks a compelling account of the way in which the capitalist class secures and 
maintains its political and social domination over society by securing the consent of 
those whom it exploits. To make these criticisms of the classical Marxist tradition is, 
of course, not to say that the general principles of historical materialism have nothing 
to contribute towards a theory of political life, nor that materialism is incapable of 
transcending the limitations of Marx's treatment of this question~ it is ,however, to 
recognise that with respect to political theory, as opposed to political economy, the 
legacy left to us by Marx falls far short of a systematic theory. In consequence the kind 
of intellectual isolationism exemplified in Korsch's remark above must be recognised 
as peculiarly self-defeating. It deprives materialism of access to those other traditions 
I3 'Authority and the Family' in Critical Theory: Selected £ssays, p.69. 
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of political thought which although commencing from quite different premises have 
sometimes arrived at conclusions which are by no means incompatible with, and 
perhaps may even have the potential to deepen, the political theory of historical 
materialism. 14 
To summarise, I have argued that Marx's writings cannot be regarded as containing an 
adequate or substantial theory of social forms of consciousness, and that in 
consequence the theoretical program formulated by Marx in his 1859 preface remains 
a statement of intention rather than a description of an actual achievement. This is not 
to deny that Marx's work says something importantly true about consciousness, 
namely that the subject is an embodied, socially-situated agent that defines itself 
through praxis directed towards the transformation of both nature and society. But 
this general philosophical truth, in itself, is not sufficient to yield a theory of the 
concrete social totality, of the series of mediations which would illuminate the complex 
dialectic between the subject and object of social experience. As Horkheimer and his 
Institute colleagues realised, Marx's discussion of this question, whilst it provides a 
basis for social theory, is no more than a starting point with respect to the task of 
developing a comprehensive account of the relation between the individual subject and 
the realm of social objectivity. Although some Marxists recognised this problem -
there was for instance frequent talk about "creatively developing" the legacy of Marx 
and Engels - the Frankfurt School were distinguished by the fact that they openly 
14 The obvious example here is provided by Weber's analysis of the origins and 
function of the bureaucracy in advanced industrial capi~alist s~cieties: U~?rtunatel~, 
most Marxists have either ignored his work or al~ematlvely reJect~d It. as ~ourgeOls 
social science". In this respect Lukacs is something of an exceptIon: m 1!1stOry and 
Class Consciousness there is a substantial and by no means unsympathetIc treatment 
of Weber's account of bureaucratic rationality. 
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acknowledged the necessity of incorporating the work of non-Marxist thinkers into 
their supra-disciplinary version of materialism. More particularly they were interested 
in producing a fusion of Marx's political economy with Freud's analytical psychology 
so as to illuminate the two-way process of interaction between the individual and the 
world, and to thereby produce a richer, more compelling explanation of the capacity of 
advanced capitalism to integrate and control its subject population than had hitherto 
been achieved by orthodox Marxism. 
This program raises a number of methodological as well as substantive questions. 
From a methodological perspective one might argue whether a historical materialist 
explanation could ever be consistent with the kind of explanations characteristic of 
Freudian depth-psychology, or indeed any form of psycho-analytical theory. 
Alternatively, from a substantive point of view it is possible to raise all kinds of doubts 
concerning the explanatory adequacy of the Frankfurt School's specific socio-
psychological analyses of various features of life in late capitalist society. IS Thus one 
might question, for instance, whether the decay of the classical autonomous individual 
subject in that society is a real phenomenon, and if it is, whether that particular process 
of psychic disintegration could serve as a convincing explanation for the incorporation 
of the proletariat into the capitalist order. However, because an exhaustive discussion 
of these issues is beyond the scope of this study, I propose to concentrate upon the 
following two questions. First, does historical materialism require any kind of theory 
of subjectivity, or is it the case that, as Althusser argues the whole point of Marx's 
15 For an interesting discussion of this question see Anthony Elliott's Social 7heory 
and PsychoAnalysis in Transition, pp.46-76. 
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thought is to remove, once and for all, the question of the subject from social scientific 
thought? Second, can the theoretical discourse of psychoanalysis be integrated into 
classical Marxism without resulting, as many critics have suggested, in a theory that is 
inconsistent as well as being impossibly eclectic? But even after restricting the 
discussion in this fashion it must be admitted that what follows is no more than a 
preliminary treatment of some of the most difficult problems facing the materialist 
tradition. In consequence, all that I would claim for the ensuing argument is that it may 
be of some use in preparing the way for a more comprehensive investigation of the 
relationship between materialism and psychoanalytical thought. 
Subject and Society 
Martin Jay has suggested that the Frankfurt School's turn towards the question of 
subjectivity derives from the specific historical context of critical theory, namely the 
failure on the part of the European proletariat to rise up against a social system that in 
the first half of the twentieth century was almost continuously enmeshed in a series of 
profound economic, social and political crises. 16 Indeed, far from engaging in 
revolutionary struggle as Marx had predicted, large sections of society, including the 
proletariat, were apparently becoming ever more integrated into the capitalist social 
order. In the extreme case of European fascism this took the fonn of irrationalist mass 
movements founded upon doctrines of racial superiority and class collaboration. Fairly 
obviously, such developments posed and indeed continue to pose serious problems for 
the Marxist tradition. To give just one example, there is a clear difference between an 
16 Adorno, pp.82-85. 
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explanation of fascism in terms of the functionality of that political regIme for 
preserving bourgeois society, and one which illuminates its appeal to the very victims 
of that society. The first kind of explanation comes relatively easily to the orthodox 
Marxist~ the second is more difficult, for it leads inevitably to a consideration of the 
various processes by which individuals come to act against their own class interests. 
In response to this difficulty, Marxists point to the role of ideology in promoting 
various forms of false consciousness which serve to deceive individuals concerning 
their real interests as members of an exploited class. This move, however, is merely to 
label a difficulty rather than to resolve it. As Terry Eagleton observes, ideologies 
"must be 'real' enough to provide the basis on which individuals can fashion a 
coherent identity, must furnish some solid motivations for effective action, and must 
make at least some attempt to explain away their own flagrant contradictions and 
incoherencies. ,,17 In other words, to be effective an ideology should offer some form of 
consolation, however minimal or ethereal, by means of which its victims may 
rationalise, or at least come to terms with their own exploitation. 
What Eagleton is criticizing here is the tendency on the part of certain Marxists to stop 
short at demonstrating, with respect to whatever particular ideology happens to be 
under consideration, that the system of belief constituting that ideology is a system of 
false belief In consequence, they fail to discover the specific patterns of concrete 
social experience, and in particular experience of the material life process, which might 
serve to explain just why what is very often demonstrably false is nevertheless believed 
by large sections of the population. As Eagleton again puts it: "Any ruling ideology 
17 Ideology, p.IS. 
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which failed altogether to mesh with its subjects lived experience (Italics mine) would 
be extremely vulnerable and its exponents would be well advised to trade it in for 
another.,,18 This observation returns us to the problem, previously discussed, of 
reductivist accounts of consciousness which seek to analyse ideological forms 
exclusively in terms of interest. The difficulty with such accounts is that they appear to 
be incapable of explaining why large numbers of individuals give their assent to 
systems of belief which run counter to their own interests, of why it is that the ruling 
class can for most of the time rule by means of ideas rather than naked force. To 
overcome this kind of problem, orthodox Marxists rely upon arguments constructed 
around the differential power and influence of the various classes. Thus in capitalist 
society, the ruling class are distinguished from the proletariat by the degree of control 
and/or ownership of the central politico-cultural institutions of that society. 
Now whilst this claim about control and ownership is to a very large extent obviously 
true, it cannot of itself explain why the beliefs propagated by these institutions 
command widespread acceptance. Simply pointing to the class origins of those who 
expound a belief system does not in itself say anything either for or against the 
acceptability or persuasiveness of that system to the population at large. In short, any 
theory of ideology which assigns minimal levels of rationality to the individual subject 
is obliged to produce some account of why particular ideologies appear to the subjects 
to whom they are addressed as reasonable systems of belief 19. To raise this demand is 
18 Ibid. 
19 See Horkheimer, M., 'History and Psychology' in Between Philos?p~J' and 
Social Science, pp.120-121. Cf Adorno, T.W., 'SocIology and Psychology, In New 
Left Review, Vol 46, 1967, pp,67-68. 
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to immediately pose another question, namely the question of the nature of the set of 
beliefs and desires held by individuals to which the ideology either consciously or 
unconsciously appeals. This thought prompted Horkheimer, as well as other members 
of the Frankfurt School, to argue that materialism must deepen its analysis of ideology 
by considering the interplay between the structure of society and the psychic economy 
of individuals. More particularly, they argued that a materialist account of false 
consciousness should take into account the instinctual drive structure of human beings. 
As Horkheimer puts it: 
That human beings sustain economic relationships which their powers and 
needs have made obsolete, instead of replacing them with a higher and more 
rational form of organisation, is only possible because the action of numerically 
significant social strata is determined not by knowledge but by a drive structure 
that leads to false consciousness. Mere ideological machinations are hardly the 
only roots of this historically crucial moment ... Psychology must therefore 
penetrate to these deeper psychic factors by means of which the economy 
conditions human beings. 20 (Italics mine) 
Thus according to Horkheimer, the prevalence of "false consciousness" cannot be 
explained as some kind of trick perpetrated, either consciously or unconsciously, by 
the ruling class upon the rest of society but must be understood as the result of the 
interaction between the instinctual structure of human beings and an exterior social 
reality. More particularly, ideology should be seen as an adaptive psychic mechanism 
enabling the individual to function in as well to accept a social order which imposes 
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unnecessarily high levels of restriction upon instinctual gratification. Any kind of 
materialism which ignores this interior dimension, and confines its attention simply to 
the critique of ideology as a system of false belief, threatens to reduce itself, as 
Horkheimer puts it, to the "rationalistic anthropology of the Enlightenment". 21 What 
he means by this remark is that there is a choice to be made between the kind of 
analysis of ideological forms which reveals their origin in the relation between the 
individual psyche and society, and the kind which restricts itself to denouncing 
prevailing forms of thought as a mass cognitive error, to be corrected by the teaching 
of those individuals fortunate enough to have an awareness of the real interest of 
society. In the latter case, the theorist is left to impotently assert what it is that 
individuals ought to believe, a position which comes close to the tendency of utopians, 
denounced by both Hegel and Marx, to build a world in thought "as it ought to be". 22 
By way of response to this problem, the Frankfurt School sought to discover in the 
work of Freud a set of concepts and principles capable of serving as the basis for a 
more comprehensive theory of the social totality, in other words a theory which would 
have something to say about the way in which subjects experience and come to 
understand the external, apparently objective world of society. Thus Freud's account 
of the formation of the psyche is taken up by the Frankfurt theorists as a means of 
explaining the phenomena of individuals ident~fying with structures of authority and 
power which in reality serve to frustrate the satisfaction of their needs. In developing 
20 'History and Psychology' in Between Philosophy and Social Science, p.120. 
21 Ibid. 
22 In the final chapter of this thesis I shaH explore the question of whether critical 
theory is itself guilty of this kind of utopianism. 
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this kind of explanation, the Frankfurt School believed that they were renewing rather 
than abandoning the materialist tradition. Furthermore they argued that such a renewal 
was essential if critical theory was to be capable of meeting the theoretical and 
practical challenges posed by various developments, unforeseen by Marx and Engels, 
in the functioning of late capitalist society. However, before discussing in detail what 
this might involve we need to consider a possible in principle objection to the very 
notion that materialism requires any kind of theory of the subject. Disposing of this 
objection is by no means straightforward, for it raises some fundamental questions 
concerning the nature of Marx's theory as well as the general coherence of the 
Frankfurt School's reconstruction of that theory. Accordingly the remainder of the 
present section will be devoted to a discussion of this problem. 
One way of formulating this objection is to say that Marx's social theory is intended to 
operate at a level of structure which excludes consideration of the individual subject. 
Hence, just as natural scientists produce explanations which are operative at specific 
levels of physical structure, so Marx provides an explanation of historical development 
which is similarly operative at a specific level of social structure, namely the level of 
classes and relations between classes. Thus in the preface to the first volume of 
Capital we are informed that "individuals are dealt with only insofar as they are the 
personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class-relations and 
class interests.,,23 This leads to the view that Marxism, considered as an explanation of 
the historical process, is distinguished from other theories by the fact that it develops 
an account of that process exclusively in terms of relations between social classes 
2:< Capital: Volume I, p.21. 
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rather than relations between individuals who comprise those classes. From this one 
might conclude that the Frankfurt School's attempt to synthesise Marx's historical 
materialism with theoretical traditions centred upon a psycho-biological conception of 
the subject represents the conflation of two fundamentally different explanatory 
paradigms. It is not that Marxism is necessarily hostile to psychoanalytical theory, but 
rather that the problem domain of the former science can be explored satisfactorily 
without reference to the concepts and principles of a depth-psychology of the 
individual psyche. 
In response to this objection the first thing to be said is that although the argument of 
Capital does indeed operate at an extremely high level of abstraction, and moreover at 
a level which appears to exclude consideration of the individual, this in itself is not a 
sufficient reason for supposing that materialism can simply dispense with the category 
of the subject. This becomes clearer if we consider Paul Sweezy's observation that 
Marx's political economy is developed on the basis that "all social relations except that 
between capital and labour must be provisionally assumed away, to be reintroduced 
one at a time, only at a later stage of the analysis.,,24 If this characterisation of Marx's 
method is correct, then it raises the question of how materialism should proceed in 
analysing a concrete social formation consisting of a multiplicity of relations other than 
that of labour and capital. I shall contend that although Marx's own analysis of the 
process of capitalist accumulation proceeds in a largely abstract fashion, this need not 
entail that it precludes consideration, at a later stage in the development of the theory, 
of those relations which stand outside of the sphere of production. This interpretation 
24 The Theory of Capitalist Development, p.17. 
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appears to be borne out by Marx's own discussion of his method of working. In the 
Grundrisse he writes that: 
The concrete IS concrete because it is the concentration of many 
determinations, hence unity of the diverse. It appears in the process of 
thinking, therefore, as a result, not as a point of departure, even though it is the 
point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for 
observation (Anschauung) and conception ... F or example, the simplest 
economic category, say e.g. exchange value, presupposes population, 
moreover a population producing in specific relations; as well as a certain kind 
of family, or commune, or state, etc. It can never exist other than as an 
abstract, one sided relation within an already given, concrete, Jiving whole. 25 
Marx's comment is, intended to remind us that the categories of Capital are high level 
abstractions, the utility of which depends upon their being integrated into the account 
of specific complexes of social relations and practices, in other words into the account 
of the total life process of a historically determinate society. Thus in developing his 
political economy Marx does indeed consider the individual as "the personification of 
economic categories"; however, as the passage above demonstrates, he is very much 
aware of the fact that in order to comprehend the concrete reality of "the living 
whole", materialism will need to advance beyond this kind of abstraction. But in 
making this advance, political economy is forced to accept the importance of domains 
of knowledge which are outside of the provenance of Capita/. In other words, in the 
25 Grundrisse, p. 1 01 . 
239 
analysis of a living whole, of a historically specific social complex, we encounter a 
range of phenomena which cannot be explained solely in terms of the concepts and 
principles of political economy. 
This fact has rarely been recognised by Marxists. One exception is the political 
economist David Harvey, who argues that however much capital may degrade the 
human material with which it works, workers themselves "are human beings possessed 
of all manner of sentiments, hopes and fears, struggling to fashion a life for themselves 
that contain at least minimal satisfactions. ,,26 Central to that life is the process of 
reproducing the next generation of workers, "a process of socialisation and 
instruction, of learning and being disciplined", the success of which is essential to the 
maintenance of the capitalist mode of production. However, as Harvey points out, 
knowledge of this process is not a "mere addendum" to political economy but 
"constitutes a fundamentally different point of departure to that upon which the 
theory of Capital is based.,,27 Summarising this difference, he writes: 
How the reproduction of capital through surplus value production meshes and 
intertwines with the reproduction of the lived life of the labourer becomes 
problematic. The two dimensions capture, in their opposition, the central 
tension between the richness of variegated culture and the arid realities of 
fi k" 28 pro t see mg. 
26 The /jmits To Capital, p.447. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
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Now if, as Marx says, the concrete is the unity of many diverse determinations, then 
this would seem to allow for the possibility of determinations which make reference to 
what Harvey calls the "lived life" of the subject, and more particularly the life of the 
subject within the context of that unity. This set of determinations will involve various 
relations between individuals, for instance relations of power and gender, which 
cannot be reduced to, nor understood in terms of the categories of Marx's Capital. To 
take one important example, the relation of a child to its parents is not an exchange 
relation, at least if exchange is understood in classical Marxist terms as an exchange of 
value equivalents. Furthermore, the socialisation process in all advanced capitalist 
states is to a very large extent wholly independent of the market. Unlike processes that 
are managed by the law of value, and in particular the unplanned, but not unregulated 
distribution of social labour, socialisation is a process that is consciously managed by a 
range of individuals as well as institutions, by the family as well as by the state. Now 
although this process has a material aspect, for it must involve the provision of 
essential use values to the child, it also involves much else. Most critically, it involves 
what psychoanalytical theory refers to as the process of ego-formatio~ by means of 
which the child learns to distinguish itself from the world that surrounds it, to 
recognise the fact that it is a separate entity capable of acting and being acted upon by 
the world. Crucial to the construction of this identity is the pattern of physical and 
linguistic interaction that takes place between the child and its parents. But this 
process, essential though it is for the reproduction of labour power, cannot be 
understood simply in terms of its social functionality. On the contrary, the life of the 
family is characterised by an largely autonomous structure of emotional relations: the 
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"lived life" of which Harvey speaks IS one which transcends the sphere of the 
instrumental and productive. In consequence, this aspect of our social being will need 
to be explored with the aid of theories possessing the conceptual resources to 
represent the orders of affective and communicative activity through which the 
individual comes to social and psychological maturity. 
This insight informs Horkheimer's conception of multi-disciplinary materialism as the 
unification of social with psychological theory. However, whilst advocating the need 
for materialism to come to grips with the question of psychology, he was opposed to 
any idea of what is sometimes called the psychology of mass behaviour. Such a 
psychology, he argues, makes the assumption of a "mass consciousness", a supra-
individual element subject to its own laws of development and functioning. 
Horkheimer rejects this assumption as unnecessary, arguing apparently paradoxically 
that psychology, if it is to contribute to social theory, needs to focus upon the 
individual rather than upon some fictitious collective psyche. But to focus upon the 
individual is not to ignore the fact that individuals are constituted in and through their 
participation in structures of social being, and most especially through their 
participation in structures of kinship and material production. As Horkheimer puts it: 
A differentiated group psychology - that is, inquiry into those instinctual 
mechanisms common to members of important groups in the production 
process - takes the place of mass psychology. Above all, this group psychology 
must investigate the extent to which the function of an individual in the 
production process is determined by the individual's fate in a certain kind of 
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family, by the effect of socialisation at this point in social space, but also by the 
way in which the individuals own labour in the economy shapes the forms of 
character and consciousness. It is necessary to investigate the genesis of 
psychic mechanisms that make it possible to keep latent the tensions between 
the social classes that lead to conflict on the basis of the economic situation.29 
Thus for Horkheimer, social theory has a responsibility to explore the ways in which 
the various macro structures and relations characteristic of a given society impact 
upon the individual. The outcome of this work will be a social psychological theory 
that will seek to explain the formation of character types and modes of consciousness 
with reference to the social situation of the subject. Such an investigation, far from 
being a diversion from the classic materialist project, is premised upon the belief that 
the realm of social being penetrates the individual at a multiplicity of levels, including 
most importantly the various depth-psychological processes associated with the 
instinctual life of human beings. For the Frankfurt School, the necessity of this kind of 
work arises from the fact that social life cannot be understood in purely instrumentalist 
terms, for it is the domain not only of production and consumption but also of 
activities constituted by layers of affective and symbolic meaning. 
An important example of the way in which these various spheres interact and impact 
upon one another can be found in the Frankfurt School's theory of fascism. Thus in 
their analysis of the anti-semitism which accompanied that political movement, Adorno 
and Horkheimer, whilst not ignoring the economic basis of the phenomenon, argue 
29 'History and Psychology' in Between Philosophy and Social Science, p.121. 
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that it represents what they call a "false projection". In effect, individuals under the 
grip of this particular political pathology have come to project their own aggressive 
and sexual impulses onto an Other, namely the Jew, thereby legitimising their 
murderous rage as an act of self defence. For the anti-semite, the Jew stands as a 
symbol for a repressed inner life, a life that is so threatening and hostile to the socially-
formed ego that it must be destroyed in proxy, by the destruction of its external 
representative. As Adorno and Horkheimer observe: 
Impulses which the subject will not admit as his own even though they are 
most assuredly so, are attributed to the object - the prospective victim. The 
actual paranoic has no choice but to obey the laws of his sickness. But in 
Fascism this behaviour is made political~ the object of the illness is deemed true 
to reality~ and the mad system becomes the reasonable norm in the world and 
deviation from it a neurosis. 30 
Needless to say, most orthodox Marxists would reject such an explanation, arguing 
that a perfectly good account of anti-semitism can be found by reflecting upon the 
position of Jews in the system of social production operative in Europe in the 1930's. 
The problem with this line of argument, however, is that the kind of explanation it 
favours, namely an explanation in terms of the material interests of this or that sector 
of German society, is simply unable to account for the degree and extent of the 
aggression launched against the European Jewish population. To dispossess Jewish 
financiers and merchants is one thing - the history of capitalism is after all littered with 
30 Dialectic of Enlightenment, p.187. 
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such forcible expropriations - but to seek the physical extermination of an entire race is 
an altogether qualitatively different phenomenon. Putting things crudely, one might say 
that although a material interest explanation might be sufficient to explain the seizure 
of Jewish capital it cannot account for Auschwitz nor indeed the bizarre racial 
mythology with which the Nazis sought to legitimise their crimes. Here the explanans 
simply does not fit the explanandum, for the truth of the matter is that no material 
interest was served by the various extermination programs; on the contrary, they 
served to deny Germany the services of large numbers of highly skilled workers, 
scientists and professionals. This observation, of course, does not automatically 
support the Frankfurt School's particular analysis of anti-Semitism but it does lend 
credence to their view that in the case of the Nazi pogroms we are dealing with 
something that cannot be explained simply by reference to class interest. 31 Indeed, 
what this suggests is that just as in the life of the individual there are a range of 
behaviour patterns, as exhibited for instance in the various neuroses, which resist 
explanation in terms of a purpose that is both conscious and rationally instrumental; 
there are similarly areas of social behaviour which have to be understood as the 
expression of unconscious beliefs and desires. Thus commenting upon the appeal of 
31 In an interesting discussion of Marxist writings on anti-semitism, Norman Geras 
makes the following observation: "Describing the build-up to the pogrom, Trotsky -
Marxist -sketches both its political background and something of the social 
composition of the mob. Then he writes this: 'the gang rushes through the town, 
drunk on vodka and the smell of blood.' Drunk 011 the smell of blood. What 
specifically Marxist category is there for that?" (The Co~tract of.Mutual Ind~tferen~e 
: Political Philosophy Afier the Holocaus~, p 158.) This quotatIon from !rotsky IS 
illustrative of the fact that intelligent Marxtsts have very often tended to Ignore the 
restrictions imposed by the material interest approac~. However, whi~st t~s d~parture 
from orthodoxy may well result in a theory that IS ~loser to reaht~, It raIses the 
problem, as Geras' question indicates, of how the vanous ~on-matenal factors t.hat 
appear in the explanation are to be integrated into the theoretIcal apparatus of claSSIcal 
Marxism. 
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fascist propaganda, Adorno writes: "It is psychological because of its irrational 
authoritarian aims which cannot be attained by means of rational convictions but only 
through the skilfu] awakening of a 'portion of the subject's archaic inheritance'" .32 
Now if this true, then materialism is faced with the choice of either ignoring such 
phenomena or of seeking assistance from other theoretical disciplines so as to 
construct a social theory capable of modulating between the inner life of the subject 
and the outer life of society. The Frankfurt School's project of synthesising Freud and 
Marx is an attempt to undertake that latter task. 
By way of conclusion to this section I shall make the following observations. First, 
that the Frankfurt's School concern with the construction of a materialist theory of the 
subject need not be thought of as being in principle in conflict with Marx's original 
project. For whilst it is true that Marx himself made no attempt to develop such a 
theory, he realised that the abstractions of political economy would by themselves be 
insufficient to develop a theory of the life process of an actual society. If this is true, 
then it is incumbent upon materialists to investigate the full range of institutions and 
social relations which mediate between the individual and the social whole. Amongst 
those institutions, the family stands out as predominantly important, not only as the 
means by which a new generation of workers is supplied to society but also as the 
most immediate context for the formation of the human subject. Thus the Frankfurt 
School's turn to depth psychology, far from being a methodological error premised 
upon a confusion concerning the level at which Marx's theory operates, is in fact an 
attempt to explore the concrete life of society as the "unity of the diverse", as the 
32 'Freudian Theory and Patterns of Fascist Propaganda' in The Rsst!ntial Frankfurt 
School Reader, p.124. 
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dialectic of a truly concrete universal. The second observation that I wish to make 
arises from the Frankfurt School's analysis of fascist anti-semitism. In their discussion 
of this phenomenon they point to a number of social-psychological features which 
quite plainly resist analysis in terms of economic interest. This suggests that with 
respect to the analysis of specific social formations, Marx's thought cannot be 
regarded as entirely sufficient. As the case of fascism demonstrates, there are 
determinants of consciousness which cannot be explained in terms of the categories of 
political economy but which are nevertheless crucial for an understanding of the way 
in which the individual acts within a social context. Whether the particular synthesis of 
historical materialism and depth psychology developed by the Frankfurt School can be 
regarded as an altogether successful response to this problem is of course another 
question, but enough has been said by now to indicate that the attempt to produce 
such a synthesis is, from the standpoint of materialism, an entirely reasonable project. 
From Marx to Freud 
Having said something to counter the general argument that Marxism does not require 
a theory of the subject, that it can operate entirely adequately at the level of supra-
individual structures, I shall now turn to the more specific question of whether it is 
possible to integrate Freud's analytical psychology with Marx's theory of historical 
materialism. Certainly some critics of the Frankfurt School have suggested that the 
very nature of Freudian theory precludes any such possibility, and that in consequence 
the project of a Freudian-Marxist synthesis is ill-conceived from the outset. Alasdair 
MacIntyre, for instance, argues that psychoanalytical theory understands society as 
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primarily a mechanism for managing the inherent conflict between the individual's 
need for gratification of instinctual impulses and a reality which imposes severe 
limitations on the capacity of the individual to successfully secure that aim.33 However, 
according to MacIntyre: "For Marx the question of the general character of the social 
order and that of the fate of individuals are inseparable and explanatory primacy 
belongs to the former; for Freud social phenomena are to be explained in terms of the 
characteristics of individual human nature. ,,34 Thus the Frankfurt synthesis of 
materialism with depth psychology is to be rejected because it disregards what 
MacIntyre calls "Freudian individualism": the belief that the explanation of society 
reduces to the explanation of the psychic constitution of individuals. 
Now in opposition to MacIntyre I shall argue that the above contrast seriously 
misrepresents Freud, insofar as it portrays him as a methodological individualist 
unconcerned with questions of the way in which the human psyche is fashioned by pre-
existing objective social structures. In particular the charge of methodological 
individualism must be rejected for the very good reason that whilst Freudian theory 
certainly does make reference to the structure of the individual psyche, that structure 
is understood primarily as the result of the interaction between the biological nature of 
the human subject and the realm of social and natural objectivity. Indeed, central to the 
whole Freudian enterprise is an ontogenetic narrative describing the formation of the 
psyche by means of a social process, namely family based socialisation, which channels 
33 The alleged incompatibility of Weberian theory with historical materialism 1S 
discussed later in this chapter. 
34 Marcuse, p.50. 
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pre-social drives into forms of behaviour consistent with material reality.35 Thus for 
Freud, as for Hegel and Marx, the Self is produced in and through its relation with the 
Other. Now the primal site of this relation is the immediate relation of the child to its 
parents, but insofar as family life also represents and recreates principles of social 
reality this brings the chi1d simultaneously into contact with society.36 In short, the 
Freudian individual is as much the bearer of socially-established, supra-individual 
structures, in this case structures of sublimation and repression, as the individuals who 
figure in Marx's Capital. 
But if the contrast between Marx and Freud as posited by MacIntyre turns out to be 
illusory, it is nevertheless true that there are real differences between these two 
theoretical traditions. As Habermas in an essay entitled "Psychoanalysis and Social 
Theory" observes: 
Marx conceives the institutional framework as an ordering of interests that are 
immediate functions of the system of social labour according to the relation of 
social rewards and imposed obligations. Institutions derive their force from 
perpetuating a distribution of rewards and obligations that is rooted in force 
and distorted according to class structure. Freud, on the contrary, conceives 
the institutional framework in connection with the repression qf instinctual 
35 Steven Lukes makes this point in his article 'Methodological Individualism 
Reconsidered' reprinted in The Philosophy of Social Explanation, ed. A.Ryan, pp. 
119-129. 
36 Freud's keen awareness of the importance of the social dimensio~ .is brought out 
particularly clearly in a discussion of the relation betwee? sexual actIvIty, labour and 
language. See his Introductory Lectures To PsychoanalysIs, p.167. 
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impulses. In the system of self-preservation this repression must be universally 
imposed, independent of a class specific distribution of goods and misfortune 
(as long an economy of scarcity stamps every satisfaction with the compulsory 
character of a rewardi7 (Italics mine) 
This suggests that there is after all a fundamental divergence between Marxist and 
Freudian accounts of social institutions: the former explains those institutions as the 
expression of class structure, whilst the latter understands them as a mechanism for 
managing the instinctual heritage of sexual and aggressive impulses. Habermas differs 
from MacIntyre, however, in that he credits Freud with a recognition that the conflict 
between instinct and society is itself socially and historically conditioned. Hence 
according to Habermas the difference between psychoanalysis and materialism is not 
that of methodological individualism versus holism, but rather that Freud utilises a 
conceptual vocabulary that is quite distinct from the technological productivist 
orientation of Marx. Whilst this difference is real enough, the question of its 
significance for a synthesis of historical materialism and psychoanalysis is by no means 
settled. In particular, it has yet to be established whether the Freudian concern with the 
instinctual basis of subjectivity entails that psychoanalytical explanations are 
incompatible with a materialist account of society, or whether alternatively such 
explanations have the potential to serve as a useful complement to that account. Those 
who take the former view argue that Capital presents an essentially instrumental, 
economistic vision of the human subject. In other words Marx, following the tradition 
of classical political economy, develops a theory based upon the assumption that the 
37 Knowledge and Human Interests, pp.276-278. 
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subject can be adequately represented in terms of a class-relativised concept of homo 
economicus. In consequence of this representation the attempt to construct a theory 
relating the individual to society in terms of non-economic motivation, that is, in terms 
other than class interest, must be regarded as necessarily inconsistent with Marx's 
original intention. This, for instance would appear to be the view of Phil Slater, who 
argues that Horkheimer's attempt to construct a social-psychological explanation of 
the appeal of Fascism to sections of the proletariat "militates against any real class 
analysis" and in particular "hazes over the theoretical need for an analysis of economic 
manipulation".38 On this basis, Slater concludes that the Frankfurt project is an eclectic 
mixture of Marx and Freud, a mixture which fails to avoid the pitfall of what he calls 
"psychological absolutisation". 
Rather than confront head on the specific objections of Slater and others like him, I 
shall argue in support of the following general thesis: that depth-psychology, far from 
being incompatible with materialism, is uniquely suited to serve alongside Marx's 
political economy as a component within a materialist social scientific synthesis. As 
Marcuse puts it: 
The psychoanalytic categories do not have to be 'related' to social and political 
conditions - they are themselves social and political categories. Psychoanalysis 
could become an effective social and political instrument, positive as well as 
negative, in an administrative as well as a critical function, because Freud had 
discovered the mechanisms of social control in the depth dimension of 
38 Origin and Significance o/the Frankfurt School, p.IIS 
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instinctual drives and satisfactions.39 
At first sight this is a rather surprising statement for a social radical to make. After all, 
most psychoanalytical explanations of behaviour involve extensive reference to the 
human instinctual apparatus, and in particular to the aggressive and sexual drives. This 
kind of explanation, however, has found very little favour amongst thinkers of the left. 
On the contrary, socialist theoreticians have tended to concentrate upon the task of 
demonstrating that human behaviour is to a very large extent determined by so-called 
objective socio-historical conditions. This is due to the fact that theories of human 
nature have very often been used by conservative thinkers to justifY the status quo -
i.e., that society as it exists reflects the unfortunate reality of human nature - as well to 
question the very possibility of constructing an alternative social order. In this context, 
therefore, Marcuse's confident declaration that psychoanalytical theory, and more 
especially Freud's theory of the instincts, can playa positive role in the development of 
a critical social theory appears to be somewhat at variance not only with Marxism but 
with any kind of radical thinking. 
To understand why Marcuse as well as other members of the Frankfurt School 
believed that Freudian theory contained a substantial emancipatory potential, it is 
necessary to return to the origins of their attempt to integrate the work of Freud with 
that of Marx. Now although both Adorno and Horkheimer had studied psychoanalysis 
in the 1920's, the first clear outline of what a Freudian-Marxist synthesis might look 
39 'The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man' in Five /'ectllres: 
Psychoanalysis, Politics and l!topia, p .. 44. T~s represen~s ~he .text of a lecture that 
Marcuse delivered to the Amencan PolItICal SCIence ASSOCIatIOn In 1963 
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like is to be found in the early writings of Erich Fromm. 4O One of the most important 
of these is the programmatic Zeitschrijt article, first published in 1932 and entitled 
"Ueber Methode und Aufgabe einer analytischen Sozial-psychologie".·n In this piece 
Fromm begins by announcing that: 
Psychoanalysis is a materialistic psychology which should be classed amongst 
the natural sciences. It points to instinctual drives and needs as the motive 
forces behind human behaviour, these drives being produced by physiologically 
based instincts that are not directly observable in themselves. Psychoanalysis 
has shown that man's conscious psychic activity is only a relatively small sector 
of his psychic life ... In particular, it has unmasked individual and collective 
ideologies as the expression of particular wishes and needs rooted in the 
instincts and shows that our "moral" and idealistic motives are in some 
measure the disguised and rationalised expression of instinctual drives. 42 
With perhaps just one reservation, it can be said that this passage succinctly expresses 
not only Fromm's position but also the broad character of the Frankfurt School's 
40 Fromm was a practising psychoanalyst when he joined the Institute, and his early 
articles in the Zeitschrijt expressed a relatively orthodox Freudian position. Later, 
under the increasing influence of Marxist historicist thinking he came to reject large 
elements of Freud's original theory, in particular his metapsychology, libido theory as 
well as the Oedipus complex. By contrast Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse held fast 
to these central aspects of Freudian depth-psychology. For a discussion of the 
evolution of Fromm's thought and its influence upon the Frankfurt School see David 
Held's Introduction to Critical Theory, pp.t! 0-147. 
41 Reprinted in the F-ssential Frankfurt School Reader as 'The Method and 
Function of an Analytic Social Psychology', pp. 477-496. 
42 Op.cit. p.479. 
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reception of Freud on behalf of materialism. The reservation, of course, is the claim in 
the opening sentence that Freudian theory should be classed as a "natural science". 
Now for an orthodox Freudian this might be taken as a reference to Freud's early 
model of the mind as a structure continuously seeking to discharge quantities of 
psychic energy; thus interpreted, depth psychology appears as closely analogous to 
theories dealing with systems of physical energy. There is, however, nothing in the 
Frankfurt School's appropriation of Freud to suggest that any of its members, 
including Fromm, understood psychoanalytical theory in this kind of mechanistic 
fashion. On the contrary, they take as their starting point the idea that psychoanalysis, 
because it begins with the instinctual structure of human beings, is a theory of a 
necessarily embodied mind. And it is on this basis, rather than any mechanistic theory 
of psychic quantum, that Fromm, as well as other members of the Institute, sought to 
integrate Freud's theory of the instincts into Marx's theory of historical materialism. 
In the case of Fromm, the attempt to integrate these theories begins with the 
observation that for Freud the individual's instinctual structure is conditioned by two 
factors: an inherited physical constitution, and individually specific life experiences 
arising from early childhood. This leads Fromm to the view that: "the analytic method 
is exquisitely historical: it seeks to understand the instinctual structure through the 
understanding of life history.,,43 Here it should be emphasised that Fromm's reference 
to history is more than a loose analogy: it refers us to the life experiences of 
individuals situated in a determinate social reality. In other words, the history that 
Fromm is speaking of is a material history, a narrative of the confrontation between a 
4~ Op. cit. P .480. 
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particular physical and instinctual structure and the universal of society. As he puts it: 
"The active and passive adaptation of the biological apparatus, the instincts, to social 
reality is the key conception of psychoanalysis. ,,44 J ndeed for Fromm the development 
of psychoanalytical theory is to be charted in terms of a transition from a discipline 
primarily concerned with the development of the individual psyche to that of a theory 
focused upon the question of how it is that society impresses itself upon the mind, 
conscious as well as unconscious, of the human subject. 
It is this notion, namely that the individual psychic structure represents the outcome of 
a process by means of which the biological is socialised, that is the basis of Fromm's 
argument that analytical theory is wholly consistent with materialism. For both 
theoretical traditions, according to Fromm, are grounded in the conception of the 
human subject as a subject of need, as the site of suffering as well as somatic 
gratification, of deprivation as well as fulfilment. Furthermore, both Marx as well as 
Freud related this conception of the subject to the question of social labour. To give an 
example of just how close analytical psychology comes to Marx's historical 
materialism we may consider the following passage from Freud's Introductory 
Lectures on PsychoAnalysis. Thus in a discussion of sexual instinct and its relation to 
society he makes the following observation: 
The motive of human society is in the last resort an economic one; since it does 
not possess enough provisions to keep its members alive unless they work, it 
must restrict the number of its members and divert their energies from sexual 
44 Ibid. 
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activity to work. It is faced, in short, by the eternal, primeval exigencies of life, 
which are with us to this day. 45 
Here Freud clearly recognises that there is a relation between the material basis of a 
society, and in particular the degree of the development of the productive forces, and 
levels of sexual repression current in that society. According to Freud, the existence of 
society is to be explained in economic terms~ for social production, rather than the 
activity of isolated individuals or family groups, is the most effective means of 
overcoming material scarcity. However, whilst the productive forces of society 
become ever more powerful, the fact of material scarcity can never be abolished and 
for this reason society imposes upon its members the obligation to labour. This 
obligation, in turn, leads to a general restriction upon the individual's capacity to 
follow a course of immediate instinctual gratification. More particularly, society 
through the medium of the family, must control and repress the sexual instinct of each 
new generation of members so as to release energy for the labour process. In 
summary, what Freud is presenting here is a social psychic economy: a mechanism for 
distributing portions of libidinous energy to the sphere of productive activity. 
On this basis, Fromm argued that psychoanalytical theory, like materialism, takes as 
fundamental the question of how it is that in the face of a recalcitrant material world 
human need is satisfied. Indeed both theories give prominence to the concept of social 
labour, to the world-transforming activity of groups of human beings organised into 
more or less coherent units of production. This activity has a dual history: the history 
45 Introductory Lectures on PsychoAnalysis, p.312. 
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of human society and the history of the human individual as it is integrated initially into 
the family and subsequently into society at large. Where, of course, Freud differs from 
Marx is first of all in the emphasis that he places upon one specific human need, 
namely the gratification of the sexual instinct, and second the rich psychological 
context in which that instinct is located. Nevertheless it can be said that there is 
nothing in this central component of Freudian theory which is necessarily inconsistent 
with Marx's conception of materialism. For example, in the German Ideology Marx 
proposes that the "first premise of all human history is .. , the existence of living 
human individuals." This leads him to argue as follows: 
Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organisation of these 
individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature. Of course, we 
cannot here go either into the actual physical nature of man, or into the natural 
conditions which he finds himself - geological, oro-hydrograhica1, climatic and 
so on. All historical writing must set out from these natural bases and their 
modification in the course of history through the action ofmen. 46 
Admittedly, whilst this passage has nothing explicit to say concerning human sexual 
instinct, the idea that Marx might have regarded this instinct as constituting a natural 
base or condition of the kind from which "all historical writing must set out" is by no 
means far-fetched. Marx's thought, at least historically, begins with a concept of 
human subjectivity as something essentially embedded in nature. In his early writings, 
he represents the subject as an embodied subject having "real, sensuous objects as the 
46 The German Ideology, p.37. 
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objects of his being". Indeed it is through this experience of need, of the subject's 
dependence upon the other, that the human self is formed. 47 This entails that the 
subject of materialism is inescapably located in the realm of the sensuous: it is the 
subject of hunger, suffering, desire, love, pain and fear. But having said this, we come 
back to the question of whether Marx's thought possesses the theoretical resources to 
develop this insight; in particular is it capable of providing an account of the way in 
which an embodied consciousness and society impact upon one another. Certainly, 
Marx was aware that any such discussion would inevitably have to focus upon the 
concept of need. For example, having observed that the human subject is a "natural 
being", he goes on to argue that: 
. .. as a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a suffering, 
conditioned and limited being, like animals and plants. That is to say, the 
o~iects of his drives exist outside him as objects independent of him; but these 
objects are objects of his need, essential objects, indispensable to the exercise 
and confirmation of his essential powers. 48 
Thus for Marx, the relation between conSClOusness and social being is mediated 
through the category of need, through in the first instance the need of human beings to 
satisfy a range of primary drives emanating from their status as biological entities. But 
47 In his later work Marx continued to emphasise the category of need. Thus at the 
very beginning of Capital h~ states tha~: "A ~ommodity is, in the first place, an object 
outside of us a thing that by Its propertIes satIsfies human wants of some sort another. 
The nature of such wants, whether, for instance they spring from the stomach or from 
fancy, makes no difference." 
48 Marx: £arly Writings, p389. 
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once this is admitted as a premise of materialism - and I think that it has to be - the 
following questions quickly present themselves. Does Marx have a satisfactory theory 
of human need? What needs do human beings have? Are needs entirely innate, or can 
some of them be thought of as socially produced? What is the nature of relation 
between the concept of need and that of human well-being? How are needs to be 
distinguished from mere wants? What mechanisms, whether individual or social, exist 
for managing potential conflicts between the subject's instinctual goals and the 
maintenance of social life? How are needs met through specific forms of the social life 
process? Are some forms intrinsically better than others in performing this task? To 
simply raise these issues is sufficient to immediately provide an answer in the negative 
to the original question, namely whether Marx's work has an adequate theory of need. 
We must conclude, therefore, that Marx who by focusing upon the objective character 
of the subject helped to liberate the concept of subjectivity from traditional 
philosophical anthropology, nevertheless failed to provide a satisfactory theory of the 
process of self-formation through which the subject comes into being. 
Now for Fromm as for other members of the Frankfurt School, psychoanalytical , 
theory offers the best hope from the standpoint of materialism for dealing with this 
particular problem. In the first place, analytical psychology unlike behavioural 
psychology, is not encumbered with a positivist methodology but seeks explanations 
of human behaviour in terms of the beliefs and desires, both conscious and 
unconscious, which motivate that behaviour. This concern with the psychic life of the 
subject was important for the Frankfurt School because in contrast with Marxist 
orthodoxy, they did not conceive of materialism as downgrading the role of 
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consciousness in the construction of a theory of society. On the contrary, they regard 
Marx's materialism as an immanent development of the original Hegelian subject-
object dialectic, and in consequence as much a theory of consciousness as it is a theory 
of material activity. However, Marx's account of consciousness, like Hegel's, is not 
content with a simple description of the self-understanding of the individual, but seeks 
instead to identify the conflict between our conceptions of how things are and how 
things actually stand in the world. For Marx, this disjunction between thought and 
reality is not accidental but is to be explained in terms of its functionality vis-a-vis the 
maintenance of class society. In this respect there is a striking analogy, as Adorno 
points out, between the Marxist category of ideology and the psychoanalytical account 
of rationalisation. Thus for Adorno, rationalisation "designates all those statements 
which, quite apart from their truth content, fulfil certain functions within the psychic 
economy of the speaker, the commonest being defence against unconscious 
tendencies. ,,49 He then goes onto to observe that: 
Such utterances are invariably the object of a psychoanalytic critique 
analogous, as has often been noted, to the Marxist doctrine of ideology: their 
objective fubction is to conceal, and the analyst is out to establish both their 
falsehood and necessity and to bring what was hidden to light. 
However the relation between the account of consciousness offered by materialism , 
and that offered by analytical psychology is more than mere analogy. For it raises the 
possibility, as Adorno suggests, of the individual's defence mechanism seeking support 
49 'Sociology and Psychology' in New Left Review, 46, 1967, p.80. 
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from socially promoted systems of belief If this is true the conflict between ego and 
the instinctual structure becomes inextricably entangled with the conflict inherent to 
class society. This in turn suggests an explanation for a range of socio-political 
phenomena, in particular the integration of individuals into the social system, which 
goes far beyond the kind of explanation traditionally advanced by orthodox Marxism. 
In short, materialism and psychoanalysis, if properly understood, offer de-mystifying 
and complementary critiques of forms of consciousness, and because these forms 
operate at both an individual as well as a social level, an adequate theory of the social 
totality must have the capacity to modulate between these two theoretical traditions. 
However, although the Frankfurt School certainly did conceive of psychoanalytical 
theory as a form of Ideologiekritik complementary to that mounted by historical 
materialism, their interest in analytical psychology was principally motivated by 
Freud's commitment to the extra-social, irreducibly natural dimension of human 
subjectivity. Indeed, what appealed to the members of the Frankfurt School was not 
simply the possibility of integrating individual psychology with social theory, with 
demonstrating for instance that conflicts internal to the individual often find expression 
in the individual's adherence to this or that form of ideology, but rather with the 
emphasis that classical analytical theory places upon the instinctual life of humanity. 
Certainly this flies in the face of a great deal of orthodox Marxist thought, which tends 
to take the line that human history is a largely unproblematic narrative of mankind's 
ever increasing domination over nature. Paradoxically, this view leads to a certain 
Hegelian imperialism of the subject, albeit one expressed in an essentially scientistic 
productivist vocabulary. Thus the development of scientific knowledge and technique, 
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together with the growth of the productive forces, was seen by many Marxists as the 
means by which human society will ultimately "liberate" itself from the realm of natural 
necessity. The trouble here, at least from the point of view of the Frankfurt School, is 
that this represents a return to the kind of dialectical thOUght which promotes identity 
over difference. In describing the dialectic of society and nature, the orthodox Marxist 
tends to prioritise the former over the latter: history represents the increasing 
socialisation (humanisation) of nature, that is to say, the diminution of the natural in 
favour of the social. 
Against this tendency the Frankfurt School promoted a form of dialectical thinking 
which emphasises difference over identity, which refuses to assimilate the various 
fractured narratives of human history into a single over-arching story of either 
progress or decline. Thus in Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer 
write that: "Europe has two histories: a well known, written history and an 
underground history. The latter consists in the fate of the human instincts and passions 
which are displaced and distorted by civilisation. ,,50 Interestingly enough, they go on to 
suggest that this repression is to a large extent motivated by the division of labour in 
society, or more accurately by the division of society into on the one hand a class freed 
from the compulsion to undertake manual labour and on the other a class compelled to 
engage in the physical struggle against a recalcitrant nature. In consequence, a ruling 
class emerges which, although wholly dependent upon the labour of others, professes 
an ideology altogether contemptuous of that labour. Now whatever the truth or 
otherwise of this particular speculation, Adorno and Horkheimer's proposal for an 
50 Dialectic of Enlightenment, p.231. 
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underground history of the body bears a striking resemblance to the Freudian concern 
with the archaic character of the unconscious. To see this, we have only to compare 
what has just been said with, for instance Freud's discussion of the archaic nature of 
dreaming where he observes that: 
The prehistory into which the dream-work leads us back is of two kinds - on 
the one hand, into the individual's prehistory, his childhood, and on the other, 
in so far as each individual somehow recapitulates in an abbreviated form the 
entire development of the human race, into phylogenetic prehistory toO.51 
The kind of history that Freud is talking about here is precisely the kind of hidden 
history advocated in Dialectic ~f Enlightenment, a history which focuses upon the 
suppression of the instinctual basis of human life. And for Freud as well as the 
Frankfurt School, this narrative of repression is central to the understanding of the 
formation of both the individual psyche and society. 
However, before considering this idea I want to return to the question of the way in 
which the Frankfurt School's conception of the subject-object dialectic relates to their 
advocacy of analytical psychology. Now it is often said that the materialism of Adorno 
and his colleagues represents an immanent but critical development of Hegel's earlier 
idealist dialectic. Most importantly, it is critical in the sense that as a materialist 
dialectic it rejects the Hegelian image of an ultimate unity between subject and object 
and insists instead upon an essential moment of non-identity between these two 
51 Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, p.199. 
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poles. 52 This argument, it should be noted, counts not only against Hegel's idealist 
conception of Nature but also against that version of Marxism, as well other kinds of 
social theory, which seek not to spiritualise Nature but to socialise it. In opposition to 
this form of identity thinking, the Frankfurt School, in line with the findings of 
analytical psychology, emphasise the essential moment of difference, and indeed 
conflict, between Nature and Society, between the instinctual processes and purposive 
rationality, between consciousness and the body. For the Frankfurt School, the 
essential truth of Nature is not that it is Mind but rather that it constitutes a realm of 
otherness which sets material limits and impacts often painfully upon the life of both 
the human individual as well as the species. Thus disdaining the standard dialectical 
move, characteristic of idealism as well as vulgar materialism, of discovering a 
synthesis which abolishes the difference, Adorno observes: 
If speculation on the state of reconciliation were permitted, neither the 
undistinguished unity of subject and object nor their antithetical hostility would 
be conceivable in it; rather, the communication of what was distinguished. Not 
until then would the concept of communication, as an objective concept, come 
into its own ... In its proper place, even epistemologically, the relationship of 
subject and object would lie in the realisation of peace among men as well as 
between men and their Other. Peace is the state of distinctness without 
52 "From our point of view mind has for its pres~p~osition Nature, ~fwhi~h it is the 
truth and for that reason its absolute prius. In this Its truth Nature IS varus~ed, and 
mind' has resulted as the 'Idea' entered on possession of itself Here ~he subject and 
object of the Idea are one - either is the intelligent unity, the notIOn." HeKel's 
Philosophy of Mind, § 381. 
264 
domination, and with the distinct participating in each other. 53 
Now from the standpoint of materialist social theory, what is interesting about this 
formulation of the subject-object dialectic is the suggestion that the current state of 
antagonism between humanity and its Other is as much the concern of that theory as 
the intra-social antagonism of the classes described by Marx in Capital. Indeed it 
might be argued, as Adorno does, that these antagonisms are essentially related to one 
another, that a theory of the one is a theory of the other. As he puts it : 
The truth of the whole sides with one-sidedness, not pluralistic synthesis: a 
psychology that turns its back on society and idiosyncratically concentrates on 
the individual and his archaic hereitage says more about the hapless state of 
society than one which seeks by its 'wholistic approach' or an inclusion of 
social 'factors' to join the ranks of a no longer existent universitatus 
literarum. 54 
Thus according to Adorno, classical psychoanalytical theory is superior to the ego 
psychology which develops from it because the former, unlike the latter, holds firmly 
to the priority of the instinctual. In so doing, and perhaps somewhat paradoxically, the 
classical theory lays the basis for an account of the subject as the site of a conflict 
between goals posited by the instincts and the role that is socially allocated to them in 
the production process. For this reason Adorno claims that: 
53 'Subject and Object' in The £ssential Frankfurt I..\'chool Reader, pp. 499-500. 
54 'Sociology and Psychology' in New Left Review, 46, 1967, p.75. 
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Rigorous psychoanalytic theory, alive to the clash of psychic forces, can better 
drive home the objective character especially of economic laws as against 
subjective impulses, than theories which, in order at all costs to establish a 
continuum between society and psyche, deny the fundamental axiom of 
analytic theory, the conflict between id and ego. S5 
Hence, according to Adorno, the conflict that arises between id and ego is driven by 
the fact that a primary function of the latter is that of reality-testing, of instrumentally 
rational thought that brings objective social interests to bear upon the behaviour of the 
individual. Thus rather than de-socialising the individual, analytic theory demonstrates 
that society penetrates consciousness to its innermost core. In this sense the socialised 
individual is seen as a compromise formation, a structure which effects a compromise 
between what has been repressed (the primary instincts) and the agency of repression 
(ego). 
Thus a critical theory of society schooled in Freud's analytical psychology will 
commence with the biological as well as the social life of the species and on this basis 
identify human well-being in terms of the maximum level of instinctual gratification 
compatible with the maintenance of society. Marcuse, in particular, makes ingenious 
use of this idea in Eros and Civilisation where he develops the concept of surplus 
repression. This is used to identify those restrictions upon the individual which are 
"necessitated by social domination" rather than the modification of the instincts 
55 Ibid .. 
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necessary for any form of human civilisation. S6 Hence, for Marcuse, part of the 
responsibility of a critical theory of society is to demonstrate that the present mode of 
social organisation serves to deny individuals the maximum attainable levels of human 
well-being. Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that Marcuse intends his theory of 
surplus repression to rank alongside Marx's theory of surplus value as a 
complementary critique of the capitalist order. A critique, moreover, which realises the 
potential of the early Marx's discussion of the subject by basing itself upon a fully 
articulated theory of the objects which serve to fulfill human need. 
To summanse, materialism begins with the recognition that the human subject is 
rooted in nature, and in consequence is a subject of biological as well as socially-
detennined need. This dependency upon a realm of externality is the basis of a 
dialectic of self-formation: in classical Hegelian fashion the subject comes to recognise 
itself through the recognition of its dependence upon objects that are independent of 
its will. In other words the concept of 'I' is essentially intertwined with the concept of 
'Not-I'. Now according to the argument of Fromm and indeed other members of the 
Frankfurt School this insight provides the basis for an important link between 
historical materialism and depth-psychology. The former offers an account of society 
in terms of its capacity to produce and reproduce material life, whilst the latter 
provides the means to systematically understand the impact of society upon the 
instinctual heritage of the human subject. The synthesis of these two disciplines would 
therefore allow us to alternate between two distinct but related questions. First, how 
adequately does society satisfy the needs of its members? Second, what is the nature 
S6 Eros and Civilisation, p.35. 
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and origin of these needs? The first question leads directly to an investigation of the 
process of material production, the second to a depth-psychology of the individual. 
The task of a critical social theory is to unify these apparently diverse investigations. 
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Chapter 7. Totality and Critique 
In this final chapter I want to try to bring together some of the more important themes 
and arguments that have thus far been developed. Thus the Marxism of the Frankfurt 
School has been variously characterised as a tum from philosophy to social theory, as 
a social scientific synthesis, as a materialist reconstruction of the Hegelian dialectic of 
subject and object and finally as a theory centred around the relation between the 
individual human subject and society. Now whilst each of these perspectives has 
something useful to offer in terms of coming to an understanding of the Institute's 
project, it must be admitted that the discussion of that project remains incomplete in a 
singularly important respect, namely the absence of any systematic account of 
Frankfurt Marxism as social critique. Indeed, until the nature of that critique has been 
determined it cannot be said that we have truly come to terms with the object of OUf 
study. This becomes apparent if we recall that in Chapter 1 it was argued that the 
work of the Frankfurt School is characterised by a high degree of meta-theoretical 
awareness, and in particular an awareness of what it is that distinguishes a theory of 
society founded upon Marx's materialism from other approaches to the social 
sciences. We may also recall that the response of Horkheimer and his colleagues to 
this question was to argue that historical materialism does not constitute a new 
positive science of society, as Marxist orthodoxy would have it, but a theory that is 
inherently critical and negative. It is now time to explore the nature of this thesis. 
Fortunately, however, the issue can be dealt with by returning to, and to some extent 
reworking the argument of the previous chapters. In this sense, therefore, we are not 
so much broaching new ground as coming to view the route that has so far been 
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travelled from another and hopefully illuminating perspective. 
Of course, to say that the work of the critical theorists constitutes a critique of society 
is in itself to say nothing very controversial. What is open to dispute, however, is the 
question of whether this critical stance can be legitimated from the standpoint of 
materialism. Thus according to Lucien Goldmann, the Frankfurt School, whilst 
remaining intensely critical of capitalist society had fairly early on abandoned any belief 
in the revolutionary potential of the proletariat and as a consequence had reverted to a 
form of Left Hegelianism, to a dualism between subject and object and a criticism of 
the world which is outside of history. 1 Interestingly, much the same objection has been 
levelled by the American analytic philosopher William Maker, who has argued that the 
logic of Frankfurt Marxism, especially as it unfolds in the early work of Marcuse and 
Horkheimer, leads to a fatal equivocation, alternating between a historically-
conditioned conception of rationality and the more classical notion of Reason as a 
speculative a priori standard. 2 Against these critics I intend to demonstrate that the 
supposed alternation is not, as Goldmann and Maker would have it, an inherent feature 
of the Frankfurt project but is in fact the consequence of these critics' failure to 
appreciate the dialectical, totalising quality of critical theory. Accordingly, I shall 
argue that the real logic of Frankfurt Marxism can only be illuminated by an account 
which emphasises the central role of the Hegelian notion of critique in the 
development of Marx's analysis of capitalist society. To recognise this intellectual 
1 Goldmann, L., l.,ulaics and Heidegger, p.96. Alasdair Maclntyre makes much the 
same kind of criticism of the Frankfurt School in MarclIse, (London: 1970), p.40. 
2 Maker, W., 'Critical Theory and its Discontents:. Rationa~ity, Contextuality and 
Normativity', Idealistic Studies, Vol. 26, Number 1, WmterlSpnng, 1996. 
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debt, however, is not to revert to a form of Left Hegelianism but is rather a matter of 
recovering the materialist and revolutionary quality of the thought of Idealism's 
greatest representative. 
In this final and concluding chapter, the argument will proceed as follows. The chapter 
begins with a general account of the nature of critical theory; this is followed by an 
exploration of some of the differences that exist between critical theory and the 
positivist conception of scientific knowledge. The particular goal of this discussion is 
to establish a clear distinction between the positivist's vision of a value-free, and 
therefore supposedly objective, social science and the Frankfurt School's unabashed 
belief in a theory of society that is openly partisan in its defence of human interests. 
Having established as well as clarified this difference, I shall then present an account of 
critical theory as a form of immanent critique: a practice that finds justification not by 
reference to any transcendental normative standards, as some of its critics allege, but 
by locating itself as a moment of the socio-historical complex of which it is a part. This 
return to the concept of totality is entirely appropriate, for this thesis has been 
intended to demonstrate, and to demonstrate in detail, that the organising principle of 
Frankfurt Marxism project derives from a materialist reconstruction of the Hegelian 
subject-object dialectic. The chapter closes with a discussion of a potentially serious 
objection to the Frankfurt School's account of critical theory, namely its inability to 
identify a concrete subject of the emancipatory process. I shall argue that whilst 
proponents of this objection are often guilty of over stating their case, nevertheless 
their argument does indeed point to an important deficiency in first-generation critical 
theory. The thesis concludes by indicating a number of possible strategies for 
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overcoming this deficit. 
Philosophy, Science and Critical Theory 
As we have seen, critical theory considers itself to be distinct not only from traditional 
philosophy but also from any of the existing positive sciences. However, as Habennas 
has observed, this description is formal rather than substantive: it simply positions the 
theory on an intellectual spectrum without determining its distinctive perspective.~ 
Clearly what is required is that we make some attempt to identify those features which 
constitute the differentia specifica of Frankfurt Marxism, distinguishing it both from 
philosophy as well as the conventional social sciences. In dealing with this question we 
begin by observing that in traditional scientific theories such as physics and biology, 
the subject and object of theory remain wholly distinct; physical theories of the 
universe, for instance, are not usually regarded as participating themselves in the 
development of the phenomenon with which they are concerned. Thus knowledge of 
the various physical laws, whilst enabling the technologist to control and manipulate 
nature does not form a basis for either the modification or overthrow of those laws. 
Here, the most that can be said is that we free ourselves from the tyranny of nature by 
coming to a more precise knowledge of the scope of natural necessity. In short, 
conventional scientific enquiry conceives of the natural world as essentially 
independent of the cognitive activity of the subject. As Husserl, a philosopher whom 
both Adorno and Horkheimer had read appreciatively, puts it, natural science: 
"pretends at every step to posit and know a nature that is in itself - in itself in 
3 Habermas, 1., Theory and Practice, p.212. 
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opposition to the subjective flow of consciousness.,,4 Now the question of whether we 
should be sceptical of this claim, as Husserl certainly was, or whether we grant the 
capacity of the natural sciences to discover the truth about a world that is ex1emal to 
the subject is not an issue that I propose to deal with here~ rather, my purpose is 
simply to establish a general description of the traditional scientific world-view. In this 
context we therefore additionally note that as subject, scientific consciousness 
perceives itself to be under a very limited obligation to comprehend its own activity: 
by large and large the investigator qua scientist does not attempt to make scientific 
enquiry, conceived of as the practice of a concrete historical subject, an object for 
itself. Indeed what little self-reflection does occur is all too often confined to a purely 
formal investigation of the logical structure of a scientific theory. 5 By way of contrast 
to this rigid separation of subject and object, critical theory involves both the 
understanding and transformation of its object, human society, into a conscious and 
therefore genuinely social subject, the socialised humanity of Marx's Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts. Moreover, the theory is concerned to understand itself as 
a moment of the very same social life process which constitutes the object of its 
enquiry; in other words to relate itself to the social totality of which it is a part. Thus 
for Horkheiemer "the scientific calling is only one, non-independent element in the 
4 'Philosophy as Rigorous Science' in Phenomenology and the ('risi.\ of 
Philosophy, p.88. 
5 This, of course, is not to deny some of the very real achievemen~s of recent 
philosophy of natural science as it has developed through .the work of QUl~e, Po~~er, 
Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend. But as Richar~ Bef!1stem has ~gued, this traditIOn 
had to first laboriously free itself from an obseSSion With th~ mearung and refere~ce of 
isolated singular terms, with the te~dency to accord pnmacy to t.he p~actlce of 
ostensive definition, before it could dIscover by means of a complex ~Ialectlc that t~e 
rationality of a scientific theory is closely coupled with .t~e nature of sCience as a SOCial 
process. See his Beyond O~jectivism. am! ~elat/~/sm, pp.75.-79. Int~restl~gly, 
Bernstein suggests that this particular dialectic mstantlates the eplstemtc dialectiC of 
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work or historical activity of man" and in consequence the social conditions of 
scientific knowledge, should become, in turn, a topic of investigation 6 Commenting 
'-
upon this aspect of critical theory Geuss observes that: 
It is an essential task of any complete theory of society to investigate not just 
social institutions and practices, but also beliefs agents have about their society 
- to investigate not just 'social reality' in the narrowest sense, but also the 
'social knowledge' which is part of that reality. A full scale social theory, then, 
will form part of its own object domain. That is, a social theory is a theory 
about (among other things) agent's beliefs about their society, but it is itself 
such a belief 7 
This is well said, for it succinctly makes the case that an adequate theory of society is 
necessarily self-reflexive, that in other words the content of a critical theory, the 
totality of social being, determines its form as a consciousness that develops itself as a 
knowledge that is for itself (fur sich). Within this dialectical structure of cognition, 
which according to the Frankfurt School defines the formation of a genuine theory of 
Hegel's Phenomenology. 
6 'Traditional and Critical Theory' in Critical Theory: Selected F;ssays, p.198 
Similarly Marcuse declares that: "Materialist theory ... understands all theory as an 
element of the social process of life, borne by particular historical interests." See the 
'Concept of Essence' in Negations, p.79. 
7 The Idea of a Critical Theory, p.S6. It is interesting to compare Geuss' 
observation with Korsch's argument that Marxists: "must try to understand e\'ery 
change, development and revision of Marxist theory, since its ?riginal emergence from 
the philosophy of German Idealism, as a neces~ry prod~ct ?f Its epoch (He~el). More 
precisely, we should seek to understand their detenrunat!on by the ,!otahty of the 
historico-social process of which they are a general expressIOn (Marx). See A-farxlsm 
and Philosophy, p.Sl. 
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society, subject and object interact to mutually transform one another. The subject 
becomes the object of theoretical concern whilst the object, namely society, has at 
least potentially the capacity to come into being as an authentic subject, that is a 
subject acting under conditions of rationality and freedom. Thus the Marxism of the 
Frankfurt School is not simply a theory which offers a particular interpretation of the 
world, an interpretation based upon Marx's thesis that capitalist society is dominated 
by the operation of the law of value, but is intended as a theoretical praxis directed 
towards transforming that reality. Put more emphatically, the project of changing the 
world is seen as a rationally compelling and necessary consequence of the 
interpretation which the theory advances. Of course, this should not be considered as 
somehow analogous to the kind of technological manipulation of nature characteristic 
of the application of the natural sciences. Rather, critical theory participates in the 
transformation of its object into an active historical subject by providing its addressee 
with a new form of self-understanding. As opposed to the natural sciences, the theory 
is not external to its object but is in fact part of a practice which reveals the object to 
itself Thus on the basis of what exists, the theory identifies the potential for a more 
adequately realised social subject: that is, a transparent form of social existence in 
which productive activity is consciously organised towards the satisfaction of human 
need. More particularly, by demonstrating that the capitalist form of production 
contains within itself the material basis for a higher form of social life, critical theory 
points to the need for the transition towards that higher form. Thus as opposed to the 
utopianism of the early socialist movement, the promise of a good society derives from 
a dialectic between what is actual and potential~ in other words, society discovers what 
it truly is by reference to what it might become. Furthermore, although awareness of 
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this potential has so far been successfully repressed, critical theory maintains that this 
potential is nevertheless preserved in certain socially- significant forms of theoretical 
and practical consciousness which, if suitably interpreted, will yield an immanent 
critique of this very repression. To summarise: according to the Frankfurt School 
, 
Marx's theory of history and society, unlike the positive sciences, acts upon the world 
it describes by developing a critical self-consciousness within the social life process, 
thereby leading those who participate in that process to seek a new form of social 
organisation centred upon the interests of the majority of society. 
From what has been said thus far it should be clear that for the Frankfurt School a 
genuinely adequate theory of society cannot avoid expressing a judgement of value 
with respect to the form of life of which it is a theory. As Horkheimer observes, 
critical theory: "has held onto the realisation that the free development of individuals 
depends on the rational constitution of society. In analysing present social conditions it 
becomes a critique of the economy.,,8 Here there is an explicit and apparently seamless 
transition from the analysis of social conditions to critique, from the study of a mode 
of production to the judgement that society is irrational and hinders the free 
development of individuals. In effect, Horkheimer is refusing to respect what has come 
to be known as the fact-value dichotomy, the idea that statements of fact about a 
society do not entail value judgements.9 This refusal, it should be noted, was 
8 Postscript to 'Traditional and Critical Theory', Critical Theory: Selected £ssays, 
p.246 
9 Marcuse makes a similar point when he writes: "All materi~l~st conce~ts contain 
an accusation and an imperative." See 'The Concept of E~sence In "!egatlOn .... ~.86. 
This finds an echo in Adorno's comment that: "Reality, the object of socIetal 
knowledge, can no more be imperative-free [Sollensfreies] or merely existent 
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developed in conscious opposition to the radically distinct account of science offered 
by positivist philosophers. Indeed, it can be safely said that hostility to positivism in all 
of its guises was to remain a central defming feature of both early and late variants of 
first-generation critical theory. 
Now although the Frankfurt School's critique of the positivist position is complex and 
exists in a variety of forms, what is always common to their argument is the complete 
rejection of the positivist notion that science is defined by its attitude of value-freedom 
( Wertfreiheit ) towards the object of theory.1O The classic site of this critique is 
undoubtedly Horkheimer's programmatic piece "Traditional and Critical Theory" 
written in the mid-1930s. This article begins with a description of a certain highly 
influential conception of scientific knowledge, in effect a meta-theory of science, 
which Horkheimer denotes by the use of the term "traditional theory". 11 Here it is 
important to emphasise that what concerns Horkheimer is not so much the adequacy 
or otherwise of this account with respect to the scientific study of the natural world, 
but rather the illicit and often ideologically motivated attempt to apply a specific 
[Daseindes] - it only becomes the latter though the disections of abstraction - than can 
the values be nailed into a firmament of ideas." See 'On the Logic of the Social 
Sciences' in The Positivist Dispute in German SOCiology, p.117. 
10 This aspect of Frankfurt Marxi~f!l has be~~ recogni~ed, b~ a num~er of 
commentators. Thus Martin Jay, descnbmg the cntlcal theonsts dIspute With the 
Hegelian tradition writes: " A genuine materialism as the Frankfurt Schoo~ always 
contended, also had an ethical function; it must regist~r and draw on the suffen~gs Cl!ld 
needs of contingent human subjects rather than explam them away through a hlstono-
philosophical theodicy." See Jay's Adorno, p.S9. 
11 At the time of writing, Horkheimer believed that t~is parti.c~l~r conception of 
science found its clearest expression in the work of the logtcal POSItIVIst movement. 
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"regulative idea of the natural sciences" to all other domains of knowledge. 12 His 
argument should not therefore be construed as a critique of science in general, but 
rather as an attempt to refute a particular epistemological dogma, namely that a theory 
of society, if it is to be an adequate theory, should be constructed after the fashion of 
the natural sciences. 13 For Horkheimer, as for other members of the Frankfurt School 
, 
the norms which govern the development of social theory can never be the same as 
those which hold sway in the natural sciences, for the reason that the relation between 
the subject and object of a theory of society is quite unlike the relation between the 
subject and object of a natural scientific theory. 
Returning, however, to the matter at hand, we note that according to Horkheimer the 
notion of a traditional theory has its origins in Cartesianism, and more specifically in 
Descartes' belief that the axiomatic system characteristic of mathematical thought 
constitutes the appropriate norm for every kind of theoretical knowledge. 14 Thus in 
accordance with this standard, traditional theory regards science as a system of general 
12 Bernstein, R.J., The Restrncturing of Social and Political Theory, p.179. It should 
be noted, however, that Horkheimer's usage of the term is somewhat confusing 
because, on occasion, he describes specific sciences, for example physics, as 
traditional theories. The term is therefore being used in two senses:- (a) to denote a 
specific regulative ideal of science and (b) to refer to theories which satisfy this idea.I. 
This ambiguity is not, however, damaging to the argument because the context IS 
usually sufficient to resolve it. I shall therefore follow Horkheimer in this respect by 
using the term to denote both the natural sciences in general as well as a specific meta-
theoretical tradition which has sought to define those sciences. 
13 Unlike Engels, and some of his followers, the Frankfurt. Scho?l had no inter~st in 
offering their own account of the nat.ural scienc~s. Horkhelmer, In fact, l~ave~ ~t an 
open question as to whether these sCiences can In fact be understood as traditIOnal 
theories" . 
14 See for example Descartes, 'Discourse on Method' in Descartes Philosophical 
Writings, pp.20-23. 
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propositions whose validity is to be tested by comparing singular propositions, 
logically derivable from the theory, with observational experience. IS Typically these 
theories contain a small number of fundamental principles and basic concepts from 
which the rest of theory is developed, and insofar as these principles, or laws, admit of 
precise quantitative expression, the development can proceed in a rigorous 
mathematical fashion. Here, as I have already indicated, the paradigm is that of 
mathematical physics; Horkheimer refers to it as "the theory of natural science in the 
strictest sense", and it is this ideal to which other branches of natural science are 
supposed to aspire. As he observes: "The derivation as usually practised in 
mathematics is to be applied to all science. The order in the world is captured by a 
chain of deductive thought. ,,16 In this respect Horkheimer's account owes something to 
Husserl's earlier critique of the Galilean scientific program, the aim of which, 
according to Husserl, is to present "the completely new idea of mathematical natural 
science". 17 Conceived of in this fashion, science seeks to eliminate qualitative concepts 
in favour of quantitative concepts, and thereby reduce our description of the world to 
the measurement of variables such as mass, position, velocity and so on. Although 
Husserl was ready to admit that Galilean science had achieved a considerable degree 
of instrumental success, he argued that it was a fundamental philosophical error to try 
to establish it as a foundational model for knowledge. Philosophers, and scientists, 
who took this view were overlooking the fact that the scientific consciousness 
15 'Traditional and Critical Theory' in Critical Theory: Selected Euays. pp.188 -
194. 
16 Ibid. p.189. 
17 Husserl, E., The Crisis of Furopean Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology, pp. 22-23. 
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represents an abstraction from the ontologically prior "life-world" (LebeIlSH'e/t), the 
world of lived experience which is resistant to quantitative reduction. I8 In summary, 
for HusserI the mistake of the Galilean program is to downgrade the subjective in 
favour of a discourse concerning objective nature, and in so doing to reduce the life-
world to the realm of mere appearance. 
Now whatever the merits or otherwise of HusserI's argument, it is undoubtedly true 
that in the twentieth century the Galilean-Cartesian program described above was 
taken up and enthusiastically pursued by a large number of philosophers and scientists. 
The axiomatic-deductive conception of theory can be found, for instance, in the work 
of the early Wittgenstein. Thus in the Tractatus he writes: 
Mechanics determines one form of description of the world by saying that all 
propositions used in the description of the world must be obtained in a given 
way from a given set of propositions - the axioms of mechanics. It thus 
supplies the bricks for building the edifice of science ... (6.341) 
Mechanics is an attempt to construct according to a single plan all the true 
propositions that we need for the description of the world. (6.343) 
According to Wittgenstein, a scientific theory such as Newton's mechanics consists of 
a set of entirely general statements describing the behaviour of certain kinds of objects 
18 As we shaH see Horkheimer has a somewhat similar critique .ofthe pretensions of 
traditional theory, but in place of the Husserlian notion of the hfe-world he accords 
primacy to the materialist concept of social being. 
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under certain quantitatively specified conditions. These statements constitute the 
fundamental laws or axioms of the theory, and together with logic enable the scientist 
to derive a series of propositions which describe the world by asserting the existence 
or non-existence of particular states of affairs. Indeed, for Wittgenstein, a genuine 
scientific theory is a purely descriptive enterprise, yielding through a process of 
deduction, propositions which say how things are in the world. Positivist followers of 
Wittgenstein, such as Carnap, took the argument of the Tractatus one step further and 
claimed that all genuine science can be reduced to a certain kind of description, namely 
a physicalist description of the world. Thus Carnap argued that a physicalist language 
is a potentially universal language, and that "if we adopt the language of physics as ... 
the language of science, then all science turns into physics" .19 
At this, its most extreme point, the program of traditional theory urges the creation of 
a unified science, each part of which must be expressible, at least in principle, in the 
language of physicalism. This kind of scientism, in effect a return to the atomistic 
mechanism criticised by Hegel, was anathema to Horkheimer and his Institute 
colleagues. Although they readily acknowledged that the natural sciences, and physics 
in particular, had proved immensely successful in understanding and mastering nature, 
they argued nonetheless that this theoretical tradition is of very limited use for 
comprehending social phenomena. However, as both Horkheimer and Marcuse 
recognised, the immense practical success of sciences like physics or biology had led 
many philosophers and social theorists to suppose that advance in the social sciences 
19 Erkenntnis, 3, 1932, p.l08. 
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consists in the latter becoming as much like the former as possible20 In essence. this is 
the positivist approach to social theory~ a program which originates in the nineteenth 
century with the work of Comte and to this day remains influential for many social 
scientists. It is, however, an approach that the Frankfurt School consistently sought to 
challenge. In opposition to positivist social theory they argued that the form and 
content of a theory define each other, and that in particular the form of a social theory 
must reflect the fact that its content consists of the way in which the human subject 
relates in thought and action to the world that surrounds it. For Marxists, this relation 
is to be understood first and foremost in terms of praxis, the act of self-realisation by 
means of which the subject defines itself in relation to both society and nature. 
Furthermore, and as we have seen, this process of self-production cannot be treated in 
mechanistic terms, that is as something that can be described without reference to the 
various forms of socially-mediated consciousness through which the subject 
understands and indeed constructs its activity. On the contrary, understanding in this 
context necessarily involves an appeal to the self-understanding of the subject. In short 
the social sciences, unlike the natural sciences, are concerned with a form of activity, 
namely the life process of society, marked out by its essentially self-reflexive nature. 
By itself, however, this kind of argument is not sufficient to distinguish the Frankfurt 
School from other critics of scientistic social theory. It has, for instance, become 
something of a common-place amongst certain philosophers of social science, as well 
as sociologists, that social theory needs to take account of the intelltiollal structure of 
20 'Traditional and Critical Theory' in Critical Theory: Selected Essays. pp.190-
191. 
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social action.
21 
Thus from a Wittgensteinian perspective, Peter Winch writes: ":\ 
man's social relations with his fellows are permeated with his ideas about reality. 
Indeed 'permeated' is hardly a strong enough word: social relations are expressions of 
ideas about reality. ,,22 In fact, for Winch no account of a social relation can be 
adequate if it fails to consider the meaning which that relation has for the subjects who 
participate in it. This leads him to conclude that "even if it is legitimate to speak of 
one's understanding of a mode of social activity as consisting in knowledge of 
regularities, the nature of this knowledge must be very different from the nature of the 
knowledge of physical regularities. ,,23 Thus like the Frankfurt School, Winch rejects 
the notion of a "unity of the sciences", the idea that there is a common methodological 
stance applicable not only to nature but also to the social life process. Furthermore this 
rejection, in both cases, depends upon a shared belief in the importance of coming to 
terms with the fact that forms of social activity are constituted by forms of 
consciousness, in other words that the way in which subjects comprehend a social 
relation is internal to the relation itself Horkheimer, however, would want to deny the 
claim that "social relations are expressions of ideas about reality", at least if this means 
that a society is to be understood uncritically in terms of the prevailing principles and 
norms of that society?4 On the contrary, for Horkheimer, as for other members of the 
21 The theoretical basis for this tradition can be found in the work of amongst 
others Weber, Husserl and the late Wittgenstein. 
22 The Idea of a Social Science, p.23. 
23 Ibid, p.88. 
24 Whether this latter day version of idealism can ,fairly be attributed to Winch j" 
open to some dispute. To pursue this partic~lar question, however, would represent a 
substantial diversion from the argument of this chapter. 
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Frankfurt School, the principal function of a social theory is to interrogate forms of 
social consciousness, to point to the way in which these ideas conflict with the reality 
they purport to describe. In summary, critical theory is concerned to explore the gulf 
between thought and social being, between our conception of the world and the way 
that the world actually is. 
However, before discussing the nature of this project there is another aspect of the 
traditional scientific model which requires consideration. According to Horkheimer, 
this model imposes substantive as well as formal restrictions upon what is to count as 
a scientific theory. This has already been hinted at when it was said that a scientific 
theory organised as an axiomatic-deductive system yields propositions that describe 
the world~ more accurately, it should have been said that science only yields certain 
kinds of propositions, namely propositions that describe the world. This, of course, is 
the familiar claim that genuine science maintains a clear separation of questions of fact 
from questions of value, that it is a descriptive rather than a critical-evaluative activity. 
In the language of traditional theory, science is a purely objective discipline, detached 
from any kind of normative involvement with whatever its subject matter might 
happen to be. Obviously this is a very strong claim but, I would argue, difficult to 
sustain in the face of abundant historical evidence indicating the involvement of both 
scientists and scientific theories in the life process of society, and in particular with the 
process of material production. As Horkheimer puts it: "neither the direction nor 
methods of [scientific] theory nor its object, reality itself, are independent of man. ,,25 
What this observation points to is the essential socio-historical character of science, 
25 'Notes on Science and the Crisis' in Critical Theory: Selected f,'ssays, p4 
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and in consequence that its methods, concerns, applications and so forth are inevitably 
conditioned by a variety of political, social and economic interests, a conditioning 
which undermine its claim to value neutrality. The standard response to this fact, on 
the part of those who seek to defend the value-free conception of science, is to urge a 
distinction between science as a social institution and science as a body of theory. 
Thus considered as an institution, it is accepted that science is influenced by as well as 
influences the wider social setting in which it occurs. But this in no way compromises 
the value freedom of scientific theory per se. On this account judgements of value, 
insofar as they appear in the work of the individual scientist, are illegitimate additions 
to a body of theory that simply describes how the world is. 
The above defence of the Wertfreiheit thesis depends upon an argument which can be 
summarised as follows: that judgements of fact can be distinguished from judgements 
of value because the latter are not descriptive, that, as Wittgenstein would put it, they 
do not assert or deny the existence of any particular state of affairs (Sachverhalten). 
Indeed, according to the Tractatus there is strictly speaking no such thing as an ethical 
proposition because a proposition, if it is to have meaning, must represent by means of 
its pictorial form a possible state of affairs. Value judgements are not pictures in this 
sense, and thus Wittgenstein concludes that ethics can only serve to suggest or to 
"make manifest" in some fashion what cannot be put into words. 26 Now of course it 
would be wrong to suggest that all those philosophers who sharply distinguish 
description from evaluation would take this line. On the contrary, some would argue 
that ethical propositions serve to express attitudes that we have to particular actions or 
26 Tractatus, 6.522. 
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states of affairs, whilst others would maintain that ethical discourse is based upon the 
category of the imperative. But whatever theory of ethics the positivist holds, they will 
steadfastly maintain that science, insofar as it aims to produce a description of how the 
world is, can have no room for judgements of value. This is because these judgements, 
whatever other role they might play in our lives, cannot be understood as picturing the 
world, as either asserting the existence or non-existence of some particular state of 
affairs. In short, what a theory says about how the world is exhausts its meaning, and 
conversely meaning is attributed to a theory, insofar as it has something to say about 
the world as it exists. 
This conception of science, it should be noted, is in general accordance with 
Horkheimer's account of traditional theory. Thus according to Horkheimer, scientists 
try to develop laws which describe the behaviour of, for instance, a physical or 
biological system, and because these laws have a universal character, they will support 
predictions concerning the future behaviour of the system. In doing this, scientists 
have no conception of how a system ought to behave: the system simply behaves as it 
does. For traditional theory, there is no sense in supposing that science could ever 
yield principles or laws to which the natural world ought to conform but which 
unfortunately fail to describe the world as it is. On this account, then, if a scientific 
theory departs from what we experience, then so much the worse for the theory. To 
summarise, the positivist project of a value- free science is, in effect, founded upon a 
typically atomistic strategy: on the one hand there are statements of fact and on the 
other there are statements of value, and each can be produced and comprehended 
without reference to the other. In what follows we shall see that the above argument 
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breaks down, and that the attempt to rigidly distinguish fact from value is the result of 
a failure to grasp the process of social life as a totality in which forms of consciousness 
and being consistently penetrate and constitute each other. 
Immanent Critique 
One of the ways in which Horkheimer seeks to mark the distinction between 
traditional scientific thought and Marx's critical theory of society is by claiming that 
the latter is governed by a commitment to the goal of a rational society: a form of life 
in which the productive activity of individuals is consciously integrated into a system 
of social labour directed towards the satisfaction of real human interests and needs. 
Such a commitment, Horkheimer argues, becomes ever more urgent as human labour 
falls under the control of an instrumentalist logic of production increasingly divorced 
from any kind of substantive rationality. This is not to say that Horkheimer believed 
that late capitalist society is a completely irrational social form. On the contrary, he 
took the position that although society as a whole is characterised by a dangerous 
irrationality, the parts of that totality may nevertheless be the result of a significant 
degree of calculation, planning and intentionality. Thus in a limited sense capitalism is 
a rational system, insofar as the individual units of production are organised according 
to principles of instrumental rationality~ however, in a global sense this social form is 
irrational by virtue of the fact that productive activity, considered as a whole, is not 
oriented towards the promotion of human welfare. 27 Now at first sight this stance of 
radical rejectionism seems to condemn itself as a typical piece of utopianism, as a 
27 See Horkheimer's 'Traditional and Critical Theory' in ('ritical Theory: Selected 
Essays, p.203. 
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largely impotent desire to defy the logic of historical conditions. After all if the world 
is so thoroughly dominated by the commodity form, if all or most human activity has 
been reduced to a kind of "pseudo-practice" in which means are efficiently tied to a set 
of ends unrelated to the creation of the good society, then the prospect of a different 
order of things appears as something entirely extraneous to our contemporary form of 
life. Indeed, this has led certain critics to argue that Horkheimer's rejectionism is a 
critique which is bereft of any real persuasive force, that it is founded upon premises 
which nobody, at least under the circumstances described by the Frankfurt School, 
would be in a position to accept. 28 Some might even say that it is a perfect example of 
the kind of futile imperative thinking that Hegel has in mind when he makes the 
following observation: 
A further word on the subject of issuing instructions on how the world ought 
to be: philosophy, at any rate, always comes too late to perform this function. 
As the thought of the world, it appears only at a time when actuality has gone 
through its formative process and attained its complete state. 29 
The clear suggestion here is that the task of philosophy is to serve as a spectator of "a 
shape of life that has grown old", to articulate and discover the rationality of the 
concrete ethic informing that shape rather than to criticise, much less contribute, to the 
transformation of that which has become actual. In other words, philosophers are 
28 Marcuse, for instance, speaks of the 'Happy Consciousness', a m.ode ofthough.t 
"which reflects the belief that the real is rational, and that the establIshed system, tn 
spite of everything, delivers the goods." (One Dimensional Man, p.79.) 
29 F./emel1ts of the Philosophy of Right, Preface, p.23. 
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engaged in an essentially descriptive exercise: they seek to interpret the world rather 
than change it. If this view is correct then the work of the Frankfurt School is doubly 
flawed: not only are judgements of value illicitly imported into the sphere of scientific 
study as positivism would charge, but their critique of contemporary life must be seen 
as a misguided attempt to "issue instructions" to a society that has firmly secured its 
existence, and has thereby legitimated itself 30 
Against this negative assessment of critical theory I shall argue that the Frankfurt 
School's concern for a rational society is not the expression of a subjective preference, 
of a wish on the part of a small number of socially isolated intellectuals, Hegel's 
"beautiful souls", that things might be otherwise, but rather a consequence of an 
immanent critical engagement with the world as it exists. 31 A critique of this kind takes 
as its starting point the fundamental conceptions that a society has about itself, and on 
this basis seeks to demonstrate that the self-understanding of that society, including its 
characteristic mode of legitimation, systematically diverges from its real existence. 
Now for the Frankfurt School, Marx's critique of political economy is a paradigmatic 
example of this kind of argument. 32 Thus according to Marx, early capitalist society 
30 This is in effect Kolakowski's criticism when he writes that "The Frankfurt 
philosophers were on weak ground ... in their. constan! proclamation. of ~n ideal 
'emancipation' which was never properly explamed. T~s. created the llluSl?n ~hat 
while condemning 'reification', exchange value, commerclalised culture and SClentlsm 
they were offering something else instead, whereas the most they were actually 
offering was nostalgia for the pre-capitalist culture of an elite." (Main Currents of 
Marxism: rolume 3, p.39S.) 
31 See Hegel's Phenomenology §632-671 for a discussion of this form of socially-
disengaged Romantic consciousness. Cf Terry Pinkard's Hegel's Phenomenology: 
The Sociality of Reasoll, pp.213-220. 
32 As Adorno puts it, Marx: "shows that the society which develops on the basis of 
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found the theoretical expreSSIon of its fundamental constitutive principles in the 
tradition of classical political economy initiated by Smith and Ricardo. For this 
tradition, the central organisational principle of the newly emergent bourgeois society 
is that individual commodity owners relate to each other under conditions of free and 
equal exchange. In place of the forced transfer of goods and labour characteristic of 
feudalism, the political economists celebrate the progressive nature of a society of 
universal exchange in which items are freely transferred from one party to another on 
the basis of equality of value. Indeed for Smith, it is through the existence of 
institutions of exchange that the highly developed and complex division of labour 
characteristic of capitalist societies comes into being and forms the basis for the 
subsequent general expansion of wealth. As he observes: "it is the power of 
exchanging that gives occasion to the divisions of labour, so the extent of this division 
must always be limited by the extent of that power, or, in other words, by the extent of 
the market. ,,33 Over time this division of labour leads to a system of genuinely social 
labour, where producers do not produce use values directly for themselves but instead 
produce for the purpose of exchange. Thus it can be said that an individual's needs are 
satisfied by the labour of others, whilst the individual's labour contributes as a fraction 
towards the satisfaction of social demand considered as a whole. This fact greatly 
impressed Hegel, who cast it as an important moment in the development of civil 
such principles [free and equal exchange] contradicts these. pri~ciple~ w~lst the 
realisation of these principles would supers~de .the form ?~ SOCIety Itself. ThIS 9u~te 
from the Philosophical Fragments appears m Simon Jarvts A1orno, p.SO. I~ a SImilar 
fashion Horkheimer tersely observes that: "Marx ... explamed the realIty of the 
ideology of bourgeois economy in the dissection of official ec~nomy. He dlsc?vere.d 
the secret of the economy itself Smith and Ricardo are dIsposed of, SOCIety IS 
indicted." ('The Authoritarian State' in The Essential Frankjilrt School Reader, 
p.108.) 
33 The Wealth of Nations: Vol I, p 15. 
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society. Describing this mode of connection between individuals he identifies the 
following principle: "The mediation of need and the satisfaction of the individual (des 
Einzelnen) through his own work and through the work and satisfaction of the needs 
of all the others - the system of needs. ,,34 Indeed, Hegel went on to celebrate the 
achievements of this system of needs - in other words exchange society - by declaring 
that it is: "the manifestation of rationality", that it represents the form of production 
best suited to the realisation of the individual subject. It should, however, be added 
that he was by no means uncritical of this form, for whilst celebrating the market he 
cautions that "this is also the field in which the understanding, with its subjective ends 
and moral opinions gives vent to its discontent and moral irritation.,,35 For this reason, 
amongst others, Hegel came to the conclusion that a fully rational society would 
require the state to stand over and above civil society so as to mediate between the 
conflicting claims of individuals to which the "system of needs" inevitably gives rise. 36 
Hegel's defence of the state came under criticism from the young Marx, who argued 
that the discontent arising from the bourgeois system of production is more than a 
conflict between, as Hegel puts it, the "subjective ends and moral opinions" of 
individuals, that it represents a conflict grounded paradoxically enough in the very 
achievement of exchange society. Now to fully understand Marx's critique of the 
34 FJements of the Philosophy of Right, § 188. 
35 Op.cit., § 189. 
36 Commenting upon this element in Hegel's thought Adorn~ writes: "This is why 
Hegel's idolization of the state should not be trivialised by bem~ tre.ate~ as. a ~ere 
empirical abberation or an irrelevant addendum. Rather th~t. Idoh~atlOn IS Itself 
produced by insight into the fact that the contradictions of cIVIl sO~lety canno.t be 
resolved by its self-movement." See 'Aspects of Hegel's Philosophy' III HeRe/: lhrcc 
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bourgeois order it is necessary to understand that his argument is founded upon an 
investigation into the historical reality of that society, which reveals how it first came 
into being and developed into a mature social form. Thus for M~ the problem with 
the above analysis is that it does not describe a developed capitalist society but rather a 
pre-capitalist system of petty commodity production in which individuals possess, on 
however small a scale, their own means of production, and in consequence are not 
compelled to sell their labour power to others. By contrast, a mature capitalism is a 
society in which the great mass of producers have nothing to exchange other than their 
labour power, and are therefore forced to sell it to the small minority of the population 
who happen to own the means of production. 
It is at this point that Marx's critique comes into play, for it demonstrates that the 
exchange relation, if generalised to human labour power, results in the development of 
a pervasive inequality between a class which purchases labour power, and a class 
forced to sell its labour on pain of social degradation or worse. Here the worker's 
formal freedom to sell their own labour power masks a substantial degree of 
compulsion; for where the great majority of society have been separated from the 
control and ownership of the means of production, that majority has no realistic option 
but to offer its labour power to those who might wish to buy it. 37 This is not to say 
that Marx believed that there is no sense in which labour under capitalism can be 
Studies, p.28. 
37 As G. A. Cohen puts it: "The proletarian has the legal right to refuse to w~rk .for 
any given capitalist, and also the legal right to refus~ to work !or all capltahs~s 
whatsoever. But he has no power matching the second nght, for he IS fo~ce~, on paI~ 
of death by starvation, to work for some or other member of the capitalIst class. 
(Karl Marx's Theory of History, (Oxford: 1978), p. 240.) 
292 
spoken of as free labour; as he himself points out, a slave, unlike a wage-labourer, is 
not the legal owner of their labour power but rather the property of the slave owner. 
By way of contrast, the wage-labourer and capitalist meet freely in the market-place to 
mutually determine a contract regulating the act of exchange which is to take place. 
Concerning this encounter between the buyer and seller of labour power, he observes: 
"They contract as free agents, and the agreement they come to, is but the form in 
which they give legal expression to their common will.,,38 However, in the context of 
Marx's overall argument this statement has a clearly ironic intent, for it is situated 
within a discussion that points to the severely limited sense in which the seller of 
labour power can be described as a free agent. Thus according to Marx, capitalists and 
workers do not confront one another as equals in the market place: by and large 
individual representatives of the former social class enter this process with necessarily 
more bargaining power than those individuals who are compelled to sell their labour 
power. The presence of this kind of coercion so Marx would argue, points to a 
substantial conflict between the concept of free exchange and the practice to which the 
concept is supposed to apply. Furthermore, according to Marx, the transaction 
between capitalists and workers results in the appropriation of the surplus product by a 
particular social class, an appropriation which further reinforces the domination of that 
class over the rest of society, and which gives the lie to the notion that exchange is the 
exchange of items that are unproblematically equivalent. Indeed Marx thought that his 
greatest achievement was to demonstrate how, on the basis of equal values exchanging 
for equal values the capitalist class is nevertheless able to extract surplus value from 
the labour that it employs. Thus although workers receive the full value of their labour 
38 Capital: Volume I, p.172. 
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power, they remain victims of exploitation for they do not receive the full value of that 
which they have produced. In this sense, the sale and purchase of labour is founded 
upon the same familiar and fundamental inequality of every class society, namely the 
capacity of a ruling class to extract surplus labour from the mass of producers. 
F or Marx, then, the consequence of free and equal exchange is its antithesis, exchange 
that is coerced and unequal. Now for the Frankfurt School what is compelling about 
this critique is that it does not rely upon any external normative reference points, but 
uses the very logic of the commodity form to confront the principle constitutive rules 
of exchange society. In other words, the dialectic of the commodity form, as it is 
developed in Capital, reveals that the very principle of bourgeois society breaks down 
once we begin to examine its claim that all exchange is free and equal. Thus Marx's 
critique does not proceed by selecting one set of norms from amongst others, but 
rather begins from a specific socio-historical context, and by comparing the 
characteristic self-understanding of that context with its reality, demonstrates the 
contradictory nature of that society. This observation should go some way towards 
refuting the objections of those critics who charge that Frankfurt Marxism relies upon 
extra-historical normative standards in order to mount its critique of capitalist society. 
On the contrary, whatever persuasive force critical theory possesses, it does so by 
virtue of the fact that it speaks the language of classical bourgeois society, that it 
mounts its critique on the basis of the traditional Enlightenment norms of Freedom, 
Equality and Fraternity. This strategy is what lies behind Horkheimer's remark that 
philosophy must take "existing values seriously"~ for in taking such values seriously, 
the critic can explore the tension that exists between what is and what our concepts 
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tell us ought to be the case. As he observes: 
It [philosophy] opposes the breach between ideas and reality. Philosophy 
confronts the existent, in its historical context, with the claim of its conceptual 
principles, in order to criticise the relation between the two and thus transcend 
them. 39 
From what has so far been argued, then, it should be clear that critical theory regards 
itself as a form of consciousness derived internally from the self-understanding of 
society. Now if this true, then it follows that the critical theorist is not faced with the 
task of justifying one particular normative system against another equally viable but 
opposing system. On the contrary, the theorist has only to recognise the self declared 
norms of bourgeois society (i. e., freedom, legal equality and property rights) in order 
to initiate a critique of that society. As Horkheimer puts it, critical theorists "interpret 
the economic categories of work, value and production exactly as they are interpreted 
in the existing order .. , at the same time they consider it rank dishonesty simply to 
accept the interpretation ... ".40 Later, Horkheimer describes this approach as the· 
"critical acceptance of the categories which rule social life", by which he means to say 
that the practice of immanent critique begins by adopting the very principles which it 
will eventually seek to overthrow. Thus Marx's analysis of the commodity form, and 
more especially his description of the evolutionary logic of that form from petty 
commodity production to monopoly capital, is an analysis that is particularly fateful to 
39 The F;clipse of Reason, p.182. 
40 'Critical and Traditional Theory' in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, p.208. 
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the capitalist order, for whilst it is based upon the very principles which are 
constitutive of bourgeois society it concludes by pointing to the need for a radical 
transformation of that particular social form. 
Immanence, Transcendence and Totality 
The above interpretation of Marxian political economy as a theory that refuses to 
accept the conventional boundaries of thought, that simultaneously posits itself as 
description and critique, is central not only to Horkheimer's thought but also to that of 
Marcuse and Adorno. Neither theorist, however, is content simply to restate 
Horkheimer's original formulation of the concept of critical theory; on the contrary, 
both of them, albeit in different ways, seek to extend as well as clarify the argument 
first presented in the pages of the Zeitschrift. Now although a comprehensive 
examination of their work is beyond the scope of this thesis I shall, in the final half of 
this chapter, try to say something concerning the respective contributions of these two 
thinkers to the idea of a critical theory of society. In this section I want to consider 
what Adorno has to say concerning both the nature and in particular the coherence of 
that project. This discussion will focus upon the version of critical theory developed by 
Adorno, and in particular upon his construction of that theory as a form of radical 
scepticism concerning the legitimacy of the socially-constructed conceptual universe 
we inhabit. In the course of my discussion, Adorno's approach to the practice of 
critique will be compared and contrasted, albeit somewhat briefly, with that of 
normative transcendentalism: a doctrine which in recent times has been re\ ived 
through the work of Jurgen Habermas. Against the transcendentalist, I shall seek to 
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defend Adorno's notion of a dialectic as a practice that is simultaneously immanent to 
but critical of the very social life process from which it arises. Clearly this strate~ is 
similar to Horkheimer's account of immanent critique which has just been considered. 
Thus according to Adorno: 
The theory of second nature, to which Hegel already gave a critical tinge, is 
not lost to a negative dialectics. It assumes, tel que I, the abrupt immediacy, the 
formations which society and its evolution present to our thought; and it does 
this so that analysis may bare its mediations to the extent of the immanent 
difference between phenomena and that which they claim to be in 
themselves. ,,41 (Italics mine) 
Hence for Adorno dialectic must comply with the requirement of immanence, and 
therefore begin by describing the gulf that exists between the existing conceptual order 
of society and the world that that form of consciousness purports to represent. As he 
puts it: 
The name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, than that objects do not go 
into their concepts without leaving a remainder, that they come to contradict 
the traditional norm of adequacy ... Contradiction ... indicates the untruth of 
identity, the fact that the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived 42 
41 Negative Dialectics, p.38. 
42 0' 5 p.Ctt., p. . 
297 
Rather like Socratic enquiry, this form of critique interrogates concepts by contrasting 
their extension with the criteria governing their application: the portion of the criteria 
which remains unfilled constitutes the challenge of a critical theory. The resulting 
discrepancy, or "remainder", is the first premise of a rigorously internal critique of the 
theory in which the concepts figure. Dialectics therefore is premised upon an 
awareness of the conflict, -Adorno would say, guilt - which consciousness experiences 
in the attempt to apply concepts to the existing world. By contrast, ideology makes the 
false claim that the object corresponds to, or is identical with its concept: that, for 
instance, exchange under capitalism occurs under conditions of freedom and equality. 
In the language of Adorno's negative dialectic, the critical consciousness is one that 
rejects the claims of identity thinking (Identitaatsdenken) and in particular its premise 
that concept (Begrif/) and object (Gegenstand) stand in a relation of harmonious 
correspondence. 
Adorno's conception of dialectic can be usefully contrasted with an alternative 
tradition of critical thought, namely that which is founded upon some notion or 
standard of an autonomous reason. This kind of critique is essentially transcendent in 
character, for it brings an external standard to bear upon its object rather than 
standards that are contextually determined by the object itself Kant's Categorical 
Imperative, with its purely formal criterion of morality, and more recently Habermas' 
notion of the 'ideal speech situation', suggest themselves as examples of 
transcendentally-grounded criticism. Doubtless, part of the appeal of this approach is 
that it seems to require a greater degree of intellectual creativity. The critic must first 
discover or deduce the ground upon which the argument is to occur, instead of having 
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to start from principles determined by the accident of historical context. Indeed many 
of Marx's early utopian rivals took precisely this approach and developed their critique 
of capitalist society from supposedly universal principles of morality and rationality, 
such as natural rights, distributional equity and so forth, rather than from the 
categories and values of bourgeois political economy which form the starting point of 
Capital. However, this freedom that criticism grants itself is largely illusory. Thought 
that is external to its context soon discovers that the grounds of its critique need not 
and logically ought not to be recognised by the society against which it is directed. As 
Hegel observes with respect to philosophy, the refutation "that proceeds from 
assumptions lying outside of the [philosophical] system and inconsistent with it" has 
little or no persuasive force if the system being criticised refuses "to recognise those 
assumptions". Against this, the transcendent critic may reply that the very purpose 
behind their critique is to exhibit principles that compel universal assent, or at least 
assent that is universal with respect to subjects following principles of cognitive 
rationality. But this rejoinder simply displaces the immanent-transcendent dispute over 
ethical norms to another dispute over epistemological norms. The strength of critical 
theory is that it takes as its starting point the object's own experience of itself, and 
thus avoids the dilemma faced by transcendent critics, who discover that the principles 
upon which their criticism is founded do not mesh with the society to whom they 
speak. Of course, such a critic may object that this leaves critical theory without any 
ultimate foundations, and that in consequence it remains a prisoner of historical 
circumstance. But this objection misses the very point of the theory: that it is a theory 
that refuses any foundation other than real human activity. Asked to justify itself, 
critical theory will point to the historical achievement of Enlightenment, the agenda of 
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freedom and rationality that was first set but never completed during the birth of the 
bourgeois order. To insist from within Enlightenment that this agenda must also be 
justified is to make a senseless demand. As the inheritors of that tradition, we use 
these ideas as the framework of every inquiry that is to count as a nonnative enquiry. 
To suppose that there is something else that could justify our adherence to these 
standards is to suppose the impossible. Instead of seeking an a priori account of the 
nonns that we have, the task of philosophy is to engage immanently with those nonns 
and in doing so to become a force for their complete realisation. 
Such a strategy, it should be noted, is in full accord with Hegel's belief that all thought 
begins in situ, and that in consequence the traditional philosophical quest to find a 
vantage point that is external to our conceptual system is a wholly misguided 
enterprise. As he observes: 
Since consciousness thus finds that its knowledge does not correspond to its 
object, the object itself does not stand the test; in other words, the criterion for 
testing is altered when that for which it was to have been the criterion fails to 
pass the test; and the testing is not only a testing of what we know, but also a 
testing of the criterion of what knowing is.43 
Thus by exploring, so to speak, from within, we presuppose only an ability to 
recognise when the criteria governing the application of a concept are fulfilled (or 
not); if this cannot be presupposed, then any kind of thought is simply impossible. 
43 Phenomenology, §85. 
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Critical theory adopts a similar strategy~ it begins with an existing form of social 
consciousness, including existing standards of rational enquiry, and seeks to 
demonstrate that by its own internal standards this form of consciousness is inadequate 
with respect to its object, that the attempt to consistently think this consciousness 
leads to contradiction. Despite therefore what certain critics of the Frankfurt School 
have maintained, critical theory is not dogged by any requirement for a transcendental 
standard against which society may be judged~ on the contrary the theory is grounded 
in pre-existing thought and has no assumptions other than those which society has 
about itself This last observation raises the question of the relation between the 
normative order that critical theory champions and the subject-object totality discussed 
in previous chapters. By way of an answer, we may say that the norms which define 
this order are, although currently inadequately realised, central to the maintenance of 
that totality. Thus unlike conventional socio-ethical theories which develop principles 
in abstraction from the concrete historical situation, critical materialism commences its 
argument with forms of consciousness that are actually constitutive of the social life 
process. In doing this, the theory poses an inescapable challenge to the society it 
confronts, for the questions it poses are questions which are internal to the form of life 
itself By contrast to the utopian, the critical theorist seeks to initiate a discussion 
directed towards the extension and deepening of the very norms which bourgeois 
society itself triumphantly proclaims. 
In this sense critical theory is a moment that is internal to the social totality: it 
represents the movement of consciousness towards a more adequate understanding of 
the world that human activity has created. Thus as we produce society, we necessarily 
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construct a conceptual and intentional order reflected in a variety of forms of social 
consciousness constituting the subjective pole of the life process. Now the claim of 
ideology is that this order corresponds to reality, that the concept describes the object, 
that the intention is fulfilled by the concrete pattern of life characteristic of society. 
Against this optimism, the critical theorist returns to dialectical thought, to reflection 
upon the tensions, inconsistencies and contradictions within that order. Thus by 
articulating the various conflicts internal to a form of consciousness, the theory is at 
once part of that form but also the means whereby that consciousness can be 
transcended. In this fashion, critical theory overcomes the disabling duality of subject 
and object characteristic of positivist social theory, for like Hegelian dialectic it is not a 
method external to its object but an element in the life of the very society it seeks to 
comprehend, evaluate and ultimately transform. 
Of course, there is a sense in which this proposition is trivially true: any set of beliefs 
held about a society by members of that society, including those which result from 
adherence to specific social scientific theories, constitute a social phenomenon. Thus 
post-modernist theories concerning the nature of contemporary society are 
simultaneously theories about that reality as well as part of that reality. This leads to 
the thought that critical theory is simply one kind of theory amongst many, that it 
represents a certain specific "approach" to the social sciences which can be put 
alongside and compared with distinct and rival theoretical perspectives such as 
positivism, functionalism, ethnomethodology and so forth. However, in a comment 
upon this attempt to reduce the theory to yet another, albeit highly radical, conception 
of the social scientific enterprise Adorno writes: 
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No theory today escapes the marketplace. Each one is offered as a possibility 
amongst competing opinions; all are put up for choice~ all are swallowed. 
There are no blinders for thought to don against this, and the self-righteous 
conviction that my own theory is spared that fate will surely deteriorate into 
self-advertising. But neither need dialectics be muted by such rebuke, or by the 
concomitant charge of its superfluity, of being a method slapped on outwardly, 
at random. 44 
To understand Adorno's confident rejection of both of the above charges, we need to 
recall that critical theory comprehends itself not as a method external to the life of 
society, but as the conscious articulation of that life. Hence, far from being a method 
randomly slapped onto the social life process, dialectic is the means by which that 
process comes to recognise itself for what it is: dialectic is not a theory about the 
world but rather is part of the movement of the world itself Describing his conception 
of philosophy, Adorno writes: 
Philosophy would be debasing itself allover again ... if it were to fool itself 
and others about the fact that it must, from without, imbue its objects with 
whatever moves them from within it. What is waiting in the objects themselves 
needs such intervention to come to speak, with the perspective that the forces 
mobilised outside, and ultimately every theory that is brought to bear on the 
phenomena, should come to rest in the phenomena. In that sense, too, 
44 Negative Dialectics, pp. 4-5. 
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philosophical theory means that its own end lies in its realisation. 45 
This is an admirable summation of the means by which an immanent but critical theory 
becomes an emancipating moment in the process of a social totality. The theory begins 
from without, in that it seeks to reflect upon the life of its object, namely society~ but 
in doing this it is compelled to think in accordance with that society's own norms of 
rationality and human well-being. Nevertheless these norms, once subject to the 
process of dialectic, can be made to speak in such a fashion as to pose a threat to the 
established order. Rather like a psychoanalyst, the critical theorist seeks to reveal the 
latent content of the concepts which in part constitute the matrix of social relations, 
and in doing so the theorist lays the essential preconditions for the transformation of 
those relations. In effect, thought about reality has come to reside in reality, for it 
gives a new form of expression to the subject: from a state of acceptance of the world 
as it is the subject moves to one in which he or she understands that their existence is 
marked by exploitation and un-freedom. Ultimately it is this total commitment to the 
life of individuals in society, and more particularly to the discovery of the antagonistic 
nature of the reality that they inhabit, which renders Adorno's dialectic a paradigm of 
materialist thinking. For in exploring that antagonism, in allowing the object of 
thought to speak for itself, thought discovers that it is rooted in the non-conceptual. 
As he puts it: 
Freedom follows the subject's urge to express itself The need to lend a voice 
to suffering is a condition of all truth. For suffering is objectivity that weighs 
450p.cit. 
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upon the subject; its most subjective experience, its expression, is objectively 
conveyed. 46 
In making that experience of suffering conscious of itself, philosophy by means of 
interpretation takes the first step towards its abolition. 
From Theory to Praxis 
By way of conclusion to this thesis, I want to consider a potentially serious objection 
to the project of critical theory as it has been outlined above. Curiously, this objection 
gains whatever force it has from the Frankfurt School's own account of the nature of 
late capitalist society. In summary form, the objection can be put like this: if the 
Frankfurt analysis of the formation of social consciousness is correct, then the 
possibility of realising the emancipatory aspiration of critical theory must be rated as 
negligible, if not wholly non-existent. For the conclusion of their analysis is that late 
capitalist society, through a variety of means, has succeeded in its quest of 
ideologically dominating the great majority of the population. Thus although dissent 
based on the theory is possible, it is rendered politically meaningless because the class 
to whom the theory is addressed has become wholly incorporated into the present 
social order. 
This argument, whilst somewhat crude, nevertheless highlights a fundamental tension 
within the broad theoretical framework of Frankfurt Marxism. By way of illustration, I 
46 Op.cit. pp.17-18. 
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shall consider part of the general argument of Marcuse's Reason and Revolution. In a 
passage which reads very much like a piece of classical Marxism Marcuse writes: 
The implications of the free labour contract lead Marx to see that labour 
produces and perpetuates its own exploitation. In other words, in the 
continuing process of capitalist society, freedom produces and perpetuates its 
own opposite. The analysis is in this wise an immanent critique of individual 
freedom as it originates in capitalist society and as it develops pari passu with 
the development of capitalism. The economic forces of capitalism left to their 
own devices, create enslavement, poverty and the intensity of class conflicts. 
The truth of this form offreedom is thus its negation. 47 
Here we are on the familiar terrain of a critique mounted not from a utopian vantage 
point but from within a specific form of life. Furthermore, that critique is associated at 
least implicitly with the logic of the historical process: intensification of the class 
conflict between capital and labour is seen as one of the necessary outcomes of the 
process of capitalist accumulation. In a later preface to Reason and Revolution, 
Marcuse amplifies this thought and argues that dialectic, by uncovering the 
contradictions within social life: " ... is not only a critique of conformist logic, which 
denies the reality of contradiction; it is also a critique oj the given state of affairs 011 
its own grounds - of the established system of life which denies its promises and 
potentialities." 48(Italics mine) Now this particular formulation of the Frankfurt 
47 Reason and Revolution, p.309. 
48 'A Note on Dialectic' in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, p.44S. 
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position suggests that a critical theory of society is obliged not only to reveal the 
unfulfilled promise of a form of life - in other words, what it claims for itself - but also 
to identify the potential for the realisation of that promise. Hence for Marcuse the , 
critique of exchange society involves two distinct but nevertheless related tasks. First, 
the theory is obliged to demonstrate that that society stands in conflict with the very 
principles upon which it is constructed, or, as he puts it, that the critique of a state of 
affairs is developed on the basis of its own grounds. Second, that the theory succeeds 
in identifying the means by which this internal contlict might be resolved~ that in other 
words it reveals the possibility of the transformation of an existing but contradictory 
state of affairs into another state in which the contradiction between conception and 
reality is resolved. Commenting upon this requirement, Marcuse writes: 
Mere possibility belongs to the very character of reality~ it is not imposed by an 
arbitrary speculative act. The possible and the real are in a dialectical relation 
that requires a special condition in order to be operative, and that condition 
must be one in fact. For instance, if the existing relations within a given social 
system are unjust and inhuman, they are not offset by other realisable 
possibilities unless these other possibilities are also manifested as having their 
roots within that system. They must be present for example in the form of an 
obvious wealth of productive forces, a development of the material wants and 
desires of men, their advanced culture, their social and political maturity, and 
so on. In such a case, the possibilities are not only real ones, but represent the 
true content of the social system as against its immediate form of existence 4<) 
49 Reason and Revolution, pp.150-51. 
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The argument of this passage relies heavily upon the Hegelian notion of "real 
possibility": a form of modality that is not identical with logical possibility, but rather 
reflects or is mediated by the nature or essence of that which is actual. 50 Thus whilst it 
is logically possible that an agrarian slave-owning society might overnight be 
transformed into a modern industrial capitalist state, such a transformation cannot be 
regarded as a real possibility. For an alternative social order to be possible in this latter 
sense, the conditions for that order must be immanent to the very society which it is to 
replace. Thus, in the passage above, Marcuse identifies a number of the conditions 
which he regards as essential for the realisation of the socialist project. These 
conditions can be seen as falling into one of two categories. On the one hand, there are 
those which are primarily associated with the material base of social production, 
factors such as the general level of scientific-technological development, the capacity 
of the productive forces of the society in question and so forth. 51 On the other, there 
are what might be called the subjective conditions of emancipation: basically, the 
awareness of the need for a transformation of social relations, as well as the desire to 
implement that transformation. Now according to Marcuse, the material conditions for 
the transition from capitalism to socialism have, at least in the most advanced capitalist 
states, been in place for some considerable time. By contrast, the principle subjective 
condition for that transformation, namely the existence of a political will on the part of 
the proletariat to move towards a new society, has become increasingly questionable. 
50 For a useful discussion of the question of historical change, see Scott Meikle's 
Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx, especially Chapter 3. 
51 See Geuss' The Idea of a Critical Theory, p.76., for a d!scussion ~~the role that 
the objective conditions for emancipation play in the formulatIOn of a cntlcal theory of 
society. 
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Indeed for Marcuse, the neutralisation of the proletariat as an agent of social 
transformation is no temporary or accidental feature of late capitalism but is rather a 
consequence of the powerful integrative strategies characteristic of that society. Thus 
under conditions of total administration, Marcuse argues that both the American and 
European working classes have degenerated into a passive, atomised aggregation of 
individuals who in the main succumb to the identities foisted upon them by society. 
This lack of correspondence between consciousness and the material development of 
society poses a substantial problem for critical theory, for it raises the question of 
whether the theory possesses any practical efficacy. In other words, although the 
Frankfurt reconstruction of the Marxian theory of society represents it as a 
consistently immanent critique of its object, the theory remains external to that reality 
insofar as it fails to connect with the lived experience of the subject. Thus unlike, say, 
Lukacs, who however problematically managed to identify critical consciousness with 
the world outlook of the proletariat, the Frankfurt School declare unambiguously for 
the independence of theory vis-a-vis every existing concrete form of social 
consciousness. 52 Whilst this stance avoids certain of the problems associated with 
Lukacs' genetic theory of knowledge, it brings in its wake the revival of the very 
question, which Marx set to solve, of the relationship between theory and practice. 
52 Thus Horkheimer observes: "The theoretician whose business it is t? hast~n 
developments which will lead to a society without i~justice can find hiI?self III 
opposition to views prevailing even amongst the proletanat ... If ~uch a COnflict \.\<ere 
not possible, there would be no need of a theory~ thos~ ~ho n~~d It would co~e upon 
it without help." (,Traditional and Critical Theory III Cntlcal Theory: Selected 
Essays, p.221). 
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Now for Korsch and Lukacs this question is disposed of by declaring that Marxism is 
the scientific articulation of the proletarian world view. Hence although not all 
individual members of that class necessarily subscribe to the theory, nevertheless the 
nature of the situation of the proletariat will lead increasing numbers of workers to 
adopt a revolutionary consciousness. 53 This answer, however unsatisfactory it might 
appear, has at least the merit of simplicity: reflection upon the process of capitalist 
development leads to the view that the process itself will automatically produce the 
requisite revolutionary subject. By the time that the Frankfurt School were writing, 
however, this particular solution to the problem of the relation between theory and 
praxis no longer seemed very plausible. In the wake of Fascism and the stabilised 
affluence of post-war capitalist society in America and Western Europe, it became 
increasingly unrealistic to argue that the unwinding of the historical process necessarily 
generates a militant class consciousness on the part of the proletariat. Furthermore, by 
declaring the independence of theory with respect to the consciousness, - whether 
imputed or not - of any social group or class the Frankfurt theorists appear to create 
an unbridgeable gulf between theory and the actual life of society. 
In essence, the problem is this: although the Frankfurt critique is developed in a 
rigorously immanent form, it lacks historical efficacy because the concrete subject - the 
proletariat - to whom it is addressed is inescapably mired in a system of ideological 
delusion. Thus according to Marcuse, advanced industrial societies through a variety 
of means are capable of preventing subjects from becoming aware of any beliefs and 
desires that they already have which might threaten society, or of acquiring new more 
53 For an account of this position see Lukacs' 'Reification and the Consciousness of 
the Proletariat' in History and Class Consciousness, pp.149-181. 
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critical attitudes to the world they inhabit. This situation has been well described by 
Geuss: 
Suppose that ... society is so powerful that it can prevent agents from 
recognising and expressing some wishes and desires that they have. It is likely, 
then, that frustration of these desires will not be something which is ever 
allowed to come to full consciousness: clear recognition of the frustration 
might lead to recognition of the inadmissible unconscious desire. The result 
will be vague malaise, free floating dissatisfaction, irrational behaviour pattern, 
etc - in short, a situation of frustration and unhappiness which is not 
recognised for what it is. S4 
Now without for the moment getting into a debate as to whether this kind of mass 
delusion actually exists or indeed is even possible, it ought to be clear that without a 
response to the state of affairs described by Geuss, the rationale of the Frankfurt 
critique is brought into question. To put the matter as concretely possible: if the 
audience to whom critical theory is addressed refuse or are unable for whatever reason 
to recognise that their lives are dominated by oppression and exploitation, then there 
seems little point in continuing with a theoretical practice whose very purpose is to 
transform that situation. Indeed in Hegelian terms, one might say that the 
transformation of society advocated by Marx and his followers is in the condition of 
late capitalism no longer a real historical possibility, for the subjective conditions of 
this event have effectively been abolished. 
Sol lhe Idea of a Criticallheory, p.81. 
311 
Obviously this is a substantial and complex question which cannot be fully addressed 
here. Some points, however, can be made in outline. First of all it might be said that 
the simple fact that the frustration generated by social conditions is currently an 
unconscious frustration need not entail that this situation is irrevocable. Thus it may be 
possible to regard critical theory as performing a role akin to that of psychoanalysis 
insofar as it is an attempt to persuade the subject to acknowledge the existence of an 
unconscious complex of beliefs and desires. The problem with this analogy is that, to 
date, we have no idea of the kind of socio-political practice which might produce this 
result. Indeed, there seems very little in the Frankfurt School's own analysis of the 
various systems of manipulation which might point to the possibility of the subject 
ever recovering the requisite kind of emancipatory self-knowledge. Nevertheless, the 
failure to construct a practical theory of economic and political emancipation does not 
necessarily constitute an objection to the Frankfurt project, but rather indicates an 
omission, or deficit, which it may be possible to make good. After all, there is plenty 
of evidence to suggest that late capitalist society is marked by a high degree of what 
Geuss calls "free floating dissatisfaction", and that if this dissatisfaction is indeed the 
result of unconscious yearning for an end to exploitation and oppression then there is 
at least some hope that this frustration could be brought to consciousness. To assume 
otherwise is to abandon the very possibility of a sphere of rational political discourse 
and discovery, through which subjects may come to a greater self-understanding of 
their life situation. 
------~~-----~-------- ---
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What has been said so far has been premised upon the thought that although 
individuals do not consciously experience their situation as one of un-freedom and 
inequality, nevertheless at some level this reality finds expression in their psychic 
structure. But what if this is not true? According to Geuss, the Frankfurt School was 
haunted by this very possibility, by the "spectre of a society where social control is so 
total and effective that members can be prevented from even forming desires which 
cannot be easily satisfied, a society of happy slaves, genuinely content with their 
chain. ,,55 In this situation there would be appear to be little or no potential for the 
realisation of critical theory, for the happy slaves are fully satisfied with the lives that 
they lead. Consequently, a theory that speaks of exploitation and oppression, however 
convincing it might be for the few who care to ponder such questions, will find it 
impossible under these circumstances to secure a mass audience. Now if this is the 
case then the situation of critical theory is bleak indeed: by its own analysis it is 
impotent to transform that which the theory denounces. It is this impasse which has 
led many a critic of the Frankfurt School to dismiss the project as an essentially 
Romantic, often backward-looking critique of the contemporary world which IS 
incapable of serving as the theoretical basis for any kind of practical radicalism. 56 
F or a number of reasons, however, this dismissal is premature. In the first place, none 
of the Frankfurt theorists actually held to the view that society had in fact become 
consistently "one-dimensional", that the condition of total administration had been 
55 Op.cit. p.84. 
56 See, for instance, Kolakowski's discussion of the Frankfurt. Scho?l in Mai~ 
Currents of Marxism: 3. The Breakdown, pp.340-395. For a MarxIst vanant ?f thiS 
same charge see Goran Therbom's critique in his article 'The Frankfurt School, New 
Left Review, No.63, Sept-Oct 1970. 
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achieved. Certainly the various members of the School were to the fore in discovering 
the extent, as well as the means, by which the universe of discourse in late capitalist 
society has been systematically narrowed. Nevertheless, all of them at various times 
cast doubt on whether this form of reflective closure could ever be complete or 
permanent. Their argument against completeness involved an appeal to the continuing 
existence of certain forms of Spirit, namely Art, Philosophy and Religion, which whilst 
inevitably tending to be the preserve of a cultural elite also retain a degree of centrality 
for the life of society as a whole. 57 These forms of consciousness, so they argue, serve 
to express in a variety of ways the vision of the good life, of a mode of being in the 
world that is qualitatively different from that which we currently experience. Thus with 
reference to the realm of the aesthetic, Marcuse writes: 
. .. art creates the realm in which the subversion of experience proper to art 
becomes possible: the world formed by art is recognised as a reality which is 
suppressed and distorted in the given reality. This experience culminates in 
extreme situations (of love and death, guilt and failure, but also joy, happiness 
and fulfillment) which explode the given reality in the name of a truth normally 
denied or even unheard. The inner logic of the work of art terminates in the 
emergence of another reason, another sensibility, which defy the rationality and 
57 For an interesting account of Adorno and Horkheimer's attitude towards religion 
see RudolfJ.Siebert's 'Adorno's Theory of Religion' in Telos, Winter, 19~3.-84, 
pp.l 08-114. Siebert argues that critical theory by presen~ing the world as It IS - as a 
fleeting historical moment - rather than from the stan~pomt of the. Absolu~e, expresses 
"what God is not." In doing this Adorno and Horkhelmer, accordl."g to SIebert, stand 
in the "great tradition of Western negative theology;" ~n the rel~tlOn between,Art and 
Philosophy in Adorno's thought see Andrew Edgar s IntroductIon to Adorno s 
Aesthetics', British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 30, No.1, Jan 1990. 
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sensibility incorporated in the dominant social institutions. 58 
At first glance, this might seem like a wildly romantic and wholly unrealistic 
celebration of the subversive potentiality of the work of art. However, I wish to argue 
that what Marcuse is saying here is not altogether unreasonable. In the first place, 
works of art are clearly motivated by the desire to escape the constraints of 
commodity production: what the artist produces is something that is radically unique, 
that resists every effort to construe it as an instance of a type, and demands that its 
very particularity be respected not only in the process of its production but also its 
consumption. Commenting upon this potential, Jay Bernstein writes: 
There is (re )-enchantment in them in the sense that they remain obstinately 
particulars that are not subsumable under any universal. They demonstrate that 
sensuous particulars can mean, can be hypnotic objects of attention, apart from 
and in defiance of any from of identifying mechanism other than the one their 
h .. 59 seer presence InsInuates. 
Now in this sense every genuine artistic product constitutes itself as a protest against 
the instrumentalist logic of contemporary society and the sensibility which reduces 
each concrete object to a lifeless abstraction. Hence we can say, as Geuss does, that 
works of art embody a utopian standard for they offer an alternative conception of 
how subjects might relate to objects, a conception which invokes the promise of 
58 The Aesthetic Dimension, p.7. 
59 'The Death of Sensuous Particulars: Adorno and Abstract Expressionism' in 
Radical Philosophy, 76, March-April, 1996, p.ll. 
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human happiness. If this argument is correct, then the closure of the universe of 
discourse in advanced capitalist societies is not yet complete. For insofar as a cultural 
space still exists for genuinely autonomous works of art, these artefacts stand as a 
rebuke to a social order in which all production is controlled and regulated by the logic 
of the commodity form. 
Nevertheless even Marcuse, whilst celebrating the emancipatory prorruse of the 
aesthetic, cautions us to remember the limitations of this particular sphere of activity. 
As he observes: "Art cannot change the world, but it can contribute to changing the 
consciousness and drives of the men and women who could change the world ,,60 The 
problem, here, of course is that the tradition of high culture that Marcuse and his 
colleagues favour is, in present circumstances, the preserve of a relatively small 
cultural elite, most of whom show little or no sign of advancing from a refined 
aesthetic sensibility towards a desire to change the world. Indeed, as one commentator 
has pointed out there is a clear circular element to this argument: 
By intervening in consciousness, authentic artworks bring back into society 
their corrective alienation of alienation. In order for artworks to intervene, 
however there must be a consciousness that is sufficiently alienated from , 
society to receive their intervention. Hence art's political impact depends upon 
a circular process: autonomous art becomes politically effectual by calling for a 
I·, I ffi 61 consciousness that can let art have a po Itlca e ect. 
60 The Aesthetic Dimension, pp.32-33. 
61 Zuidervaart, L., AdonlO's Aesthetic Theory: The Redemption of an IIll1sion, 
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This suggests that although the administered society has as yet failed to silence or 
compromise every voice of protest, it has nonetheless managed to marginalize the few 
remaining forms of critical consciousness which have persisted to this day. But if this 
is true then the present universe of discourse, although not wholly closed, remains 
largely and effectively a discourse of manipulation and delusion. In consequence the 
question as to the permanence of this state of affairs becomes ever more pressing. 
Here it must be said that the message of the Frankfurt School is ambiguous and 
sometimes even confused. Thus one way of interpreting the thesis of a society of total 
administration is to take this as an account of the powerful but not necessarily 
omnipotent forces of social integration which characterise the contemporary world. 
This, it should be said, is perfectly consistent with classical Marxist thought: it is 
simply an updating to the era of film, radio, television and computer communication of 
Marx's claim that the ruling ideas of the age are the ideas of the ruling class. On this 
reading, Adorno and Horkheimer's analysis of the culture industry can be taken as a 
fairly straightforward materialist account of this particular social formation, for their 
analysis of the culture industry claims to reveal the way in which apparently "harmless 
entertainment" serves to maintain and even reinforce the domination of capital over 
society as a whole. They speak, for example, of the "triumph of invested capital, 
whose title as absolute master is etched deep into the hearts of the dispossessed of the 
unemployment line; it is the meaningful content of every film, whatever plot the 
pp.140-41. 
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production team may have selected.,,62 Here the film industry as a form of "mass 
culture" is directly identified as an agent of ideological control~ the consumers of its 
product are seen as succumbing to the complex of conservative ideas which the very 
organisation of the industry does so much to promote. However, from the point of 
view of classical Marxism this need not be regarded as particularly startling~ after all, it 
might be argued that in an era of high technology the means of social integration will 
themselves be the product of that technology. On this account the Hollywood dream 
factory is simply a replacement, and from the perspective of capital a more efficient as 
well as a more profitable replacement, for the opium of religion. In this sense, 
therefore, the Frankfurt School's analysis of manipulation can be seen as essentially 
complementary to the classic Marxist account of ideology. 
However, as I have already suggested, it is possible to construct a more radically 
pessimistic reading of the Frankfurt School's analysis of late capitalist society. 
According to this interpretation, a range of technological developments, both 
quantitative and qualitative, has led to a qualitative change in the means of ideological 
control: in place of systems of belief such as religion, liberalism, nationalism and social 
democracy, which are at least capable of being challenged by reasoned argument, late 
capitalism controls its subject population through a regime of manufactured needs and 
socially organised pleasures. Thus the culture industry, considered as a means of social 
control, represents a transition from strategies of domination, oriented around the 
manipulation of a public sphere of discursive rationality, to a program of mass 
"entertainment" designed to obstruct and eventually extinguish the possibility of any 
62 Dialectic of Enlightenment, p.124. 
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form of radical consciousness.63 Commenting upon the capacity of pleasure to induce 
a generalised quiescence, Adorno and Horkheimer observe that: 
Pleasure always means not to think about anything, to forget suffering even 
where it is shown. Basically it is helplessness. It is flight~ not, as is asserted, 
flight from a wretched reality, but from the last remaining thought of 
resistance. The liberation which amusement promises is freedom from thought 
and negation. 64 
Now if this situation has indeed become the norm, if it is in fact the case that the great 
mass of the popUlation have become completely absorbed in the quest for socially 
approved pleasure, then it would be true to say that the possibility of mounting an 
effective challenge to the contemporary social order has all but disappeared. It should 
be frankly admitted that this line of argument is not consistent with classical Marxism, 
for it takes the viewpoint that the developmental logic of capitalism, in particular the 
development of a sphere of mass consumption, leads to the permanent foreclosing of 
63 This extremely negative assessment of mass culture has been contested by a large 
number of critics. Thus lB. Thompson argues that the Adomo-Horkheimer "argument 
exaggerates the passivity of individuals and takes far too much for granted concerning 
the process of reception. Assumptions of this kind have to be replaced by a more 
contextualised and hermeneutically sensitive account of the ways in which individuals 
receive media products, use them and incorporate them into their lives." (The Media 
and Modernity, pp.74-75). An important source for this kind of argument is Umberto 
Eco's article' Apocalyptic and Integrated Intellectuals' in Apocalypse Postponed. See 
also, Albrecht Wellmer's defence of the emancipatory potential of certain forms of 
popular culture in 'Truth, Semblance and Reconciliation: Adorno's Aesthetic . 
Redemption of Modernity' , Telos, 62, Wi~ter, 1984~85~ pp.89- ~ ~ 5: For a sympathetIC 
re-assessment of Adorno's analysis in the hght of this kind of cntIclsm see John 
Caughie's 'Adorno's reproach: repetition, difference and television genre' in Screen, 
32:2, Summer 1991. 
64 Dialectic of Rnlightenment, p.144. 
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the possibility of a genume class conSClOusness. However, this pessimistic 
interpretation of Frankfurt Marxism relies heavily upon a strategy of "selective 
quotation", ignoring passages in the work of both Adorno and Marcuse which point to 
other, and conflicting tendencies in contemporary society. For example, in an 
interesting comment on resistance to the influence of the culture industry and 
consumerism in general, Adorno writes: 
The two-faced irony in the relationship of servile individuals to the culture 
industry is not restricted to them alone. It may also be supposed that the 
consciousness of consumers themselves is split between the prescribed fun 
such as is supplied to them by the culture industry and a particularly not well 
hidden doubt about its blessings. The phrase 'the world wants to be deceived' 
becomes truer than it had ever been intended. People are not only, as the 
saying goes, falling for the swindle~ if it guarantees them even the most fleeting 
gratification, they desire a deception which is nonetheless transparent to 
them. 65 
Here Adorno, far from supposing that individuals are simply passive consumers of 
whatever the culture industry cares to offer them, is arguing that the process of 
consumption is marked by a kind of bad faith. In effect, he is describing a state in 
which individuals believe and disbelieve the very same propositions: they believe 
because they want to believe and they disbelieve because they are at least implicitly 
65 'The Culture Industry Reconsidered' in The Culture Industry: ... \'elected f;ssays on 
Mass Culture, p.279. 
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aware of what it is that they are doing. This leads to a peculiarly fragile form of social 
consensus which holds only for so long as individuals choose not to think 
systematically about the potentiality for transforming their life situation. 
This threat to the established order is further reinforced by the very real potential for 
an significant improvement in human well-being. Thus according to Adorno, the 
advanced technology and productive capacity of late capitalism makes it possible for 
human needs to be satisfied to a degree that is historically unprecedented. He therefore 
goes on to argue that this disparity between how things are and how they might be is 
now so great that it increasingly threatens the ability of the power elite to coherently 
justify its rule. As he observes: 
It cannot be denied in this context that in the increasing satisfaction of material 
needs, in spite of their deformation by the social apparatus, the possibility of a 
life without indigence is incomparably more concretely possible than before. 
Even in the poorest lands, no-one would need to go hungry any more. The fact 
that the veil over our consciousness of the possible has become thin is 
demonstrated by the panic aroused by all forms of social enlightenment that do 
not fall within the official system of communications. That which Marx and 
Engels - who wanted society organised in a way consonant with human dignity 
_ attacked as an utopia which would only sabotage this sort of social 
organisation, has now become a palpable possibility.66 
66 'Is Marx Obsolete?', Diogenes, 64, Winter 1968, p.8. 
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What Adorno is getting at here is the idea that the discourses of legitimation 
characteristic of contemporary capitalism have become increasingly divorced from 
reality, and that this is sensed, however dimly, by the population at large.67 Of course 
this is not to suggest that such an awareness is the immediate precursor of an imminent 
mass radicalism; on the contrary, the most likely outcome is an increasing detachment 
on the part of large sections of the population from the entire political process. 
However, despite the obvious dangers involved in such a widespread degree of 
political anomie, and in particular the opportunity it provides for reactionary and neo-
fascist movements to gain a popular following, it needs to be recognised as an 
important and potentially beneficial development. For it signals that the traditional 
forms of political control in advanced capitalist society are beginning to break down 
and that this may once again offer the possibility of creating a mass movement centred 
around the social emancipation of producers. 
Similar doubts concerning the permanence of the social integration characteristic of 
the advanced economies of the world can be found in the work of Marcuse. Thus even 
in his apparently most pessimistic text, One Dimensional Man, he discovers that: 
. .. underneath the conservative popular base is the substratum of the outcasts 
and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colours, 
the unemployed and the unemployable. They exist outside the democratic 
process; their life is the most immediate and the most real need for ending 
67 The notion that advanced capitalist societies are increasingly prone to a c~sis of 
legitimation is, of course, a prominent theme in the work ofH~erm~s. There IS more 
than an echo of this argument in Charles Taylor's Hegel. See, 10 particular, Chapter 
XX. 
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intolerable conditions and institutions. Thus their opposition is revolutionary 
even if their consciousness is not. 68 
Furthermore, as Hegel long ago recognised, the existence of this pauperised "rabble" 
or lumpenproletariat, far from being a historical contingency, results from the 
inherent logic of the process of capitalist accumulation. And in this respect he is 
undoubtedly correct: such a population has been created and recreated by capitalism 
innumerable times in the course of its development. Thus in the United States, at 
present, the marginalised and excluded number tens of millions, forming a population 
that has to be contained through a system of bureaucratic welfare, and a prison system 
of gulag proportions. However, despite these mechanisms of containment, this so-
called "under-class" remains a restless and potentially destabilising element within 
American society. Now whilst Marcuse did not believe that these highly disparate 
groups could of themselves constitute an effective threat to the established order he 
did regard this layer of the population as a potential base for the reconstruction of a 
realistic challenge to the administered society. By autonomously raising demands, 
challenging the established universe of political discourse as well as resisting the 
inevitably ensuing oppression, Marcuse hoped that the activity of these groups might 
ignite an escalating series of emancipatory demands on behalf of the working class 
itself. That so far this challenge has not materialised cannot be taken as an indicator 
that it never will; to make that supposition is to align oneself with a tradition of 
68 One Dimensional Man, pp.256-257. For a summary of Marcuse'.s P?sition 
concerning the potential for revolutionary c~~g.e in ~he advanced C~Pltallst sector see 
'Re-examination of the Concept of Revolution m Dlogenes, 64, Wmter 1 ?68. For a 
criticism of Marc use's arguments see G.Cohen's 'Critical Theory: The Philosophy of 
Marcuse', New Left Review, 57, Sept-Oct 169. 
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thought marked out by complacency and indeed arrogant contempt for the victims of 
the historical process. Critical theory stands in opposition to this attitude, remaining 
committed to the hope that: as Marcuse put it, "the historical extremes may meet 
again: the most advanced consciousness of humanity and its most exploited force." 69 
This work is dedicated to the realisation of that possibility. 
69 Ibid. 
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